2026 Mali offensives

Mali has been embroiled in a civil war since 2012, initiated by a loose coalition of secular Tuareg rebels from the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) with support from various jihadist groups, including Ansar Dine and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. In January 2012, these groups launched an offensive against government forces in northern Mali. By April, the MNLA had seized control of Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu, proclaiming the independence of the State of Azawad. The offensive prompted Malian officers to overthrow President Amadou Toumani Touré and seek French intervention via Operation Serval, which routed the jihadists at Konna and reversed the gains made by the Islamist faction of the alliance. Malian president Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, elected in 2013, failed to implement reforms to strengthen the Malian state. Foreign military missions such as MINUSMA and the French-led Operation Barkhane also failed to fully suppress rebel and jihadist groups, some of which formed the al-Qaeda affiliated alliance Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) in 2017. Following protests in response to alleged fraud in the 2020 parliamentary election, Keïta was removed in a coup led by Assimi Goïta, who became the military ruler of Mali after another coup in 2021. Following a setback at the Battle of Tinzaouaten in 2024, which was won by the Azawad Liberation Front (a descendant of the MNLA) and JNIM, the Wagner Group was replaced by the Russian Africa Corps, who have since exploited the country's minerals and killed civilians in areas frequented by the FLA and JNIM. Following 2024, JNIM opened a new front to isolate Bamako and other urban areas in western and southern Mali from economic centers and supply lines. The group targeted the mining region of Kayes and towns that connect Mali to Senegal, Mauritania, Guinea and Ivory Coast, the primary sources of Malian fuel imports. This was part of wider pressure by JNIM in southern Mali. In July 2025, JNIM launched attacks on the cities of Kayes and Nioro du Sahel. In September 2025, JNIM imposed a fuel blockade by attacking transport routes from the borders to government-controlled southern cities. As the south houses the majority of Mali's population, food production, and economic centers, the blockade of fuel imports crippled the Malian state's ability to function. Prior to these attacks, a truce between JNIM and the Malian government had freed 100 JNIM prisoners in exchange for a lifting of the fuel blockade. Signed in late March, the truce was intended to last until Eid al-Adha (locally called Tabaski) in late May. The Malian government later denied releasing any prisoners, claiming the reports were "completely unfounded and lacking any reliable source." == Attacks ==

On 25 April, shortly before 5:20, two explosions and heavy gunfire were reported near Kati, the main military base located on the outskirts of Bamako (which houses Malian leader Assimi Goïta). JNIM fighters drove a car bomb into the house of Defense Minister Sadio Camara, killing him and members of his family. At around 6:00, men dressed in Malian army uniforms entered the town of Kati. Witnesses also reported that Russian mercenaries were involved in fighting near the Modibo Keita International Airport in Bamako, where three helicopters were reportedly seen patrolling amid sustained gunfire. Gunfire was simultaneously reported in Gao, Sévaré, Kidal Footage showed FLA fighters entering the residence of the Governor of Kidal General El Hadj Ag Gamou, who had been appointed by the junta in 2023. A former Kidal mayor confirmed to the Associated Press that gunmen took control of neighborhoods in the city, leading to clashes with the army. Gunfire was reported on April 26 at the garrison in Kati, where JNIM attackers were present in unfinished buildings and surrounding hills, despite Malian army claims of full control over the town. The FLA later announced that they reached a deal to allow the withdrawal of Russian Africa Corps forces from Kidal, granting the rebels full control of the area. An unnamed FLA spokesperson stated that after negotiations with elements of the encircled Africa Corps detachment at the base, they were to be withdrawn and escorted to the town of Tessalit. followed by the withdrawal of Malian soldiers. The FLA subsequently gained full control over Kidal, and the Malian flag no longer flew over the city. The Africa Corps later confirmed its withdrawal from Kidal on 27 April. It was also reported that the Africa Corps withdrew from the Aguelhok and Tessalit communes adjacent to Kidal. Also on 27 April, Malian and Russian troops withdrew from Labbezanga in the Gao Region, a border post on the Mali–Niger border, which was subsequently occupied by Islamic State - Sahel Province (ISSP) members. ISSP also began amassing forces around Ménaka, the capital of the Ménaka Region, and launched probing attacks on military positions around the city. On 30 April, the government of Niger announced that the unified forces of the Alliance of Sahel States had "conducted intense air campaigns" against jihadist and separatist forces in the hours after the 25 April attacks in Kidal, Gao, and Ménaka, which in addition to Mali involved Burkina Faso and Niger. Central and southern Mali JNIM was reportedly involved in attacking Sévaré and Kati, where an FLA presence was not reported. Other clashes took place between JNIM and the Malian armed forces in Base 101 in Senou. A civilian told RFI JNIM fighters killed two people during the initial attack on Mopti. Libération claimed that "the city of Gao was mostly under rebel control, although Malian forces held the Gao airport". Gunfire was reported on April 26 at the garrison in Kati, where JNIM attackers were present in unfinished buildings and surrounding hills, Negotiated withdrawals of Malian and Africa Corps forces also took place in Ber and at the lucrative Intahaka gold mine. On 30 April, JNIM claimed that it took control of two checkpoints outside of Bamako, and also that it captured the military camp near Hombori in central Mali, which the Africa Corps denied. On the same day it was reported that JNIM had set up its own checkpoints around the capital. More than 250 buses and private vehicles were stranded on the roads outside the capital, and the Malian military launched operations to restore access on two critical national highways. There were no fuel shortages reported as of 2 May. == Casualties and losses ==

The Malian government did not release an official death toll, although a hospital source said that the attack in Kati killed 23 soldiers and civilians. Government spokesperson General Issa Ousmane Coulibaly stated that 16 people, including soldiers and civilians, were injured. An Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) spokesperson released video footage allegedly showing the downing of a Malian Air Force Mil Mi-35 helicopter in the Gao Region. Subsequent reports revealed that the helicopter belonged to the Africa Corps and that both the crew and the mobile fire group on board were killed. There is evidence that one Malian Air Force Mi-24 helicopter was captured by the FLA on the ground. Defense Minister Sadio Camara was targeted by a car bombing which destroyed his residence in Kati, killing him alongside his second wife and two grandchildren. Some nearby buildings, including a mosque, were also destroyed by the bombing, killing several civilians. Camara's fate was initially the subject of conflicting reports, with staff initially claiming he was safe. His death was confirmed by the government on 26 April, which announced two days of countrywide mourning. According to RFI, President Assimi Goïta was evacuated from Kati to a secure military camp, while intelligence chief Modibo Koné and Army Chief of Staff Oumar Diarra were reportedly wounded, with Koné sustaining multiple gunshot wounds in the fighting at Kati. Conflicting reports emerged of Koné's death on April 26, and others saying he was still alive as of April 28 but in deteriorating condition. The location of Assimi Goïta was unknown until Tuesday. His first public appearance since the start of the attacks was in a visit to a hospital in Bamako to the hospitalized family of Sadio Camara. In a post on X, the Africa Corps claimed that 10,000 to 12,000 JNIM and FLA fighters participated in the attacks. They alleged that over 1,000 insurgents were killed, including over 200 in Bamako, 500 in Gao, 300 in Kati, and 200 in Kidal, and that over 100 vehicles were destroyed. On 28 April, the Russian Ministry of Defence released footage of airstrikes carried out by Russian personnel, claiming that at least 305 militants had been killed in recent strikes. On 2 May, Malian state TV reported that over 200 militants were killed in targeted airstrikes the prior morning; Xinhua News Agency reported that four weaponized trucks and 60 motorcycles were also destroyed. == Response ==

Government response The Malian military confirmed on 25 April that it was clashing with unidentified "terrorist groups" in the capital and other parts of the country. An official statement from the General Staff of the Armed Forces informed the public that "unidentified armed terrorist groups" had targeted locations and barracks across the country. The Africa Corps also accused "Ukrainian mercenaries" and Western intelligence of involvement in the offensive, In the days following the attack, tensions grew between Africa Corps officials and Malian officials, both sides perceiving the other as having betrayed them. A Malian official told RFI that Kidal governor El Hadj Ag Gamou had warned the Russians of an impending attack three days beforehand, and the Russians didn't react. On 2 May, the Military Court of Bamako launched an investigation into five soldiers, including three active duty servicemen and one killed during the attacks, stating that there was "solid evidence" implicating them in the attacks. The court also accused politicians, including the exiled Oumar Mariko, of involvement. Militant response An FLA field commander stated the offensive had been planned for months; he indicated that the rebels next intended to capture Gao, after which "Timbuktu will be easy to fall." JNIM later released a statement confirming its involvement in the attacks, claiming responsibility for attacks against the residence of Assimi Goïta, Defense Minister Sadio Camara, the Kati military base, Mopti, and other locations. An FLA spokesman told AFP while in Paris on 29 April that they intend to capture Gao, Timbuktu, and Ménaka. He also said that "the regime will fall, sooner or later," and that the group wants Russia to withdraw from Mali, though "We have no particular problem with Russia...Our problem is with the regime that governs Bamako." == Reactions ==

Domestic On 28 April, according to a statement by his office, Assimi Goïta visited Russian ambassador Igor Gromyko and a hospital treating people wounded in the attacks, in his first appearances since the attacks began. In a televised speech later that day, he said that the situation was "of extreme gravity" but was "under control." He vowed to crackdown on rebels. Fousseynou Ouattara, the vice president of the Defense and Security Commission of Mali's National Transitional Council, said that the actions of the Africa Corps were "decisive" in preventing the overthrow of the Malian transitional government. Malian Prime Minister Abdoulaye Maïga called the attacks "cowardly and barbaric" and said that their extensive scale suggested foreign funding. He added that the government would continue its fight against militant groups and claimed that the Malian army had killed hundreds of fighters. He then claimed that the 25 April attacks were "intended to overthrow the government, dismantle state institutions and end the transition process." An opposition party in exile, the Coalition of Forces for the Republic, said in a statement that the offensive has shown that the military junta has failed in its pledge to restore security and stability in Mali. The Malian Football Federation postponed all Malian Première Division matches scheduled for 25 April. International Supranational • – Commission Chairman Mahmoud Ali Youssouf's office issued a post that read he "strongly condemns these acts, which risk exposing civilian populations to significant harm, and reaffirms the Commission's steadfast commitment to the promotion of peace, security, good governance, and stability in Mali." • – The organization called the attacks "a monstrous plot backed by the enemies of the liberation of the Sahel." • – Secretary-General Hissein Brahim Taha posted that he is following "with great concern the military operations" that he "strongly condemned" the attacks for seriously endangering the "lives of civilians and threaten peace, security, and stability." States • – On 27 April 2026, Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmed Attaf reaffirmed Algeria's firm support for the "unity of Mali, its land, people and institutions," while also "categorically rejecting all forms and manifestations of terrorism." Attaf stated that such attacks "cannot be justified or tolerated regardless of its motives and causes" and called for strengthening state cohesion in Mali as the best way to combat the phenomenon. • – The Foreign Ministry issued a statement that read "French nationals are advised to make arrangements to leave Mali temporarily as soon as possible on the commercial flights that are still available" and that "travel to Mali is still strongly discouraged, regardless of the reason." • – Expressed solidarity with Mali. Some Moroccan news outlets also claimed the Polisario Front was aiding the rebels. • – Announced that it, Burkina Faso, and Mali "conducted intense air campaigns" against the attackers. Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov said that "Russia's presence there is, in fact, due to the need identified by the current government. Russia will continue, including in Mali, to combat extremism, terrorism and other harmful phenomena and will continue to provide ‌assistance ⁠to the current government." • – The foreign ministry condemned the attacks, offered condolences and reaffirming its solidarity with the Malian government. • – President Bassirou Diomaye Faye condemned the attacks, stating that his government and military would "work together with the countries of the sub-region toward the restoration of peace and security in our shared space." • – The foreign ministry released a statement condemning the offensives as "terrorist attacks". • – The embassy said that its citizens "should shelter in place and avoid travel to these destinations until further information becomes available." Non-state actors • Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin: Insurgents called for Malians to begin an uprising against the Malian military junta and transition to Sharia law. ==Analysis==

Liam Karr of the Critical Threats Project said that "one of the primary aims of JNIM's attacks in central and southern Mali was likely to degrade the Malian army's ability to coordinate a response to the attacks in northern Mali." == References ==