Timeliness contributed no small part to the widespread acceptance of Mahan's theories. Although his history was relatively thin, based as it was on
secondary sources, his vigorous style, and clear theory won widespread acceptance of navalists and supporters of the
New Imperialism in Africa and Asia. Given the rapid technological changes underway in propulsion (from coal to oil and from
reciprocating engines to turbines), ordnance (with better fire directors, and new high explosives), and armor and the emergence of new craft such as
destroyers and
submarines, Mahan's emphasis on the capital ship and the command of the sea came at an opportune moment. Tirpitz, an intense navalist who believed ardently in Mahan's dictum that whatever power rules the sea also ruled the world, had
The Influence of Sea Power Upon History translated into German in 1898 and had 8,000 copies distributed for free as a way of pressuring the
Reichstag to vote for the
First Navy Bill. Tirpitz used Mahan not only as a way of winning over German public opinion but also as a guide to strategic thinking. Before 1914, Tirpitz completely rejected
commerce raiding as a strategy and instead embraced Mahan's ideal of a decisive battle of annihilation between two fleets as the way to win command of the seas. Finally as the German army neared defeat in the
Hundred Days Offensive, the German Navy's high command, without informing the government, tried to mobilize the fleet for a decisive engagement with the Royal Navy. The sailors rebelled in the
Kiel mutiny, instigating the
German Revolution of 1918–1919 which toppled the
Hohenzollern monarchy.
United Kingdom Mahan and British First Sea Lord
John Fisher (1841–1920) both addressed the problem of how to dominate home waters and distant seas with naval forces unable to do both. Mahan argued for a universal principle of concentration of powerful ships in home waters with minimized strength in distant seas. Fisher instead decided to use submarines to defend home waters and mobile battlecruisers to protect British interests.
France Though in 1914, French naval doctrine was dominated by Mahan's theory of sea power, the course of
World War I changed ideas about the place of the navy. The refusal of the German fleet to engage in a decisive battle, the
Dardanelles expedition of 1915, the development of
submarine warfare, and the organization of convoys all showed the
French Navy's new role in combined operations with the
French Army. The Navy's part in securing victory was not fully understood by French public opinion in 1918, but a synthesis of old and new ideas arose from the lessons of the war, especially by Admiral
Raoul Castex (1878–1968), who synthesized in his five-volume
Théories Stratégiques the classical and materialist schools of naval theory. He reversed Mahan's theory that command of the sea precedes maritime communications and foresaw the enlarged roles of aircraft and submarines in naval warfare.
Japan The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660–1783 was translated into Japanese and was used as a textbook in the
Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN). That usage strongly affected the IJN's plan to end
Russian naval expansion in the Far East, which culminated in the
Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05. It has been argued that the IJN's pursuit of the "decisive battle" (
Kantai Kessen) contributed to
Imperial Japan's defeat in
World War II, because the development of the submarine and the
aircraft carrier, combined with advances in technology, largely rendered obsolete the doctrine of the decisive battle between fleets. Nevertheless, the IJN did not adhere strictly to Mahanian doctrine because its forces were often tactically divided, particularly during the
attack on Pearl Harbor and the
Battle of Midway.
United States Mahan believed that if the United States were to build an
Isthmian canal, it would become a Pacific power, and therefore it should take possession of
Hawaii to protect the
West Coast. ==Later career==