Subsidiarity is perhaps presently best known as a
general principle of European Union law. According to this principle, the Union may only act (i.e. make laws) collectively where independent action of individual countries is insufficient without equal action by other members. The principle was established in the 1992
Treaty of Maastricht. However, at the local level it was already a key element of the
European Charter of Local Self-Government, an instrument of the
Council of Europe promulgated in 1985 (see Article 4, Paragraph 3 of the
Charter) (which states that the exercise of public responsibilities should be decentralised). Subsidiarity is related in essence to, but should not be confused with, the concept of a
margin of appreciation. Subsidiarity was established in EU law by the Treaty of Maastricht, which was signed on 7 February 1992 and entered into force on 1 November 1993. The present formulation is contained in Article 5(3) of the
Treaty on European Union (consolidated version following the
Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force on 1 December 2009): The national parliaments of
EU member states have an "early warning mechanism" whereby if one third raise an objection – a "yellow card" – on the basis that the principle of subsidiarity has been violated, then the proposal must be reviewed. If a majority do so – an "orange card" – then the council or parliament can vote it down immediately. If the logistical problems of putting this into practice are overcome, then the power of the national parliaments could be deemed an extra legislature, without a common debate or physical location: dubbed by
EUObserver a "virtual third chamber". A more descriptive analysis of the principle can be found in Protocol 2 to the
European Treaties.
Court of Justice The
Court of Justice of the European Union in Luxembourg is the authority that has to decide whether a regulation falls within the exclusive competence of the Union, as defined by the
Treaty on European Union and its predecessors. As the concept of subsidiarity has a political as well as a legal dimension, the Court of Justice has a reserved attitude toward judging whether EU legislation is consistent with the concept. The Court will examine only marginally whether the principle is fulfilled. A detailed explanation of the legislation is not required; it is enough that the EU institutions explain why national legislation seems inadequate and that Union law has an added value. An example is the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in a legal action taken by the Federal Republic of Germany against the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union concerning a Directive on
deposit guarantee schemes (13 May 1997). Germany argued that the Directive did not explain how it was compatible with the principle of subsidiarity. The Court answered: == See also ==