Origins and LHX During 1982, the U.S. Army initiated the
Light Helicopter Experimental (LHX) program with the aim of producing a replacement for several existing rotorcraft, including the
UH-1,
AH-1,
OH-6, and
OH-58 helicopters. Then in 1988 a formal
request for proposal (RFP) was issued to various manufacturers; the requirement had evolved into a battlefield reconnaissance helicopter by this time. During the 1990s, the program's name was changed from LHX to simply
Light Helicopter (LH). Later that month the helicopter was officially named
RAH-66 Comanche. On 25 May 1995, the first Comanche prototype was formally rolled out at Sikorsky's production facility, after which it was transferred to
West Palm Beach, Florida to commence flight testing activities. On 4 January 1996, the prototype Comanche, flown by test pilots Bob Gradle and Rus Stiles, performed its 39-minute
maiden flight. The first flight had been originally planned to take place during August 1995, but had been delayed by a number of structural and software problems that had been encountered. Through the early 2000s, the U.S. Army maintained its plans for the intended purchase of over 1,200 Comanches, which were to fill both the scout helicopter and light attack roles; as late as 2003, it was being anticipated that deliveries of operational RAH-66s would commence as scheduled during 2006. During late 2000, it was revealed that an effort to reduce the Comanche's
empty weight by approximately or 2.1 percent in order to conform with its established target weight had been initiated. On 23 May 2002, the second prototype re-commenced flight testing with the additional equipment fitted. Accordingly, the expanded test program involved new aspects such as the testing of the armaments and
night vision systems; these test flights continued into 2003. The initial production RAH-66s were to be completed in a Block I configuration that included the majority of the rotorcraft's planned weapons and sensors. From the 16th Comanche onwards, deliveries would have been made to the Block II standard with all of the planned capabilities.
Cancellation On 23 February 2004, the U.S. Army announced that they had decided to terminate all work on the Comanche program. At the time, it was stated that the Army had determined that a number of upgrades would be necessary in order for the RAH-66 to be capable of surviving on the battlefield in the face of current
anti-aircraft threats; however, the Army had instead decided to re-direct the bulk of its funding for rotary development toward the renovation of its existing helicopter fleet of attack, utility, and reconnaissance aircraft. Specifically, the Army also had plans to reuse the funds allocated to the Comanche program to speed up development of
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which could also perform the scouting role intended for the vehicle. At the time of its termination, the Comanche program had reportedly spent US$6.9 billion. The contract termination fees involved were estimated to total US$450–680 million for the main program partners
Sikorsky and
Boeing. Subsequently, the Army decided to pursue development of another battlefield scout helicopter under the
Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter program; this resulted in another rotorcraft, designated as the
Bell ARH-70, being selected and developed with the intention to replace the OH-58D in place of the Comanche. However, on 16 October 2008, the Department of Defense notified Congress and Bell that it was canceling the program, reportedly due to cost overruns on its development. A multitude of reasons contributed to the ultimate cancellation of the RAH-66 program. According to aviation author James Williams, efforts to speed up the program via the elimination of risk-mitigation measures and the stream of continuous adjustments to account for annual budget cuts to the rotorcraft resulted in the formation of a negative cycle that functioned to greatly extend the rotorcraft's development schedule. As early as 1995, it is claimed by Williams that the Comanche had been facing complete cancellation as a choice between which defense development programs were to be scrapped. During mid-1999, the Comanche was subject to substantial governmental scrutiny; the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that it had "serious doubts" about the program and noted that the Comanche would "consume almost two thirds of the whole Aviation budget by Fiscal Year 2008". In addition, wartime experiences, such as from the
Kosovo War, had led to some senior figures within the Army to place a greater emphasis on the use of unmanned platforms for conducting many of the same roles for which the Comanche was being developed to perform. By 2000, Williams postulates that the primary reason for retaining the program was out of concern for the state of the helicopter industry—Sikorsky's production and employment figures were at their lowest for decades and the contract was considered critical. Author
Fred Brooks criticized the program's requirement for the Comanche to be capable of ferrying itself across the
Atlantic as an example of excessive requirements being present in a project's design phase and of their costly repercussions. Williams observes that the Comanche's weight requirements were unachievable, and claimed that this was due to poor management, in which no party was allegedly aware of or in control of the rotorcraft's final weight; there were concerns that, when outfitted with actual equipment required for operations, the Comanche's engines would be incapable of lifting the total weight of the helicopter. In a report published during 2008, the GAO recorded that an Army spokesperson had stated that "the program's costs could no longer be justified". Author Cindy Williams stated of the Comanche: "The rationale for cutting Comanche... is twofold. First, the doctrinal niche that the Comanche occupies is unnecessary in the near term and probably not viable in the longer term. Secondly, as with all rotary-wing aircraft, the Comanche is a voracious consumer of strategic airlift." The manufacturing team, Sikorsky and Boeing, have attributed factors that were outside of their control, such as budget cuts, "
requirement creep", and a protracted development period, to have caused problems with the program, rather than dysfunctionality on their part. Under the Comanche program, each company was responsible for the construction of different elements of the rotorcraft. Since the termination, both companies have decided to team up again to produce a jointly developed prototype, designated as the
SB-1 Defiant, for the Army's
Future Vertical Lift (FVL) program. ==Design==