APT 41's operations are described as "
moonlighting" due to their balance of espionage supported by the Chinese state and financially motivated activities outside of state authorization in their downtime. As such, it is harder to ascertain whether particular incidents are state-directed or not. The organization has conducted multiple operations against 14 countries, most notably the United States. Such activities include incidents of
tracking, the compromising of business
supply chains, and collecting
surveillance data. In 2022, APT 41 was linked to theft of at least $20 million in COVID-19 relief aid in the U.S. APT 41 uses
cyber-espionage malware typically kept exclusive to the Chinese government. This characteristic is common for other advanced persistent threats, as this allows them to derive information to spy on high-profile targets or make contact with them to gain information that benefits
national interest. APT 41 relation to the Chinese state can be evidenced by the fact that none of this information is on the
dark web and may be obtained by the CCP. APT 41 targeting is consistent with the Chinese government's national plans to move into high research and development fields and increase production capabilities. Such initiatives coincide with the Chinese government's "
Made in China 2025" plan, aiming to move Chinese production into high-value fields such as
pharmacy,
semi-conductors, and other
high-tech sectors. FireEye has also evaluated with moderate confidence that APT 41 may engage in contract work associated with the Chinese government. Identified personas associated with the group have previously advertised their skills as hackers for hire. Their usage of HOMEUNIX and PHOTO in their personal and financially motivated operations, which are malware inaccessible to the public used by other state-sponsored espionage actors also evidences this stance. The FireEye report also noted that the Chinese state has depended on contractors to assist with other state operations focused on cyber-espionage, as demonstrated by prior Chinese advanced persistent threats like
APT 10. APT 41 is viewed by some as potentially made up of skilled Chinese citizens, who are used and employed by the Chinese government, leading to the assumptions that members of the group often work two jobs, which is supported by their operating hours. == Techniques ==