Bolshevik disagreements On , news arrived of the Bolshevik victory in Moscow and the withdrawal of Kerensky's forces from the outskirts of Petrograd, which eased military pressure on the government and, in the following days, led to a divergence of positions at the negotiating table. With military victory, the Bolsheviks' interest in negotiating with their adversaries —non-existent in Lenin's case— notably diminished. For their part, the Socialist Revolutionaries were also not participating with the intention of reaching an agreement. Both parties attended the negotiations compelled by the railway workers. The return of Lenin and Trotsky to the Central Committee sessions also favored the hardening of the Bolshevik negotiating position. Lenin and Trotsky —the latter just returned from the fighting south of the capital against Kerensky— convinced that Kamenev had made excessive concessions, attacked the agreement in the lengthy Central Committee meeting on the afternoon and night of . Lenin argued that including the
dumas would be a concession to bourgeois forces and would end the assumption of power by the soviets approved at the Second Congress; he advocated an exclusively Bolshevik government. Convinced that the revolution in Russia would soon spread throughout the rest of Europe, he maintained that concessions to the moderate socialists would return governmental power to them and frustrate the world revolution. In a heated session, he advocated arresting Vikzhel if it resisted the government and challenged the conciliationist current of Kamenev to force a split in the party and take power if it obtained a majority —while threatening to seek the support of the sailors in that case—.
Lunacharsky, in defense of the agreement, opposed excluding the
dumas, elected by universal suffrage and which he considered necessary to guarantee state administration, as well as using force or terror to remain in power. He received support from
Viktor Nogin, who criticized the absence of Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries from the soviets, as this rendered them useless, and from
David Riazanov, who feared that rejecting the pact would deprive them of the support of the
Left Socialist Revolutionaries and invalidate the promise of a Soviet government. Trotsky, for his part, sided with Lenin and harshly attacked the moderates. Although the moderates were willing to continue negotiations and try to modify the agreement reached, Lenin indicated that the talks should only continue as a stratagem to facilitate military operations against
Kerensky, since he was convinced that the other socialist parties would not accept the soviets as the basis of national government. Trotsky, meanwhile, indicated that an agreement with the Mensheviks would only serve to complicate the Bolsheviks' governmental activities.
Yakov Sverdlov suggested using an incident to end the negotiations. The final vote concluded with ten votes in favor of continuing dialogue with the socialist adversaries and four opposed. Despite this, the committee approved certain conditions, proposed by Lenin: acceptance of Soviet political power and of the Second Congress and its decrees, the government's responsibility to the CEC, the exclusion from the CEC of organizations that were not soviets, the inclusion of himself and Trotsky in the cabinet, and the fight against counterrevolutionary forces, including Kerensky. These minimum conditions were intended to demonstrate the impossibility —pointed out by Trotsky— of reaching an agreement with the moderates without at the same time destroying the possibility of an alliance with the Left Socialist Revolutionaries. The Bolshevik position approved at the Central Committee meeting was presented shortly after that same night by
V. Volodarsky, closer to Lenin's theses, to the CEC, to the disappointment of supporters of the agreement from other parties, who believed in the prospects of an immediate pact. The Bolshevik majority in the CEC ensured the approval of the motion proposed by Volodarsky, finally passed also with the votes of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries, who first tried in vain to present a more conciliatory alternative motion.
The withdrawal of the Socialist Revolutionaries Faced with the reiteration of the Bolshevik demand that power reside solely in the soviets, the Socialist Revolutionary delegates withdrew from the talks, thereafter attending only as observers. In reality, the PSR had participated reluctantly in the negotiations, compelled by the railway workers; Kerensky had been receptive to Vikzhel's proposals only after the defeat at the
Pulkovo Heights. Intransigent in the sessions, they had scarcely agreed to grant the Bolsheviks a part of the political power that they already fully enjoyed.
Menshevik disagreements While Kamenev faced the need to try to convince his co-religionists to accept the
dumas in the new parliament or for the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks to accept the conditions added by Lenin and approved by the Bolshevik Central Committee, the Menshevik supporters of the agreement simultaneously faced their own rivals within the party. The previous day, they had barely managed to pass a resolution to continue negotiating with the Bolsheviks by twelve votes to eleven. On the night of , the result was repeated, and the
defensists decided to resign from the Central Committee, which would have unleashed a serious crisis between the party's two currents. To avoid this, the narrow internationalist majority decided to make concessions to the defensists. The Menshevik Central Committee responded the following day to the Bolshevik conditions with its own. These included the rejection of excluding the
dumas and other democratic organizations from the new parliament —a concession to the defensists to try to secure their support—, the release of political prisoners arrested in the preceding days, an end to political terror and the restoration of political rights such as the right to strike, assembly, association, and freedom of the press, a ceasefire in the
conflict with Krasnov and Kerensky, and the transfer of some troops to the
dumas to prevent pogroms and looting.
New agreement, Bolshevik and Menshevik crisis Lenin rejected these conditions and managed to pass, by a one-vote majority, a new resolution more intransigent than the previous one on . The motion, vainly rejected by the moderates on the Central Committee, demanded his presence and Trotsky's in the government, and indicated that only the Sovnarkom's measures were compatible with the expansion of the Russian revolution throughout Europe. By demanding conditions unacceptable to the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries, he sought to derail the negotiations, without openly rejecting the original agreement. Kamenev, with dwindling support in the Bolshevik Central Committee, tried to unblock the negotiations by publicly presenting Lenin's second motion before the CEC; after protesting and allowing a recess, the opposition approved Kamenev's motion presented on behalf of the Bolshevik delegation. This included the admission of the
dumas, trade unions, and representatives of the Congress of Peasants' Soviets and the army into the new parliament, the reservation of at least half the seats for the Bolsheviks, the inclusion of Lenin and Trotsky in the new government, and the cession of the Ministries of Interior, Labor, and Foreign Affairs to their party. In the early hours of , the opposition had accepted Kamenev's motion upon learning of Lenin's much greater demands. The agreement in the
VTsIK was a serious setback for Lenin's position, as the approved motion included the main Bolshevik demands in exchange for granting fifty seats to the
dumas. The moderates hoped it would gain majority support from the Bolshevik and Menshevik Central Committees and the party rank and file. Lenin, furious, considering that the actions of a minority against an approved motion violated
party discipline, reacted by interviewing all members of the Central Committee separately and proposing their signing of an ultimatum addressed to the moderates. Lenin demanded support for his positions expressed in the motion and the resignation of the opposition or their taking the reins of government and his own exclusion. Nine members signed Lenin's proposal. Finally, Lenin offered to convene an extraordinary congress to decide the party's position, a challenge the moderates did not accept. For their part, the situation was similar in the Menshevik party: the
defensists demanded a party conference after the defeat of their positions in the Central Committee. The two party currents clashed fiercely and tried to gain a majority at the extraordinary conference on . They engaged in a bitter debate in which each presented itself as the true representative of Menshevism. With forces evenly matched, the final resolution did not clearly adopt the theses of either the supporters or opponents of an agreement; it timidly criticized the Central Committee's actions and vaguely recommended a change of attitude, without specifying which one should be adopted. However, the proposal of the moderate Bolsheviks approved by the CEC proved unacceptable to the opposition, which expressed its rejection in the session of before launching into criticism of Bolshevik repression and again demanding the formation of a new cabinet responsible to the "Provisional People's Council". Given the continuation of political repression by the Military Revolutionary Committee, Martov and Dan proved unable to garner sufficient support from the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries to sustain the agreement. Thus, they demanded an end to the repression on as a condition for continuing dialogue. The Mensheviks demanded an end to terror, the release of the bourgeois ministers from the
Peter and Paul Fortress, and an end to hostilities —which Kerensky had already accepted—. This maneuver was intended to strengthen their position in the Central Committee and dispel doubts that they were yielding to Lenin. Kamenev reacted by demanding that the Military Revolutionary Committee cease its repression to allow negotiations to continue, in accordance with the motion approved by the Central Committee days earlier. The moderate faction opposed the terror, criticized its use by the Sovnarkom, and warned that it could lead to the failure of the revolution and the formation of a government not responsible to the people: Five members of the Central Committee —Kamenev, Zinoviev,
Rykov, Nogin, and
Milyutin— and four People's Commissars —Rykov, Nogin, Teodorovich, and Milyutin— resigned. Kamenev left the presidency of the VTsIK, which passed to
Sverdlov. The resignations, accompanied by letters from Kamenev, Zinoviev, Rykov, Nogin, and Milyutin to various Bolshevik organizations, sought to involve the party rank and file in the position on the negotiations. The Left Socialist Revolutionaries, in protest against the measures of the Military Revolutionary Committee, resigned from it between and . Lenin's rejection of the Menshevik ultimatum, however, sufficed to end them. On , Vikzhel informed its members in Moscow of the failure of the negotiations and its return to the capital. At the session that night, the Bolsheviks and Left Socialist Revolutionaries did not appear, and the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries, convinced of the imminent disintegration of the Bolshevik party due to the resignations of the moderates and increasingly opposed to an agreement with them due to the repression of the Military Revolutionary Committee, appeared with no intention of reaching a deal. The last session took place on , and the Bolshevik representatives no longer attended. At that moment, they were approving in the CEC the permission for the Sovnarkom to govern by decree. The Leninist position had been gaining strength during the last few days among the capital's proletariat. Both the meeting of the Bolshevik Petersburg Committee and the delegates of the First Conference of Petrograd Workers or the Petrograd Trade Union Council —the latter two initially favorable to the positions of the moderate Bolsheviks— expressed their support for Lenin's position during the final days of the negotiations. Moreover, Vikzhel's strength was less than it appeared: the executive committee could not impose its criteria on all railway workers, and Bolshevik supporters abounded, especially among workshop workers and in Moscow. ==Conclusions==