MarketCrisis in Venezuela
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Crisis in Venezuela

An ongoing socioeconomic and political crisis began in Venezuela during the presidency of Hugo Chávez and has worsened during the presidency of successor Nicolás Maduro. It has been marked by hyperinflation, escalating starvation, disease, crime, and mortality rates, resulting in massive emigration. Food shortages and hyperinflation have largely ended, but inflation remains high.

History
Chávez presidency After attempting a coup d'état in 1992 and being pardoned by President Rafael Caldera, Hugo Chávez was elected president and maintained the presidency from 1999 until his death in 2013. After increasing oil prices in the early 2000s provided additional funds to Venezuela, Chávez established Bolivarian missions, aimed at providing public services to improve economic, cultural, and social conditions. The Missions entailed the construction of thousands of free medical clinics for the poor, indicated achievements in addressing illiteracy, healthcare and poverty, and economic and social advances. Quality of life for Venezuelans had also improved. While poverty declined more than 20 percent between 2002 and 2008, "aid was disbursed to some of the poor...in a way that ended up helping the president and his allies and cronies more than anyone else", according to Corrales and Penfold. Teresa A. Meade wrote that Chávez's popularity strongly depended "on the lower classes who have benefited from these health initiatives and similar policies." The social works initiated by Chávez's government relied on oil exports. The nation's richness in natural resources hindered its industrial development and diversification. By the early 2010s, economic actions taken by Chávez's government during the preceding decade, such as overspending and price controls, became unsustainable. Venezuela's economy faltered while poverty, inflation and shortages increased. On 2 June 2010, Chávez declared an "economic war" due to increasing shortages in Venezuela. Maduro continued most of the existing economic policies of Chávez. Upon entering the presidency, his administration faced a high inflation rate and large shortages of goods, Maduro said capitalist speculation had driven high rates of inflation and created widespread shortages of basic necessities. In September 2013, the government seized a toilet paper factory, saying that its owners had been hoarding goods in hopes of selling them later at a higher price. In November, the government seized an electronics store over allegations of price gouging, and imposed price controls on another. The imposition of price controls on certain industries led to a surge in demand for those goods. Though the price controls made goods more affordable for those who could obtain them, they could not meet overall demand. Maduro announced a three phase plan to alleviate the country's economic troubles. The goals of his "economic offensive" were to activate domestic production, break with "oil rentism", guarantee supply and fix prices at affordable levels. In 2014, The National Assembly granted him greater powers to impose price controls and seize businesses he accused of price gouging scarce goods. By 2014, Venezuela had entered an economic recession. The economy contracted by 4.8%, 4.9% and 2.3% in the first three quarters of the year. 12-month inflation reached 63.6%. Oil exports fell by 14.2%. Despite poor GDP growth, some social indicators continued to improve. Extreme poverty was reduced to 5.4% and unemployment fell to 5.9%. The crisis intensified as a result of oil oversupply in early 2015, In January 2016, the National Assembly declared a "health humanitarian crisis" given the "serious shortage of medicines, medical supplies and deterioration of humanitarian infrastructure", asking Maduro's government to "guarantee immediate access to the list of essential medicines that are basic and indispensable and that must be accessible at all times." Extrajudicial killings by the Venezuelan government became common, with the United Nations (UN) reporting 5,287 killings by the Special Action Forces (FAES) in 2017, with at least another 1,569 killings recorded in the first six months of 2019. On the grounds that many of these killings constituted extrajudicial executions, the Venezuelan authorities responded with security operations aimed at "neutralizing, repressing and criminalizing political opponents and people critical of the government". The UN stated that the Special Action Forces "would plant arms and drugs and fire their weapons against the walls or in the air to suggest a confrontation and to show the victim had resisted authority" and that some of the killings were "done as a reprisal for [the victims'] participation in anti-government demonstrations." Maduro's refusal of aid worsened the effects of Venezuela's crisis. Elections and protests during the 2019 Venezuelan uprising As a result of discontent with the government, in the 2015 parliamentary election the opposition was elected to the majority in the National Assembly, after which the outgoing (lame duck) National Assembly—consisting of Bolivarian officials—filled the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, the highest court in Venezuela, with Maduro allies. Maduro disavowed the National Assembly in 2017 leading to the 2017 Venezuelan constitutional crisis; as of 2018, some considered the National Assembly the only "legitimate" institution left in the country, and human rights organizations said there were no independent institutional checks on presidential power. Protests grew to their most "combative" since they began in 2014. On 1 May 2017, Maduro called for a constituent assembly that would draft a new constitution to replace the 1999 Venezuela Constitution. The members of the Constituent Assembly would not be elected in open elections, but selected from social organizations loyal to Maduro. Many countries considered these actions a bid by Maduro to stay in power indefinitely, and over 40 countries, along with NGOs, stated that they would not recognize the 2017 Constituent National Assembly (ANC). The Democratic Unity Roundtable—the opposition to the incumbent ruling party—boycotted the election, and the incumbent Great Patriotic Pole, dominated by the United Socialist Party of Venezuela, won almost all seats in the assembly by default. The ANC was sworn in on 4 August 2017, and the next day declared itself to be the government branch with supreme power in Venezuela, banning the opposition-led National Assembly from performing actions that would interfere with the assembly. In February 2018 Maduro called presidential elections, four months before the prescribed date. There were many irregularities, including the banning from standing of several major opposition parties. Maduro was declared the winner in May 2018. Many said the elections were invalid. Politicians both internally and internationally said Maduro was not legitimately elected, and considered him an ineffective dictator. In the months leading up to his 10 January 2019 inauguration, Maduro was facing pressure to step down by nations and bodies including the Lima Group (excluding Mexico), the United States, and the OAS; this pressure was increased after the new National Assembly of Venezuela was sworn in on 5 January 2019. The 2019 presidential crisis came to a head when the National Assembly stated that the results of the May 2018 presidential election were invalid and declared National Assembly president Juan Guaidó to be the acting president, citing several clauses of the 1999 Venezuelan Constitution. 2024 Venezuelan political crisis The 2024 Venezuelan political crisis is the crisis that continued after the 2024 Venezuelan presidential election results were announced. Maduro ran for a third consecutive term, while former diplomat Edmundo González Urrutia represented the Unitary Platform (; PUD), the main opposition political alliance, after the Venezuelan government barred leading candidate María Corina Machado from participating. Academics, news outlets and the opposition provided "strong evidence" according to The Guardian to suggest that González won the election by a wide margin. The government-controlled National Electoral Council (CNE) announced results claiming a narrow Maduro victory on 29 July. A 6 August article in The New York Times stated that the CNE declaration that Maduro won "plunged Venezuela into a political crisis that has claimed at least 22 lives in violent demonstrations, led to the jailing of more than 2,000 people and provoked global denunciation." Maduro did not acknowledge the results which showed him losing the election, and instead asked the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) on 1 August to audit and approve the results. On 22 August, as anticipated, the TSJ described the CNE's statement of Maduro winning the election as "validated". ==Basic needs==
Basic needs
Poverty The Wall Street Journal reported in March 2019 that poverty was double that of 2014. in May 2018 Several other factors have led to shortages: imports over the two years until the end of 2017 declined by two-thirds; hyperinflation has made food too costly for many Venezuelans; and for those who depend on food boxes supplied by the government, "these do not reach all Venezuelans who need them, provision of boxes is intermittent, and receipt is often linked to political support of the government". With shadowy connections to the government, The Washington Post says "some have been put in charge of the distribution of government food packages in poor areas—giving them control over hungry neighborhoods." The Associated Press reports that people gather every evening in downtown Caracas in search of food thrown out on a sidewalk; the people are typically unemployed, but are "frequently joined by small business owners, college students and pensioners—people who consider themselves middle class even though their living standards have long ago been pulverized by triple-digit inflation, food shortages and a collapsing currency". One dump reports finding parts of dismembered animals, like "dogs, cats, donkeys, horses and pigeons" and there is evidence that people are eating wildlife such as anteaters, flamingos, vultures and lizards. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN said that less than 5% of Venezuelans were undernourished between 2008 and 2013, but that number had more than doubled, to almost 12% from 2015 and 2017, representing 3.7 million people. A 2016 Venebarometro poll of 1,200 Venezuelans found almost half are no longer able to eat three daily meals; the government blames this on an "economic war" they say is waged by the opposition. Analysts said that two-thirds of Venezuela's population (20 million people) were without water, partially or completely, in the weeks after the blackouts. The head of the infectious disease department at the University Hospital of Caracas, María Eugenia Landaeta said that, without access to clean water, the chance of people contracting bacterial infections increased, and that doctors had seen during the blackouts "surges in diarrhea, typhoid fever and hepatitis A", An UN report estimated in March 2019 that 94% of Venezuelans lived in poverty, Following increased international sanctions throughout 2019, the Maduro government abandoned policies established by Chávez such as price and currency controls, which resulted in the country seeing a temporary rebound from economic decline before COVID-19 entered Venezuela the following year. As a response to the devaluation of the official bolívar currency, by 2019 the population increasingly started relying on US dollars for transactions. Maduro described dollarization as an "escape valve" that helps the recovery of the country, the spread of productive forces in the country and the economy. However, Maduro said that the Venezuelan bolívar remained as the national currency. During the Bolivarian Revolution, the government began providing free healthcare, with Cuban medical professionals providing aid. The government's failure to concentrate on healthcare and a reduction in spending on healthcare, along with unchecked government corruption resulted in avoidable deaths due to severe shortages of medical supplies and equipment, and the emigration of medical professionals to other countries. Venezuela's reliance on imported goods and the complicated exchange rates initiated under Chávez led to increasing shortages during the late 2000s and into the 2010s that affected the availability of medicines and medical equipment in the country. The Health Minister changed multiple times during Chávez's presidency. According to a high-ranking official of Venezuela's Health Ministry, the ministers were treated as scapegoats whenever issues with public health arose in Venezuela. By early 2015, only 35% of hospital beds were available and 50% of operating rooms could not function due to the lack of resources. In 2015, the government reported that a third of patients admitted to public hospitals died. The medications of individuals who die are re-distributed through small-scale and local efforts, with the help of the families of the deceased, to try to supply surviving patients. One study of 6,500 households by three of the main universities in Venezuela found that "74% of the population had lost on average nineteen pounds in 2016". It also said that the number of cases of malaria was up by 76%. Shortly after Minister of Health Antonieta Caporale released in 2017 this data, and health statistics showing increases in 2016 infant and maternal mortality and infectious diseases, Maduro fired her and replaced the physician with a pharmacist close to vice-president Tareck El Aissami, Luis López Chejade. The publications were removed from the Ministry's website, and no further health data has been made available, although the government had produced health bulletins for several decades. 2019 Human Rights Watch/Johns Hopkins report for medicine due to the shortages in Venezuela In April 2019, Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health published the results of a joint, year-long research project in a report entitled "Venezuela's humanitarian emergency: Large-scale UN response needed to address health and food crises". Combined with data from the World Health Organization (WHO), the PAHO with Venezuelan emigrants to Colombia and Brazil, officials from relief and humanitarian organizations, Venezuelan health care professionals, and UN and government officials from Brazil and Colombia. Paul Spiegel, MD, who was the editor and reviewer of the report said, "Venezuela is a middle-income country with a previously strong infrastructure, so just to see this incredible decline ... in such a short period of time is quite astonishing." Venezuela's Foreign Minister Jorge Arreaza did not respond to a letter asking for Venezuela's "views regarding the extent of the crisis and the policies it was implementing to address it" before the HRW/Johns Hopkins report was published. The Americas director for HRW, José Miguel Vivanco said, "Venezuelan authorities publicly minimise and suppress information about the crisis, and harass and retaliate against those who collect data or speak out about it, while also doing far too little to alleviate it." The increased aid would focus in four areas: the migration crisis, the health care system collapse, water and sanitation, and prisons and detention centers. The Wall Street Journal said that the acceptance of humanitarian shipments by Maduro was his first acknowledgement that Venezuela is "suffering from an economic collapse", and The Guardian reported that Maduro's stance has softened in the face of increasing pressure. Infectious and preventable diseases stated that there could be between 65,000 and 117,000 Venezuelans infected. In August 2015 independent health monitors said that there were more than two million people infected with chikungunya while the government said there were 36,000 cases. further limiting access to these utilities. Shortages of beds and essential medical equipment, such as latex gloves and antibiotics, have severely limited the capabilities of the country's medical infrastructure. In April 2020 the Venezuelan government asked the Bank of England to sell $US1.02 billion of the Venezuelan gold reserves held by the bank to help the government fund its response to the COVID-19 pandemic. This was followed on 14 May by a legal claim by the Venezuelan Central Bank (BCV) asking the Bank of England to send the proceeds of the sale of gold to the United Nations Development Programme. The claim stated that the funds would then be used to buy healthcare equipment, medicine, and food to address the country's "COVID-19 emergency". The UK Foreign Office had previously agreed to a request from the Trump administration to block the release of Venezuela's gold. In July 2020, the UK High Court ruled that the gold could not be released to the BCV because the UK government recognised Juan Guaidó as the "constitutional interim president of Venezuela". However, in October 2020, an appeals court overturned the High Court decision and asked the UK Foreign Office to clarify who it recognised as president of Venezuela. The Guardian wrote that the position of the UK government was unclear as it "maintains full consular and diplomatic relations with the Venezuela government". Women, maternal and infant In 2016, infant mortality increased 30% in one year, to 11,466 deaths of children under the age of one. "Venezuela is the only South American country where infant mortality has returned to levels last seen in the 1990s", according to the HRW/Johns Hopkins report. Abortion is illegal in Venezuela; the director of a large family planning clinic in Venezuela indicated that more women are arranging for permanent sterilization, and that more are presenting with "complications from clandestine abortions". Pregnancy and motherhood Due to lack of medical supplies, food and medical care in Venezuelan hospitals, many pregnant women in Venezuela are crossing the border into neighboring countries to give birth. Lack of basic medicine and equipment is causing preventable deaths and maternity is a very high risk for women, especially since there are no blood banks in the event of excessive bleeding. Hospitals frequently have water and electricity outages and only 7% of emergency services are fully operative. Maternal mortality is estimated to have increased by 65% from 2013 to 2016, and unsafe abortions have contributed to 20% of preventable maternal deaths. Statelessness Cúcuta, a city on the Colombian-Venezuela border, has received 14,000 Venezuelan patients at the Erasmo Meoz University Hospital since 2016 and is expecting to receive even more. The situation has strained the budget of these hospitals, putting Erasmo Meoz 14 million dollars into debt. The number of births of Venezuelan babies attended to in Boa Vista, Brazil, has increased from 700 in 2014 to 50,000 in 2017. For Colombian citizenship it is required that Colombian citizens be born to at least one Colombian parent or be born to foreign parents who meet residence requirements and are eligible to become citizens. Due to the influx of Venezuelan babies being born in Colombia and the Venezuelan government's inability to issue citizenship, Colombia has introduced a new measure that will give these Colombian-born newborns Colombian citizenship to avoid 'statelessness'. As a result of the crisis, stressors resulting in suicide included economic burden, hunger and loneliness due to the emigration of relatives. In 2016, reporters from The New York Times visited six psychiatric wards across the Venezuela at the invitation of doctors; all reported shortages of medicine and even food. In the investigation, they reported that El Pampero Hospital had not employed a psychiatrist in two years, and that it only had running water for only a few hours a day. The hospital, the article said, also suffered from shortages of basic personal-care and cleaning supplies, such as soap, shampoo, toothpaste or toilet paper. The nurses declared that without sedatives, they had to restrain patients or lock them in isolation cells to keep them from harming themselves. The reporters also noted that the government had denied that its public hospitals were suffering from shortages, and had refused multiple offers of international medical aid. Despite the threat of violent protests, the economic crisis affected children more than violence. Abel Saraiba, a psychologist with children's rights organization Cecodap said in 2017, "We have children from a very early age who are having to think about how to survive", with half of her young clients requiring treatment because of the crisis. Children are often forced to stand in food lines or beg with their parents, while the games they play with other children revolve around finding food. Friends of the Child Foundation psychologist Ninoska Zambrano said that children are offering sexual services for food. Zambrano said "Families are doing things that not only lead them to break physically, but in general, socially, we are being morally broken". In 2017, suicide increased by 67% among the elderly and 18% among minors; by 2018, reports emerged of a rapidly increasing suicide rate due to the stressors surrounding the crisis. Medical care and elections Mission Barrio Adentro was a program established by Chávez to bring medical care to poor neighborhoods; it was staffed by Cubans that were sent to Venezuela in exchange for petroleum. The New York Times interviewed sixteen Cuban medical professionals in 2019 who had worked for Barrio Adentro prior to the 2018 Venezuelan presidential elections; all sixteen revealed that they were required to participate in voting fraud. Some of the Cubans said that "command centers" for elections were placed near clinics to facilitate "dispatching doctors to pressure residents". In 2005, the Venezuelan Construction Chamber (CVC) estimated that there was a shortage of 1.6 million homes, with only 10,000 of 120,000 promised homes constructed by Chávez's government despite billions of dollars in investments. Poor Venezuelans attempted to construct homes on their own despite structural risks. Up to 2011, only 500,000 homes were constructed during the Chávez administration, with over two-thirds of the new housing developments being built by private companies; his government provided about the same amount of housing as previous administrations. By 2012, a shortage of building materials also disrupted construction, with metal production at a 16-year low. By the end of Chávez's presidency in 2013, the number of Venezuelans in inadequate housing had grown to 3 million. By 2016, residents of government-provided housing, who were usually supporters of the government, began protesting due to the lack of utilities and food. ==Social==
Social
Corruption Corruption is high in Venezuela according to the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index and is prevalent at many levels of society. While corruption is difficult to measure reliably, in 2018 Transparency International ranked Venezuela among the top 13 most corrupt countries out of 180 measured, tied with Iraq, but ahead of Afghanistan, Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, North Korea, Libya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. A 2016 poll found that 73% of Venezuelans believed their police were corrupt. Latinobarómetro's 2018 report said that 65% of Venezuelans believed their president was involved in corruption, and 64% believed that government officials were corrupt. Discontent with corruption was cited by opposition-aligned groups as one of the reasons for the 2014 Venezuelan protests. A once wealthy country, Venezuela's economy was driven into political and economic crisis by corruption and mismanagement. Crime Escalating violent crime, especially murder, had been called "perhaps the biggest concern" of Venezuelans during the crisis. Venezuela had "by various measures, the world's highest violent-crime rate" in 2017, and almost none of crimes that were reported were prosecuted. InSight Crime says the crisis has "all too often been obscured by the government's reluctance to release damning crime statistics". The New Yorker reporter found that even stairwells in a public hospital were not safe from robbers, who preyed on staff and patients despite the large number of security forces guarding the hospital, saying this was because the police were assigned to contain journalists who might embarrass the government with exposés on the state of the hospital; they were not assigned to protect its occupants. The police allegedly collaborated with the robbers receiving a cut of what they stole. The Bureau states that there were 73 daily violent deaths in 2018, and that the government "often attempts to refute or repudiate reports of increasing crime and murder rates; however, independent observers widely reject" the Venezuelan government's claims. According to the World Bank, the 2016 homicide rate was 56 per 100,000, making Venezuela third in the world, after El Salvador and Honduras. According to the Los Angeles Times,... carjack gangs set up ambushes, sometimes laying down nail-embedded strips to puncture tires of vehicles ferrying potential quarry. Motorists speak matter-of-factly of spotting body parts along roadways. ... While most crime victims are poor, they also include members of the middle and upper classes and scores of police and military personnel killed each year, sometimes for their weapons. ... "Before the thieves would only rob you," is a common refrain here in the capital. "Now they kill you." Venezuela led the world in murder rates, with 81 per 100,000 people killed in 2018; the third most violent country. El País reported in 2014 that Chávez had years earlier assigned colectivos to be "the armed wing of the Bolivarian Revolution" for the Venezuelan government, giving them weapons, communication systems, motorcycles and surveillance equipment to exercise control in the hills of Caracas where police are forbidden entry. In 2006, they received arms and funding from the state when they were brought under the government's community councils. s may not be included in data. During the 2014 Venezuelan protests against Maduro, colectivos acted against the opposition protesters. As the crisis intensified, armed gangs have taken control of cities. Human Rights Watch described colectivos as "armed gangs who use violence with impunity" to harass political opponents of the Venezuelan government. Amnesty International calls them "armed pro-government supporters who are tolerated or supported by the authorities". During the 2019 Venezuelan blackouts in March, Maduro called on the armed paramilitary gangs, saying, "The time has come for active resistance". As blackouts continued, on 31 March, citizens protested the lack of electricity and water in Caracas and other cities; Maduro called again on the colectivos, asking them "to defend the peace of every barrio, of every block". two protestors were shot. There is no reliable data on kidnapping in Venezuela and available data is considered an underestimate; The murder rate declined even further to 60.3 in 2019. Human rights Repression and politically motivated detentions have risen to record levels in 2019. Foro Penal states that Venezuela has at least 900 political prisoners as of April 2019, with more arrests of people being held longer in poor conditions and on dubious charges. The human rights organization has documented more than 50 instances that include "sexual abuse, strangulation using plastic bags and the use of razor blades to cut detainees' feet". Bachelet expressed her concerns for the "shockingly high" number of extrajudicial killings and urged for the dissolution of the FAES. According to the report, 1,569 cases of executions as consequence as a result of "resistance to authority" were registered by the Venezuelan authorities from 1 January to 19 March. The report also details how the Venezuelan government "aimed at neutralising, repressing and criminalising political opponents and people critical of the government" since 2016. On 15 February 2024, the Maduro government closed the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights office in Caracas after High Commissioner Volker Türk condemned the detention of activist Rocío San Miguel, demanding "her immediate release and respect for her right to legal defense". Maduro's government expelled its officials, giving them 72 hours to leave the country. Emigration accompanying Venezuelans to Cúcuta The exodus of millions of desperate impoverished Venezuelans to surrounding countries has been called "a risk for the entire region". The crisis started during the Chávez presidency, but became much more pronounced during Maduro's term. a failing public sector, and "shortages of basic necessities". The PGA Group estimates more than 1.5 million Venezuelans emigrated in the 15 years between 1999 and 2014; The UN said that in the first part of 2018, about 5,000 Venezuelans were leaving Venezuela daily. The UN estimates 2.7 million have gone to the Caribbean and Latin America. Venezuelans also cross into northern Brazil, where UNHCR has set up 10 shelters to house thousands of Venezuelans. The first wave of Venezuelan emigrants were wealthy and middle class Venezuelans concerned by Chávez's rhetoric of redistributing wealth to the poor; the early exodus of college-educated people with capital caused a brain drain. This second wave of emigration consisted of lower class Venezuelans suffering directly from the economic crisis facing the country; thus, the same individuals whom Chávez attempted to aid were now seeking to emigrate, driven by worsening economic conditions, scarcity of food and medicine, and rising rates of violent crime. Migration crisis The Organization of American States (OAS) and spokespersons for the United Nations refugee agency, UNHCR, have described it as the largest exodus in the history of the Western Hemisphere in the last 50 years. == Economic ==
Economic
Maduro's government stopped releasing social and economic indicators, so most data rely on estimates. A chief economist of the IIF said the crisis resulted from "policy decisions, economic mismanagement, and political turmoil", saying it is on a scale that "one would only expect from extreme natural disasters or military confrontations". The government's main source of income is oil, with output "plummeting due to lack of investment, poor maintenance and neglect", However, a "slight recovery" in economic activity in January 2020 reportedly "evaporated in February and March" due to "the fall in global oil prices and the coronavirus pandemic". Business and industry (1 = free, 7 = not free) A number of foreign firms have left the nation—often due to quarrels with the socialist government—including Smurfit Kappa, Clorox, Kimberly Clark and General Mills; the departures aggravate unemployment and shortages. Before the effects of the 2019 Venezuelan blackouts, the number of multinational companies in the industrial city of Valencia in Carabobo State had dropped from 5,000 when Chávez became president to a tenth of that. Airline industry Domestic airlines are having difficulties because of hyperinflation and parts shortages, and most international airlines have left the country. Other airlines that have left are Aeroméxico, Avianca, Delta, Lufthansa, LATAM, and United Airlines. Airlines have left for other reasons, including crime against flight crews and foreign passengers, stolen baggage, and problems with the quality of jet fuel and maintenance of runways. Aerolíneas Argentinas left in 2017, citing security reasons, and American Airlines, the last U.S. airline serving Venezuela, left on 15 March 2019, after its pilots refused to fly to Venezuela, citing safety issues. Currently, the only North American airline flying to Venezuela is Sunwing Airlines, with seasonal service to Margarita Island and Punto Fijo. Following the increasing economic partnership between Venezuela and Turkey in October 2016, Turkish Airlines started offering direct flights from December 2016 connecting between Caracas to Istanbul (via Havana, Cuba) in an effort to "link and expand contacts" between the two countries. Iranian airline Mahan Air (blacklisted by the U.S. government since 2011) began direct flights to Caracas in April 2019, "signifying a growing relationship between the two nations" according to Fox News. The suspension affects mainly Venezuelan airlines flying to Miami, which are Avior Airlines, LASER Airlines and Estelar Latinoamérica. Gross domestic product Estimated to drop by 25% in 2019, the IMF said the contraction in Venezuela's GDP—the largest since the Libyan Civil War began in 2014—was affecting all of Latin America. and by 2014 at 69% it was the highest in the world. In November 2016, Venezuela entered a period of hyperinflation, with inflation reaching 4,000% in 2017; the Venezuelan government "essentially stopped" producing inflation estimates in early 2018. In the 2017 Christmas season, some shops stopped using price tags since prices would inflate so quickly. From 2017 to 2019, some Venezuelans became video game gold farmers and could be seen playing games such as RuneScape to sell in-game currency or characters for real currency; players could make more money than salaried workers by earning only a few dollars per day. Some of these "gold farmers" will use cryptocurrencies as an intermediary currency before converting into Bolivares, as indicated in this interview. In October 2018, the IMF estimated that inflation would reach 10,000,000% by the end of 2019. In early 2019, the monthly minimum salary was the equivalent of US$5.50 (18,000 sovereign bolivars)—less than the price of a Happy Meal at McDonald's. The new reports imply a contraction of more than half of the economy in five years, according to the Financial Times "one of the biggest contractions in Latin American history". Sources quoted by Reuters, said that China may have asked Venezuela to release the data to bring Venezuela into compliance with the IMF and make it more difficult for the IMF to recognise Juan Guaidó during the presidential crisis. The IMF said it was not able to assess the quality of the data as it had no contact with the Venezuelan government. Some Venezuelans must search for food—occasionally resorting to eating wild fruit or garbage—wait in lines for hours and sometimes settle without having certain products. Unemployment In January 2016 the unemployment rate was 18.1 percent and the economy was the worst in the world according to the misery index. Venezuela has not reported official unemployment figures since April 2016, when the rate was at 7.3 percent. Unemployment was forecasted to reach 44% for 2019; the IMF stated that this was the highest unemployment seen since the end of the Bosnian War in 1995. which banned transactions involving Venezuela's state debt including debt restructuring. The technical default period ended 13 November 2017 and Venezuela did not pay coupons on its dollar eurobonds, causing a cross-default on other dollar bonds. A committee consisting of the fifteen largest banks admitted default on state debt obligations which in turn entailed payments on CDS on 30 November. In November 2017, The Economist estimated Venezuela's debt at US$105 billion and its reserves at US$10 billion. In 2018, Venezuela's debt grew to US$156 billion and as of March 2019, its reserves had dropped to US$8 billion. as of January 2019, all of Venezuela's bonds are in default, and Venezuela's government and state-owned companies owe nearly US$8 billion in unpaid interest and principal. As of March 2019, the government and state-owned companies have US$150 billion in debt. Oil industry By 2018 the political and economic troubles facing Venezuela had engulfed the El Tigre-San Tomé region, a key region for oil production in eastern Venezuela. Oil workers were fleeing the state-owned oil company as salaries could not keep up with hyperinflation, reducing families to starvation. Workers and criminals stripped vital oil industry equipment of anything valuable, ranging from pickup trucks to the copper wire within critical oil production components. Oil facilities were neglected and unprotected, crippling oil production and leading to environmental damage. As noted petroleum historian, expert, and former San Tomé resident Emma Brossard stated in 2005, "Venezuelan oil fields had a depletion rate of 25 per cent annually [and] there had to be an investment of US$3.4 billion a year to keep up its production." "But since Chávez has become president there has been no investment." As of 2020 there were no longer any oil rigs searching for oil in Venezuela, and production has been "reduced to a trickle". Oil exports are expected to total $2.3 billion for 2020, continuing a decline of more than a decade. Pollution from crude oil leaking from abandoned underwater wells and pipelines has caused serious damage to fishing and human health. In 2022, rising oil prices caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine led the World Oil Commission to start meetings with the Venezuelan Government to push oil production to have a control over the price. As a consequence of the energy crisis caused by the war, the United States allowed the American oil and gas company Chevron to resume limited operations in Venezuela again. ==Foreign involvement==
Foreign involvement
Economic sanctions Targeted sanctions against Venezuelan individuals and businesses began as early as 2005, over what the United States said were insufficient efforts by Venezuela to cooperate with its drug enforcement and anti-terrorism efforts. In 2011, the United States sanctioned Venezuela's state-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela. On 9 March 2015, Barack Obama signed and issued an executive order declaring Venezuela a national security threat and ordered sanctions against Venezuelan officials. The sanctions did not affect Venezuela's oil company and trade relations with the US continued. In 2017, Trump's administration imposed additional economic sanctions on Venezuela. The new sanctions prohibited Venezuela from borrowing from US financial institutions. During the COVID-19 pandemic, world leaders called for a suspension of economic sanctions, including against Venezuela and Iran, that have "increasingly become the pursuit of war by other means". The US responded by intensifying the sanctions against Venezuela. In June 2021, US banks blocked Venezuela's payments for COVID-19 vaccinations through the Covax program, delaying the first shipment of the vaccines until September. Impact According to executives within the company as well as the Venezuelan government, the 2011 United States sanctions were mostly symbolic and had little effect (if any) on Venezuela's trade with the US since the company's sale of oil to the US and the operations of its US-based subsidiary Citgo were unaffected. Sachs and Weisbrot argue that the 40,000 excess deaths measured between 2017 and 2018 are largely attributable to the impact of the 2017 US sanctions. Sachs and Weisbrot concede that the outcome in a counterfactual scenario without sanctions in unknowable, but argue that the sanctions "lock Venezuela into a downward economic spiral" by making policies that would ordinarily resolve a similar crisis impossible to implement. An October 2020 report published by the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) by Venezuelan economist Luis Oliveros found that "while Venezuela's economic crisis began before the first U.S. sectoral sanctions were imposed in 2017, these measures 'directly contributed to its deep decline, and to the further deterioration of the quality of life of Venezuelans' ". The report concluded that economic sanctions "have cost Venezuela's government as much as $31 billion since 2017" Legality In 2019, former UN rapporteur Alfred de Zayas said that US sanctions on Venezuela were illegal as they constituted economic warfare and "could amount to 'crimes against humanity' under international law". In February 2019, Jorge Arreaza, Maduro's Minister for Foreign Affairs, said he was forming a coalition of diplomats who "believe the U.S. and others are violating the U.N. charter against non-interference in member states". During the announcement, he was surrounded by diplomats from 16 other countries, including Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and Cuba. Arreaza said the cost to the Venezuelan economy of the US blockade was over $30 billion. Reporting on Arreaza's statements, the Associated Press said that Maduro was blocking aid, and "saying that Venezuelans are not beggars and that the move is part of a U.S.-led coup". Alena Douhan, United Nations special rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures, was due to visit Venezuela in August 2020 to investigate the impact of international sanctions. Before her visit, 66 Venezuelan NGOs (including PROVEA) asked Douhan in an open letter to consider the harmful impact of sanctions in the context of years of repression, corruption and economic mismanagement that predate the sanctions, and requested she meet independent press and civil society researchers. She arrived on 31 January, and was welcomed on arrival by a government minister and the Venezuelan ambassador to the UN. that sanctions against Venezuela have had a "devastating" noticeable impact in both the economy and the population. She said "the increasing number of unilateral sanctions imposed by United States, the European Union and other countries have exacerbated the economic and humanitarian calamities in Venezuela" but that Venezuela's economic decline "began in 2014 with the fall in oil prices" and that "mismanagement and corruption had also contributed." The government welcomed the report, while the opposition accused her of "playing into the hands of the regime" of Maduro. Douhan was harshly criticized by the Venezuelan civil society, and several non-governmental organizations pronounced themselves in social media with the hashtag "#Lacrisisfueprimero" (The crisis came first). Responsibility for the crisis Some US-based economists have argued that the significance of US sanctions on Venezuela is minimal because shortages and high inflation in Venezuela began before US sanctions were directed towards the country. The Wall Street Journal said that economists place the blame for Venezuela's economy shrinking by half on "Maduro's policies, including widespread nationalizations, out-of-control spending that sparked inflation, price controls that led to shortages, and widespread graft and mismanagement."On 11 August 2017, President Trump said that he is "not going to rule out a military option" to confront the autocratic government of Nicolás Maduro and the deepening crisis in Venezuela. Military Times said the unnamed aides told Trump it was not wise to even discuss a military solution due to the long history of unpopular intervention in Latin America by the United States. Venezuela's Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino criticized Trump for the statement, calling it "an act of supreme extremism" and "an act of madness". The Venezuelan communications minister, Ernesto Villegas, said Trump's words amounted to "an unprecedented threat to national sovereignty". Representatives of the United States were in contact with dissident Venezuelan military officers during 2017 and 2018 but declined to collaborate with them or provide assistance to them. The opinion of other Latin American nations was split with respect to military intervention. Luis Almagro, the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, while visiting Colombia, did not rule out the potential benefit of the use of military force to intervene with the crisis. Canada, Colombia and Guyana, which are members of the Lima Group, refused to sign the organization's document rejecting military intervention in Venezuela. During the 2019 Venezuelan presidential crisis, allegations of potential United States military involvement began to circulate, with military intervention in Venezuela was already being executed by the governments of Cuba and Russia. On 2 April 2019, the Russian Foreign Ministry rejected Trump's call to "get out" saying their 100 military servicemen now in Venezuela will support Maduro "for as long as needed". In May 2020, Venezuelan dissidents backed by Silvercorp USA attempted to infiltrate Venezuela by sea and overthrow Maduro in Operation Gideon. The raid failed, and the dissidents and mercenaries were killed or captured. The owner of Silvercorp, an ex-US special operations sergeant, said he met with Trump administration officials about the plan. Humanitarian aid Throughout the crisis, humanitarian aid was provided to Venezuelans in need both within Venezuela and abroad. In October 2018, the USNS Comfort departed for an eleven-week operation in Latin America, with a primary mission being to assist countries who received Venezuelan refugees who fled the crisis in Venezuela. The main goal was to relieve health systems in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and other nations which faced the arrival of thousands of Venezuelan migrants. At the end of January 2019, as the US prepared to bring aid across the border, the International Committee of the Red Cross warned the United States about the risk of delivering humanitarian aid without the approval of the government's security forces. The UN similarly warned the US about politicising the crisis and using aid as a pawn in the power struggle. Other humanitarian organisations also raised risks. On 23 February 2019, 14 trucks carrying 280 tons of humanitarian aid attempted to bring aid across the Simon Bolivar and Francisco de Paula Santander bridges from Colombia. There were clashes, with Venezuelan security forces reported to use tear gas attack in attempt to maintain a blockade of the border. Colombia said around 285 people were injured and at least two trucks set on fire. CNN reported that the Venezuela government accused Guaidó supporters of burning the trucks and noted that "While a CNN team saw incendiary devices from police on the Venezuelan side of the border ignite the trucks, the network's journalists are unsure if the trucks were burned on purpose." In March, The New York Times reported that footage showed that it was anti-Maduro protestors rather than Venezuelan security forces who were responsible for the burning trucks. The New York Times reported that the trucks had been set on fire by anti-Maduro protester who threw a Molotov cocktail that hit one of the trucks. Responding when asked about the claims in a BBC interview, Juan Guaidó stressed that its findings suggested only a possible theory, that it was the newspaper's point of view and that a total of three trucks were burned, while the footage focused on one. Journalist Karla Salcedo Flores denounced state-run Telesur for plagiarism and the manipulation of her photos for propaganda purposes after the network claimed protesters poured gasoline on the trucks. Agence France-Presse published an investigation disproving Telesur's claims with the photos. Bellingcat reported that since the open source evidence examined for its investigation does not show the moment of ignition, it is not possible to make a definitive determination regarding the cause of the fire. Franceso Rocca, president of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, announced on 29 March 2019 that the Red Cross was preparing to bring humanitarian aid to the country to help ease both the chronic hunger and the medical crisis. The Guardian reported that Maduro had "long denied the existence of a humanitarian crisis, and on 23 February blocked an effort led by Guaidó to bring aid into the country", and that the Red Cross had "brokered a deal" between the Maduro and Guaidó administrations "indicating a seldom-seen middle ground between the two men". Maduro and Arreaza met with representative of Red Cross International on 9 April to discuss the aid effort. The Wall Street Journal said that the acceptance of humanitarian shipments by Maduro was his first acknowledgement that Venezuela is "suffering from an economic collapse", adding that "until a few days ago, the government maintained there was no crisis and it didn't need outside help". Quoting Tamara Taraciuk—an expert at Human Rights Watch on Venezuela—who called the situation "a completely man-made crisis", The New York Times said the aid effort in Venezuela presented challenges regarding how to deliver aid in an "unprecedented political, economic and humanitarian crisis" that was "caused largely by the policies of a government intent on staying in power, rather than war or natural disaster". Armed pro-government paramilitaries fired weapons to disrupt the first Red Cross delivery, and officials associated with Maduro's party told the Red Cross to leave. An April 2021 report by the inspector general at United States Agency for International Development found that the Trump administration had politicized the early 2019 humanitarian aid package and was motivated by regime change in Venezuela more so than ameliorating the humanitarian situation there. ==Public opinion==
Public opinion
A November 2016 Datincorp survey that asked Venezuelans living in urban areas which entity was responsible for the crisis, 59% blamed chavismo or the presidents (Chávez, 25%; Maduro 19%; Chavismo 15%) while others blamed the opposition (10%), entrepreneurs (4%) and the United States (2%). A September 2018 Meganálisis survey found that 85% of Venezuelans wanted Maduro to leave power immediately. A November 2018 Datanálisis poll found that 54% of Venezuelans opposed a foreign military intervention to remove Maduro, while 35% supported an intervention. Instead, 63% supported a "negotiated settlement to remove Maduro". An 11–14 March 2019 survey of 1,100 people in 16 Venezuelan states and 32 cities by Meganálisis found that 89% of respondents wanted Maduro to leave the presidency. A Datanálisis poll on 4 March 2019 found Maduro's approval rating at an all-time low of 14%. According to Datanálisis, in early 2019, 63% of Venezuelans believed that a change of government was possible. Fourteen months later, in May 2020, after the Macuto Bay raid, the percentage decreased to 20%. According to economists interviewed by The New York Times, the situation is by far the worst economic crisis in Venezuela's history, and is also the worst facing a country in peace time since the mid-20th century. The crisis is also more severe than that of the United States during the Great Depression, the 1985–1994 Brazilian economic crisis, or the 2008–2009 hyperinflation in Zimbabwe. Other writers have also compared aspects of the crisis, such as unemployment and GDP contraction, to that of Bosnia and Herzegovina after the 1992–1995 Bosnian War, and those in Russia, Cuba and Albania following the collapse of the Eastern Bloc in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. == See also ==
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