First tests United States , first full-scale thermonuclear test,
Enewetak Atoll, November 1, 1952 The idea of a thermonuclear fusion bomb ignited by a smaller fission bomb was first proposed by
Enrico Fermi to his colleague
Edward Teller when they were talking at
Columbia University in September 1941, The
first atomic bomb test by the Soviet Union in August 1949 came earlier than expected by Americans, and over the next several months there was an intense debate within the US government, military, and scientific communities regarding whether to proceed with development of the far more powerful Super. Despite the objections raised, on 31 January 1950, President
Harry S. Truman made the decision to go forward with the development of the new weapon. it raised expectations to a near certainty that the concept would work. On 1 November 1952, the Teller–Ulam configuration was tested at full scale in the
Mike shot of
Operation Ivy, at an island in the
Enewetak Atoll, with a yield of (over 450 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Nagasaki during
World War II). The device, dubbed the
Sausage, was created by
Richard Garwin, assigned this task by
Edward Teller. This was not widely known until 2001, as his involvement was kept secret. It used an extra-large fission bomb as a "trigger" and liquid deuterium—kept in its liquid state by of
cryogenic equipment—as its fusion fuel, and weighed around altogether. The liquid deuterium fuel of Ivy Mike was impractical for a deployable weapon, and the next advance was to use a solid
lithium deuteride fusion fuel instead. In 1954 this was tested in the "
Castle Bravo" shot (the device was code-named
Shrimp), which had a yield of , 2.5 times what was expected, and is the largest US bomb ever tested. Efforts shifted towards developing miniaturized Teller–Ulam weapons that could fit into
intercontinental ballistic missiles and
submarine-launched ballistic missiles. By 1960, with the
W47 warhead deployed on
Polaris ballistic missile submarines, megaton-class warheads were as small as in diameter and in weight. Further innovation in miniaturizing warheads was accomplished by the mid-1970s, when versions of the Teller–Ulam design were created that could fit ten or more warheads on the end of a small MIRVed missile.
United Kingdom on
Christmas Island was the first British hydrogen bomb test. In 1954 work began at
Aldermaston to develop the British fusion bomb, with
Sir William Penney in charge of the project. British knowledge on how to make a thermonuclear fusion bomb was rudimentary, and at the time the United States was not exchanging any nuclear knowledge because of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946. The United Kingdom had worked closely with the Americans on the Manhattan Project. British access to nuclear weapons information was cut off by the United States at one point due to concerns about Soviet espionage. Full cooperation was not reestablished until an agreement governing the handling of secret information and other issues was signed. The Soviet Union assisted the Chinese nuclear program from 1957, but this was abruptly ended by the
Sino-Soviet split in 1959. For thermonuclear weapons, China had received a lithium deuteride production plant, and limited knowledge of the Soviet layer cake design. Unlike the US and USSR, at the time of their hydrogen bomb program, China operated no production facilities for plutonium or tritium. Plutonium production reactor in
Jiuquan became operational only in 1967, and plutonium separation began in September 1968. During 1963, Chinese scientists led by
Peng Huanwu extensively investigated this design, but knew it was too inefficient to be the hydrogen bomb possessed by other countries. Nonetheless, plans were made to test a small layer cake designs in 1966 and "658", a three-staged layer cake design capable of reaching one megaton (similar to the British backup design
Orange Herald Large), in October 1967. In September and October 1965, a theoretical research crash project ran in Shanghai led by
Yu Min, using digital computers and manual calculation. Yu held a lecture series on the layer cake bomb, and in doing so realized its flaw was its slow production of
tritium from lithium deuteride i.e. the
Jetter cycle. This resulted in a Teller-Ulam analogue design for compression of a thermonuclear secondary by a fission primary. In December 1965, this design was selected as the focus of thermonuclear development. Yu later stated this rapid development prevented the hydrogen bomb research program from crumbling during the ten-year
Cultural Revolution beginning in May 1966 (such as occurred to
China's first crewed space program). The differences are unclear, as the Chinese design also channels energy from a nuclear fission primary to compress a thermonuclear secondary. Like the initial Soviet and British hydrogen bombs, the secondary is spherical, unlike the first cylindrical secondaries used in the US. reported that in 1995, a supposed Chinese
double agent delivered information indicating that China knew secret details of the US W88 warhead, supposedly through espionage. (This line of investigation eventually resulted in the abortive trial of
Wen Ho Lee.)
France Following
their first nuclear test in 1960, France prioritized fission weapon development and deliverability by
Mirage IV bombers. In 1966, de Gaulle felt pressure that China would become the fourth thermonuclear country, and set a deadline of 1968 for the first hydrogen bomb test. A participating scientist, Pierre Billaud, wrote of French thermonuclear knowledge in 1965: Early tests "closely fitted Li6D [lithium deuteride] to the fissile core", implying a
layer cake design. France began testing thermonuclear principles in the
1966–70 French nuclear tests, beginning with the 125 kt
Rigel boosted fission shot in September 1966. In April 1967, physicist outlined the radiation implosion idea central to the Teller-Ulam design, but the weapons scientists were not immediately convinced it was the solution. In June, France lost the hydrogen bomb race to China's three-megaton
Project 639 test. By mid-1967, like their Chinese counterparts, French scientists had identified an extremely high, almost twenty-fold density increase of the lithium deuteride fuel, to be crucial to megaton success, but planned a test of Carayol's correct Teller-Ulam analogue as only one of three designs for summer of 1968. France's hydrogen bomb development path was crucially influenced by the British scientist
William Richard Joseph Cook, who led the successful
British hydrogen bomb programme a decade prior. Unlike France, the UK, as well as the US and USSR, had aerial reconnaissance capabilities to collect
nuclear fallout from testing and make deductions, including France's lack of progress in thermonuclear weapons. In September 1967, Cook provided limited thermonuclear development information to the military attache at the
French Embassy in London, specifically that their current designs would not succeed and that the solution was more simple. This allowed the French scientists to identify and proceed with only Carayol's proposal for the ultimately successful 1968 thermonuclear tests. It is believed this was done on the instruction of Prime Minister
Harold Wilson, aimed as an overture to de Gaulle, who was currently blocking the
accession of the United Kingdom to the European Communities due to its closer relationship to the United States. However, de Gaulle again vetoed UK accession in November 1967, and was very shocked when made aware of the British contribution. The first
DT-boosted warhead, the
MR 41, was tested in the Castor and Pollux shots of July and August 1968, successfully yielding in the former. The
"Canopus" test in the
Fangataufa atoll in
French Polynesia on 24 August 1968 was the country's first multistage thermonuclear weapon test. The bomb was detonated from a balloon at a height of . The result of this test was significant atmospheric contamination. France is currently believed to have nuclear weapons equal in sophistication to the other major nuclear powers. France has about 60 air-launched missiles tipped with
TN 80/
TN 81 warheads with a yield of about each. France's nuclear program has been carefully designed to ensure that these weapons remain usable decades into the future.
India On 11 May 1998, India announced that it had detonated a thermonuclear bomb in its
Operation Shakti tests ("Shakti-I", specifically, in Hindi the word 'Shakti' means power). However,
Harold M. Agnew, former director of the
Los Alamos National Laboratory, said that India's assertion of having detonated a staged thermonuclear bomb was believable. The yield of India's hydrogen bomb test remains highly debatable among the Indian science community and the international scholars. The question of politicisation and disputes between Indian scientists further complicated the matter. In an interview in August 2009, the director for the 1998 test site preparations, K. Santhanam claimed that the yield of the thermonuclear explosion was lower than expected and that India should therefore not rush into signing the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Other Indian scientists involved in the test have disputed Santhanam's claim, arguing that his claims are unscientific. British seismologist Roger Clarke argued that the magnitudes suggested a combined yield of up to , consistent with the Indian announced total yield of . US seismologist Jack Evernden has argued that for correct estimation of yields, one should 'account properly for geological and seismological differences between test sites'.
Israel Israel is alleged to possess thermonuclear weapons of the Teller–Ulam design, but it is not known to have tested any nuclear devices, although it is widely speculated that the
Vela incident of 1979 may have been a joint Israeli–South African nuclear test. It took him a year to convince the
CIA about Israel's capability and finally in 1976,
Carl Duckett of the CIA testified to the
US Congress, after receiving credible information from an "American scientist" (Teller), on Israel's nuclear capability. After he conveyed the matter to the higher level of the US government, Teller reportedly said: "They [Israel] have it, and they were clever enough to trust their research and not to test, they know that to test would get them into trouble." In January 2016, North Korea claimed to have successfully tested a hydrogen bomb, although only a magnitude 5.1 seismic event was detected at the time of the test, a similar magnitude to the 2013 test of a atomic bomb. These seismic recordings cast doubt upon North Korea's claim that a hydrogen bomb was tested and suggest it was a non-fusion nuclear test. On 3 September 2017, the country's state media reported that a
hydrogen bomb test was conducted that resulted in "perfect success". According to the
US Geological Survey (USGS), the blast released energy equivalent to an earthquake with a seismic magnitude of 6.3, 10 times more powerful than previous nuclear tests conducted by North Korea. US Intelligence released an early assessment that the yield estimate was , with an uncertainty range of . On 12 September,
NORSAR revised its estimate of the explosion magnitude upward to 6.1, matching that of the
CTBTO but less powerful than the
USGS estimate of 6.3. Its yield estimate was revised to , while noting the estimate had some uncertainty and an undisclosed margin of error. On 13 September, an analysis of before and after
synthetic-aperture radar satellite imagery of the test site was published suggesting the test occurred under of rock, and the yield "could have been in excess of 300 kilotons". == Public knowledge ==