The paper took an opposition line toward the
Pelham ministry.
Horace Walpole later observed that it was “more than once emboldened” by contributions from
the Earl of Egmont and others.
Foreign policy and war aims The paper argued for a “blue-water” strategy that confined Britain’s role in the conflict to maritime operations; within this line, criticism of allied shortcomings was comparatively muted (1747–1748). In January 1748 it maintained that “the war ought to be condemned and yet now ought to be prosecuted” (9 January), pressed the strategic importance of preserving the
Dutch Republic (“Holland”) as Britain’s barrier, and urged abandoning continental campaigns in favour of naval action (16 January). It warned that wartime fiscal burdens were pushing Britain toward bankruptcy—invoking
Charles Davenant’s £6 million “annual supply” threshold and noting that the 1747 supply exceeded £13 million—while lamenting public indifference (29 January 1748). As a remedy, it contended that Britain should continue the war to seize French trade and colonies, thereby acquiring means to discharge the principal of the
national debt (1748). The paper further alleged that Henry Pelham’s opposition to prolonging the war led him not to shore up public credit by using his supposed influence over the
Bank of England (2 April 1748). It criticized the ministry’s independent conclusion of the peace preliminaries and compared this to the supposed betrayal of allies under the Treaty of Utrecht (25 June 1748), and it argued that the
Dunkirk clause of the peace showed ministerial indifference to national interests, recalling that Utrecht had required Dunkirk’s total demolition and that Whig critics had once “clamoured” for its enforcement (31 December 1748). Early in 1749 it also noted the question of
Hanover’s relation to Britain’s interests in the peace debate (7 January 1749).
Domestic politics and rhetoric Early issues registered popular disillusionment with “patriot” politics after earlier betrayals, warning that “abuse of confidence has broke all the connections … necessary for our preservation” (26 December 1747). In shaping its arguments the paper drew on the country writer Charles Davenant—“the oracle of this country” (23 January 1748)—and urged “a general confederacy of all parties and Factions … to rescue the constitution out of [the ministry’s] Hands” (21 May 1748). Later that year it proposed a threefold division of contemporary politics (ministerial;
Jacobite; and those equally apprehensive of ruin from either) and cautioned readers not to be “bugbear’d … out of their senses … by the shameless Endeavours … to resolve all opposition into Jacobitism” (8 October 1748).
Civil–military law and the Navy Bill In the 1749 Navy Bill debates the paper argued that extending wartime discipline to the sea service and to
half-pay officers in peacetime would “convert two orders of subjects into slaves” (25 February 1749). It went on to warn that the bill sought to “establish a military system … with the sanction of law” and that professionalisation aimed “to separate the half-pay officers from the body of the people,” invoking as a cautionary precedent a 1746 dispute in which the
Admiralty resisted civil-court oversight of
courts-martial (8 April 1749). ==Reception and suppression==