and
Vyacheslav Molotov in 1937 during the Great Purge During the first of the
Moscow trials, in August 1936, Voroshilov was one of four Politburo members who signed the order that appeals for clemency were to be denied and that the defendants were to be executed without delay. He was also of the main speakers at the March 1937 plenum of the Central Committee, which ended with the arrests of
Nikolai Bukharin and
Alexei Rykov, whom Voroshilov denounced as "renegades". In the early stages, he seemed to have believed that the purge would not affect the armed forces, and was seemingly unprepared for the arrest of
Marshal Tukhachevsky and others in April and May. Voroshilov did not personally share the paranoia towards upper-class elements of the officer corps. When the Council met on 1 June 1937, Voroshilov vacated the chair to deliver a report in which he said, apologetically: "I could not believe we would reveal so many and such scoundrels in the ranks of the highest command of our glorious, our valiant Workers' and Peasants' Army." , November 1935. Clockwise from top left:
Budyonny,
Blyukher,
Yegorov, Voroshilov and
Tukhachevsky. Only Voroshilov and Budyonny would survive Stalin's
Great Purge. After that, he played a central role in Stalin's
Great Purge of the 1930s, denouncing many of his own military colleagues and subordinates when asked to do so by Stalin. He wrote personal letters to exiled former Soviet officers and diplomats such as commissar Mikhail Ostrovsky, asking them to return voluntarily to the Soviet Union and falsely reassuring them that they would not face retribution from authorities. Voroshilov personally signed 185 documented execution lists, fourth among the Soviet leadership after
Molotov, Stalin and
Kaganovich. He had no problem denouncing officers he disliked such as Tukhachevsky. ,
Vyacheslav Molotov and
Sergo Ordzhonikidze at a military airfield near Moscow, 1933 Despite taking part in the purging of many "mechanisers" (supporters of wide usage of tanks rather than cavalry) from the Red Army, Voroshilov became convinced that reliance on cavalry should be decreased while more modern arms should receive higher priority. members awarded with the "
Voroshilov Sharpshooter" badge, 1935 When the Great Purge ended, some reforms were undertaken by the high command to reconcile Red Army doctrine (for example
deep operations doctrine) with the real state of the Red Army. The politically appointed commanders of the post-purge Red Army saw that the army, especially after the purge, was not suitable to carry out deep operations style warfare. Commanders such as Voroshilov and
Kulik were among the instigators of these reforms which positively impacted the Red Army. These commanders themselves turned out not to be able to carry out such operations in practice. Voroshilov and Kulik turned out to be unable to put these reforms into practice. One of these reforms was a reorganization of Red Army field units which accidentally moved Red Army organization to a far less advanced state than it had been in 1936. This reorganization was conceived by Kulik but put into practice by Voroshilov. When territorial units were abolished Voroshilov noted that among the reasons for disbanding them was inability to train conscripts in the use of modern technology. He had openly proclaimed that the system was inadequate in an era in which imperialist powers (such as
Germany) were expanding the capabilities of their armies. The territorial units had been very unpopular, not only with Voroshilov, but with the Red Army leadership a whole. They were hopelessly ineffective: territorial conscript Alexey Grigorovich Maslov noted that he never fired a shot during his training, while it was noted that these units only underwent real training in the one month a year when experienced veterans returned. == World War II ==