In 1947, in the context of the growing
Cold War against the
Soviet Union and its leader
Joseph Stalin, Borden and two Yale classmates composed a so-called "Inflammatory Document", which advocated a very aggressive approach to foreign policy while the United States still held a nuclear monopoly and called upon President
Harry S. Truman to issue a nuclear ultimatum to the Soviet Union: "Let Stalin decide: atomic war or atomic peace." (Accounts differ as to whether the Inflammatory Document was published as an advertisement that McMahon saw, in particular because McMahon often relied on his staff to master specifics of legislation and policy and Borden was smart and full of energy. (Borden's rhetoric tended towards the overheated, though, and sometimes McMahon chose not to send out a letter.) Overall, Borden worked towards making the committee more effective in determining policy. Due to secrecy requirements, the actual size of the American atomic weapons stockpile in the late 1940s was a subject of great confusion and uncertainty within the U.S. government, with members of the JCAE not knowing and often not wanting to know. Upon joining the JCAE, Borden was able to roughly guess the size of the stockpile and was disturbed by how few atomic weapons the United States actually possessed. Borden felt his mission was to help bring about what he would call "atomic abundance". He thus urged a rapid increase in atomic weapons manufacture and the creation of another nuclear production complex on the scale of the
Hanford Site. This fit with his view of the future in which there would be no chance to build more weapons once war began. The
first atomic bomb test by the Soviet Union in August 1949 came earlier than expected by Americans, and as Borden subsequently described, left the JCAE in a state of "tremendous shock". Over the next several months there was an intense debate within the U.S. government, military, and scientific communities regarding whether to proceed with development of the far more powerful
hydrogen bomb, then known as "the Super". Borden influenced McMahon into supporting development of the Super, even if its military usefulness was not yet clear. Opposition to the new weapon was led by the AEC's General Advisory Committee (GAC), chaired by physicist
J. Robert Oppenheimer, which issued a report against it. Borden drafted a 5,000-word letter under McMahon's name that attacked the GAC report as embodying "false, horror-inspired logic". Throughout this period, the JCAE placed consistent pressure on Truman to support going ahead with an urgent program to build the Super, and Borden and McMahon, along with AEC commissioner
Lewis Strauss and physicist
Edward Teller, were leading advocates of that course of action. The Super debate was decided on January 31, 1950, when Truman gave the order to go ahead with the new weapon. But even after Truman's decision, success was not ensured; as the work to build the H-bomb hit technical troubles and resource limits, Teller successfully appealed to Borden and McMahon for added Congressional support of the effort. Borden also pushed to have the AEC hire people who favored building the H-bomb, thereby reducing the influence within that organization of those who had opposed Truman's decision. Borden's own ultimate vision of the best weapon for his inevitable war went even further, being that of a
nuclear-powered aircraft carrying thermonuclear weapons. The first time Borden met Oppenheimer in person was at a GAC meeting where the physicist was belittling the idea of a nuclear-powered bomber. In any case, in the words of the official AEC history of this period, Borden had become "one of the most powerful and effective spokesmen for nuclear weapons in the atomic energy establishment." Borden received a modest amount of press attention during this time, such as in March 1952 when he was profiled for having achieved considerable influence in Washington by the age of thirty-two. He was also put in charge of an effort to write an internal chronology of the development of the H-bomb that would appear neutral on the surface but in fact would favor the pro-Super advocates and show opponents in a poor light. In the
United States Senate elections, 1952, Republicans gained back control of the chamber and the committee. These two factors led to a decline in Borden's influence, Although Borden had some sympathy with aspects of
Operation Candor, a push by the new
Eisenhower administration to be more open with the American public about nuclear weapons matters, Borden's situation became worse following an incident in January 1953 where physicist
John A. Wheeler, who was working on
Policy and Progress in the H-Bomb Program, the chronology that Borden had commissioned, lost a highly sensitive excerpt from that document on an overnight train. Borden was considered sometimes lax with security procedures to begin with, and he was held as the person most responsible for this security breach. Wheeler himself was too important to remove from nuclear weapons work, but AEC chair
Gordon Dean was eager to diminish the power of the JCAE and used the Wheeler incident as a lever with which to push Borden out. By end of May 1953, Borden was gone from the JCAE. ==The Oppenheimer letter==