1914 Raising the New Armies poster At the outset of the
First World War, the prime minister, Asquith, quickly had Kitchener appointed
secretary of state for war; Asquith had been filling the job himself as a stopgap following the resignation of
Colonel Seely over the
Curragh Incident earlier in 1914. Kitchener was in Britain on his annual summer leave, between 23 June and 3 August 1914, and had boarded a cross-Channel steamer to commence his return trip to Cairo when he was recalled to London to meet with Asquith.
War was declared at 11pm the next day. Against
cabinet opinion, Kitchener correctly predicted a long war that would last at least three years, require huge new armies to defeat Germany, and cause huge casualties before the end would come. Kitchener stated that the conflict would plumb the depths of manpower "to the last million". A massive
recruitment campaign began, which soon featured a
distinctive poster of Kitchener, taken from a magazine front cover. It may have encouraged large numbers of volunteers, and has proven to be one of the most enduring images of the war, having been copied and parodied many times since. Kitchener built up the "
New Armies" as separate units because he distrusted the
Territorials from what he had seen with the French Army in 1870. This may have been a mistaken judgement. The British reservists of 1914 tended to be much younger and fitter than their French equivalents a generation earlier. Cabinet Secretary
Maurice Hankey wrote of Kitchener: However,
Ian Hamilton later wrote of Kitchener "he hated organisations; he smashed organisations ... he was a Master of Expedients".
Deploying the BEF At the War Council (5 August) Kitchener and Lieutenant General Sir
Douglas Haig argued that the BEF should be deployed at
Amiens, where it could deliver a vigorous counterattack once the route of German advance was known. Kitchener argued that the deployment of the
BEF in Belgium would result in having to retreat and abandon much of its supplies almost immediately, because the
Belgian Army would be unable to hold its ground against the Germans; Kitchener was proved right but, given the belief in fortresses common at the time, it is not surprising that the War Council disagreed with him. Kitchener, believing Britain should husband its resources for a long war, decided at Cabinet (6 August) that the initial BEF would consist of only 4 infantry divisions (and 1 cavalry), not the 5 or 6 promised. His decision to hold back two of the six divisions of the BEF, although based on exaggerated concerns about German invasion of Britain, arguably saved the BEF from disaster when Sir
John French (on the advice of Sir
Henry Wilson who was much influenced by the French) might have been tempted to advance further into the teeth of the advancing German forces, had his own force been stronger. Kitchener's wish to concentrate further back at Amiens may also have been influenced by a largely accurate map of German dispositions which was published by
Repington in
The Times on the morning of 12 August. Kitchener had a three-hour meeting (12 August) with Sir John French,
Archibald Murray, Wilson and the French liaison officer Victor Huguet, before being overruled by the prime minister, who eventually agreed that the BEF should assemble at
Maubeuge. Sir John French's orders from Kitchener were to cooperate with the French but not to take orders from them. Given that the tiny BEF (about 100,000 men, half of them serving regulars and half reservists) was Britain's only field army, Kitchener also instructed French to avoid undue losses and exposure to "forward movements where large numbers of French troops are not engaged" until Kitchener himself had had a chance to discuss the matter with the Cabinet.
Meeting with Sir John French The BEF commander in France, Sir John French, concerned by heavy British losses at the
Battle of Le Cateau, was considering withdrawing his forces from the Allied line. By 31 August, French commander-in-chief
Joseph Joffre, President
Raymond Poincaré (relayed via Bertie, the British ambassador) and Kitchener had sent him messages urging him not to do so. Kitchener, authorised by a midnight meeting of whichever cabinet ministers could be found, left for France for a meeting with Sir John on 1 September. They met, together with
René Viviani (French prime minister) and
Alexandre Millerand (now French
War Minister). Huguet recorded that Kitchener was "calm, balanced, reflective" whilst Sir John was "sour, impetuous, with congested face, sullen and ill-tempered". On
Francis Bertie's advice Kitchener dropped his intention of inspecting the BEF. French and Kitchener moved to a separate room, and no independent account of the meeting exists. After the meeting Kitchener telegraphed the Cabinet that the BEF would remain in the line, although taking care not to be outflanked, and told French to consider this "an instruction". French had a friendly exchange of letters with Joffre. French had been particularly angry that Kitchener had arrived wearing his field marshal's uniform. This was how Kitchener normally dressed at the time (
Maurice Hankey thought Kitchener's uniform tactless, but it had probably not occurred to him to change), but French felt that Kitchener was implying that he was his military superior and not simply a cabinet member. By the end of the year French thought that Kitchener had "gone mad" and his hostility had become common knowledge at
GHQ and
GQG.
1915 Strategy In January 1915, Field Marshal French, with the concurrence of other senior commanders (e.g. General Sir Douglas Haig), wanted the New Armies incorporated into existing divisions as battalions rather than sent out as entire divisions. French felt (wrongly) that the war would be over by the summer before the New Army divisions were deployed because Germany had recently redeployed some divisions to the east. French took the step of appealing to the prime minister, Asquith, over Kitchener's head, but Asquith refused to overrule Kitchener. This further damaged relations between French and Kitchener, who had travelled to France in September 1914 during the
First Battle of the Marne to order French to resume his place in the Allied line. Kitchener warned French in January 1915 that the
Western Front was a siege line that could not be breached, in the context of Cabinet discussions about amphibious landings on the Baltic or North Sea Coast, or against Turkey. In an effort to find a way to relieve pressure on the Western front, Kitchener proposed an invasion of
Alexandretta in Turkey with
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC),
New Army, and
Indian troops. Alexandretta was an area with a large Christian population and was the strategic centre of the
Ottoman Empire's railway network – its capture would have cut the empire in two. Yet he was instead eventually persuaded to support
Winston Churchill's disastrous
Gallipoli Campaign in 1915–1916. (Churchill's responsibility for the failure of this campaign is debated; for more information see
David Fromkin's
A Peace to End All Peace.) As late as mid-October 1915, however, Kitchener told a parliamentary committee that withdrawal from the peninsula would be "the most disastrous event in the history of the empire". The eventual failure, combined with the
Shell Crisis of 1915 – amidst press publicity engineered by Sir John French – dealt Kitchener's political reputation a heavy blow; Kitchener was popular with the public, so Asquith retained him in office in the new
coalition government, but responsibility for munitions was moved to a new ministry headed by
David Lloyd George. He was a sceptic about the tank, which is why it was
developed under the auspices of Churchill's
Admiralty. With the
Russians being pushed back from
Poland, Kitchener thought the transfer of German troops west and a possible invasion of Britain were increasingly likely. He told the War Council (14 May) that he was not willing to send the New Armies overseas. He wired French (16 May 1915) that he would send no more reinforcements to France until he was clear the German line could be broken but sent two divisions at the end of May to please Joffre, not because he thought a breakthrough possible. He had wanted to conserve his New Armies to strike a knockout blow in 1916–17, but by the summer of 1915 realised that high casualties and a major commitment to France were inescapable. "Unfortunately we have to make war as we must, and not as we should like" as he told the Dardanelles Committee on 20 August 1915. reviews the
36th (Ulster) Division at Aldershot, 30 September 1915. Lord Kitchener rides in the centre of the three riders behind him, with Major General
Oliver Nugent, GOC 36th Division, to Kitchener's right. At an Anglo-French conference at Calais (6 July) Joffre and Kitchener, who was opposed to "too vigorous" offensives, reached a compromise on "local offensives on a vigorous scale", and Kitchener agreed to deploy New Army divisions to France. An inter-Allied
conference at Chantilly (7 July, including Russian, Belgian, Serb and Italian delegates) agreed on coordinated offensives. However, Kitchener now came to support the upcoming Loos offensive. He travelled to France for talks with Joffre and Millerand (16 August). The French leaders believed
Russia might sue for peace (Warsaw had fallen on 4 August). Kitchener (19 August) ordered the
Loos offensive to proceed, despite the attack being on ground not favoured by French or Haig (then commanding
First Army). The Official History later admitted that Kitchener hoped to be appointed Supreme Allied Commander.
Basil Liddell Hart speculated that this was why he allowed himself to be persuaded by Joffre. New Army divisions first saw action at Loos in September 1915.
Reduction in powers Kitchener continued to lose favour with politicians and professional soldiers. He found it "repugnant and unnatural to have to discuss military secrets with a large number of gentlemen with whom he was but barely acquainted".
Esher complained that he would either lapse into "obstinacy and silence" or else mull aloud over various difficulties.
Alfred Milner told
Howell Arthur Gwynne (18 August 1915) that he thought Kitchener a "slippery fish". By autumn 1915, with Asquith's Coalition close to breaking up over
conscription, he was blamed for his opposition to that measure (which would eventually be introduced for single men in
January 1916) and for the excessive influence which civilians like Churchill and
Richard Haldane had come to exert over strategy, allowing
ad hoc campaigns to develop in
Sinai,
Mesopotamia and
Salonika. Generals such as Sir
William Robertson were critical of Kitchener's failure to ask the Imperial General Staff (whose chief
James Wolfe-Murray was intimidated by Kitchener) to study the feasibility of any of these campaigns. These operations were certainly feasible but assumed a level of competence that the British armed forces proved unable to achieve at that time. Tactical incompetence in the Gallipoli campaign meant that even a fairly straightforward task ended in disaster. Kitchener advised the Dardanelles Committee (21 October) that
Baghdad be seized for the sake of prestige then abandoned as logistically untenable. His advice was no longer accepted without question, but the British forces fell short of their objective and were eventually besieged and captured at
Kut. at Anzac, November 1915
Archibald Murray (Chief of the Imperial General Staff) later recorded that Kitchener was "quite unfit for the position of secretary of state" and "impossible", claiming that he never assembled the
Army Council as a body, but instead gave them orders separately, and was usually exhausted by Friday. Kitchener was also keen to break up Territorial units whenever possible whilst ensuring that "No 'K' Division left the country incomplete". Murray wrote that "He seldom told the absolute truth and the whole truth" and claimed that it was not until he left on a tour of inspection of Gallipoli and the Near East that Murray was able to inform the Cabinet that volunteering had fallen far below the level needed to maintain a BEF of 70 divisions, requiring the introduction of conscription. The Cabinet insisted on proper General Staff papers being presented in Kitchener's absence. Asquith, who told Robertson that Kitchener was "an impossible colleague" and "his veracity left much to be desired", hoped that he could be persuaded to remain in the region as commander-in-chief and acted in charge of the
War Office, but Kitchener took his seals of office with him so he could not be sacked in his absence. Douglas Haig – at that time involved in intrigues to have Robertson appointed
Chief of the Imperial General Staff – recommended that Kitchener be appointed Viceroy of India ("where trouble was brewing") but not to the Middle East, where his strong personality would have led to that sideshow receiving too much attention and resources. Kitchener visited Rome and Athens, but
Archibald Murray warned that he would likely demand the diversion of British troops to fight the Turks in the Sinai. Kitchener and Asquith were agreed that Robertson should become CIGS, but Robertson refused to do this if Kitchener "continued to be his own CIGS", although given Kitchener's great prestige he did not want him to resign; he wanted the secretary of state to be sidelined to an advisory role like the
Prussian War Minister. Asquith asked them to negotiate an agreement, which they did over the exchange of several draft documents at the
Hotel de Crillon in Paris. Kitchener agreed that Robertson alone should present strategic advice to the Cabinet, with Kitchener responsible for recruiting and supplying the Army, although he refused to agree that military orders should go out over Robertson's signature alone – it was agreed that the secretary of state should continue to sign orders jointly with the CIGS. The agreement was formalised in an
Order in Council in January 1916. Robertson was suspicious of efforts in the Balkans and Near East and was instead committed to major British offensives against Germany on the Western Front – the first of these was to be the Somme in 1916.
1916 Early in 1916 Kitchener visited Douglas Haig, newly appointed commander-in-chief of the BEF in France. Kitchener had been a key figure in the removal of Haig's predecessor Sir John French, with whom he had a poor relationship. Haig differed with Kitchener over the importance of Mediterranean efforts and wanted to see a strong General Staff in London, but nonetheless valued Kitchener as a military voice against the "folly" of civilians such as Churchill. However, he thought Kitchener "pinched, tired, and much aged", and thought it sad that his mind was "losing its comprehension" as the time for decisive victory on the Western Front (as Haig and Robertson saw it) approached. Kitchener was somewhat doubtful of Haig's plan to win decisive victory in 1916, and would have preferred smaller and purely attritional attacks, but sided with Robertson in telling the Cabinet that the planned
Anglo-French offensive on the Somme should go ahead. By 29 March 1916, Kitchener was under pressure from French prime minister
Aristide Briand for the British to attack on the Western Front to help relieve the pressure of the
German attack at Verdun. The French refused to bring troops home from Salonika, which Kitchener thought a ploy for the increase of French power in the Mediterranean. On 2 June 1916, Kitchener personally answered questions asked by politicians about his running of the war effort; at the start of hostilities Kitchener had ordered two million rifles from various US arms manufacturers. Only 480 of these rifles had arrived in the UK by 4 June 1916. The number of shells supplied was no less paltry. Kitchener explained the efforts he had made to secure alternative supplies. He received a resounding vote of thanks from the 200
Members of Parliament (MPs) who had arrived to question him, both for his candour and for his efforts to keep the troops armed; Sir
Ivor Herbert, who, a week before, had introduced the failed vote of censure in the
House of Commons against Kitchener's running of the War Office, personally seconded the motion. ==Death==