Organisation Apart from research, training, and a five-tank attachment to the
Panzer Lehr, the Tiger II was only issued to heavy tank battalions (
schwere Panzer-Abteilungen) of the
German Army (
Heer), or
Waffen-SS. posing in formation for the
Nazi German wartime-propaganda newsreel at the armour-training ground in Sennelager, Germany, prior to the unit's departure for Hungary A standard battalion (
Abteilung) comprised 45 tanks: :
Heer: (s.H.Pz.Abt) 501,
502,
503,
504,
505,
506,
507,
508,
509,
510,
511 :
SS: (s.SS.Pz.Abt) 501,
502,
503 Reliability and mobility . The long gun overhangs the bow by several meters. Early Tiger IIs proved unreliable, owing principally to leaking seals and gaskets, an overburdened drive train originally intended for a lighter vehicle, manufacturing defects, and failures of the final drives, track tensioning adjusters, and sprocket wheels due to production simplifications in the tracks that led to manufacturing defects. The final drive unit and the double radius steering gear were initially particularly prone to failures. The new double-link track design proved to be vulnerable to sideways stresses when the tank was driving on uneven terrain, as well as causing only every other sprocket tooth to engage with the track due to manufacturing defects, leading to rapid wear of the sprocket teeth and damage to final drives and track tensioning systems. The inspector general of panzer troops,
Wolfgang Thomale, stated in a briefing on 4 November 1944 regarding the Tiger II’s reliability problems: "The Führer has been informed of the complaints regarding the Tiger II, all of which stem from the new tracks. To simplify the manufacturing process, not every tooth of the drive sprocket engages with the track, as was previously the case, but only every second tooth. This has resulted in severe jerks in the final drives that reduce the driving force to the drive sprockets, which cannot withstand these blows."At several occasions in early 1945, Thomale took a stance against the, in his eyes, exaggerated production simplifications that were carried out at any cost. According to him, prime examples were the Panther final drives and Tiger II tracks, which led to increased losses and expenditure in material and man-power to fix the problems created by the initial simplification. ,
Fort Benning, Georgia Henschel's chief designer,
Erwin Aders, wrote, "The failures occurred because the Tiger II went into production without considering the test results." Lack of crew training could amplify this problem; drivers originally given only limited training on other tanks were often sent directly to operational units already on their way to the front. The 506th Heavy Tank Battalion had been equipped with 45 Tiger IIs between late August and mid-September and made the following report on 30 September 1944 about its initial experiences with the Tiger II: Henschel worked closely with crews to solve the problems, and with the introduction of modified seals, gaskets, drive train components, a new track and sprocket wheel design, as well as improved driver training and sufficient maintenance, the Tiger II could be maintained in a satisfactory operational condition. Statistics from 15 March 1945 show reliability rates of 59 percent for the Tiger, almost equal to the 62 percent of the
Panzer IV and better than the 48 percent of the Panther that were operational by this period. Lt Col H.A. Shields of the
American Army's
66th Armored Regiment reported in 1945:
Combat history The first combat use of the Tiger II was by the 1st Company of the
503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion (
s.H.Pz.Abt. 503) during the
Battle of Normandy, opposing the Canadian offensive
Operation Atlantic between
Troarn and
Demouville on 18 July 1944. Two were lost in combat, while the company commander's tank became irrecoverably trapped after falling into a bomb crater created during
Operation Goodwood. On the Eastern Front, it was first used on 12 August 1944 by the
501st Heavy Panzer Battalion (
s.H.Pz.Abt. 501) resisting the
Lvov–Sandomierz Offensive. It attacked the Soviet bridgehead over the
Vistula River near
Baranów Sandomierski. On the road to
Oględów, three Tiger IIs were destroyed in an ambush by a few
T-34-85s. Because these German tanks suffered ammunition explosions, which caused many crew fatalities, main gun rounds were no longer allowed to be stowed within the turret, reducing capacity to 68. Up to fourteen Tiger IIs of the 501st were destroyed or captured in the area between 11 and 14 August to ambushes and flank attacks by both Soviet T-34-85 and
IS-2 tanks, and
ISU-122 assault guns in inconvenient sandy terrain. The capture of three operational Tiger IIs allowed the Soviets to conduct tests at
Kubinka and to evaluate its strengths and weaknesses and
Arrow Cross militia units in a battle-scarred street in
Buda's Castle district, October 1944 On 15 October 1944, Tiger IIs of 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion played a crucial role during
Operation Panzerfaust, supporting
Otto Skorzeny's troops in taking the Hungarian capital of
Budapest, which ensured that the country remained with the
Axis until the end of the war. The 503rd then took part in the
Battle of Debrecen. The 503rd remained in the Hungarian theater of operations for 166 days, during which time it accounted for at least 121 Soviet tanks, 244 anti-tank guns and artillery pieces, five aircraft and a train. This was set against the loss of 25 Tiger IIs; ten were knocked out by Soviet troops and burned out, two were sent back to
Vienna for a factory overhaul, while thirteen were blown up by their crews for various reasons, usually to prevent them from falling into enemy hands. The Tiger II was also used in significant numbers, distributed into four heavy panzer battalions, during the
Ardennes Offensive (also known as the 'Battle of the Bulge') of December 1944. At least 150 Tiger IIs were present, nearly a third of total production; most were lost over the course of the offensive. Some Tiger IIs were also present during the Soviet
Vistula–Oder and
East Prussian Offensives in January 1945, as well as the German
Lake Balaton Offensive in Hungary in March 1945, the
Battle of the Seelow Heights in April 1945, and the
Battle of Berlin at the end of the war. The
103rd SS Heavy Panzer Battalion (
s.SS Pz.Abt. 503) claimed approximately 500 kills in the period from January to April 1945 on the Eastern Front for the loss of 45 Tiger IIs (most of which were abandoned and destroyed by their own crews after mechanical breakdowns or for lack of fuel).
Gun and armour performance The heavy armour and powerful long-range gun gave the Tiger II an advantage against all opposing
Western Allied and
Soviet tanks attempting to engage it from head on. This was especially true on the Western Front where, until the arrival of the few
M26 Pershings in 1945 and the few
M4A3E2 Sherman "Jumbo" assault tanks with additional armour that were scattered around Europe after D-Day, as well as a few late
Churchill models, neither the British nor US forces brought heavy tanks into service. A
Wa Prüf 1 report estimated that the Tiger II's frontal aspect was impervious to the Soviet 122 mm
D-25T, one of the largest calibre tank guns of the war. Soviet testing found that the frontal glacis could be destroyed only by firing 3–4 shots at the weld joints from the ranges of 500–600m. Weld joints were found to be inferior quality to the Tiger I and Panther. An R.A.C 3.d. document of February 1945 estimated that the British (76.2 mm)
QF 17-pounder gun, using
armour-piercing discarding sabot shot was theoretically capable of penetrating the front of the Tiger II's turret and nose (lower front hull) at respectively although, given the lack of a stated angle, this was presumably at the ideal 90 degrees and in combat the Tiger II was never penetrated frontally by the QF 17-Pounder. As a result of its thick frontal armour, flanking manoeuvres were most often used against the Tiger II to attempt a shot at the thinner side and rear armour, giving a tactical advantage to the Tiger II in most engagements. Moreover, the main armament of the Tiger II was capable of knocking out any Allied tank frontally at ranges exceeding , well beyond the effective range of Allied tank guns.
Soviet wartime testing During August 1944, two Tiger Ausf B tanks were captured by the Soviets near
Sandomierz, and were soon moved to the testing grounds at
Kubinka. During the transfer, the two tanks suffered from mechanical breakdowns. The cooling system was insufficient for the excessively hot weather, causing overheated engines and gearbox failure. The right suspension of one of the tanks had to be completely replaced, and its full functionality could not be re-established. The design of the track tensioning mechanism hadn't been completely perfected. As a result, the tension had to be adjusted after every 10–15 km. The 8.8 cm KwK 43 gave positive results in penetration and accuracy, which were on par with the 122 mm D-25T. It proved capable of passing completely through its "colleague", a Tiger Ausf B's turret at a range of 400 m. The armour of one vehicle was tested by firing at it with shells between 100 and 152 mm calibre. The welding was, despite careful workmanship, significantly worse than on similar designs. As a result, even when shells did not penetrate the armour, there was often a large amount of
spalling from the inside of the plates, which damaged the transmission and rendered the tank inoperable. Further testing showed that the armour plate was of an inferior quality to earlier German tanks such as the Tiger I and Panther. Lab testing found the plates lacked molybdenum (ascribed to a loss of supply, being replaced by vanadium), resulting in low malleability. The expanded firing test states that the
АР projectiles from the
100 mm BS-3 and
122 mm A-19 gun penetrated a Tiger Ausf B's turret at ranges of 1000–1500 metres. However, the firing test against the turret front was conducted after removal of the gun and mantlet, and penetrations were close to openings such as vision slits and the gun location. The penetrations to the right gun opening occurred after previous 100 mm projectile penetration hits or armour damage. The 100 mm BS-3 and 122 mm A-19 could also penetrate the weld joints of the front hull at ranges of 500–600 metres after 3–4 shots. ==Surviving vehicles==