Adama's mandate The news of
Usman dan Fodio's Sokoto jihad, initiated in 1804, eventually reached the Fulbe community in Fombina. This was primarily due to the activities of influential jihadists such as
Buba Yero and Bauchi Gordi, who were actively expanding their control over neighboring territories in the
Gongola valley. Their military campaigns and conquests served as a conduit for information about the unfolding Sokoto jihad. Furthermore, the Fulbe migrants who had fled the regions affected by the jihadists' advancements, particularly from
Bornu, played a crucial role in disseminating news about the Sokoto jihad. These individuals, seeking refuge from the conflict, carried with them tales of the unfolding events and the growing influence of Usman dan Fodio's movement. As a result of these combined factors—jihadist activities near Fombina and the accounts of those who had experienced the impact of the Sokoto jihad—the news of this religious and political movement gradually reached and resonated with parts of the Muslim Fulbe community of Fombina. The reason for Uthman's decision to pick Adama, according to a manuscript dated March 1809 in
Yola, was:
...since you tell me that some of the fulani leaders did not come with you, but they sent you to come and receive the flag of the jihad from me and take it back to them. I instruct you to tell them that it is you to whom I have given this jihad flag, and tell them that who ever obeys you obeys me, and whoever swears fealty to you, it is exactly as if he had sworn fealty to me. Early campaigns Adama immediately began recruiting Fulani and Hausa volunteers and
mercenaries. These were mainly mounted
cavalrymen fighting with
sword,
bow, and
poisoned arrow. Adama forbade them to pillage or to kill indiscriminately, but enemy nations were given two choices: convert to Islam or become a tributary state. Those
ethnic groups that lacked a centralised government had but one: become
slaves or convert to Islam. The non-Fulani Muslims of the Adamawa largely rejected Adama's jihad; they viewed it as little more than an excuse to spread Fulani hegemony. However, it was primarily the Fulani leaders (''ardo'en
, singular: ardo'') of Fumbina with whom Adama was concerned. Some of them rejected his primacy for various reasons: He was from a fairly humble background, he owned little wealth, his army was still small, and he lacked
charisma. The majority, however, welcomed Adama as a military commander or religious leader at the very least. Adama's son-in-law,
Jauro Dembo, had already settled in Fumbina at
Malabu and became one of his lieutenants. The makeshift army made headquarters at
Gurin, a fort at the junction of the
Faro and
Benue Rivers where Fulani warriors had regrouped after fighting the
Bata in 1803. Adama then led his forces in a series of strikes on Bata settlements such as Pema,
Tepa, and
Turuwa. The victories elated Adama's men, who took numerous Bata slaves. It was during these battles that Adama received the news that his father was killed by the Bata on the
Beti River. Modibbo Adama's force continued their battles against Bata and Lala peoples as far as the Gongola River, where he met the
Lamido of Gombe,
Buba Yero. The two joined forces and fought back the Yanguru, Hona and Kibba peoples. The two forces eventually stopped and both went homewards. The early successes convinced more local Fulani leaders to come to Adama's side. Even those ardo'en who opposed his political rule recognised the jihad as an opportunity to expand their territories.
Njobdi of the
Wollarbe clan is one notable example, and his major rival,
Hammam Sambo, perhaps the first ardo to have settled in Fumbina, proved the major holdout. Bitter relations between Njobdi and Hammam would prove a major obstacle in Adama's quest to maintain a cohesive empire. In addition, common Fulani were inspired by Adama's exploits and formed into bands. Adama created a new position for their leaders: The
lamido (plural:
lamibe), who was the leader of a particular territory, as opposed to an ardo, leader of a particular people. Both groups received flags of command and shared the same status in Adama's armies. Before his death, Adama would appoint over 40 non-ardo lamibe. They would prove his most loyal lieutenants.
Mandara campaign Adama turned his attentions on the only major state in Fumbina that could present a threat to his fledgling emirate:
Mandara. It was an attractive target. It lay between
Bornu to the north and
Baghirmi in the
Chad Basin, so its fall would facilitate the conquest of these areas. Its people were already Muslim, though they mixed the religion with pagan practices. Moreover, it had a large population from whom soldiers could be conscripted, and it was renowned for its excellent horses. Mandara was well organised, however, and would not be an easy prize. The people who lived there, the
Mandarawa, had a long-standing rivalry with the Fulani, who had fought them under the Bornu in previous years. This animosity only served to drive more Fulani to Adama's armies, though, as many veterans were eager for another crack at an old rival. Furthermore, Fulbe rulers
Modibo Damraka and others were already embroiled in fighting against the Mandara in the
Diamaré Plain. Adama reached
Guringa in 1809 with a large army in good
morale. He quickly conquered the Mandara settlement at
Guider and headed north, taking several more villages along the way. Outside of the Mandara capital,
Dulo, Adama demanded that the king,
Bukar Djiama, swear his allegiance and convert to Islam untainted with paganism. Bukar agreed to acknowledged Adama's right to rule his own subjects, but he refused to yield his own sovereignty. Adama and his men took Dulo with little fighting. Adama searched for someone to rule the settlement, but he found no one whom he felt adequate for the post. Meanwhile, his troops revelled in their plunder. No one expected the Mandara counterattack, which was launched from nearby
Mora. Adama fled the town. ==Administration==