In the 18th century,
Adam Smith famously warned against the "interested sophistry" of industry, seeking to gain an advantage at the cost of the consumers.
Friedrich List saw Adam Smith's views on
free trade as disingenuous, believing that Smith advocated for free trade so that British industry could lock out underdeveloped foreign competition. According to economic historians Douglas Irwin and Kevin O'Rourke, "shocks that emanate from brief financial crises tend to be transitory and have a little long-run effect on trade policy, whereas those that play out over longer periods (the early 1890s, early 1930s) may give rise to protectionism that is difficult to reverse. Regional wars also produce transitory shocks that have little impact on long-run trade policy, while global wars give rise to extensive government trade restrictions that can be difficult to reverse." One study shows that sudden shifts in comparative advantage for specific countries have led some countries to become protectionist: "The shift in comparative advantage associated with the opening up of New World frontiers, and the subsequent "grain invasion" of Europe, led to higher agricultural tariffs from the late 1870s onwards, which as we have seen reversed the move toward freer trade that had characterized mid-nineteenth-century Europe. In the decades after World War II, Japan's rapid rise led to trade friction with other countries. Japan's recovery was accompanied by a sharp increase in its exports of certain product categories: cotton textiles in the 1950s, steel in the 1960s, automobiles in the 1970s, and electronics in the 1980s. In each case, the rapid expansion in Japan's exports created difficulties for its trading partners and the use of protectionism as a shock absorber." In June 2015, the international community, through the
IMF, rejected this notion and assessed the renminbi as suggested to be no longer undervalued. Later that year, American economist
Charles Calomiris wrote that US presidential candidate at the time
Donald Trump had falsely characterized the trajectory of the renminbi's exchange rate in nominal terms and especially so when using the
real exchange rate, and that a recent devaluation by the
PBC was a passive one where inaction would've led to an even steeper devaluation by market forces, understandably so after the disappearance of "a lot of [Chinese economic growth] low-hanging fruit that was easily picked in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s."
Europe Continental Europe Europe became increasingly protectionist during the eighteenth century. Economic historians Findlay and O'Rourke write that in "the immediate aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, European trade policies were almost universally protectionist", with the exceptions being smaller countries such as the Netherlands and Denmark. A 1990 study by the Harvard economic historian
Jeffrey Williamson showed that the Corn Laws (which imposed restrictions and
tariffs on imported
grain) substantially increased the cost of living for British workers, and hampered the British manufacturing sector by reducing the disposable incomes that British workers could have spent on manufactured goods. The shift towards liberalization in Britain occurred in part due to "the influence of economists like David Ricardo", but also due to "the growing power of urban interests". Findlay and O'Rourke characterize 1860
Cobden Chevalier treaty between France and the United Kingdom as "a decisive shift toward European free trade." In the Ottoman Empire's case, however, it previously had
liberal free trade policies during the 18th to early 19th centuries. The countries of Western Europe began to steadily liberalize their economies after World War II and the protectionism of the interwar period,
United Kingdom Britain became one of the most prosperous economic regions in the world between the late 17th century and the early 19th century as a result of being the birthplace of the
Industrial Revolution that began in the mid-eighteenth century. Successive British government protected Britain's merchants using trade regulations, barriers and subsidies to domestic industries in order to maximise exports from and minimise imports to Britain. The
Navigation Acts of the late 17th century required all trade in England and its colonies to be conducted with English-flagged ships with at least 75% of their crews being English subjects. The Navigation Acts also prohibited British colonies from exporting certain products to countries other than Britain along with mandating that imports be sourced only through Britain. The colonies were forbidden to trade directly with other nations or rival empires with the intention of maintaining them as dependent agricultural economies geared towards producing raw materials for export to Britain. The growth of native industries in the colonies were discouraged in order to keep them dependent on the metropole for finished goods. From 1815 to 1870, the United Kingdom reaped the benefits of being the world's first modern, industrialised nation. It became known as "the workshop of the world", with British finished goods being produced so efficiently and cheaply that they could often undersell comparable, locally manufactured goods in almost any other market. By the 1840s, the United Kingdom had adopted a free-trade policy, meaning open markets and no tariffs throughout the empire. The
Corn Laws were
tariffs and other
trade restrictions on imported food and
corn enforced in the
United Kingdom between 1815 and 1846, and enhanced the profits and political power associated with
land ownership. The laws raised
food prices and the costs of living for the British public, and hampered the growth of other British economic sectors, such as manufacturing, by reducing the disposable income of the British public. The Prime Minister,
Sir Robert Peel, a
Conservative, achieved repeal in 1846 with the support of the
Whigs in Parliament, overcoming the opposition of most of his own party. While the United Kingdom espoused a policy of free trade in the late nineteenth century, it was hardly the case that Britain was unaffected by the tariffs imposed by its trade partners—tariffs that generally increased during the late nineteenth century. According to one study, Britain's exports in 1902 would have been 57% higher, if all of Britain's trade partners also embraced free trade. The decline in overseas demand for British exports, resulting from foreign tariffs, contributed to the so-called late-Victorian climacteric in the British economy: a decline in the growth rate, i.e. a deceleration. During the interwar era, Britain abandoned free trade. There was a limited erosion of free trade during the 1920s under a patchwork of legislation including the
Safeguarding of Industries Act of 1921, the
Safeguarding of Industries Act of 1925, and the
Finance Act of 1925. The
McKenna Duties, which were imposed during the First World War on motorcars; clocks and watches; musical instruments; and cinematographic film were retained. Under commodities that were early to receive protection included matches, chemicals, scientific equipment, silk, rayon, embroidery, lace, cutlery, gloves, incandescent mantles, paper, pottery, enamelled holloware, and buttons. The duties on motorcars and rayon have been determined to have expanded output considerably. Amid the Depression, Britain passed the
Import Duties Act of 1932, which imposed a general tariff of 10% on most imports and created the Import Duties Advisory Committee (IDAC), which could recommend even higher duties. Britain's protectionism in the early 1930s was shown by Lloyd and Solomou to have been productivity-enhancing. The possessions of the
East India Company in India, known as
British India, was the centrepiece of the British Empire, and because of an efficient taxation system it paid its own administrative expenses as well as the cost of the large
British Indian Army. In terms of trade, India turned only a small profit for British business. However, transfers to the British government was massive: in 1801 unrequited (unpaid, or paid from Indian-collected revenue) was about 30% of British domestic savings available for capital formation in the United Kingdom.
Latin America Most Latin American countries
gained independence in the early 19th century, with notable exceptions including
Spanish Cuba and
Spanish Puerto Rico. Following the achievement of their independence, many of the Latin American countries adopted protectionism. They both feared that any foreign competition would stomp out their newly created state and believed that lack of outside resources would drive domestic production. The protectionist behavior continued up until and during the World Wars. During World War 2, Latin America had, on average, the highest tariffs in the world.
Argentina Argentina, which had been insignificant during the first half of the 19th century, showed an impressive and sustained economic performance from the 1860s up until 1930. A 2018 study describes Argentina as a "super-exporter" during the period 1880–1929, and credits the boom to low trade costs and trade liberalization on one hand and on the other hand to the fact that Argentina "offered a diverse basket of products to the different European and American countries that consumed them". The study concludes "that Argentina took advantage of a multilateral and open economic system." Beginning in the 1940s,
Juan Perón erected a system of almost complete protectionism against imports, largely cutting off Argentina from the international market. Protectionism created a domestically oriented industry with high production costs, incapable of competing in international markets. At the same time, output of beef and grain, the country's main export goods, stagnated. The IAPI began shortchanging growers and, when world grain prices dropped in the late 1940s, it stifled agricultural production, exports and business sentiment, in general. During this period Argentina's economy continued to grow, on average, but more slowly than the world as a whole or than its neighbors, Brazil and Chile. By 1954, while still leading the region, Argentina's GDP per capita had fallen to less than half of that of the United States, from being 80% equivalent before the 1930s.
United States According to
Douglas Irwin, tariffs have historically served three main purposes: generating revenue for the
federal government, restricting imports to protect domestic producers, and securing reciprocity through
trade agreements that reduce barriers. The history of
U.S. trade policy can be divided into three distinct eras, each characterized by the predominance of one goal. From 1790 to 1860, revenue considerations dominated, as import duties accounted for approximately 90% of federal government receipts. From 1861 to 1933, the growing reliance on
domestic taxation shifted the focus of tariffs toward protecting domestic industries. From 1934 to 2016, the primary objective of trade policy became the negotiation of trade agreements with other countries. The three eras of U.S. tariff history were separated by two major shocks—the Civil War and the Great Depression—that realigned political power and shifted trade policy objectives. Political support by members of
Congress often reflects the economic interests of producers rather than
consumers, as producers tend to be better organized politically and employ many voting workers. Trade-related interests differ across industries, depending on whether they focus on exports or face import competition. In general, workers in export-oriented sectors favor lower tariffs, while those in import-competing industries support higher tariffs. The economic burden of the Navigation Acts fell mostly on the southern colonies, especially tobacco planters in Maryland and Virginia, potentially reducing regional income by up to 2.5% and strengthening support for independence. American foreign trade declined sharply during the
Revolutionary War and remained subdued into the 1780s. Trade revived during the 1790s but remained volatile due to ongoing military conflicts in Europe. President
Thomas Jefferson initiated a notable policy experiment by enacting a complete embargo on maritime commerce, with Congressional support, beginning in December 1807. The stated objective of the embargo was to protect American vessels and sailors from becoming entangled in the Anglo-French naval conflict (the
Napoleonic Wars). By mid-1808, the United States had reached near-
autarkic conditions, representing one of the most extreme peacetime interruptions of international trade in its history. The embargo, which remained in effect from December 1807 to March 1809, imposed significant economic costs. From 1837 to 1860, spanning the
Second Party System and ending with the Civil War, the Democratic Party held political dominance in the United States. The Democrats drew support primarily from the export-oriented South and promoted the slogan "a tariff for revenue only" to express their opposition to protective tariffs. As a result, the average tariff declined from early 1830s levels to under 20% by 1860. During this period, there were 12 sessions of Congress: 7 under unified government (6 led by Democrats, 1 by Whigs) and 5 under divided control. This meant that over the 34-year span, the pro-tariff
Whig Party, based in the North, held power for only two years. They succeeded in raising tariffs in 1842, but this was reversed in 1846 after Democrats returned to power. Throughout the 10 years of divided government, tariff policy remained unchanged.
Great Depression and Smoot–Hawley Tariff (1929–1933) The Tariff Act of 1930, commonly known as the Smoot–Hawley Tariff, is considered one of the most controversial tariff laws ever enacted by the United States Congress. The act raised the average tariff on dutiable imports from approximately 40% to 47%, though price deflation during the
Great Depression caused the effective rate to rise to nearly 60% by 1932. The Smoot–Hawley Tariff was implemented as the global economy was entering a severe downturn. The Great Depression of 1929–1933 represented an economic collapse for both the United States—where real GDP declined by about 25% and
unemployment exceeded 20%—and much of the world. As international trade contracted, trade barriers multiplied, unemployment increased, and industrial output declined worldwide, leading many to attribute part of the global economic crisis to the Smoot–Hawley Tariff. The extent to which this legislation contributed to the depth of the Great Depression has remained a subject of ongoing debate. A more cautious view is represented by the New Keynesian economist
Paul Krugman, who argues that tariffs were not the primary cause of the Great Depression but rather a response to it, and that protectionism constitutes only a limited source of allocative inefficiency. Other economists have contended that the record tariffs of the 1920s and early 1930s exacerbated the
Great Depression in the U.S., in part because of retaliatory tariffs imposed by other countries on the United States.
Reciprocity period (1934–2016) The Great Depression led to a political realignment following the Democratic victory in the 1932 election. This election ended decades of Republican dominance and initiated a period of Democratic control over the federal government that lasted from 1933 to 1993. The realignment shifted influence toward the party that prioritized export-oriented interests in the South. Consequently, the focus of trade policy moved from protectionism to reciprocity, and average tariff levels declined significantly. During this period, there were 30 sessions of Congress, with 16 under unified government (15 Democratic, 1 Republican) and 14 under divided government. Over these 60 years, the overarching goal of promoting reciprocal trade agreements remained largely unchanged, including during the two-year span (1953–1955) when Republicans held unified control. After the 1993 vote on the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Democratic support for trade liberalization declined significantly. By that time, the two major parties had effectively reversed their positions on trade policy. This shift in party alignment primarily reflects changes in regional representation: the South transitioned from being a Democratic stronghold to a Republican one, while the Northeast became increasingly Democratic. As a result, regional views on trade policy remained largely consistent, but the parties came to represent different geographic constituencies. ==Current world trends==