Resolution 2625 was adopted in a context of increasing
decolonization and a redefinition of geopolitical balances. It codifies fundamental principles of
international law, including the prohibition on the
use of force, the principle of non-intervention, the sovereign equality of states, and the right of peoples to self-determination. The International Court of Justice has recognized the customary value of these principles, as demonstrated in the
Nicaragua v. United States judgment of 1986, where the Court explicitly referred to Resolution 2625 as evidence of the existence of customary obligations parallel to those arising from the UN Charter, in light of which the notion of armed attack must be interpreted.
Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 1974 on the definition of
aggression, adopted by the same General Assembly four years later (on 14 December 1974), serves as an operational complement to Resolution 2625. It defines in detailed terms what constitutes an "act of
aggression", listing situations such as armed
invasion, bombardment,
blockade of ports, or support for armed militias operating against another state. Although not legally binding, the resolution provides authoritative guidance for interpreting Article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter, and it has been used both in legal scholarship and in international case law to assess the legality of the
use of force. From a systematic perspective, Resolution 2625 provides the general axiological and normative framework, while Resolution 3314 performs an applicative and specifying function. Both resolutions are closely linked to Articles 1, 2(4), and 51 of the UN Charter and have been used in international practice to interpret state obligations regarding the use of force. The prevailing doctrine—including the works of
Antonio Cassese, Ian Brownlie, and
Bruno Simma—confirms the importance of these two resolutions not only as
soft law instruments but as texts that crystallize binding international principles and customs. ==Bibliography==