During the
German Revolution of 1918–19, Canaris helped organise the formation of
Freikorps paramilitary units to suppress the
communist revolutionary movements, whose members were attempting to spread the ideals of the
Russian Revolution into Germany. Canaris was also a member of the military court that tried and in many cases acquitted those involved in the murders of the leftist revolutionaries
Karl Liebknecht and
Rosa Luxemburg for their involvement in the
Spartacist uprising. He helped one of those convicted in the murders, Kurt Vogel, escape from prison and although Canaris was imprisoned for four days over this, he was never prosecuted. Despite these actions, Canaris was eventually appointed to the adjutancy of Defence Minister
Gustav Noske. In 1919, he married Erika Waag, the child of an industrialist, with whom he had two children. On 20 July 1920, Canaris became admiral's staff officer at the
Marinestation der Ostsee (Baltic Naval Station) command. In the spring of 1924, Canaris was sent to
Osaka, Japan, to supervise a secret U-boat construction program in direct violation of the
Treaty of Versailles. When that project was shelved by Vice Admiral Adolf Zenker in favour of a more co-operative relationship with the British, Canaris began making deals. Aided by Captain
Walter Lohmann, the son of a powerful German shipping magnate, they negotiated with Spanish merchants, German industrialists, some Argentinian venture capitalists and the Spanish Navy so the Germans could continue their clandestine naval activities. Canaris made some enemies within Germany during the course of his secret business and intelligence negotiations, partially as a consequence of the bankruptcy incurred by the film-maker
Phoebus Film in his dealings with Lohmann (the '
Lohmann Affair'). Suddenly, the former involvement with the "Liebknecht affair" re-emerged and placed Canaris in an unfavourable light, which ended up costing him his position in Spain. Instead, he was sent to
Wilhelmshaven. From his new post, Canaris haplessly discovered that Lohmann's "investments" had cost upwards of 26 million marks in total losses. At some point in 1928, Canaris was removed from his intelligence post and began two years of conventional naval service aboard the
pre-dreadnought battleship and became captain of the vessel on 1 December 1932. Just two months later,
Adolf Hitler became Germany's new chancellor. Canaris was enthused by that development and was known to give lectures about the virtues of Nazism to his crew aboard the
Schlesien. Detached from the previous government of Weimar, whose republican principles never appealed to Canaris, he looked to the Nazi Party to shape the future. Two things stood out for Canaris about the Nazis; they represented a return to state-centered authoritarian government led by a charismatic leader, which he supported, and they were determined to throw off the shackles of the Treaty of Versailles. Hitler proselytised a return to world-power status, which for Canaris implied constructing a super-fleet, by the preservation of a virtuous soldier-based society, a "community under arms". It is worth recalling that in the turmoil after the First World War in Germany, while the Weimar government was fledgling, Canaris helped establish home guard units in contravention of the treaty, sympathised with the
Freikorps movement and participated in the
Kapp Putsch. Another aspect of the Nazis that attracted Canaris was their anticommunism. Many of his friends joined the Nazi crusade, and Canaris "likewise came to be regarded as an enthusiastic National Socialist". A former SS general,
Werner Best, once described Canaris as an "inveterate nationalist" and correspondingly asserted that Canaris felt the Nazis were much better "than anything that had gone before". Even after the
Night of the Long Knives, Canaris "preached wholehearted cooperation with the new regime". Canaris once said, "we officers... should always recognize that without the Führer and his NSDAP, the restoration of German military greatness and military strength would not have been possible... the officer's duty is to be a living example of National Socialism and make the German
Wehrmacht (Armed Forces) reflect the fulfillment of National Socialist ideology. That must be our grand design". , 1924–31 Taking a position as the fortress commander at
Swinemünde on 29 September 1934, Canaris seemed to be near the end of his career as he settled into a sort of "provincial exile" with his family. Then, in short order, Canaris caught wind of the dispute in the Reichswehr Ministry over the impending successor to the
Abwehr chief Captain , who was forced to resign. Patzig recommended Canaris as his replacement because of his outstanding service record and because he considered him best suited for the position from his previous experience in intelligence operations. His aspirations were quickly being realized, and in his zeal for his new job, Canaris paid "little heed" to the warnings from Patzig about the "fiendish" machinations of the party and its police organs. The admonitions principally concerned
Reinhard Heydrich, the head of the SS intelligence service known as the
Sicherheitsdienst (SD) who was not well-disposed towards the
Abwehr since he believed that Germany's defeat during the First World War was attributable to military intelligence failures by the organization. Moreover, Heydrich had aspirations to oversee all aspects of political intelligence-gathering for Germany. On 1 January 1935, a little less than two years after Hitler had taken control of the German government, Canaris was made head of the
Abwehr, Germany's official military intelligence agency. Records suggest that Canaris was approved in his role as
Abwehr chief as a compromise candidate since the commander-in-chief of the German Navy, Admiral
Erich Raeder, a staunch navy man, was initially opposed to his appointment but caved when Patzig manipulated the situation by suggesting an army officer for the post if Canaris was rejected. With the seemingly-amicable relationship between Heydrich and Canaris that then existed, according to former
Abwehr Secretary Inge Haag, it is possible that Heydrich supported the installment of Canaris as head of the
Abwehr at least based on their behaviour toward each other. The two remained "friendly" rivals, but Canaris considered Heydrich a "brutal fanatic" and was likewise aware that Heydrich's SD constantly monitored the telephone traffic of the
Abwehr. Heydrich was suspicious of Canaris, referred to him as a "wily old fox", and cautioned his colleagues never to underestimate the man. Just a few weeks into his role as head of the
Abwehr, Canaris met with Heydrich and some of his officials to parcel out intelligence operations between the
Abwehr,
Gestapo, and SD. It is clear from sources that Canaris was then a true devotee to Hitler according to a former Gestapo officer, Gerhard Fischer, who claimed that the Führer's gentlemanly relationship with Canaris converted the latter into "an extreme exponent of Hitlerism." In May 1935, Canaris first donned the uniform of a rear admiral, a promotion that coincided with his responsibility for shielding Germany's burgeoning rearmament program from enemy counterintelligence agents, which meant a significant expansion of the
Abwehr. The enlargement of the
Abwehr mission brought Canaris into contact with "counterespionage virtuoso" Major
Rudolf Bamler, who assisted him in establishing an extensive surveillance web over munitions factories, seaports, the armed forces and the media. Between 1935 and 1937, Canaris expanded the
Abwehr staff from a mere 150 people to nearly 1,000. He met Heydrich again on 21 December 1936, and the two men signed a document, which came to be known in their orbit as the "Ten Commandments". The agreement clarified the respective areas of counterespionage responsibilities between the Gestapo and the
Abwehr. According to the biographer
Heinz Höhne, Canaris subscribed to most of Hitler's views since Hitler's nationalism, his social-Darwinist beliefs, his opposition to the Versailles Treaty, his belief in rebuilding a Greater German Reich, and his anti-Semitic ideology appealed to the
Abwehr chief. Prompted by anti-Semitism, Canaris first suggested the use of the
Star of David to identify Jews in 1935 to 1936, which was later used to set them apart from German citizens within the Reich, and eventually heralded their isolation, presaged their compulsory resettlement, and ultimately led to their physical annihilation. walking in front of an honor guard during his visit to Berlin, to his left is Canaris, November 1938 During the
Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), Germany
signed an international agreement to embargo arms to the warring factions, the
Nationalists, led by
Francisco Franco, and the
Republicans. In fact, Germany provided aid to Franco's side, with Canaris using his contacts at England's
Vickers armaments manufacturing company to help supply the Nationalists with weapons. One month before Hitler's annexation of Austria, known as the
Anschluss, Canaris put the
Abwehr into action and personally oversaw deception operations, which were designed to give the Austrians the impression of what appeared to be substantial German military preparations for an impending act of aggression. However, the sham action did not move Austrian Chancellor
Schuschnigg, who was forced to resign when German troops marched into Austria, which was followed by its official annexation into Greater Germany (
Grossdeutschland) on 13 March 1938. At that development, however, Canaris began spending more and more time in the company of
Hans Oster and also began formulating ways to forestall or prevent a European war. Among the first to arrive in Vienna, Canaris had a special team seize records from the Austrian archives since he feared possible references to his Spanish Civil War arms supplier connections in London. He also absorbed as much of the Austrian intelligence service as he could into the
Abwehr while he avoided those who were already Nazi converts. Canaris was disturbed by Hitler's intention to absorb
Czechoslovakia as were others, who feared another European war. That resulted in the formation of a conspiratorial group consisting of members of the German Foreign Office and ranking members of the military. The assemblage included General
Ludwig Beck, the Foreign Office's state secretary
Ernst von Weizsäcker, General
Erwin von Witzleben and Admiral Canaris.
Munich Agreement and intrigue Canaris and his associates were not necessarily committed to the overthrow of Hitler's regime, but they were loosely allied to another more radical group: the "anti-Nazi" faction, led by Colonel
Hans Oster and
Hans Bernd Gisevius, which wanted to use the crisis as an excuse for executing a
putsch to overthrow the Nazi regime. The most audacious plan contemplated by Canaris, in collaboration with
Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin, was to capture and to unseat Hitler and the entire Nazi Party before the invasion of
Czechoslovakia. At that particular moment, Kleist visited Britain secretly and discussed the situation with British
MI6 and some high-ranking politicians. The high-ranking German military leaders believed that if Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia or any other country, Britain would declare war on Germany. MI6 was of the same opinion. The British declaration of war would have given the General Staff, it thought, both the pretext and the support for an overthrow of Hitler, which many of them were planning because of the prevailing "anti-war sentiment of the German people". The reaction of the British government to Hitler's demands on the
Sudetenland was more cautious. At a meeting with Hitler in Munich, British Prime Minister
Neville Chamberlain and French Prime Minister
Édouard Daladier chose diplomacy over war. The
Munich Agreement was thus a severe disappointment for Kleist and Canaris. It gave Hitler's reputation an important boost and his popularity soared, as he appeared to have brought peace. However, Hitler was scornful of his generals for resisting his plans since he had wanted war.
Hermann Göring fell out of favour with him for negotiating peace, but Hitler's drive for war remained unabated although the Western powers had granted him concessions. Canaris was relieved that war was averted and sought to re-establish contact with Hitler since many of the
Abwehr reports submitted on the Sudeten crisis had proven to be grossly inaccurate. To Hans Oster and his circle, Canaris suddenly appeared recommitted to Hitler.
Dutch War Scare In January 1939, Canaris manufactured the "Dutch War Scare", which gripped the British government. By 23 January 1939, the British government received information that Germany intended to invade the Netherlands in February 1939 with the aim of using Dutch airfields to launch a strategic bombing offensive intended to achieve a "knock-out" blow against Britain by razing British cities to the ground. All of that information was false but was intended by Canaris to achieve a change in British foreign policy. Canaris was successful, and the "Dutch War Scare" played a major role in causing Chamberlain to make the "continental commitment" by pledging in February 1939 to send a British ground force to the defence of France in the event of war.
United States In 1937, Canaris created a new office of air intelligence in the
Abwehr and assigned
Hauptmann Nikolaus Ritter of the Luftwaffe to be the chief of I. Luft (Chief of Air Intelligence). Ritter, who had lived in the United States for twelve years, was given primary authority over
Abwehr agents operating in the Americas and Britain. Canaris instructed Ritter to contact and reactivate a former German Naval Intelligence
spymaster living in
New York City whom Canaris knew from the First World War,
Fritz Joubert Duquesne. Duquesne was an
Afrikaner who had escaped from a prisoner-of-war camp in the British
Imperial fortress colony of
Bermuda during the
Second Boer War and had been falsely credited for the death of British Army Field Marshal
Herbert Kitchener, 1st Earl Kitchener in the sinking of during the First World War). Back in 1931, Ritter had met Duquesne in New York, and both spies reconnected in New York on 3 December 1937. Ritter also met with Herman W. Lang, a spy who operated under the code name PAUL. Herman Lang worked as a machinist, draftsman and assembly inspector for the Carl L. Norden Company in New York, which had been contracted to manufacture an advanced top-secret military bomber part, the
Norden bomb-sight. He provided the
Abwehr a large drawing of the bomb-sight and later went to Germany to work on and finish an improved version. In Germany, Lang debriefed with both Canaris and Göring. Ritter employed several other successful agents across the United States, but he also made the mistake of recruiting a man who would later become a double agent for the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
William Sebold. On 8 February 1940, Ritter sent Sebold to New York under the alias of Harry Sawyer and instructed him to set up a shortwave radio-transmitting station to establish contact with the German shortwave station abroad. Sebold was also instructed to use the codename TRAMP and to contact a fellow agent, codenamed DUNN, Fritz Duquesne. On 28 June 1941, after a two-year investigation, the FBI arrested Duquesne and 32 other Nazi spies on charges of relaying secret information on US weaponry and shipping movements to Germany. On 2 January 1942, less than a month after the US was
attacked by Japan at Pearl Harbor and Germany had declared war on the United States, the 33 members of the Duquesne Spy Ring were sentenced to serve a total of more than 300 years in prison. They were found guilty in what historian Peter Duffy said in 2014 is "still to this day the largest espionage case in the history of the United States". One German spymaster later commented that the ring's roundup delivered "the death blow" to their espionage efforts in the United States.
J. Edgar Hoover called his FBI swoop on Duquesne's ring the greatest spy roundup in US history. In a 1942 memo to his superiors, Canaris reported on the importance of several of his captured spies by noting their valued contributions, and he wrote that Duquesne had "delivered valuable reports and important technical material in the original, including U.S. gas masks, radio-controlled apparatus, leak proof fuel tanks, television instruments, small bombs for airplanes versus airplanes, air separator, and propeller-driving mechanisms. Items delivered were labeled 'valuable', and several 'good' and 'very good'". ==Second World War==