By September 1900, the British were nominally in control of both Republics, with the exception of north Transvaal. However, they discovered they only controlled the territory their columns physically occupied. Despite the loss of their capitals and half their army, the Boer commanders adopted
guerrilla warfare, conducting raids against railways, resource and supply targets, aimed at disrupting the operational capacity of the British Army. They avoided pitched battles and casualties were light. Boer commando units were sent to the district from which its members were recruited, which meant they could rely on local support and knowledge of the terrain and towns, enabling them to live off the land. Their orders were simply to act against the British whenever possible. Their tactics were to strike fast causing as much damage as possible, then withdraw before enemy reinforcements could arrive. The vast distances of the republics allowed Boer commandos freedom to move about and made it nearly impossible for the 250,000 British troops to control the territory effectively using columns alone. As soon as a British column left a town or district, British control of that area faded away. Boer commandos were especially effective during the initial guerrilla phase because Roberts had assumed the war would end with the capture of the capitals and dispersal of the Boer armies. British troops were therefore redeployed out of the area, and had been replaced by lower-quality
Imperial Yeomanry and locally-raised irregular corps. From late May 1900, the first successes of the Boer guerrilla strategy were at Lindley (where 500 Yeomanry surrendered), and at Heilbron (where a large convoy and its escort were captured) and other skirmishes resulting in 1,500 British casualties in less than ten days. In December 1900, De la Rey and
Christiaan Beyers attacked and mauled a British brigade at
Nooitgedacht, inflicting 650 casualties. As a result, the British, led by Lord Kitchener, mounted extensive searches for
Christiaan de Wet, but without success. However, Boer raids on British army camps and other targets were sporadic and poorly planned, and the nature of the Boer guerrilla war itself had no long-term objectives, with the exception to harass the British. This led to a disorganised pattern of scattered engagements between the British and Boers.
Use of blockhouses The British were forced to revise their tactics. They concentrated on restricting the freedom of movement of the Boer commandos and depriving them of local support. The railway lines had provided vital lines of communication and supply, and as the British had advanced across South Africa, they had used
armoured trains and established fortified
blockhouses at key points along most lines. The Army linked the blockhouses with barbed wire fences to parcel up the wide veld into smaller areas. "New Model" drives were mounted under which a line of troops could sweep an area of veld bounded by blockhouse lines, unlike the earlier inefficient scouring of the countryside by scattered columns.
Scorched earth campaign against civilians policy to deny guerrillas supplies and refuge. Here
Boer civilians watch their house as it is burned. The British implemented a scorched earth policy under which they targeted everything within the controlled areas that could give sustenance to the guerrillas, making it harder for them to survive. As British troops swept the countryside, they systematically destroyed crops, poisoned wells, burned homesteads and farms, and interned Boer and African men, women, children and workers in concentration camps. The British established mounted raiding columns in support of sweeper columns. These were used to rapidly follow and relentlessly harass the Boers to delay them and cut off escape, while the sweeper units caught up. Many of the 90 or so mobile columns formed by the British to participate in such drives were a mixture of British and colonial troops, but they also had a large minority of armed Africans. The number of armed Africans serving with these columns has been estimated at 20,000. The British Army made use of Boer auxiliaries who had been persuaded to change sides and enlist as "
National Scouts". Serving under General
Andries Cronjé (1849–1923), the National Scouts were despised as
joiners but numbered a fifth of the fighting Afrikaners by the end of the War. The British utilised armoured trains to deliver rapid reaction forces much more quickly to incidents (such as Boer attacks on blockhouses and columns) or drop them off ahead of retreating Boer columns.
Peace committees Among those Burghers who had stopped fighting, it was decided to form peace committees to persuade those fighting to desist. In December 1900, Lord Kitchener gave permission that a central Burgher Peace Committee be inaugurated in Pretoria. By the end of 1900 thirty envoys were sent out to the districts to form peace committees to persuade burghers to give up. Previous leaders of the Boers, like Generals Piet de Wet and Andries Cronjé were involved in the organisation.
Meyer de Kock was an emissary of a peace committee, but he was arrested, convicted of high treason, and executed by firing squad.
Joiners Some burghers joined the British in their fight against the Boers. By the end of hostilities in May 1902, there were 5,464 burghers working for the British.
Orange Free State was the most formidable leader of the Boer guerrillas. He successfully evaded capture several times and later involved in the negotiations for a peace settlement. After having conferred with the Transvaal leaders, de Wet returned to the Orange Free State, where he inspired successful attacks and raids in the western part of the country, though he suffered a defeat at
Bothaville in November 1900. Many Boers who had returned to their farms and towns, sometimes after being given parole by the British, took up arms again. In late January 1901, De Wet led a renewed invasion of Cape Colony. This was less successful, because there was no general uprising among the Cape Boers, and De Wet's men were hampered by bad weather and pursued by British forces. They narrowly escaped across the Orange River. From then until the final days of the war, De Wet remained comparatively quiet, rarely attacking British army camps and columns partly because the Orange Free State was effectively left desolate by British sweeps. In December 1901, De Wet attacked and overran an isolated British detachment at
Groenkop, inflicting heavy casualties and capturing over 200 British soldiers. This prompted Kitchener to launch the first of the "New Model" drives against him. De Wet escaped the first such drive but lost 300 of his fighters. This was a severe loss, and a portent of further attrition, although sweep attempts to round up De Wet were badly handled, and De Wet's forces avoided capture for the rest of the war.
Western Transvaal The Boer commandos in the Western Transvaal were very active after September 1901. Several battles were fought there between September 1901 and March 1902. At Moedwil on 30 September 1901 and again at Driefontein on 24 October, General
Koos De La Rey's forces attacked British camps and outposts but were forced to withdraw after the British offered strong resistance. From late 1901 to early 1902, a time of relative quiet descended on the western Transvaal. February 1902 saw the next major battle in that region. On 25 February, De La Rey attacked a British column under Lieutenant-Colonel
S. B. von Donop at Ysterspruit near
Wolmaransstad. De La Rey succeeded in capturing many men and ammunition. The Boer attacks prompted Lord Methuen, the British second-in-command after Kitchener, to move his column from Vryburg to Klerksdorp to deal with De La Rey. On the morning of 7 March 1902, the Boers attacked the rear guard of Methuen's moving column at
Tweebosch. Confusion reigned in British ranks and Methuen was wounded and captured by the Boers. The Boer victories in the west led to stronger action by the British. In the second half of March 1902, British reinforcements were sent to the Western Transvaal under the direction of Ian Hamilton. The opportunity the British were waiting for arose on 11 April 1902 at
Rooiwal, where a commando led by General
Jan Kemp and Commandant Potgieter attacked a superior force under Kekewich. The British soldiers were well positioned on the hillside and inflicted casualties on the Boers charging on horseback over a large distance, beating them back. This was the end of the war in the Western Transvaal and the last major battle of the war.
Eastern Transvaal c. 1900 Two Boer forces fought in this area, under Botha in the south east and under Ben Viljoen in the north east around Lydenburg. Botha's forces were particularly active, raiding railways and British supply convoys, and mounting a renewed invasion of Natal in September 1901. After defeating British mounted infantry in the
Battle of Blood River Poort near
Dundee, Botha was forced to withdraw by heavy rain that made movement difficult and crippled his horses. Back on the Transvaal territory around his home district of Vryheid, Botha attacked a British raiding column at
Bakenlaagte, using an effective mounted charge. One of the most active British units was effectively destroyed. This made Botha's forces the target of increasingly large scorched earth drives by British forces, in which the British made particular use of native scouts and informers. Eventually, Botha had to abandon the high veld and retreat to a narrow enclave bordering
Swaziland. To the north, Ben Viljoen grew steadily less active. His forces mounted comparatively few attacks and as a result, the Boer enclave around
Lydenburg was largely unmolested. Viljoen was eventually captured.
Cape Colony In parts of Cape Colony, particularly the Cape Midlands District where Boers formed a majority of the white inhabitants, the British had always feared a general uprising against them. In fact, no such uprising took place, even in the early days of the war when Boer armies had advanced across the Orange. The cautious conduct of some elderly Orange Free State generals had been one factor that discouraged the Cape Boers from siding with the Boer republics. Nevertheless, there was widespread pro-Boer sympathy. Some Cape Dutch volunteered to help the British, but a larger number volunteered to help the other side. Politics was more important than the military factor: the Cape Dutch, according to Milner 90 percent of whom favoured the rebels, controlled the provincial legislature, and its authorities forbade the British Army to burn farms or to force Boer civilians into concentration camps. The British had more limited options to suppress the insurgency in the Cape Colony as result. After he escaped across the Orange in March 1901, de Wet had left forces under Cape rebels
Kritzinger and
Gideon Scheepers to maintain a guerrilla campaign in the Cape Midlands. The campaign here was one of the least chivalrous of the war, with intimidation by both sides of each other's civilian sympathisers. In one of many skirmishes, Commandant
Johannes Lötter's small commando was tracked down by a much-superior British column and wiped out at
Groenkloof. Several captured Boers, including Lotter and Scheepers, who was captured when he fell ill with appendicitis, were executed by the British for treason or for capital crimes such as the murder of British prisoners or unarmed civilians. Some of the executions took place in public, to deter further disaffection. Fresh Boer forces under
Jan Christiaan Smuts, joined by the surviving rebels under Kritzinger, made another attack on the Cape in September 1901. They suffered severe hardships and were hard pressed by British columns, but eventually rescued themselves by routing some of their pursuers at the
Battle of Elands River and capturing their equipment. From then until the end of the war, Smuts increased his forces from among Cape rebels until they numbered 3,000. However, no general uprising took place, and the situation in the Cape remained stalemated. In January 1902, Boer leader
Manie Maritz was implicated in the
Leliefontein massacre in the far
Northern Cape. == Boer foreign volunteers ==