The policy document outlining the was published by the German government in September 2010, six months before the
Fukushima nuclear accident. Legislative support was passed in September 2010. On 6 June 2011, following Fukushima, the government removed the use of nuclear power as a bridging technology as part of their policy. The program was later described as "Germany's vendetta against nuclear" and attributed to the influence of ideologically anti-nuclear green movements in politics. In 2014, then-
Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy Sigmar Gabriel lobbied Swedish company
Vattenfall to continue investments in brown coal mines in Germany, explaining that "we cannot simultaneously quit nuclear energy and coal-based power generation." A similar statement by Gabriel was recalled by
James Hansen in his 2009 book I— Gabriel argued that "coal use was essential because Germany was going to phase out nuclear power. Period. It was a political decision, and it was non-negotiable". In 2011, the Ethical Committee on Secure Energy Supply was tasked with assessing the feasibility of the nuclear phase-out and transition to renewable energy, and it concluded: In 2019, Germany's
Federal Court of Auditors determined the program had cost €160 billion over the last 5 years and criticized the expenses for being "in extreme disproportion to the results." Despite widespread initial support, the program is perceived as "expensive, chaotic, and unfair", and a "massive failure" as of 2019. Russian fossil gas was perceived as a "safe, cheap, and temporary" fuel to replace nuclear power in the initial phase of
Energiewende as part of the German policy of integrating Russia with the European Union through mutually beneficial trade relations. German dependency on Russian gas imports was presented as "mutual dependency."
Initial phase 2013–2016 After the 2013 federal elections, the new
Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) /
Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU) and
Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) coalition government continued the , with minor modification of its goals in the coalition agreement. The coalition government introduced an intermediate target of a 55–60% share of renewable energy in gross electricity consumption in 2035. The targets were described as "ambitious". The Berlin-based
policy institute Agora Energiewende noted that "while the German approach is not unique worldwide, the speed and scope of the are exceptional". A characteristic of the compared to other planned energy transitions was the expectation that the transition is driven by citizens and not large energy utilities. Germany's switch to renewable energy was described as "democratization of the energy supply". The also sought a greater transparency in relation to national
energy policy formation. As of 2013, Germany was spending €1.5 billion per year on energy research to solve the technical and social issues raised by the transition, which are provided by the individual federal states, universities, and the government, which provided €400 million per year. The Government's contribution was increased to €800 million in 2017. The targets went beyond
European Union legislation and the national policies of other European states. The policy objectives have been embraced by the German Federal Government and has resulted in an expansion of renewable energy, particularly wind power. Germany's share of renewables has increased from around 5% in 1999 to 22.9% in 2012, surpassing the
OECD average of 18% usage of renewables. Producers have been guaranteed a fixed
feed-in tariff for 20 years, guaranteeing a fixed income. Energy co-operatives have been created, and efforts were made to decentralize control and profits. Poor investment designs have caused bankruptcies and low
returns, and unrealistic promises have been shown to be far from reality. Nuclear power plants were closed, and the existing nine plants were scheduled to close earlier than planned, in 2022. A factor that inhibited efficient employment of new renewable energy has been the lack of an accompanying investment in power infrastructure to bring the power to market. It is believed of power lines must be built or upgraded. In comparison, its neighbours (Poland, Sweden, Denmark and nuclear-reliant France) have some of the lowest
costs (excluding taxes) in the EU. On 1 August 2014, a revised
Renewable Energy Sources Act entered into force. Deployment corridors stipulated the extent to renewable energy to be expanded in the future and the funding rates (
feed-in tariffs) will no longer be fixed by the government, but will be determined by auction. Wind and solar power cannot be principally refinanced under the current
marginal cost based market.
Carbon pricing is also central to the , and the
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) needs to be reformed to create a genuine
scarcity of certificates. The German Federal Government is calling for a reform. Most of the computer scenarios used to analyse the rely on a substantial carbon price to drive the transition to low-carbon technologies. Coal-fired generation needs to be retired as part of the . Some argue for an explicit negotiated phase-out of coal plants, along the lines of the well-publicized nuclear phase-out, but as German minister of economy noted, "we cannot shut down both our nuclear and coal-fired power plants". Coal comprised 42% of electricity generation in 2015. A phase-out of
fossil fuels together with a shift to
100% renewable energy is required by about 2040. The is made up of various building blocks and assumptions.
Electricity storage was hoped to become a useful technology in the future. As of 2019, a number of potential storage projects (power-to-gas, hydrogen storage and others) are still in prototype phase with losses up to 40% of the stored energy in the existing small scale installations.
Energy efficiency plays a key but under-recognised role. Energy efficiency is one of Germany's targets. Integration with national
electricity networks can offer benefits. Systems with high shares of renewables can use geographical diversity to offset intermittency. Germany invested €1.5billion in energy research in 2013. The German Federal Government spent €820million supporting projects ranging from basic research to applications. Eva Schmid,
Brigitte Knopf, and Anna Pechan analyze the actors and institutions that will be decisive in the and how latency in the national electricity
infrastructure may restrict progress. On 3 December 2014, the German Federal Government released its National Action Plan on Energy Efficiency (NAPE) in order to improve the uptake of energy efficiency. The areas covered are the energy efficiency of buildings, energy conservation for companies, consumer energy efficiency, and transport energy efficiency. German industry is expected to make a sizeable contribution. An official Federal Government report on progress under the , notes:
Slowdown from 2016 Slow progress on transmission network reinforcement had led to a deferment of new windfarms in northern Germany. The German cabinet approved costly underground cabling in October 2015 in a bid to dispel local resistance against above-ground pylons and to speed up the expansion process. Analysis by Agora Energiewende in late-2016 suggests that Germany will probably miss several of its key targets, despite recent reforms to the
Renewable Energy Sources Act and the wholesale electricity market. The goal to cut emissions by 40% by 2020 "will most likely be missed... if no further measures are taken" and the 55–60% share of renewable energy in gross electricity consumption by 2035 is "unachievable" with the current plans for renewables expansion. In November 2016, Agora Energiewende reported on the impact of the and several other related new laws. It concludes that the new legislation will bring "fundamental changes" for large sections of the energy industry, but have limited effect on the economy and on consumers. The 2016
Climate Action Plan for Germany, adopted on 14November 2016, introduced sector targets for
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The goal for the energy sector is shown in the
table. The plan states that the energy supply must be "almost completely decarbonised" by 2050, with renewable energy as its main source. For the electricity sector, "in the long-term, electricity generation must be based almost entirely on renewable energies" and "the share of wind and solar power in total electricity production will rise significantly". Notwithstanding, during the transition, "less carbon-intensive natural gas power plants and the existing most modern coal power plants play an important role as interim technologies". The fifth monitoring report on the for 2015 was published in December 2016. The expert commission which wrote the report warns that Germany will probably miss its 2020 climate targets and believes that this could threaten the credibility of the entire endeavour. The commission puts forward a number of measures to address the slowdown, including a flat national price imposed across all sectors, a greater focus on transport, and full market exposure for renewable generation. Regarding the carbon price, the commission thinks that a reformed
EUETS would be better, but that achieving agreement across Europe is unlikely.
After 2017 Since 2017, it had become clear that the was not progressing at the anticipated speed, with the country's
climate policy regarded as "lackluster" and the energy transition "stalling". High
electricity prices, growing resistance against the use of wind turbines over their environmental and potential health impacts, and regulatory hurdles, have been identified as causes for the slowdown. As of 2017 Germany imported more than half of its energy. A 2018 European Commission case study report on the noted 27% decrease in emissions against the 1990 levels with a slight increase over the few preceding years and concluded achieving of the intended 40% reduction target by 2020 in unfeasible, primarily due to the "simultaneous nuclear phase-out and increased energy consumption". 50% increase of electricity prices was observed (compared to base 2007 prices). Germany's energy sector remains the largest single source of emissions, contributing over 40%. In 2018 the slow-down of deployment of new renewable energy was partially attributed to high demand for land, which has been highlighted as a potential "downside" by a WWF report. In March 2019, Chancellor Merkel formed a "climate cabinet" to find a consensus on new emissions reduction measures to meet 2030 targets. The result was the Climate Action Program 2030, which Berlin adopted on 9 October 2019. The Program contains plans for a carbon pricing system for the heating and transportation sectors, which are not covered by the EU ETS. It includes tax and other incentives to encourage energy-efficient building renovations, higher
EV subsidies, and more public transport investments. The IEA report concludes that "[t]he package represents a clear step in the right direction towards Germany meeting its 2030 targets." As result of phasing out nuclear power and, in long term, coal, Germany declared increased reliance on
fossil gas. A similar statement was voiced by SPD MP
Udo Bullmann who explained that Germany has to stick with fossil fuels as it is trying to replace both coal and nuclear "at the same time", while countries that rely on nuclear power have "easier task replacing fossil fuels". In 2020
Agora Energiewende also declared a number of new fossil gas plants will be also required to "guarantee supply security as Germany relies more and more on intermittent renewable electricity". In January 2019, Germany's Economy Minister
Peter Altmaier did not want to import "cheap nuclear power" from other countries to compensate for planned phase-out of coal. In 2021
Green MEP Sven Giegold admitted that Germany may require new fossil gas power plants in order to "stabilise the more fluctuating power supply of renewables". The 2020 climate goals were successful in the following areas: • closure of nuclear plants • increasing renewable energy share • reducing greenhouse gas emissions The following climate goals failed: • increasing renewable energy share in the transport sector • reducing primary energy consumption • final energy productivity. In 2020, a number of previously shut down fossil gas plants (
Irsching units 4 and 5) were restarted due to "heavy fluctuations of level of power generated from the wind and sun" and a new fossil gas power plant was announced by RWE near the former
Biblis nuclear power plant shut down in 2017. The project is declared as part of "decarbonization plan" where renewable energy capacity is accompanied by fossil gas plants to cover for intermittency. In 2020, a new coal power plant unit,
Datteln 4, was also connected to the grid. A new fossil gas power plant will be also opened from 2023 in
Leipheim,
Bavaria to compensate for loss of power caused by "nuclear exit" in the Region. In 2021, the planned decommissioning of
Heyden 4 coal power plant was cancelled and the plant remains online to compensate for shutdown of the
Grohnde nuclear power station. In 2022, another coal power plant was restarted in
Schongau, Bavaria, for the same reasons. In June 2021, professor from Stuttgart university published an open letter accusing
Klaus Töpfer and
Matthias Kleiner, the authors of the 2011 Ethical Committee for Secure Energy Supply report that served as the scientific background of the "nuclear exit" decision, of disregarding the basic rules of scientific independence. The analysis promised that phase-out of nuclear energy and full transition to renewable energy "can be completed within a decade". Thess highlighted that the authors lacked the expertise necessary to properly understand and "balance between the risk of more rapid climate change without nuclear energy and the risk of slower climate change with nuclear energy". High average amounts of wind in 2019 and 2020 were presented in Germany as a success of renewable energy, but when the amount of wind was low for the first half of 2021, use of coal rose by 21% as compared to the previous years. In the first half of 2021 coal, gas, and nuclear power delivered 56% of overall electricity in Germany, with proportionally higher intensity due to high inputs from coal and fossil gas. According to another analysis by Oekomoderne, in 2021, Germany produced nearly 260 TWh of electricity from coal in the first half of 2021, making it the single largest source of energy in that period—as it used "one billion tons" of coal. The situation once again raised questions about the future of weather-dependent electricity system that is dependent on fossil energy for stability and its contradiction with the initial objectives of decarbonization. Projections Report published in 2021 predicted that Germany will miss its 2030 target by 16% (49% reduction vs 65% planned) and the 2040 target by 21% (67% vs 88% planned). Reduction of emissions in other sectors of the economy is also expected to miss the original targets. In October 2021, over 20 climate scientists and activists signed an open letter to the German Government to reconsider the nuclear exit as it will lead to emissions of an extra 60 million tons of each year and hinder decarbonization efforts even further. The new coalition formed after the
2021 elections proposed earlier phase-out of coal and internal combustion cars by 2035, 65% energy generated from renewables by 2030 and 80% by 2040. In addition, 2% of land surface is to be set aside for on-shore wind power, and off-shore wind capacity is to be increased to 75 GW. Fossil gas role was reinforced as "indispensable"
transition fuel with low-carbon nuclear power imported from France to ensure stability of supplies. By end of 2021, the single largest source of electricity in Germany was coal (9.5% hard and 20.2% brown), increase of 20% compared to 2020 due to significant drop in wind (−14.5%) and solar (−5%) power output in that year. Solar power only produced 9.9% electricity, while nuclear power produced 13% as it was going through the process of decommissioning. In 2022, Agora Energiewende warned that Germany has missed its 2020 emission targets and is likely going to miss the 2030 targets, and increase of total emissions after 2022 is likely. Previously celebrated 2020 record low emissions were described as one-off effect of favorable weather and lower demand due to COVID-19 pandemics. Nuclear phase-out, skyrocketing gas prices, and low wind and solar output resulting in increased reliance on coal were also attributed to the increase in emissions. In January 2022 the new coalition government reiterated its opposition to the inclusion of
nuclear power in the
EU sustainable taxonomy, but also requested that fossil gas is instead included as a "transitional" fuel and carbon intensity thresholds for gas are relaxed. As the subsidies for gas were upheld, a number of new fossil gas plants plan to benefit from the subsidies, while expecting increased profits thanks to "rising wholesale electricity prices" as result of "the last nuclear power plants to be removed from the grid" at the same time. In 2023, Germany achieved its lowest
greenhouse gas emissions since the 1950s with a 20% reduction, largely impacted by a decline in industrial production due to economic factors like the
Ukraine war and high energy prices. The Berlin-based think-tank Agora Energiewende attributed approximately half of the reduction to decreased coal-fired power generation, while only 15% resulted from technological improvements such as enhanced renewable energy utilization. Despite these gains, with over 50% of Germany's electricity now derived from renewable energy, concerns persist about the industrial sector's competitiveness and sustainability, as emission levels in construction and transport have not changed, putting Germany at risk of missing its EU emission targets.
Post-2022 Following the
2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Germany announced they would re-open 10 GW of coal power to allegedly "conserve
natural gas" following the shortage in Europe. This led to a subsequent criticism of '
s strategy, and how this impacted different countries in Europe.
Michael Kretschmer (CDU) declared the to be a failure, highlighting that renewable generation is insufficient and baseload capabilities have reached its limits. He called for nuclear power phase-out to be cancelled and remaining reactors restarted, until a new feasible strategy is created. From February 2022, there was a heated debate about pausing the nuclear phase-out and restarting still operational reactors in order to better cope with the
energy crisis caused by the
Russian invasion of Ukraine. In August 2022, German counter-intelligence started an investigation into two high-ranked officials at German ministry of energy suspected of representing interests of Russia. In October 2022, Germany ministry of energy approved extension of RWE
brown coal open pit mine in
Lutzerath, claiming it is "necessary for energy security". In October 2022, the Government also declared the operational nuclear power plants will not be shut down by end of 2022, but will instead operate until 15 April to help cope with the electricity demand through the winter. was taken out of service on 15 April 2023. In 2023, the Government declared its plans to remove a key clause from the law that binds all ministries to reduce carbon emissions within their area of responsibility. The binding target will be the overall 2030 emissions reduction target. The largest emissions source in Germany is its electricity production, and in that sector, emissions have roughly halved from its peak in 2007 until 2023. 2020 already saw a similar decline as 2023, as electricity demand dropped massively due to COVID-19 lockdowns, leading to an annual average intensity of German electricity production of 364 gCO2/kWh (2023: 380 gCO2/kWh). In 2022, the cut-off from Russian gas led to a brief restarting of coal power plants, meaning the share of coal in electricity production increased from 24% in 2020 to 32% in 2022, before going down to 27% in 2023. To move away from coal, in February 2024, the Federal Government agreed to subsidize 10 GW of
hydrogen-ready gas plants. In the first years, the plants will use fossil gas and are expected to be switched over to hydrogen between 2035 and 2040. The plants will mainly provide backup capacity in times where solar and wind power are low. As running plants this way is not economically feasible, utilities will be paid for maintaining the baseload capacity. The last three nuclear power plants in Germany—
Emsland,
Isar II and
Neckarwestheim II—were shut down on 15 April 2023. In March 2024, Federal Audit Office published a report in which it assessed the policy as not meeting goals on a number of points: the planned 80% share of renewable energy requires
dispatchable sources but the assumed 10 GW in fossil gas generation is neither sufficient nor on schedule; extension of electric grid is behind the schedule by and 7 years; security of the supply chain is not sufficiently assessed; system costs to ensure 24/7 generation are underestimated and based on "best-case" scenarios; capacity installed in renewables is behind the schedule by 30%, whereas demand is expected to grow by 30% as result of electrification of heating and transport. On 1 January 2025 Germany produced 120% of its electricity demand with renewables. During 2024 Germany added 3 GW of wind energy and 15 GW of solar. In 2024, 54% of Germany's electricity demand was produced by renewables. == Criticism ==