Blasphemy In 2009, the Venice Commission attracted rare news coverage for its opinion that "
blasphemy should not be illegal".
Elections: boundary delimitation As part of its report,
European Commission for Democracy Through Law: Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, Guidelines and Explanatory Reports adopted October 2002, the Venice Commission recommended a number of considerations, also when dealing with issues of
boundary delimitation.
Poland Background and the roots of democratic backsliding The
2015 Polish parliamentary elections saw the victory of the
Law and Justice Party (PiS) with an outright majority against the incumbent
Civic Platform party. Before the elections were held, the ruling Civic Platform party changed the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal that prevented judges from being elected before their term was over. The Civic Platform party before could only appoint three constitutional judges, as there were vacancies at the time, however, under the new rule, the governing party appointed five judges to the
Polish Constitutional Tribunal as there were two vacancies that were to open right after the parliamentary elections. Nonetheless, none of the judges were sworn in by the President and the governing
PiS appointed five judges, passing a series of legislation related to the Tribunal that was characterized by the
European Union in its first Rule of Law Recommendation as posing a serious threat to the rule of law in Poland. This legislation included around 6 specific laws, ranging from a chronology requirement, where the Tribunal had to decide cases in order that they came in which effectively allowed the newer government greater leverage with the most recent laws it has passed, to a 6-month requirement for the Court to review laws. However, in absence of
vacatio legis, the legislation entered into force which: a) prevented the Commission's recommendations to be incorporated and improve the law before it had legal effect, and b) imposed a special mechanism of control on the Constitutional Tribunal which was effectively disabled from exercising its powers because the legislation changes had already been implemented. To illustrate the latter point, since the Court had at the time only 12 sitting judges, it could not review the constitutionality of current laws, as the new legislation required quorum of 13 judges. related to the
Romanian Constitutional Court and upheld that "it must be ensured that the Constitutional Court as the guarantor of the Constitution remains functioning as a democratic institution". Additionally, in an opinion related to the Constitutional Court of Albania that posed the question of whether the judges sitting at the Court could be involved in assessing the constitutionality of laws that affected them, the Commission again upheld that "the authorization of the Court derives from the necessity to make sure that no law is exempt from constitutional review, including laws that relate to the position of judges...". The Commission commented specifically on the quorum through a comparative lens. It mentioned that in other European Countries, such as Albania, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Georgia, Hungary, Lithuania, the Republic of Moldova, Romania and the Russian Federation, there seems to be a consensus about having two-thirds as the quorum that would allow the Constitutional Court to decide; the German Federal Constitutional Court, on the other hand, has a three-fourths requirement in both of its eight-member chambers. However, the new requirement introduced by the Polish legislator with 13 judges out of 15 judges to have quorum goes beyond the established standards according to the Commission. While European legislators agree for the need of quorum that goes above an absolute majority, the Commission warns that the proposed changes could lead to inefficiency and make the Tribunal "dysfunctional". In addition, the Commission reviews the "sequence rule", the majority for adopting decisions (2/3), and the delay on hearings, as procedural aspects, along with the disciplinary proceedings and the Tribunal's composition—all parts of the new legislation. The Opinion 833/2015 concludes by highlighting that for the achievement of checks and balances in a constitutional democracy, an independent Constitutional Court is needed, and so long there is a lack thereof, "not only is rule of law in danger, but so is democracy and human rights".
The National Council of the Judiciary (NCJ) reforms According to Article 186 from the
Polish Constitution, the
National Council of the Judiciary (NCJ) is a constitutional organ that "shall safeguard the independence of courts and judges". Its main responsibilities lie in appointing judges, reviewing the professional ethic standards regarding the judiciary, a general overview of any judiciary matters and overall—the protection of the Polish judiciary's independence, thus ensuring that rule of law is upheld within this branch of government. On 20 January 2017, the
Polish government announced a comprehensive reform of the judiciary in Poland, which included the NCJ. This process of legislative changes was aided by the actions of the new composition of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, which in its decision K5/17 declared the NCJ's Statute "unconstitutional", which paved the way for the new legislation. To summarize, in a period of only two years after PiS election there have been 13 laws that transformed the judiciary branch and the structure of Polish justice system, from the Constitutional Tribunal, the NCJ, to the lower courts across the country. As a result, the European Commission has established that the constitutionality of national legislation "can no longer be guaranteed" and the independence of the judicial branch has been undermined. By looking at the new method of election of NCJ members, the early termination of the mandate of the current members, the creation of new chambers, early retirement of senior judges, and extraordinary review of final judgments, among others, the Commission has issued the Opinion 904/2017, where it clearly underlines that "the judiciary should be insulated from quickly changing political winds". It was followed by a prolonged period of internal consultations and additional deliberations in Montenegro, resulting in the creation of a new draft law, that was followed by another opinion of the VC, issued in June 2019, recommending various improvements and clarifications.
Pre-trial Detention and Local Governance In its 2025 report Report on the Impact of the Pre-Trial Detention of Mayors on the Exercise of Local Democratic Governance, the Venice Commission examined the implications of detaining elected local officials prior to trial. It emphasized that pre-trial detention should remain an exceptional measure, justified by case-specific reasons and subject to effective judicial oversight. The Commission highlighted that such detention may affect not only the individual rights of elected officials, but also the rights of voters and the functioning of local democracy, particularly where it risks undermining political pluralism or the effective exercise of elected mandates. ==See also==