Since the 1970s, economic and occupational insecurity has become a major problem for American workers, their families, and their communities, to a much greater extent than their counterparts in peer countries. According to
Matthew Desmond, the U.S. "offers some of the lowest wages in the industrialized world" which has "swelled the ranks of the working poor, most of whom are thirty-five or older."
Jonathan Hopkin writes that the United States took the lead in implementing the
neoliberal agenda in the 1980s, making it "the most extreme case of the subjection of society to the brute force of the market." As such, he argues this made the United States an outlier with
economic inequality hitting "unprecedented levels for the rich democracies." While
outsourcing, the
busting and decline of unionization and welfare supports, the rise of immigration, the
prison-industrial complex, and unemployment have brought increased competition and considerable economic insecurity to working-class employees in the "traditional" blue-collar fields, there is an increasing demand for
service personnel, including clerical and retail occupations. At the same time, political economist Radhika Desai says that working people have been encouraged, but not always permitted, to supplement their inadequate incomes with credit.Despite, or perhaps because of the well-known limitations that the US
labor market, inequality—including deep
educational inequality, and other structural factors set on
social mobility in the US, many commentators find more interesting the idea of
class cultures. Education, for example, can pose an especially intransigent barrier in the US, and not just because of gross educational inequality; culture plays some role as well. The middle class is often recognized in the US by educational attainment, which is correlated with (
but may not cause) income and wealth, especially for white men. Members of the working class commonly have a high school diploma and many have only some college education. Due to differences between middle and
working class cultures, working class college students may face
culture shock upon entering the post-secondary education system, with its "middle class" culture. Labor historian
Julie Greene writes that the working class of the United States is living through a
Second Gilded Age "characterized by de-industrialization, the rise of the
gig economy, and falling real wages." She distinguishes this from the original
Gilded Age when working class people created powerful
labor movements to improve wages and working conditions, whereas the second has seen a greater effort by the capitalist class and their supporters to roll back the labor movement and protections for workers, which has led to "greater acquiescence to exploitation." The disappearance of any alternatives to capitalism globally, in particular the
dissolution of the Soviet Union and China's
economic liberalization, she argues, has made this process easier. Some experts, including the economists
Anne Case and
Angus Deaton and psychiatrist Anna Zeira, attribute rising
diseases of despair, which are impacting mostly the working class, to what they see as flaws in contemporary
capitalism: neoliberal capitalist policies which shifted political and economic power from labor to capital, (with an emphasis on cutting social services), weakened unions, and
deregulated markets, which resulted in empowered corporations, increased outsourcing and
rent-seeking, and increased economic inequality as wealth was transferred from the bottom to the top. Such policies, they argue, have been extremely toxic to the working class and have exacerbated emotional distress. Scholars including business theorist
Jeffrey Pfeffer and political scientist Daniel Kinderman posit that contemporary employment practices in the United States relating to the increased performance pressure from management, and the hardships imposed on working class people such as toxic working environments,
precarity, and long hours, could be responsible for 120,000 excess deaths annually, making the workplace the fifth leading cause of death in the United States.
Culture Some researchers try to measure the cultural differences between the American middle class and working class and suggest their ahistorical sources and implications for educational attainment, future income, and other life chances. Sociologist Melvin Kohn argues that working class values emphasize external standards, such as obedience and a strong respect for authority as well as little tolerance for deviance. This is opposed to middle-class individuals who, he says, emphasize internal standards, self-direction, curiosity and a tolerance for non-conformity. Working class culture can be broken down into subgroup tendencies. According to Rubin (1976), there is a differential in social and emotional skills both between working-class men and women and between the blue-color working-class and college-educated workers. Working-class men are characterized by Rubin as taking a rational posture while women are characterized as being more emotional and oriented towards communication of feelings. This constellation of cultural issues has been explored in the popular media, for example, the television shows,
Roseanne or
All in the Family featuring
Archie Bunker and his wife
Edith Bunker. These popular television programs also explored generational change and conflict in working-class families. One does need to note, however, that there are great variations in cultural values among the members of all classes and that any statement pertaining to the cultural values of such large social groups needs to be seen as a broad generalization.
Political role of the white working class According to
Thomas B. Edsall, an experienced political commentator, the white working class, defined as non-Hispanic whites who have not completed college, plays a pivotal role in the
politics of the United States. This segment of the electorate was solidly Democratic during the
New Deal, but its support of Democratic candidates steadily eroded to about 50% by the end of the 20th century. It is also diminishing as a portion of the electorate, both due to increased educational opportunities and because whites make up a declining share of the electorate overall. At the turn of the millennium in the
2000 presidential election, whites without college degrees became a Republican demographic stronghold. They had been approximately evenly split in the
1996 presidential election, but swung hard towards
George W. Bush, who won by them a 17% margin that year. Whites without college degrees continued to become more Republican before Donald Trump first ran for president in 2016. The political role of the white working class was re-examined during the
2016 United States presidential election, due to the strong support for
Donald Trump by white working class voters. Trump's victory was in part credited to this support in swing states such as
Wisconsin,
Michigan, and
Pennsylvania, that had
previously been won by his Democratic predecessor
Barack Obama. Professional pollsters did not predict such a large swing for Trump among the white working class. According to Nate Cohn, the gains that Trump's opponent
Hillary Clinton made among other voter classes "were overwhelmed by Mr. Trump's huge appeal to white voters without a degree." According to
Nate Silver, educational attainment, not income, predicted who would vote for Trump in 2016. Specifically, Trump gained among White voters without college degrees and lost ground among White voters with college degrees. The most college-educated counties in the United States had the smallest swings to or shifted against Trump. This can be seen by comparing the swing map and the map of the most college-educated counties. Whites with college degrees did not become a Democratic stronghold until 2016. They had only voted for
Lyndon B. Johnson 52-48% in his
1964 landslide victory, even as Johnson won 61-39%. According to
Nate Cohn, Trump made his largest gains among the least-educated and lowest-income White voters, while Hillary Clinton made her largest gains among the best-educated and most affluent White voters. In particular, Trump gained the most among Whites who did not graduate from college, while Whites with graduate degrees dramatically shifted towards Clinton. Clinton still won the lowest-income voters as a whole. According to
Lynn Vavreck and colleagues, survey data revealed that economic insecurities mattered to Trump voters most when connected to a racial animus, with the job losses being specifically important when lost to an
out-group, in a composite they called 'racialized economics'. Trump supporters have in turn been claimed to have actually have their jobs threatened by Trump's policies, but have continued supporting him.
Jonathan Metzl has claimed that low-income white men in Missouri,
Tennessee and Kansas oppose policies that support people in their position because they believe that undeserving groups would benefit from them.
Arlie Russell Hochschild has studied working-class people in
Louisiana, and come to the conclusion that what is motivating them is a feeling, which she calls the Deep Story:You are patiently standing in a long line leading up a hill, as in a pilgrimage. You are situated in the middle of this line, along with others who are also white, older, Christian, predominantly male, some with college degrees, some not. Just over the brow of the hill is the American Dream, the goal of everyone waiting in line.... You've suffered long hours, layoffs, and exposure to dangerous chemicals at work, and received reduced pensions. You have shown moral character through trial by fire, and the American Dream of prosperity and security is a reward for all of this, showing who you have been and are—a badge of honor.... Look! You see people cutting in line ahead of you! You're following the rules. They aren't. As they cut in, it feels like you are being moved back. How can they just do that? Who are they? Some are black. Through affirmative action plans, pushed by the federal government, they are being given preference for places in colleges and universities, apprenticeships, jobs, welfare payments, and free lunches.... Women, immigrants, refugees, public sector workers—where will it end? Your money is running through a liberal sympathy sieve you don't control or agree with.... But it's people like you who have made this country great. You feel uneasy. It has to be said: the line cutters irritate you.... You are a stranger in your own land. You do not recognize yourself in how others see you. It is a struggle to feel seen and honored.... [Y]ou are slipping backward. ==See also==