beside the Amu Darya river, AD 1504 In the late 3rd millennium BCE, the watershed was home to
a river valley civilization, forgotten to history until its discovery by Soviet archaeologists in the 1970's. The ancient
Greeks called the Amu Darya the
Oxus. In ancient times, the river was regarded as the boundary between
Greater Iran and
Ṫūrān (). One southern route of the
Silk Road ran along part of the Amu Darya northwestward from
Termez before going westwards to the
Caspian Sea. According to the Quaternary International, it is possible that the Amu Darya's course across the
Karakum Desert has gone through several major shifts in the past few thousand years. Much of the time – most recently from the 13th century to the late 16th century – the Amu Darya emptied into both the Aral and the Caspian Seas, reaching the latter via a large
distributary called the
Uzboy River. The Uzboy splits off from the main channel just south of the river's delta. Sometimes the flow through the two branches was more or less equal, but often most of the Amu Darya's flow split to the west and flowed into the Caspian. People began to settle along the lower Amu Darya and the Uzboy in the 5th century, establishing a thriving chain of agricultural lands, towns, and cities. In about AD 985, the massive
Gurganj Dam at the bifurcation of the forks started to divert water to the Aral.
Genghis Khan's troops destroyed the dam in 1221, and the Amu Darya shifted to distributing its flow more or less equally between the main stem and the Uzboy. But in the 18th century, the river again turned north, flowing into the Aral Sea, a path it has taken since. Less and less water flowed down the Uzboy. When Russian explorer Bekovich-Cherkasski surveyed the region in 1720, the Amu Darya did not flow into the Caspian Sea anymore. . 1873 By the 1800s, the ethnographic makeup of the region was described by
Peter Kropotkin as the communities of "the vassal Khanates of Maimene, Khulm, Kunduz, and even the Badakshan and Wahkran." An Englishman,
William Moorcroft, visited the Oxus around 1824 during the
Great Game period. Another Englishman, a naval officer called
John Wood, came with an expedition to find the source of the river in 1839. He found modern-day
Lake Zorkul, called it Lake Victoria, and proclaimed he had found the source. Then, the French explorer and geographer Thibaut Viné collected a lot of information about this area during five expeditions between 1856 and 1862. The question of finding a route between the Oxus valley and India has been of concern historically. A direct route crosses extremely high mountain passes in the
Hindu Kush and isolated areas like
Kafiristan. Some in Britain feared that the Empire of Russia, which at the time wielded great influence over the Oxus area, would overcome these obstacles and find a suitable route through which to invade
British India – but this never came to pass. The area was taken over by Russia during the
Russian conquest of Turkestan. The
Soviet Union became the ruling power in the early 1920s and expelled
Mohammed Alim Khan. It later put down the
Basmachi movement and killed
Ibrahim Bek. A large refugee population of Central Asians, including Turkmen, Tajiks, and Uzbeks, fled to northern Afghanistan. In the 1960s and 1970s the Soviets started using the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya to irrigate extensive
cotton fields in the Central Asian plain. Before this time, water from the rivers was already being used for agriculture, but not on this massive scale. The
Qaraqum Canal, Karshi Canal, and Bukhara Canal were among the largest of the irrigation diversions built. However, the
Main Turkmen Canal, which would have diverted water along the dry Uzboy River bed into central Turkmenistan, was never built. In the course of the
Soviet–Afghan War in the 1970s, Soviet forces used the valley to invade Afghanistan through
Termez. The Soviet Union fell in the 1990s and Central Asia split up into the many smaller countries that lie within or partially within the Amu Darya basin. During the Soviet era, a resource-sharing system was instated in which
Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan shared water originating from the Amu and
Syr Daryas with
Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan in summer. In return,
Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan received Kazakh, Turkmen, and Uzbek coal, gas, and electricity in winter. After the fall of the Soviet Union this system disintegrated and the Central Asian nations have failed to reinstate it. Inadequate infrastructure, poor water management, and outdated irrigation methods all exacerbate the issue.
Siberian Tiger Introduction Project The
Caspian tiger used to occur along the river's banks, but was last seen in the area in the 1970s. After its extirpation, the Amu Darya's delta was suggested as a potential site for the introduction of its closest surviving relative, the
Siberian tiger. A feasibility study was initiated to investigate if the area is suitable and if such an initiative would receive support from relevant decision makers. A viable tiger population of about 100 animals would require at least of large tracts of contiguous habitat with rich prey populations. Such habitat is not available at this stage and cannot be provided in the short term. The proposed region is therefore unsuitable for the reintroduction, at least at this stage.
Resource extraction Since March 2022, the building of the 285 km
Qosh Tepa Canal has been underway in northern
Afghanistan to divert water from the Amu Darya.
Uzbekistan has expressed concern that the canal will have an adverse effect on its agriculture. The canal is also expected to make the
Aral Sea disaster worse, and in 2023 Uzbek officials held talks on the canal with the Taliban. The Taliban has made the canal a priority, with images supplied by
Planet Labs demonstrate that from April 2022 to February 2023, more than 100 km of canal was excavated. In January 2023, the
Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Company (aka CAPEIC) signed a $720 million four-year investment deal with the
Taliban government of
Afghanistan for extraction on its side of the Amu Darya basin. The deal will see a 15% royalty given to the Afghan government over the course of its 25-year term. A 2019 study by
PetroChina listed this basin as the third-largest potential gas field in the world. ==Literature==