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Sino-Indian border dispute

The Sino–Indian border dispute is an ongoing territorial dispute over the sovereignty of two relatively large, and several smaller, separated pieces of territory between China and India. The territorial disputes between the two countries stem from the legacy of British colonial-era border agreements, particularly the McMahon Line in the eastern sector, which was drawn in 1914 during the Simla Convention between British ruled India and Tibet but was rejected by China. In the western sector, the dispute involves Aksai Chin, a region historically linked to the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir but effectively controlled by China after the 1962 war. The lack of mutually recognized boundary agreements has led to ongoing tensions and occasional military clashes.

Background
The territorial disputes between the two countries result from the historical consequences of colonialism in Asia and the lack of clear historical boundary demarcations. There was one historical attempt to set a proposed boundary, the McMahon Line, by the United Kingdom during the 1913–1914 Simla Convention. One of the earliest treaties regarding the boundaries in the western sector was issued in 1842 following the Dogra–Tibetan War. The Sikh Empire of the Punjab region had annexed Ladakh into the state of Jammu in 1834. In 1841, they invaded Tibet with an army. Tibetan forces defeated the Sikh army and, in turn, entered Ladakh and besieged Leh. After being checked by the Sikh forces, the Tibetans and the Sikhs signed the Treaty of Chushul in September 1842, which stipulated no transgressions or interference in the other country's frontiers. The British defeat of the Sikhs in 1846 resulted in transfer of sovereignty over Ladakh to the British, and British commissioners attempted to meet with Chinese officials to discuss the border they now shared. However, both sides were sufficiently satisfied that a traditional border was recognised and defined by natural elements, and the border was not demarcated. The Johnson Line (near top right corner). The previous border claimed by the British Indian Empire is shown in the two-toned purple and pink band with Shahidulla and the Kilik, Kilian, and Sanju Passes clearly north of the border. W. H. Johnson, a civil servant with the Survey of India, proposed the "Johnson Line" in 1865, which the British claimed Aksai Chin to be in Jammu and Kashmir. This was the time of the Uyghur occupation, when China did not control Xinjiang, so this line was never presented to the Chinese. Johnson presented this line to the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, who then claimed the 18,000 square kilometres contained within his territory and by some accounts he claimed territory further north as far as the Sanju Pass in the Kun Lun Mountains. The Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir constructed a fort at Shahidulla (modern-day Xaidulla), and had troops stationed there for some years to protect caravans. Eventually, most sources placed Shahidulla and the upper Karakash River firmly within the territory of Xinjiang (see accompanying map). According to Francis Younghusband, who explored the region in the late 1880s, there was only an abandoned fort and not one inhabited house at Shahidulla when he was there – it was just a convenient staging post and a convenient headquarters for the nomadic Kirghiz. The abandoned fort had apparently been built a few years earlier by the Dogras. In 1878, the Chinese had reconquered Xinjiang, and by 1890, they already had Shahidulla before the issue was decided. In 1899, Britain proposed a revised boundary, initially suggested by Macartney and developed by the Governor General of India Lord Elgin. This boundary placed the Lingzi Tang plains, which are south of the Laktsang range, in India, and Aksai Chin proper, which is north of the Laktsang range, in China. This border, along the Karakoram Mountains, was proposed and supported by British officials for a number of reasons. The Karakoram Mountains formed a natural boundary, which would set the British borders up to the Indus River watershed while leaving the Tarim River watershed in Chinese control, and Chinese control of this tract would present a further obstacle to Russian advance in Central Asia. The British presented this line, known as the Macartney-MacDonald Line, to the Chinese in 1899 in a note by Sir Claude MacDonald. The Qing government did not respond to the note. According to some commentators, China believed that this had been the accepted boundary. 1899 to 1947 Both the Johnson-Ardagh and the Macartney-MacDonald lines were used on British maps of India. Since 1947 Upon independence in 1947, the government of India fixed its official boundary in the west, which included the Aksai Chin, in a manner that resembled the Ardagh–Johnson Line. India's basis for defining the border was "chiefly by long usage and custom". Unlike the Johnson line, India did not claim the northern areas near Shahidulla and Khotan. From the Karakoram Pass (which is not under dispute), the Indian claim line extends northeast of the Karakoram Mountains north of the salt flats of the Aksai Chin, to set a boundary at the Kunlun Mountains, and incorporating part of the Karakash River and Yarkand River watersheds. From there, it runs east along the Kunlun Mountains, before turning southwest through the Aksai Chin salt flats, through the Karakoram Mountains, and then to Pangong Lake. Chinese boundary markers, including one set up by the newly created Chinese Republic, stood near Walong until January 1914, when T. O'Callaghan, an assistant administrator of North East Frontier Agency (NEFA)'s eastern sector, relocated them north to locations closer to the McMahon Line (albeit still South of the Line). He then went to Rima, met with Tibetan officials, and saw no Chinese influence in the area. By signing the Simla Convention with Tibet, the British had violated the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, in which both parties were not to negotiate with Tibet, "except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government", as well as the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906, which bound the British government "not to annex Tibetan territory". Because of doubts concerning the legal status of the accord, the British did not put the McMahon Line on their maps until 1937, nor did they publish the Simla Convention in the treaty record until 1938. Rejecting Tibet's 1913 declaration of independence, China argued that the Simla Convention and McMahon Line were illegal and that the Tibetan government was merely a local government without treaty-making powers. Tibetan officials continued to administer Tawang and refused to concede territory during negotiations in 1938. The governor of Assam asserted that Tawang was "undoubtedly British" but noted that it was "controlled by Tibet, and none of its inhabitants have any idea that they are not Tibetan". During World War II, with India's east threatened by Japanese troops and with the threat of Chinese expansionism, British troops secured Tawang for extra defence. China's claim on areas south of the McMahon Line, encompassed in the NEFA, was based on the traditional boundaries. India believes that the boundaries China proposed in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh have no written basis and no documentation of acceptance by anyone apart from China. The Indian government has argued that China claims the territory on the basis that it was under Chinese imperial control in the past, However, the practice that India does not place a claim to the regions which previously had the presence of the Mauryan Empire and Chola Dynasty, but which were heavily influenced by Indian culture, further complicates the issue. However, India claimed that the intent of the treaty was to follow the main watershed ridge divide of the Himalayas based on memos from McMahon and the fact that over 90% of the McMahon Line does in fact follow the main watershed ridge divide of the Himalayas. They claimed that territory south of the high ridges here near Bhutan (as elsewhere along most of the McMahon Line) should be Indian territory and north of the high ridges should be Chinese territory. In the Indian claim, the two armies would be separated from each other by the highest mountains in the world. During and after the 1950s, when India began patrolling this area and mapping in greater detail, they confirmed what the 1914 Simla agreement map depicted: six river crossings that interrupted the main Himalayan watershed ridge. At the westernmost location near Bhutan, north of Tawang, they modified their maps to extend their claim line northwards to include features such as Thag La ridge, Longju, and Khinzemane as Indian territory. Sikkim The Nathu La and Cho La clashes were a series of military clashes in 1967 between India and China alongside the border of the Himalayan Kingdom of Sikkim, then an Indian protectorate. The end of the conflicts saw a Chinese military withdrawal from Sikkim. In 1975, the Sikkimese monarchy held a referendum, in which the Sikkimese voted overwhelmingly in favour of joining India. At the time China protested and rejected it as illegal. The Sino-Indian Memorandum of 2003 was hailed as a de facto Chinese acceptance of the annexation. China published a map showing Sikkim as a part of India and the Foreign Ministry deleted it from the list of China's "border countries and regions". Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao said in 2005 that "Sikkim is no longer the problem between China and India." == Boundary disputes ==
Boundary disputes
1947–1962 During the 1950s, the People's Republic of China built a road connecting Xinjiang and western Tibet, of which ran south of the Johnson Line through the Aksai Chin region claimed by India. The Indian position, as argued by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, was that the Aksai Chin was "part of the Ladakh region of India for centuries", in spite of the fact that Ladakh has been a traditional Tibetan kingdom. The two sides disagreed on the major watershed that defined the boundary in the western sector. Despite several Chinese attempts of negotiations, Indians refused to negotiate, leading to tensions grew on the line of actual control. An editorial was published on 22 September named "If this can be tolerated, what cannot be tolerated?" by Chinese government on Chinese newspaper ''People's Daily'' as a warning to Indian provocation. On 20 October 1962 the People's Liberation Army had no choice but tried to protect the borderline and initiated counterattack to Indian forces. The battle has been an easy one for PLA as Indian forces failed to create effective defences. On 16 November 1962 four Chinese soldiers led by Guoxing Pang, unsupported and detached from other Chinese forces, even defeated a whole Indian artillery regiment unscathed and seized seven pieces of artillery. Indian defeat forced Nehru ask Kennedy for military aid. Two poles of cold war were then in great tension due to Cuban Missile Crisis until November 1962. Surprisingly China declared a unilateral ceasefire on 21 November 1962 despite a huge military advantage and having expelled Indian army from all disputed areas. Many considered Chinese retreat was an attempt to avoidance of USA or Soviet intervention (and to a worsened Chinese diplomatic position) as the Cuban Missile Crisis had just been resolved. After this conflict the line of actual control remained unchanged. 1967 Nathu La and Cho La clashes The Nathu La and Cho La clashes were a series of military clashes in 1967, between India and China alongside the border of the Himalayan Kingdom of Sikkim, then an Indian protectorate. The Nathu La clashes started on 11 September 1967, when the People's Liberation Army (PLA) launched an attack on Indian posts at Nathu La, and lasted till 15 September 1967. In October 1967, another military duel took place at Cho La and ended on the same day. According to independent sources, the Indian forces achieved "decisive tactical advantage" and defeated the Chinese forces in these clashes. Many PLA fortifications at Nathu La were said to be destroyed, where the Indian troops drove back the attacking Chinese forces. 1987 Sino Indian skirmish The 1987 Sino-Indian skirmish was the third military conflict between the Chinese People's Liberation Army Ground Force and the Indian Army that occurred at the Sumdorong Chu Valley, with the previous one taking place 20 years earlier. 1968–2017 On 20 October 1975, 4 Indian soldiers were killed at Tulung La in Arunachal Pradesh. According to the official statement by the Indian government, a patrol of the Assam Rifles comprising a non-commissioned officer (NCO) and four other soldiers was ambushed by about 40 Chinese soldiers while in an area well within Indian territory, and which had been regularly patrolled for years without incident. Four members of the patrol unit were initially listed as missing before confirmation via diplomatic channels that they had been killed by the Chinese troops; their bodies were later returned. The Indian government registered a strong protest with the Chinese. In 2006, the Chinese ambassador to India claimed that all of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory amidst a military buildup. At the time, both countries claimed incursions as much as a kilometre at the northern tip of Sikkim. In 2014, India proposed that China acknowledge a "One India" policy to resolve the border dispute. In April 2013 India claimed, referencing their own perception of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) location, that Chinese troops had established a camp in the Daulat Beg Oldi sector, on their side of the Line of Actual Control. This figure was later revised to a claim. According to Indian media, the incursion included Chinese military helicopters entering Indian airspace to drop supplies to the troops. However, Chinese officials denied any trespass having taken place. Soldiers from both countries briefly set up camps on the ill-defined frontier facing each other, but the tension was defused when both sides pulled back soldiers in early May. In September 2014, India and China had a standoff at the LAC, when Indian workers began constructing a canal in the border village of Demchok, Ladakh, and Chinese civilians protested with the army's support. It ended after about three weeks, when both sides agreed to withdraw troops. The Indian army claimed that the Chinese military had set up a camp inside territory claimed by India. In September 2015, Chinese and Indian troops faced off in the Burtse region of northern Ladakh after Indian troops dismantled a disputed watchtower the Chinese were building close to the mutually agreed patrolling line. 2017 Doklam military standoff In June, a military standoff occurred between India and China in the disputed territory of Doklam, near the Doka La pass. On 16 June 2017, the Chinese brought heavy road-building equipment to the Doklam region and began constructing a road in the disputed area. Previously, China had built a dirt road terminating at Doka La, where Indian troops were stationed. The agreements drawn state that the status quo must be maintained in the Doklam area as of before March 1959. On 30 June, India's Foreign Ministry claimed that China's road construction in violation of the status quo had security implications for India. Following this, on 5 July, Bhutan issued a demarche asking China to restore the status quo as of before 16 June. Throughout July and August, the Doklam issue remained unresolved. On 28 August, India issued a statement saying that both countries have agreed to "expeditious disengagement" in the Doklam region. 2020–2022 skirmishes In June 2020, Indian and Chinese troops engaged in a brawl in the Galwan River valley, which reportedly led to the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers. International media claimed 40+ Chinese soldiers had been killed, but this number was not confirmed by Chinese authorities. China has since enhanced its position in the border area through salami-slicing tactics. == Timeline ==
Boundary discussions
One of the first sets of formal talks between China and India on the border was following Zhou Enlai's visit to India from 19 to 25 April 1960. Following this, there were a further three sessions of talks, the "Official's" talks, between 15 June-6 July 1960; 15 August-24 September 1960; and 7 November-12 December 1960. These discussions produced the 'Report of the Officials on the boundary question'. Boundary discussions have covered micro and macro issues of the dispute. At a local level, localised disputes and related events such as de-engagement and de-escalation are tackled. Wider overarching issues include discussion related to a package settlement versus sector-wise, clarification of the LAC and border and accordingly the exchange of maps, and delinking or linking the boundary dispute to other bilateral ties. Package proposal China made the so-called "package" offer in 1960, which again came to the table in 1980–85. As explained by former foreign secretary Shyam Saran, China "would be prepared to accept an alignment in the Eastern Sector, in general conforming to the McMahon Line, but India would have to concede Aksai Chin to China in the Western Sector [...] For the Central Sector, the differences were regarded as relatively minor and manageable." In other words, China "offered to hold 26% of the disputed land". In 1985, China made modifications to the package— "the Indian side would have to make significant and meaningful concessions in the Eastern Sector... for which China would make corresponding but undefined concessions in the Western Sector". Additionally, Tawang was brought up "as indispensable to any boundary settlement". These changes in the package proposal by China remained till at least 2015. Legal positions In the 1980s, during the beginning of talks between the two countries, India made it clear that it would not discuss the legal position of either side as it had already been documented in the 1960 Official's report. Political initiatives During the eighth round of talks in November 1987, in the background of the Sumdorong Chu standoff, the negotiators on both sides concluded that apart from these bureaucratic-level talks, a political move was needed. == Dispute management and resolution mechanism ==
Dispute management and resolution mechanism
Indian spokesperson for the Ministry of External Affairs stated in May 2020 that there were enough bilateral mechanisms to solve border disputes diplomatically. However, some critics say that these agreements are "deeply flawed". Bilateral mechanisms Bodies/mechanisms have been formed as per bilateral agreements to consult on the boundary question: Following the 1962 boundary war, official border talks started in December 1981. There were eight rounds of these talks, with the eighth round being in 1987. In 1988, through a joint press communique, the border talks were formalized as the 'India-China Joint Working Group on the Boundary Question' (JWG). The JWG met 15 times, the final meeting being in 2005. In 2003, the Special Representatives Mechanism (SRM) was set up as per the 'Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation'. In April 2005, another agreement mentioned that the JWG, the "India-China Diplomatic and Military Expert Group", and the "Special Representatives on the boundary question" would carry on with their work and consultations. Bilateral agreements • India-China border-related agreements • 1988: India-China Joint Working Group on the boundary question • Trade • 1991: Memorandum on the Resumption of Border Trade • 1992: Protocol on Entry and Exit Procedures for Border Trade • 2003: Memorandum on Expanding Border Trade • Confidence-building measures • 1993: Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement, 1993 • 1996: Agreement on Military Confidence Building Measures • 2005: Protocol for the Implementation of Military Confidence Building Measures • Political measures • 2003: Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation • 2005: Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question • 2012: Agreement on the Establishment of a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs • 2013: Border Defence Cooperation Agreement • 2020: 5-point statement Bilateral military communication channels Border meeting points There are five Border Personnel Meeting points (BPM) for holding rounds of dispute resolution talks among the military personnel with a defined escalation path, such as first between colonels, then between brigadiers, and finally between major generals. Of these five BPM, two are in the Indian Union Territory of Ladakh or India's western (northern) sector corresponding to China's Southern Xinxiang Military District, one in Sikkim and two in Arunachal Pradesh in India's central and eastern sectors corresponding to China's Tibet Military District. Hotlines Negotiations for an inter-military hotline started in 2012. It was initially planned for communication between India's Eastern Command and PLA's Chengdu Military Region Command. Negotiations for the Director General of Military Operations (DGMOs) level hotline continued in 2013. In 2014, a hotline was set up between the DGMOs of both countries. In 2021, both countries agreed to set up a hotline between their foreign ministers. By 31 July 2021, six hotlines had been set up between commanders; 2 in Ladakh, 2 in Sikkim and 2 in Arunachal Pradesh. The length of these meetings varied from 9 hours to over 12 hours. Apart from the military, the chief of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police and a Ministry of External Affairs representative were also present. In October 2024, India announced that it had reached an agreement over patrolling arrangements along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the border area, which would lead to disengagement and resolution of the long-running conflict that began in 2020. India and China started implementing an agreement to end a military standoff along their disputed Himalayan border. This marks a significant diplomatic development between the two countries since deadly clashes occurred between their armies four years ago. Both sides have agreed on phased disengagement steps aimed at reducing tensions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), where troops have been deployed in proximity. == Geostrategic military aspects ==
Geostrategic military aspects
Commands and troops deployment of China, area under integrated command. Chinese Military has an integrated Western Theater Command (WTC) across the whole LAC with India. Western Theater Command also covers provinces of Sichuan, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, and Chongqing. China has 5 integrated theater commands. Indian Military has divided the LAC into 3 sectors – the northern sector (some times also called western sector) across Ladakh and the Chinese-held Aksai Chin, the central sector across Himachal Pradesh and Uttrakhand states, and the eastern sector across Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh states. Similarly, Indian Airforce has Prayagraj-based Western Air Command, Delhi-based Central Air Command, and Shillong-based Eastern Air Command to cover the LAC. The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA) carried out an independent analysis of troop deployment in 2020. Indian Army strike forces have 225,000 soldiers near its border, all of whom are focused on China. Numbers include 34,000 in the Northern Command, 15,500 in the Central Command, and 175,500 troops in the Eastern Command, including 3,000 soldiers of T-72 tank brigade in Ladakh and 1,000 soldiers of BrahMos cruise missile regiment in Arunachal Pradesh. Of the 200,000 to 230,000 ground forces under China's Western Theater Command, only 110,000 are stationed on its border, while the rest are deployed on China's border with Russia in the North, inside Tibet and Xinjiang, or deployed elsewhere inside Western China. Of the Chinese troops stationed on the India border, mainly belonging to the 76th Group Army and 77th Group Army, 70,000 are deployed in Southern Xinjiang Military District (corresponding to India's northern or western sector in Ladakh), and 40,000 are deployed in Tibet Military District (corresponding to India's central and eastern sector along with the rest of the LAC from Himachal Pradesh to Arunachal Pradesh). The remaining forces would not be available for deployment to the India border in the case of a wider conflict. This creates a disparity in terms of India's larger number of conventional troops (225,000) focused on the China border, compared to the smaller number of Chinese troops (90,000–120,000) focused on the Indian border, the majority of whom are deployed far from the Indian border, while Indian troops are deployed closer. In the case of conflict, while Indian troops are already in position on or near the border, China will have to mobilise troops mainly from Xinjiang and from other Western Theater Command troops inside China's interior. Chinese individuals, called "border guardians," received annual subsidies to relocate to newly built villages and paid to conduct border patrols. == List of disputed areas ==
List of disputed areas
List of disputed areas, == See also ==
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