1961–1974: Angolan War of Independence From 1962, during Angola's
protracted struggle for independence from Portugal, the U.S. provided covert support to
Holden Roberto of the
National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA). The administration of U.S. President
John F. Kennedy also barred Portugal from using American weapons in its colonies, although compliance with this ban was imperfect. Like subsequent presidents, Kennedy, in his policy stance, attempted to balance the U.S.'s multiple interests in Angola. Political imperatives arose from
Cold War politics and the U.S.
containment policy: although some American policymakers viewed
Portuguese colonialism as a stabilising force in Africa, American support for FNLA was calculated to avoid an outcome in which the
left-wing,
Soviet-aligned
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) gained control of an independent Angola. The U.S. also had significant economic interests in Angola: various American companies operated there, including
Gulf Oil in
Cabinda; and in 1975, the U.S. was Angola's primary export market (ahead even of Portugal) and its third largest import market. while occasionally lobbying privately for reform of the Portuguese regime in Angola.
1975–2002: Angolan Civil War Early U.S. involvement By late 1975, Angola had achieved independence but had become the site of a territorial contest between MPLA (later supported
by Cuban troops, with Soviet backing) and its domestic rivals, the
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and FNLA (later supported
by South African troops). The U.S. publicly advocated a negotiated political solution to the conflict. However, as observers suspected at the time, In July 1975, reportedly at the urging of
U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, The operation provided for $32 million in financial support to UNITA and FNLA; $16 million in military equipment, to be supplied to the groups through Zaire; and the recruitment of
mercenaries, and some CIA experts, to advise the groups' military commands. However, Stockwell alleges that, the following week, Kissinger, via U.S. diplomats in
Kinshasa, assured UNITA that the U.S. would "continue to support UNITA as long as it demonstrated the capacity for effective resistance to the MPLA". – became the single Western power to refuse to
recognise the new,
socialist, MPLA-ruled
People's Republic of Angola.
Jimmy Carter was highly critical of the Ford administration's Angolan policy during his presidential campaign, and members of his administration – especially UN Ambassador
Andrew Young – publicly supported taking a less hostile posture towards MPLA. However, by 1977, reportedly under the influence of his
National Security Advisor,
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter too had announced that a Cuban drawdown in Angola was a prerequisite for any diplomatic relations between Washington, D.C., and
Luanda. Over the next two years, Angolan-backed insurgents invaded Zaire twice, precipitating conflicts known as
Shaba I and
Shaba II, and, on the latter occasion, provoking U.S. involvement in the Zairean military response.
Reagan Doctrine and constructive engagement meets U.S. President
Ronald Reagan at the
White House, January 1986. In the 1980s, UNITA – by then the dominant anti-government force in the ongoing
Angolan Civil War – became a beneficiary of the so-called
Reagan Doctrine, under which U.S. President
Ronald Reagan extended American support to insurgents fighting Soviet proxies or allies worldwide. In 1981, the year of his election, Reagan announced his support for UNITA, urged Congress to repeal the Clark Amendment, and established high-level political contact with UNITA. In February 1986, the Reagan administration informed the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that, though it remained committed to a diplomatic solution of the ongoing
Angolan Civil War, it planned to prevent a MPLA military victory by providing covert military aid to UNITA, beginning with $15 million in military assistance, primarily accounted for by
Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. The Angolan government objected strenuously to this approach, and the announcement of the UNITA aid programme stalled negotiations between 1986 and 1987. However, negotiations resumed, with the U.S. playing a central role, and ultimately resulted in Angola's signature of the
Brazzaville Protocol and
Tripartite Accord in December 1988.
Continued tensions , October 1990. Although the 1988 accords were welcomed as "open[ing] a new phase of American diplomacy", the U.S. failed to capitalise on improved conditions for a thaw in its relations with Angola, partly because of the continued influence of pro-UNITA individuals and groups in Washington. In January 1989, the outgoing Reagan administration proposed to send U.S. diplomats to Luanda, officially to monitor the implementation of the 1988 accords but also to provide a direct channel of communication between the American and Angolan governments. However, the U.S. was unwilling to accommodate an Angolan liaison in Washington, suggesting instead that the Angolans operate through their New York mission to the UN. Unable to secure a reciprocal offer, Angola rejected the proposal. Second, Bush's appointee as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,
Herman J. Cohen, expressed "a vigorously pro-UNITA position" during his confirmation hearings. – the U.S. appeared increasingly impatient with UNITA's intransigence, while MPLA increasingly sought Western partners. On 19 May 1993, the U.S. extended formal diplomatic recognition to the MPLA-led government of Angola, a move viewed as calculated to pressure Savimbi into cooperation with ongoing peace talks. Clinton's administration subsequently expressed support for UN sanctions against UNITA, and publicly disavowed any prospect of Angolan regime change by UNITA-led coup. and Angolan President
João Lourenço in
Luanda, February 2020 UNITA, meanwhile, did not comply with U.S. urging to demobilise, and, into Clinton's second term, the civil war continued in parts of Angola. However, in 1998, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs said, while visiting Angola, that the U.S. government "believes it is time to move our economic relations forward with Angola despite the current political-military problems in Angola". In 2009, the administration of U.S. President
Barack Obama declared Angola one of the U.S.'s three key strategic partners in Africa, along with Nigeria and South Africa. Both Obama and his successor,
Donald Trump, advanced the bilateral security partnership – including through a 2010 U.S.–Angola Strategic Partnership Dialogue and a 2017 Memorandum of Understanding – with a particular focus on security in the
Gulf of Guinea. In December 2024, U.S. President
Joe Biden visited Angola, the first by an American President. During the visit, President Biden met with President
João Lourenço and discussed security and trade cooperation between both nations. ==Economic relations==