The slide to war (1995–1998) According to an Amnesty International report in 1998, due to dismissals from the Yugoslav government it was estimated that by 1998 unemployment rate in the Kosovar Albanian population was higher than 70%. The economic apartheid imposed by Belgrade was aimed at impoverishing an already poor Kosovo Albanian population.
Ibrahim Rugova, first
President of the Republic of Kosovo pursued a policy of passive resistance which succeeded in maintaining peace in Kosovo during the
earlier wars in
Slovenia,
Croatia and
Bosnia during the early 1990s. As evidenced by the emergence of the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), this came at the cost of increasing frustration among Kosovo's Albanian population. In the mid-1990s, Rugova pleaded for a
United Nations peacekeeping force for Kosovo. Continuing repression convinced many Albanians that only armed resistance would change the situation. On 22 April 1996, four attacks on Serbian security personnel were carried out almost simultaneously in different parts of Kosovo. The KLA, a hitherto-unknown organisation, subsequently claimed responsibility. The nature of the KLA was at first mysterious. It initially seemed that their only goals were to stop repression from Yugoslav authorities. KLA goals also included the establishment of a
Greater Albania, a state stretching into surrounding
Macedonia,
Montenegro and
southern Serbia. In July 1998, in an interview for
Der Spiegel, KLA spokesman
Jakup Krasniqi publicly announced that the KLA's goal was the unification of all Albanian-inhabited lands. This was followed by the return of the
Contact Group that oversaw the last phases of the Bosnian conflict and declarations from European powers demanding that Yugoslavia solve the problem in Kosovo. The KLA received financial and material support from the Kosovo Albanian diaspora. He later told the
House Committee on International Relations that "while the KLA had committed 'terrorist acts,' it had 'not been classified legally by the U.S. Government as a terrorist organization.'" However, his 23 February statements have been seen as an unwitting "green light" to the Serbian crackdown that followed less than a week later.
War begins KLA attacks intensified, centering on the
Drenica valley area with the compound of
Adem Jashari being a focal point during the
first attack on Prekaz on 22 January 1998, where Yugoslav security forces were repelled in an attack on the compound, and were driven out of the village the next day by thousands of Jashari's supporters. Days after Robert Gelbard described the KLA as a terrorist group, Serbian police responded to the KLA attacks in the
Likošane area, and pursued some of the KLA to Čirez, resulting in the deaths of four Serbian policemen, 16 Albanian fighters and 26 civilians in the
attacks on Likoshane and Çirez. The KLA's goal was to merge its Drenica stronghold with their stronghold in Albania proper, and this would shape the first few months of the fighting. and 60 other people, mainly civilians, were murdered in the
attack on Prekaz Serb police then began to pursue
Adem Jashari and his followers in the village of Donje Prekaze. After the failure of the first attempt on the Jashari compound in January, on 5 March 1998 a
much larger attack on the Jashari compound in Prekaz led to the massacre of 60 Albanians, of which eighteen were women and ten were under the age of sixteen. The event provoked massive condemnation from western capitals.
Madeleine Albright said that "this crisis is not an internal affair of the FRY". On 24 March, Yugoslav forces surrounded the village of Glodjane and
attacked a rebel compound there. Despite superior firepower, the Yugoslav forces failed to destroy the KLA unit, which had been their objective. Although there were deaths and severe injuries on the Albanian side, the insurgency in
Glodjane was far from stamped out. The village was in fact to become one of the strongest centres of resistance in the upcoming war. A new Yugoslav government was formed at this time, led by the
Socialist Party of Serbia and the
Serbian Radical Party. Ultra-nationalist Radical Party chairman
Vojislav Šešelj became a deputy prime minister. This increased the dissatisfaction with the country's position among Western diplomats and spokespersons. In early April, Serbia arranged for
a referendum on the issue of foreign interference in Kosovo. Serbian voters decisively rejected foreign interference in the crisis. Meanwhile, the KLA claimed much of the area in and around
Deçan and ran a territory based in the village of Glodjane, encompassing its surroundings. On 21 April, Yugoslav forces began shelling the village of Babaloć. Members of the KLA along with civilians held their positions, which stopped the Yugoslav advance. It was one of the first clashes between the KLA and the security forces in western Kosovo. In May, the security situation in Kosovo was rapidly deteriorating. The KLA
captured Lapušnik, obstructing the
Priština-Peć motorway. Security concerns increased as
clashes broke out near the town of Orahovac, where a
Serb community is present in the municipality. In late-May, fighting between the KLA and the MUP broke out in western Kosovo, amid growing tensions between ethnic Albanians and ethnic Serbs in the town of
Dečan. On 1 June 1998, the Yugoslav army and the Serb Ministry of the Interior police
began an operation to clear the border of the KLA. NATO's response to this offensive was mid-June's Operation Determined Falcon, a NATO show of force over the Yugoslav borders. took place During this time, Yugoslav President Milošević reached an arrangement with
Boris Yeltsin of
Russia to stop offensive operations and prepare for talks with the Albanians, who refused to talk to the Serbian side throughout the crisis, but would talk with the Yugoslav government. In fact, the only meeting between Milošević and
Ibrahim Rugova happened on 15 May in Belgrade, two days after the special presidential envoy
Richard Holbrooke announced that it would take place. Holbrooke threatened Milošević that if he did not obey, "what's left of your country will implode". A month later, Holbrooke visited the border areas affected by the fighting in early June, where he was famously photographed with the KLA. The publication of these images sent a signal to the KLA, its supporters and sympathisers, and to observers in general, that the US was decisively backing the KLA and the Albanian population in Kosovo. The Yeltsin agreement required Milošević to allow international representatives to set up a mission in Kosovo to monitor the situation there. The
Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM) began operations in early July 1998. The US government welcomed this part of the agreement, but denounced the initiative's call for a mutual cease fire. Rather, the US demanded that the Serbian-Yugoslavian side should cease fire "without linkage ... to a cessation in terrorist activities". All through June and into mid-July, the KLA maintained its advance. The KLA surrounded
Peć and
Ðakovica, and set up an interim capital in the town of
Mališevo. KLA troops infiltrated
Suva Reka and the northwest of Pristina. They moved on to capture the
Belaćevac coal pits in late June, threatening energy supplies in the region. In early July, KLA activity was reported south of
Prizren. Their tactics as usual focused mainly on
guerrilla and
mountain warfare, and harassing and ambushing Yugoslav forces and Serb police patrols. The tide turned in mid-July when the KLA
captured Orahovac. On 17 July 1998, two nearby villages, Retimlije and Opteruša, were also captured, while less systematic events took place in the larger Serb-populated village of Velika Hoča. The Orthodox monastery of Zočište away was looted and torched. This led to a series of
Yugoslav counter-offensives which would continue into the beginning of August. A new set of KLA attacks in mid-August triggered Yugoslav operations in south-central Kosovo, south of the Pristina-Peja road. In early September, Yugoslav forces began an
offensive near
Prizren, and were unable to capture the KLA stronghold there. In western Kosovo, around
Peja, another offensive caused condemnation as international officials expressed fear that a large column of displaced people would be attacked. In early mid-September, for the first time, KLA activity was reported in northern Kosovo around
Podujevo. Finally, in late September, a Yugoslav determined effort was made to clear the KLA out of the northern and central parts of Kosovo and out of the Drenica valley. During this time many threats were made from Western capitals but these were tempered somewhat by the elections in Bosnia, as they did not want Serbian Democrats and Radicals to win. Following the elections, the threats intensified once again. On 28 September,
the mutilated corpses of a family were discovered by KDOM outside the village of Gornje Obrinje. The bloody image of a child's doll and streams of displaced persons rallied the international community to action.
Morale Morale was a serious problem for Serb forces; intelligence surveys found that many soldiers disagreed with their comrades' actions. One tank commander reported, "for the entire time I was in Kosovo, I never saw an enemy soldier and my unit was never once involved in firing at enemy targets. The tanks which cost $2.5 million each were used to slaughter Albanian children... I am ashamed". When retreating from Kosovo after NATO intervention, Yugoslav units appeared combat effective with high morale and displaying large holdings of undamaged equipment. Weeks before the end of hostilities, David Fromkin noted that "it seemed possible that NATO unity might crack before Yugoslav morale did." The announcement by President Clinton that the US would not deploy ground troops gave a tremendous boost to Serbian morale.
UN, NATO, and OSCE (1998–1999) On 9 June 1998, US President Bill Clinton declared a "national emergency" (
state of emergency) due to the "unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and
foreign policy of the United States" imposed by Yugoslavia and Serbia over the Kosovo War. On 23 September 1998, acting under
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the
UN Security Council adopted
Resolution 1199. This expressed 'grave concern' at reports reaching the Secretary General that over 230,000 people had been displaced from their homes by 'the excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav Army', demanding that all parties in Kosovo and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia cease hostilities and maintain a ceasefire. On 24 September the
North Atlantic Council (NAC) of NATO issued an "activation warning" taking NATO to an increased level of military preparedness for both a limited air option and a phased air campaign in Kosovo. The other major issue for those who saw no option but to resort to the use of force was the estimated 250,000 displaced Albanians, 30,000 of whom were out in the woods, without warm clothing or shelter, with winter fast approaching. Meanwhile, the US Ambassador to the Republic of Macedonia,
Christopher Hill, was leading
shuttle diplomacy between an Albanian delegation, led by Rugova, and the Yugoslav and Serbian authorities. These meetings were shaping the peace plan to be discussed during a period of planned NATO occupation of Kosovo. During a period of two weeks, threats intensified, culminating in NATO's Activation Order being given. NATO was ready to begin airstrikes, and Richard Holbrooke went to Belgrade in the hope of reaching an agreement with Milošević. Officially, the international community demanded an end to fighting. It specifically demanded that Yugoslavia end its offensives against the KLA whilst attempting to convince the KLA to drop its bid for independence. Attempts were made to persuade Milošević to permit NATO peacekeeping troops to enter Kosovo. This, they argued, would allow for the Christopher Hill peace process to proceed and yield a peace agreement. On 13 October 1998, the
North Atlantic Council issued activation orders for the execution of both limited
air strikes and a phased
air campaign in Yugoslavia which would begin in approximately 96 hours. On 15 October the NATO
Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) Agreement for a ceasefire was signed, and the deadline for withdrawal was extended to 27 October. Difficulties implementing the agreement were reported, as clashes continued between government troops and the guerrillas. The Serbian withdrawal commenced on or around 25 October 1998, and
Operation Eagle Eye commenced on 30 October. and this surge in violence culminated in the killing of Zvonko Bojanić, the Serb mayor of the town of
Kosovo Polje. Fighting
broke out in northern Kosovo, near
Podujevo. Yugoslav authorities responded by launching a crackdown against KLA militants. The January to March 1999 phase of the war brought increasing insecurity in urban areas, including bombings and murders. Such attacks took place during the
Rambouillet talks in February and as the Kosovo Verification Agreement unraveled in March. Killings on the roads continued and increased. There were military confrontations in, among other places, the
Vushtrri area in February and the heretofore unaffected
Kaçanik area in early March. On 15 January 1999 the
Račak massacre occurred when 45 Kosovan Albanians were killed. The bodies had been discovered by OSCE monitors, including Head of Mission
William G. Walker, and foreign news correspondents. Yugoslavia denied a massacre took place.
The Rambouillet Conference (January–March 1999) On 30 January 1999, NATO issued a statement announcing that the
North Atlantic Council had agreed that "the NATO Secretary General may authorise air strikes against targets on FRY territory" to "[compel] compliance with the demands of the international community and [to achieve] a political settlement". While this was mainly a threat to the Milošević government, it also included a coded threat to the Albanians: any decision would depend on the "position and actions of the Kosovo Albanian leadership and all Kosovo Albanian armed elements in and around Kosovo." While the Serbs agreed to an autonomous government, free elections, and the release of all political prisoners, the West also insisted on the presence of NATO troops. While the accords did not fully satisfy the Albanians, they were much too radical for the Yugoslavs, who responded by substituting a drastically revised text that even Russia (ally of FR Yugoslavia) found unacceptable. It sought to reopen the painstakingly negotiated political status of Kosovo and deleted all of the proposed implementation measures. Among many other changes in the proposed new version, it eliminated the entire chapter on humanitarian assistance and reconstruction, removed virtually all international oversight and dropped any mention of invoking "the will of the people [of Kosovo]" in determining the final status of the province. Amid accords, on 11 March 1999, Yugoslav forces
began an operation near Prizren, which led to hundreds of villagers leaving the surrounding area. The VJ denied access to the
OSCE at the VJ position near Dulje, showing rising concerns of NATO involvement in Kosovo. On 18 March 1999, the Albanian, US, and British delegations signed what became known as the
Rambouillet Accords, while the Yugoslav and Russian delegations refused. The accords called for NATO administration of Kosovo as an autonomous province within Yugoslavia, a force of 30,000 NATO troops to maintain order in Kosovo; an unhindered right of passage for NATO troops on Yugoslav territory, including Kosovo; and immunity for NATO and its agents to Yugoslav law. They would have also permitted a continuing Yugoslav army presence of 1,500 troops for border monitoring, backed by up to 1,000 troops to perform command and support functions, as well as a small number of border police, 2,500 ordinary MUP for public security purposes (although these were expected to draw down and to be transformed), and 3,000 local police. Although the Yugoslav Government cited military provisions of Appendix B of the Rambouillet provisions as the reason for its objections, claiming that it was an unacceptable violation of Yugoslavia's sovereignty, these provisions were essentially the same as had been applied to Bosnia for the
SFOR (Stabilisation Force) mission there after the Dayton Agreement in 1995. The two sides did not discuss the issue in detail because of their disagreements on more fundamental problems. In particular, the Serb side rejected the idea of any NATO troop presence in Kosovo to replace their security forces, preferring unarmed UN observers. Milošević himself had refused to discuss the annex after informing NATO that it was unacceptable, even after he was asked to propose amendments to the provisions which would have made them acceptable. After the failure at Rambouillet and the alternative Yugoslav proposal, international monitors from the OSCE withdrew on 22 March, to ensure their safety ahead of the anticipated NATO bombing campaign. On 23 March, the Serbian assembly accepted the principle of autonomy for Kosovo, as well as the non-military aspects of the agreement, but rejected a NATO troop presence. In a 2009 judgement regarding six former Serb leaders charged with war crimes in Kosovo, the
ICTY noted that the causes of the breakdown in the negotiations at Rambouillet were complex and stated that "international negotiators did not take an entirely even-handed approach to the respective positions of the parties and tended to favour the Kosovo Albanians." It further recorded that, according to a witness, on 14 April 1999, at a meeting initiated by the White House with representatives of the
Serbian-American community, President
Bill Clinton had stated that "the provision for allowing a referendum for the Albanians in Kosovo went too far and that, if he were in the shoes of Milošević, he probably would not have signed the draft [Rambouillet] agreement either." ==NATO bombing timeline==