Efficiency of markets Some academics and economists argue that the claim a
free market is an efficient, or even the most efficient, method of resource allocation is incorrect.
Alexander Nove argued that Mises "tends to spoil his case by the implicit assumption that capitalism and optimum resource allocation go together" in Mises' "Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth".
Joan Robinson argued that many prices in modern capitalism are effectively "administered prices" created by "quasi monopolies", thus challenging the connection between capital markets and rational resource allocation. Socialist
market abolitionists argue that whilst advocates of
capitalism and the
Austrian School in particular recognize
equilibrium prices do not exist in real life, they nonetheless claim that these prices can be used as a rational basis when this is not the case, hence markets are not efficient.
Robin Hahnel further argued that market inefficiencies, such as externalities and excess supply and demand, arise from buyers and sellers thoughtlessly maximizing their rational interests, which free markets inherently do not deter. Nonetheless, Hahnel commended current policies pursued by free market capitalist societies against these inefficiencies (e.g.
Pigouvian taxes, antitrust laws etc.), as long as they are properly calculated and consistently enforced.
Milton Friedman agreed that markets with monopolistic competition are not efficient, but he argued that it is easy to force monopolies to adopt competitive behavior by
exposing them to foreign rivals.
Economic liberals and
libertarian capitalists also argue that monopolies and big business are not generally the result of a free market, or that they never arise from a free market; rather, they say that such concentration is enabled by governmental grants of franchises or privileges. That said,
protectionist economies can theoretically still foster competition as long as there is strong
consumer switching.
Joseph Schumpeter additionally argued that economic advancement, through innovation and investment, are often driven by large monopolies.
Equilibrium Allin Cottrell,
Paul Cockshott and Greg Michaelson argued that the contention that finding a true economic equilibrium is not just hard but impossible for a central planner applies equally well to a market system. As any
universal Turing machine can do what any other Turing machine can, a system of dispersed calculators, i.e. a market, in principle has no advantage over a central calculator.
Don Lavoie makes a local knowledge argument by taking this implication in reverse. The market socialists pointed out the formal similarity between the neoclassical model of
Walrasian general equilibrium and that of market socialism which simply replace the Walrasian auctioneer with a planning board. According to Lavoie, this emphasizes the shortcomings of the model. By relying on this formal similarity, the market socialists must adopt the simplifying assumptions of the model. The model assumes that various sorts of information are given to the auctioneer or planning board. However, if not coordinated by a capital market, this information exists in a fundamentally
distributed form, which would be difficult to utilize on the planners' part. If the planners decided to utilize the information, it would immediately become stale and relatively useless, unless reality somehow imitated the changeless monotony of the equilibrium model. The existence and usability of this information depends on its creation and situation within a
distributed discovery procedure.
Exaggerated claims One criticism is that proponents of the theory overstate the strength of their case by describing socialism as impossible rather than inefficient. In explaining why he is not an
Austrian School economist,
anarcho-capitalist economist
Bryan Caplan argues that while the economic calculation problem is a problem for socialism, he denies that Mises has shown it to be fatal or that it is this particular problem that led to the collapse of authoritarian socialist states. Caplan also states the exaggeration of the problem; in his view, Mises did not manage to prove why economic calculation made the socialist economy 'impossible', and even if there were serious doubts about the efficiency of cost benefit analysis, other arguments are plentiful (Caplan gives the example of the incentive problem).
Steady-state economy Joan Robinson argued that in a
steady-state economy there would be an effective abundance of means of production and so markets would not be needed. Mises acknowledged such a theoretical possibility in his original tract when he said the following: "The static state can dispense with economic calculation. For here the same events in economic life are ever recurring; and if we assume that the first disposition of the static socialist economy follows on the basis of the final state of the competitive economy, we might at all events conceive of a socialist production system which is rationally controlled from an economic point of view."
Use of technology In
Towards a New Socialism's "Information and Economics: A Critique of Hayek" and "Against Mises",
Paul Cockshott and Allin Cottrell argued that the use of computational technology now simplifies economic calculation and allows planning to be implemented and sustained. Len Brewster replied to this by arguing that
Towards a New Socialism establishes what is essentially another form of a market economy, making the following point: In response, Cockshott argued that the economic system is sufficiently far removed from a capitalist free-market economy to not count as one, saying: Leigh Phillips' and Michal Rozworski's 2019 book ''
The People's Republic of Walmart'' argues that multinational corporations like
Walmart and
Amazon already operate centrally planned economies in a more technologically sophisticated manner than the Soviet Union, proving that the economic calculation problem is surmountable. There are some contentions to this view however, namely how economic planning and planned economy ought to be distinguished. Both entail formulating data-driven economic objectives but the latter precludes it from occurring within a free-market context and delegates the task to centralized bodies. One reason includes how they are dependent on
Big Data, which in turn is entirely based on past information. Hence, the system cannot make any meaningful conclusions about future consumer preferences, which are required for optimal pricing. This necessitates the intervention of the programmer, who is highly likely to be biased in their judgments. Even the manner by which a system can "predict" consumer preferences is also based on a programmer's creative bias. They further argue that even if artificial intelligence is able to ordinally rank items like humans, they would still suffer from the same issues of
not being able to conceive of a
pricing structure where meaningful pricing calculations, using a common cardinal utility unit, can be formed. Nonetheless, Lambert and Fegley acknowledge that entrepreneurs can benefit from Big Data's predictive value, provided that the data is based on past market prices and that it is used in tandem with free market-styled
bidding. == See also ==