Ibn Nusayr and his followers are considered the founders of the religion. After the death of the Eleventh Imam, al-Askari, problems emerged in the Shia Community concerning his succession, and then Ibn Nusayr claimed to be the Bab and Ism of the deceased Imam and that he received his secret teachings. Ibn Nusayr and his followers' development seems to be one of many other early ghulat mystical Islamic sects, and were apparently excommunicated by the Shia representatives of the 12th Hidden Imam. The Alawites were later organised during
Hamdanid rule in northern Syria (947–1008) by a follower of Muhammad ibn Nusayr known as
al-Khaṣībī, who died in
Aleppo about 969, after a rivalry with the Ishaqiyya sect, which claimed also to have the doctrine of Ibn Nusayr. Winter argues that while it is likely the Alawite presence in Latakia dates to Tabarani's lifetime, it is unclear if Alawite teachings spread to the city's mountainous hinterland, where the Muslim population generally leaned toward Shia Islam, in the eleventh century. In the early part of the century, the Jabal al-Rawadif (part of the Syrian Coastal Mountains around Latakia) were controlled by the local Arab chieftain Nasr ibn Mushraf al-Rudafi, who vacillated between alliance and conflict with Byzantium. There is nothing in the literary sources indicating al-Rudafi patronized the Alawites. To the south of Jabal al-Rawadif, in the Jabal Bahra, a 13th-century Alawite treatise mentions the sect was sponsored by the Banu'l-Ahmar, Banu'l-Arid, and
Banu Muhriz, three local families who controlled fortresses in the region in the 11th and 12th centuries. From this southern part of the Syrian coastal mountain range, a significant Alawite presence developed in the mountains east of Latakia and
Jableh during the
Mamluk period (1260s–1516). According to
Bar Hebraeus, many Alawites were killed when the
Crusaders initially entered Syria in 1097; however, they tolerated them when they concluded they were not a truly Islamic sect. They even incorporated them within their ranks, along with the
Maronites and
Turcopoles. Two prominent Alawite leaders in the following centuries, credited with uplifting the group, were Shaykhs
al-Makzun (d. 1240) and al-Tubani (d. 1300), both originally from
Mount Sinjar in modern Iraq.
Ottoman Empire During the reign of
Sultan Selim I, of the Ottoman Empire, the Alawites would again experience significant persecution; especially in
Aleppo when a massacre occurred in the
Great Mosque of Aleppo on 24 April 1517. The massacre was known as the "Massacre of the Telal" () in which the corpses of thousands of victims accumulated as a
tell located west of the
castle. The horrors of the massacre which caused the immigration of the survivors to the coastal region are documented at the
National and University Library in
Strasbourg. The
Ottoman Empire took aggressive actions against Alawites, due to their alleged "treacherous activities" as "they had a long history of betraying the Muslim governments due to their mistrust towards Sunnis." The Alawis rose up against the Ottomans on several occasions, and maintained their autonomy in their mountains. In his book
Seven Pillars of Wisdom T. E. Lawrence wrote: During the 18th century, the Ottomans employed a number of Alawite leaders as tax collectors under the
iltizam system. Between 1809 and 1813,
Mustafa Agha Barbar, the governor of Tripoli, attacked the
Kalbiyya Alawites with "marked savagery." Some Alawites supported Ottoman involvement in the Egyptian-Ottoman Wars of
1831–1833 and
1839–1841, and had careers in the Ottoman army or as Ottoman governors. Moreover, they even initiated the
Alawite revolt (1834–35) against the Egyptian rule of the region, which was later suppressed by the Governor of Homs. By the mid-19th century, the Alawite people, customs and way of life were described by
Samuel Lyde, an English missionary among them, as suffering from nothing except a gloomy plight. Early in the 20th century, the mainly-Sunni Ottoman leaders were bankrupt and losing political power; the Alawites were poor
peasants.
French Mandate period , leader of the
Alawite revolt of 1919 After the end of World War I and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Syria and Lebanon were placed by the
League of Nations under the
French Mandate for Syria and Lebanon. On 15 December 1918, Alawite leader
Saleh al-Ali called for a meeting of Alawite leaders in the town of
Al-Shaykh Badr, urging them to revolt and expel the French from Syria. When French authorities heard about the meeting, they sent a force to arrest Saleh al-Ali. He and his men ambushed and defeated the French forces at Al-Shaykh Badr, inflicting more than 35 casualties. After this victory, al-Ali began organizing his Alawite rebels into a disciplined force, with its general command and military ranks. The Al-Shaykh Badr skirmish began the
Syrian Revolt of 1919. Al-Ali responded to French attacks by laying siege to (and occupying)
al-Qadmus, from which the French had conducted their military operations against him. an
Alawite State was created in the coastal and mountain country comprising most Alawite villages. The division was intended to protect the Alawite people from more powerful majorities, such as the Sunnis. The French also created
microstates, such as
Greater Lebanon for the
Maronite Christians and
Jabal al-Druze for the
Druze. Aleppo and Damascus were also separate states. Under the Mandate, many Alawite
chieftains supported a separate Alawite nation, and tried to convert their autonomy into independence. The French Mandate Administration encouraged Alawites to join their military forces, in part to provide a counterweight to the Sunni majority, which was more hostile to their rule. According to a 1935 letter by the French minister of war, the French considered the Alawites and the
Druze the only "
warlike races" in the Mandate territories. Between 1926 and 1939, the Alawites and other minority groups provided the majority of the locally recruited component of the
Army of the Levant—the designation given to the French military forces garrisoning Syria and the Lebanon. in northwest Syria under French colonial rule, ca. 1920–1936. The region was home to a mostly-rural, heterogeneous population. The landowning families and 80 percent of the population of the port city of
Latakia were Sunni Muslims; however, in rural areas 62 percent of the population were Alawite. According to some researchers, there was considerable Alawite separatist sentiment in the region, However, according to Associate Professor
Stefan Winter, this letter is a forgery. Even during this time of increased Alawite rights, the situation was still so bad for the group that many women had to leave their homes to work for urban Sunnis. In May 1930, the Alawite State was renamed the Government of Latakia in one of the few concessions by the French to Arab nationalists before 1936. in 1938 In 1939, the
Sanjak of Alexandretta (now
Hatay) contained a large number of Alawites. The Hatayan land was given to Turkey by the French after a League of Nations
plebiscite in the province. This development greatly angered most Syrians; to add to Alawi contempt, in 1938, the Turkish military went into
İskenderun and expelled most of the
Arab and
Armenian population. Before this, the Alawite Arabs and Armenians comprised most of the province's population. The coup ended the political instability which had existed since independence. In 1974, to satisfy this constitutional requirement,
Musa as-Sadr (a leader of the Twelvers of
Lebanon and founder of the
Amal Movement, who had unsuccessfully sought to unite Lebanese Alawites and Shiites under the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council) issued a
fatwa that Alawites were a community of Twelver Shiite Muslims. A significant majority of Sunni Syrians accepted Hafez al-Assad's rule, but the
Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, an
Islamist group, did not. After the
Syrian civil war broke out in 2011, the
Ba'athist state conscripted able-bodied men, mostly youth, into the
regime's military. Fearing mass defections in military ranks, the Assad regime preferred to send Alawite recruits for active combat on the frontlines, and conscriptions disproportionately targeted Alawite regions. This has resulted in a large number of Alawite casualties and immense suffering to Alawite villages along the Syrian coast. Many younger
Alawites were greatly angered by the Assad government, held the government responsible for the crisis, and increasingly called for an end to the conflict via reconciliation with the
Syrian opposition and preventing their community from being perceived as being associated with the Assad government. In the early days of the Syrian civil war, many Alawites felt compelled to back Assad, fearing that a rebel victory would lead to a slaughter of the Alawite community, especially as the conflict took on an increasingly
sectarian cast. In May 2013, pro-opposition
SOHR stated that out of 94,000
Syrian regime soldiers killed during the war, at least 41,000 were Alawites. Reports estimate that up to a third of 250,000 young Alawite men of fighting age has been killed in the war by 2015, due to being disproportionately sent to fight in the frontlines by the Assad government. In April 2017, a pro-opposition source claimed 150,000 young Alawites had died. Another report estimates that around 100,000 Alawite youths were killed in combat by 2020. Many Alawites feared
significant danger during the Syrian civil war, particularly from Islamic groups who were a part
of the opposition, though denied by secular opposition factions. Alawites have also been wary of the increased Iranian influence in Syria since
the Syrian civil war, viewing it as a threat to their long-term survival due to
Khomeinist conversion campaigns focused in Alawite coastal regions. Many Alawites, including Assad loyalists, criticize such activities as a plot to absorb their ethno-religious identity into Iran's Twelver Shia umbrella and spread
religious extremism in Syria. Alawite villages and neighborhoods were targeted by Islamist rebel attacks during the war. These include the
Aqrab,
Maan and
Adra massacres, the
2013 Latakia offensive, the
Homs school bombing, the
Zara'a attack, and the
February 2016 Homs bombings. While many Alawites were Assad loyalists throughout the civil war, the Baathist regime faced increasing discontent in the war's later years from Alawite-dominated areas. By 2023, some Alawites had criticized the regime for its corruption, economic mismanagement, and disregard for civil liberties. During a
rapid offense in November and December 2024 by
opposition forces fighting the Assad regime, thousands of Alawites fled the city of
Homs ahead of
the capture of the city; those who left headed to coastal
Tartus Governorate. Upon the
fall of Damascus and
collapse of the Assad regime days later, Alawite communities continued to express uncertainty about their future, although fears receded somewhat because the opposition forces did not target Alawites after capturing Homs. This proposed coastal statelet was reportedly intended to serve as a stronghold for his regime in the event of losing control over the rest of the country. Russia, a key ally of Assad, allegedly rejected this plan, viewing it as an attempt to divide Syria. The SOHR claimed that Assad subsequently fled to Russia on his plane after facing opposition to the proposal and refused to deliver a speech about stepping down from power. There were also reports claiming that Assad had been relying heavily on Iran's support to maintain his position.
Post-Assad Syria gives a speech about anti-Alawite violence in Syria at the
Shrine of Khidr. On 25 December 2024, thousands of people protested across Syria in various regions including Latakia, Tartus, Jableh and Homs after a video surfaced showing an attack on the Alawite shrine of
Al-Khasibi in Aleppo's Maysaloon district following the
rebel offensive and the
fall of the regime of
Bashar al-Assad. During the shrine attack at least five people were killed and the shrine was set ablaze. The UK-based
SOHR reported significant demonstrations, including in
Qardaha, President Assad's hometown. The
transitional authorities, appointed by
Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) which led the offensive that toppled Assad, said in a statement that the shrine attack was from earlier December, attributing its resurfacing to "unknown groups" aiming to incite unrest. This incident followed protests in Damascus against the burning of a
Christmas tree, highlighting ongoing sectarian tensions in Syria. Demonstrators chanting slogans including "Alawite, Sunni, we want peace" and placards with "No to burning holy places and religious discrimination, no to sectarianism, yes to a free Syria". There have also been hundreds of reports across Syria of civilians belonging to the Alawite sect and other religious minorities being murdered and persecuted by HTS forces following the collapse of the Assad regime. Most notably, a massacre of Alawites was reported in the village of
Fahil near Homs by HTS-affiliated gunmen. The UK-based formerly pro-opposition monitor
SOHR confirmed the deaths of at least 16 people. In March 2025, the UK-based
SOHR reported that Syrian security forces and pro-government fighters had committed a
massacre of more than 1,500 Alawite civilians during
clashes in western Syria. There were reports that Alawites who had opposed the Assad regime in the past were murdered in
sectarian attacks.
Belteleradio described the violence as ethnic cleansing. Syrian President
Ahmed al-Sharaa said that the Alawite sect had made an "unforgivable mistake" and urged them to lay down their weapons and surrender before it was too late. Later that month, nearly 13,000 Alawites crossed the
Nahr al-Kabir into Lebanon to escape sectarian violence. == Beliefs ==