Before the War Pre-war military exercises in 1940 In the autumn of 1940, Zhukov started preparing plans for the
military exercise concerning the defence of the Western border of the Soviet Union. It had been pushed further to the west after the Soviet Union annexed eastern Poland and the Baltic republics. In his memoirs, Zhukov reports that in this exercise, he commanded the Western or Blue forces—the supposed invasion troops—and his opponent was Colonel General
Dmitry Pavlov, the commander of the Eastern or Red forces—the supposed Soviet troops. He noted that Blue had 60 divisions, while Red had 50 divisions. Zhukov describes the exercise as being similar to events that later took place during the German invasion. In this military exercise, I commanded Blue forces representing the Germans, while Pavlov, the commander of Western Military District, commanded the Red forces representing our army [...] After knowing the original documents and the real amount of German forces, when commanding the Blue Forces, I had the attacks developed into three directions, that in the following event the Germans also attacked us in the same manners. The main strikes of us that time was also similar to the main strikes of the Germans later. The army groups built was also nearly similar to the army groups that the Germans formed during the war. [...] Comrade [Stalin] asked why the Blue forces were so powerful, why the original documents of the military exercise allocated too many large forces for the German. He was replied that such forces corresponded to the German capability and the real calculation about the potential forces that the German could unleash after they managed to achieve great superiority on the main axes. That sufficiently showed why the Blue forces could make strong advances during the military exercise. Russian historian Bobylev noted that the details of the exercises were reported differently by the various participants who published memoirs. He said that there were two exercises; one from 2 to 6 January 1941, for the North-West direction; another from 8 to 11 January, for the South-West direction. The plan was completed no later than 15 May 1941, according to a dated document found in the Soviet archives after they were declassified in the 1990s. Some researchers, such as
Victor Suvorov, have theorized that on 14 May, Soviet People's Commissar of Defense
Semyon Timoshenko and General Zhukov presented these plans to Stalin for a preemptive attack against Germany through Southern Poland. Soviet forces would occupy the
Vistula Border and continue to
Katowice or even
Berlin—should the main German armies retreat—or the Baltic coast, should German forces not retreat and be forced to protect Poland and
East Prussia. The attacking Soviets were supposed to reach
Siedlce,
Dęblin, and then capture
Warsaw before penetrating toward the southwest and imposing final defeat at
Lublin. Historians do not have the original documents that could verify the existence of such a plan, and there is no evidence that Stalin accepted it. In a transcript of an interview on 26 May 1965, Zhukov said that Stalin did not approve the plan. But Zhukov did not clarify whether execution was attempted. , no other approved plan for a Soviet attack had been found. On 10 June 1941, Zhukov sent a message to the Military Council of the Kiev Special Military District, after someone, most likely the commander of the Kiev district,
Mikhail Kirponos, had ordered troops on the border to occupy forward positions. Zhukov ordered: "Such action could provoke the Germans into armed confrontation fraught with all sorts of consequences. Revoke this order immediately and report who, specifically, gave such an unauthorised order." On 11 June, he sent a telegram saying that his immediate superior, Timoshenko, had ordered that they were to report back by 16 June confirming that the troops had been withdrawn from their forward positions." According to the historian David E. Murphy, "the action by Timoshenko and Zhukov must have been initiated at the request of Stalin."
David Glantz and
Jonathan House, American scholars of the Red Army, argue that "the Soviet Union was not ready for war in June 1941, nor did it intend, as some have contended, to launch a preventative war."
Gerhard Weinberg, a scholar of Nazi foreign policy, supports their view, arguing that
Adolf Hitler's decision to launch
Operation Barbarossa was not because of a sense of urgent foreboding, but rather from a "purposeful determination" and he had started his planning for the invasion well in advance of the summer of 1941.
The Eastern front Germany invades the Soviet Union On 22 June 1941, Germany launched
Operation Barbarossa, an invasion of the Soviet Union. On the same day, Zhukov responded by signing the "Directive of Peoples' Commissariat of Defence No. 3", which ordered an all-out counteroffensive by Red Army forces. He commanded the troops to "encircle and destroy [the] enemy grouping near
Suwałki and to seize the Suwałki region by the evening of 24 June" and "to encircle and destroy the enemy grouping invading in [the] Vladimir-Volynia and Brody direction" and even "to seize the
Lublin region by the evening of 24 June". This manoeuvre failed and disorganized Red Army units were destroyed by the Wehrmacht. Furthermore the subsequent
Battle of Kiev in September, where over 600,000 Soviet troops were captured or killed, lowered his standing with Stalin. Zhukov subsequently claimed that he was forced by
Joseph Stalin to sign the directive, supposedly written by
Aleksandr Vasilevsky, despite the reservations that he raised. When Stalin arrived unannounced at command headquarters on 29 June, demanding to know why he was not being told what was happening at the front, Zhukov said: "Comrade Stalin, our duty is first of all to help the front commanders and only then to inform you." But when he had to admit that they lost contact with the front commanders in Belarus, Stalin lost his temper and called him "useless". On 29 July, Zhukov was removed from his post of chief of the general staff. In his memoirs he gives his suggested abandoning of
Kiev to avoid an encirclement as a reason for it. On the next day the decision was made official and he was appointed the commander of the
Reserve Front. There he oversaw the
Yelnya offensive, delivering the Red Army's first victory over the Germans. On 10 September, Zhukov was made the commander of the
Leningrad Front. There he oversaw the
defense of the city. On 6 October, Zhukov was appointed the representative of
Stavka for the
Reserve and
Western Fronts. On 10 October, those fronts were merged into the Western Front under Zhukov's command. This front then participated in the
Battle of Moscow and several
Battles of Rzhev. In late August 1942, Zhukov was made deputy commander in chief, subordinate only to Stalin, and sent to the southwestern front to take charge of the
defence of Stalingrad. He and Vasilevsky later planned the
Stalingrad counteroffensive. In November, Zhukov was sent to coordinate the Western Front and the
Kalinin Front during
Operation Mars. In January 1943, he—together with
Kliment Voroshilov—coordinated the actions of the
Leningrad and
Volkhov Fronts and the
Baltic Fleet in
Operation Iskra. On January 18, 1943, Zhukov was promoted to Marshal of the Soviet Union.
Battle of Kursk during the Battle of Kursk, 1943 Zhukov was a
Stavka coordinator at the
battle of Kursk in July 1943. He was considered the main architect of the Soviet victory together with Vasilevsky. According to Zhukov's memoirs, he played a central role in the planning of the battle and the hugely successful offensive that followed. Commander of the Central Front
Konstantin Rokossovsky, said, however, that the planning and decisions for the Battle of Kursk were made without Zhukov, that he only arrived just before the battle, made no decisions and left soon afterward, and that Zhukov exaggerated his role. A sense of the nature of the beginning of Rokossovsky's famous World War II rivalry with Zhukov can be gathered from reading Rokossovsky's comments in an official report on Zhukov's character: Has a strong will. Decisive and firm. Often demonstrates initiative and skillfully applies it. Disciplined. Demanding and persistent in his demands. A somewhat ungracious and not sufficiently sympathetic person. Rather stubborn. Painfully proud. In professional terms well trained. Broadly experienced as a military leader... Absolutely cannot be used in staff or teaching jobs because constitutionally he hates them. From 12 February 1944, Zhukov coordinated the actions of the
1st Ukrainian and
2nd Ukrainian Fronts. On 1 March, Zhukov was appointed the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front until early May following the ambush of
Nikolai Vatutin, its commander, by the anti-Soviet
Ukrainian Insurgent Army near
Ostroh. During the Soviet offensive named
Operation Bagration, Zhukov coordinated the
1st Belorussian and
2nd Belorussian Fronts, and later the 1st Ukrainian Front as well. On 23 August, Zhukov was sent to the
3rd Ukrainian Front to prepare for the advance into Bulgaria.
Surrender of Germany March on Berlin On 16 November, he became commander of the 1st Belorussian Front which took part in the
Vistula–Oder offensive and the
Battle of Berlin. He called on his troops to "remember our brothers and sisters, our mothers and fathers, our wives and children tortured to death by Germans ... We shall exact a brutal revenge for everything". More than 20 million Soviet soldiers and civilians died as a result of the war. In a reprisal for atrocities committed by German soldiers against Soviet civilians in the eastward advance into Soviet territory during Operation Barbarossa, the westward march by Soviet forces was marked by brutality towards German civilians, which included looting, burning and systematic rapes. Zhukov was chosen to personally accept the
German Instrument of Surrender in Berlin. == Post-war service ==