Investment of Tobruk By 8 April, the most advanced German units had arrived at Derna; but some units which had cut across the chord of the
Jebel Akhdar ran out of water and fuel at Tengeder.
Heinrich von Prittwitz und Gaffron, the commander of the 15th Panzer Division, was sent ahead with a column of reconnaissance, anti-tank, machine-gun, and artillery units to block the eastern exit from Tobruk as the 5th Light Division moved from the southwest and the
27th Infantry Division "Brescia" advanced from the west. On 10 April, Rommel made the
Suez Canal the objective of the and ordered that a breakout from Tobruk be prevented. The next day, the port was
invested; but the rush ended with the 5th Light Division on the east side, the Prittwitz group to the south (Prittwitz having been killed), and the 27th Infantry Division "Brescia" to the west. Reconnaissance Unit 3 went on to
Bardia, and a composite force was sent on to
Sollum to try to reach Mersa Matruh. The British
Mobile Force (Brigadier
William Gott), on the frontier from
Halfaya Pass to
Sidi Barrani, conducted a delaying-action around Sollum and
Capuzzo.
El Adem road From the 5th Panzer Regiment probed the defences of the 20th Australian Brigade near the El Adem road. The tanks were held off by artillery-fire; German infantry who reached the anti-tank ditch were forced back by Australian infantry. The Germans were surprised, having assumed that the shipping at Tobruk was to evacuate the garrison and planned a night attack by the 5th Light Division for Groups of Axis vehicles were attacked by
45 and
55 Squadrons RAF, which rearmed at the airfields inside the perimeter. The attack began after dark, with an attempt to get over the anti-tank ditch west of the El Adem road in the
2/17th Australian Battalion sector, which the Australians repulsed. Another attempt was made later and by dawn a small bridgehead had been established, where the 5th Panzer Regiment drove through and turned northwards, ready to divide into one column for the harbour and one to move west to stop the escape of the garrison. defending Tobruk The German tanks were engaged head on by the 1st RHA and veered away, only to drive into the path of the British cruiser tanks, waiting
hull-down and received anti-tank fire from three sides, losing sixteen of and retreated. The Australian infantry had stood their ground and pinned down the German infantry. As the retreat continued, every gun and aircraft at Tobruk fired into the area and the German 8th Machine-Gun Battalion lost about of its men including its commander
Gustav Ponath, for a garrison loss of two tanks and a field gun knocked out. Attacks from the south were abandoned and the 5th Light Division dug in, with the Schwerin Group (renamed after Prittwitz had been killed) to the east. In support, the
Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica flew 959
sorties over Tobruk; on 14 April 40
Ju 87s bombed the defences and on day 27 they succeeded in destroying a heavy anti-aircraft battery at Tobruk by swamping the defences with 50 aircraft allowing for an entire
staffel (12) to concentrate on each gun.
Ras el Medauar On 16 April, Rommel led an attack from the west, with the 132nd Armoured Division "Ariete" reinforced by the 62nd Infantry Regiment of the
102nd Motorised Division "Trento". The
2/48th Australian Battalion counter-attacked and took In the morning, the 132nd Armoured Division "Ariete" attacked again and some tanks reached the most advanced Australian posts, found that their infantry had not followed and retired after five tanks were knocked out. Morshead ordered the garrison to exploit Axis disorganisation and their inability to quickly dig in on stony ground, through conducting patrols and small sorties. On 22 April, a company of the 2/48th Australian Battalion, three infantry tanks and a troop of 25-pounders, raided a hillock held by the Fabris Detachment south-west of Ras el Medauar; the raiders destroyed two guns and took At the same time a company of the
2/23rd Battalion advanced across the Derna road and in a costly attack, took about from the 27th Infantry Division "Brescia", which led the Germans to hurry on the 15th Panzer Division from Tripoli.
Air and sea war The defeat of the Axis attacks in April greatly improved the situation in Tobruk but
Fliegerkorps X had sent to Libya from
Sicily in February, which flew frequent dive-bomber sorties by day and medium-bomber raids by day and night on the docks, buildings, anti-aircraft sites, artillery positions and the airfields.
Westland Lysander aircraft and all but the most essential ground crew of
6 and
73 Squadron were withdrawn to Egypt. At least ten
Hawker Hurricane fighters were based at the port during the day and on 19 April, Hurricanes of 73 and
274 Squadrons, intercepted a Ju 87 raid escorted by fighters. After another two days, 73 Squadron was down to five operational aircraft with very tired pilots. By 23 April, three more Hurricanes had been shot down, a further two were damaged and on 25 April the squadron was withdrawn. The fighters of 274 Squadron stayed at Gerawla and 6 Squadron remained at Tobruk to fly tactical reconnaissance sorties. Fighter cover could only be maintained at intervals by the last in the desert; Axis airfields at Gazala, Derna and
Benina, were bombed at dusk and night to limit Axis air attacks on Tobruk. The Desert Air Force [so-named from October 1941] flew long-range missions to attack German armour massing near Tobruk in the early stages of the siege. On 12 April, for example, 45 and 55 Squadron
Bristol Blenheim bombers, operating from airfields in Egypt, attacked German tank formations near the port. The attack succeeded in breaking up the German advance. Bf 110 crash-landed near Tobruk, 1941 Air Commodore
Raymond Collishaw, commanding 204 Group RAF (renamed the Desert Air Force), wrote to Air Marshal
Arthur Tedder on 24 April. In his view the situation in the air had rapidly deteriorated. The arrival of two German fighter wings (
Jagdgeschwader 27 and
Zerstörergeschwader 26) near Tobruk allowed the enemy formations to arrive at great height within ten minutes of an air raid warning, leaving British fighters at lower altitude and a great disadvantage. He remarked attrition had caused "a serious reduction in our fighter force." The bombardment and
close air support operations in the initial phases were carried out by
Lehrgeschwader 1, III./
Sturzkampfgeschwader 1 and II./
Sturzkampfgeschwader 2. Collishaw noted the aggression shown by Axis aviation and reported to Tedder that 274 Squadron, which had only 13 fighters available as of 23 April, formed the major part of the fighter defence for Egypt and he was "loathe to send them to Tobruk." As Collishaw wrote his letter, the RAF lost a further six aircraft over Tobruk, equating to very heavy losses given the small contingent defending the port. He requested Tedder's advice. Air Marshal
Arthur Longmore cabled the
Air Ministry in London. He wished to operate in greater strength, and complained reinforcements and fresh pilots were needed to replace the exhausted 73 Squadron. He told London that to maintain patrols, the fighters were forced to refuel at Sidi Barrani granting Axis air units a free hand over Tobruk but arguing that without patrols to defend fighter squadrons refuelling at Tobruk on the ground, they were "hostage to a fortune we cannot afford." On 1 May, for example, 274 Squadron lost all six Hurricanes it sent on a single mission when a flight of
Bf 109s from JG 27 led by
Gerhard Homuth, and containing the most successful fighter pilot in Africa,
Hans-Joachim Marseille, engaged them from a superior altitude over Tobruk. From 1–14 May each side paused to stockpile supplies for the next battle. Of stated losses from 10 April—14 May [excluding claims made by either side], 73 Squadron lost 15 fighters and five damaged. Five pilots were killed, one captured and one wounded. 274 Squadron lost six fighters, three pilots killed and two captured. 45 Squadron suffered the loss of three aircraft and five killed, while 55 and 6 Squadron lost one and two respectively.
39 Squadron lost three bombers and
14 Squadron one for a total of 31 aircraft. Reported German losses, excluding RAF claims, were lower. III/StG 1 and II/StG 2 lost eight between them while III/ZG 26 reported three destroyed and one damaged, two killed, one wounded and three captured. III./LG 1 reported the loss of one aircraft. JG 27 suffered the loss of four fighters, three damaged and three pilots killed. The Regia Aeronautica's 151
Gruppo reported two aircraft destroyed and one damaged. The intensity of the battle for
air superiority was mirrored by the air war over the sea as the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica attempted to
cut off sea traffic supplying the defenders. The air-sea battle, after the failure of
Operation Battleaxe, was the main sector of operations for Allied and Axis aviation throughout the summer.
Sturzkampfgeschwader 3, another Ju 87 wing arrived in Africa in the summer. The eight-month long siege was costly for the
Stuka gruppen. At the end of April, virtually all Tobruk-based fighters had been removed from the encircled port. The Ju 87s were facing defenders with
anti-aircraft artillery numbering 88 guns—28 heavy (90 mm or above). Ships lent their weapons to the defenders. In an example, the gunboat
Ladybird, sunk in shallow waters to her deck by II./StG 2, was able to use her 3-inch deck guns. In April,
Draco,
Bankura,
Urania, and were sunk by Axis aircraft. On 4 May the
hospital ship Kapara (846t) was damaged evoking fury on the Allied side. The arrival of Italian Ju 87s from 97
Gruppo resulted in the sinking of the 3,741-ton tanker
Helka on 25 May before it could reach Tobruk. The squadron involved, the 239
Squadriglia was the successful unit, which became among the most successful over Tobruk. The escorting
sloop,
Grimsby was damaged, and sunk by 3./StG 1. Commensurate with the sinking of
Fiona and
Chakla in April, the burden fell to the
Mediterranean Fleet's destroyers to carry out supply operations in daylight. Moonlit nights also proved hazardous. On 24 June the sloop
Auckland was sunk by 239
Squadriglia. This unit also sank the destroyer
Waterhen. The vessel had just survived an attack by
Junkers Ju 88s of III/
LG 1 and II/
StG 2. The lack of fighters made for a straight battle between the gunners and German pilots. The gunners changed their tactics from a sustained barrage at a fixed altitude, to a staggered, and thickened belt, at various altitudes covering 1000 meters or more, thereby forcing the Ju 87s to fly through fire for much longer. The gunners spread their fire from side to side, to prevent German pilots from travelling down the side of the barrage and sliding in underneath it. The
Stukas were active in night operations. On 26/27 October 1941, I/
StG 1 attacked a convoy transporting 7,000 British and Polish soldiers with munitions sailed toward Tobruk. An attack by the Ju 87s sank the
Latona (2,650 t) with a direct hit—though the vessel could reach 40 knots. The destroyer
Hero was badly damaged in the same attack. from the
Vertical stabiliser. In March, destroyers were withdrawn from the Inshore Squadron to escort convoys to Greece and in April, four more ships joined the squadron. As the army retreated to Tobruk and the frontier, coastal operations were conducted on the nights of by gunboats, which bombarded transport on the Via Balbia around
Bomba and
Gambut airfield and on the night of 12 April, six destroyers and two cruisers made a coastal sweep from Ras Tayones to Ras et Tin. Next day, three ships bombarded Sollum and on 15 April, transport was bombarded at Bardia and Capuzzo, as Gazala airfield was shelled again. For the rest of April, naval bombardments continued along the Libyan coast on the Via Balbia, airfields and ports. A Commando raid was carried out on Bardia and supply runs began to Tobruk. From were taken from Tobruk, brought in and of stores delivered; were sunk and
Bardia raid The Bardia raid was planned for the night of by 'A' Battalion,
Layforce to disrupt Axis lines of communication and damage installations and equipment. The landing force sailed to the area in , escorted by the
anti-aircraft cruiser and the
destroyers , and
Waterhen. The Commandos of 'A' Battalion and a troop of tanks from the
Royal Tank Regiment were to land on four beaches from
Landing Craft Assault (LCA). On arrival, one LCA could not be lowered and there were difficulties releasing the others. On the run-in, there were no lights to guide them in, because the advance
Folbot section had been delayed, when their
submarine had to dive and take evasive action when it was mistakenly attacked by Allied aircraft. As a result of these issues the main force was late and landed on the wrong beaches, albeit unopposed. Once ashore the Commandos found that the port was empty of Axis forces and faulty intelligence led to some objectives being missed and others turning out not to exist. The Commandos destroyed an Italian supply dump and a coastal
artillery battery before re-embarking. Seventy men got lost, ended up on the wrong evacuation beach and were captured.
Battle of the Salient After the failure to capture Tobruk off the march,
Comando Supremo and the
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) agreed that Tobruk should be captured and supplies accumulated, before the advance into Egypt was resumed. Rommel thought that Tobruk could only be taken by a deliberate attack, which could not begin until support units had arrived in the area and the Luftwaffe had been reinforced, particularly with transport aircraft to carry ammunition, fuel and water. On 27 April, Major-General
Friedrich Paulus, a Deputy Chief of the General Staff, arrived from
Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) in
Berlin, to question Rommel on his intentions, impress on him that there was little more help available and to forecast the defensive possibilities of the area, if Sollum was lost. Paulus refused to allow an attack planned for 30 April, until he had studied the situation and on 29 April, allowed the attack to go ahead, as did General
Italo Gariboldi who had arrived on 28 April. Nothing more ambitious than securing the Axis hold on the Egyptian frontier, from Siwa Oasis north to Sollum was envisaged. The Tobruk garrison continued work on the defences and sowed minefields, the first being planted in the south-west, between the outer and inner perimeters. Twelve infantry tanks had been delivered among of supplies landed during the month, despite Axis bombing of the harbour and the sinking of two supply ships. The Axis attack was to be made in the south-west, either side of the hillock of Ras el Medauar, about two weeks after the previous attempt, using the 5th Light Division on the right and the 15th Panzer Division on the left, even though it had only recently arrived in Africa. At on 30 April, the divisions were to break into the Tobruk defences, followed by assault groups from the
Ariete Division and 27th Infantry Division "Brescia" to roll up the flanks. German infantry would press forward to reconnoitre the vicinity of Fort Pilastrino, to see if the attack could continue to the harbour. If not, the Italian infantry would dig in on the flanks and artillery would be moved forward for an attack the next day. The attack came in the area held by the 26th Australian Brigade, which had the 2/23rd and
2/24th battalions in the line and the 2/48th Battalion in reserve at Wadi Giaida. The Australians expected an attack, after withstanding bombing and artillery-fire on the perimeter defences on 29 April; Axis troops seen massing in the evening of 30 April had been dispersed by artillery-fire. The posts either side of Ras el Medauar were shelled and bombed and German troops began to dribble forward, under cover of dust and the gathering darkness. By the Germans made a small bridgehead as planned but several Australian posts held out, the reconnaissance party vanished and the Italian troops were not able to reach their objectives. The night passed in confused fighting as the Germans tried to reorganise and mop up at Ras el Medauar and attack south-westwards along the perimeter. The new attack failed and by morning, some of the Australian posts were still holding out. A thick mist rose and German tanks moved eastwards instead of south-east and then ran into the new minefield, where they were engaged by anti-tank guns and repulsed. Tanks of the 15th Panzer Division, tried to drive north but were prevented by anti-tank fire. No German reserves were left and the most advanced troops were south of Wadi Giaida, tired and isolated in a sandstorm. Paulus judged that the attack had failed and Rommel decided to attack on the right to widen the breach. In the afternoon, German tanks attacked south-east towards Bir el Medauar and Morshead sent and five infantry tanks to counter-attack. The German attack was stopped for a loss of five British tanks and in the evening, the Australian
2/48th Battalion counter-attacked Ras el Medauar but met determined resistance and was repulsed. During the day, 73 and 274 Squadrons had maintained standing patrols over the area and on the morning of 2 May, the fighting around Wadi Giaida continued in a dust storm, as German troops tried to trickle forward. On the night of 3 May, the 18th Australian Brigade made a converging counter-attack with two battalions, which lost co-ordination, failed and was ended, to avoid being caught in the open at daybreak. The Axis attack had overrun the perimeter defences on a front, to a maximum depth of and captured higher ground useful as a jumping-off position and from which observation points could be established, for a loss of and casualties. The
8th Bersaglieri Regiment of the 132nd Armoured Division "Ariete" had captured most of the Australian positions. Paulus ordered that no more attacks be made, unless the Allies were evacuating the port. The
DAK was to hold Cyrenaica regardless of who held Sollum, Bardia or Tobruk and a new line was to be built further back at Gazala. In a report on 12 May, Paulus wrote that sea communications between Italy and Libya should be reinforced, that any air and anti-aircraft units sent to Libya should be German and that the army in Libya needed ammunition, fuel and food first, then more vehicles before the dispatch of more men, of whom medium artillery and anti-tank gun crews should have priority. The Tobruk garrison settled into a routine of patrols, air raids and minor attacks, some to regain positions in the Medauar salient and some in connexion with WDF operations.
Twin Pimples raid The Twin Pimples was a defensive strong point outside Tobruk, on two hills close together which overlooked the Tobruk perimeter. It was held by the Italian Army, and the 18th King Edward's Own Cavalry (normally part of the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade) held the perimeter opposite. No. 8 Commando was selected to carry out an attack on the Twin Pimples, which conducted patrols for several days with the Indians, to reconnoitre the ground. The 18th Cavalry Regiment was to mount a diversion, while of No. 8 Commando and some
Australian Engineers crossed the Italian forward positions and a supply road, to attack the Twin Pimples from behind. The Commandos advanced at on the night of and crossed the Italian lines undetected. At the supply road they took cover, waited until and edged forward just before the diversion by the 18th Cavalry. The diversion attracted Italian machine-gun fire and
Very lights, as the Commandos got within of the Twin Pimples before challenge, at which the commandos attacked. The password
Jock was used when a position had been taken and the Italians were swiftly overcome. The Australian engineers planted explosives on several
mortars and an ammunition dump. The plan assumed that it would take for Italian artillery to open fire on the captured trenches, and the raiders were only about away when shelling began to come down onto the position they had just departed. ==Relief operations==