Deployments and budget overruns In 2007, the U.S. Navy canceled contracts to build LCS-3 of Lockheed Martin and LCS-4 of General Dynamics and Austal USA, citing failure to control
cost overruns. Subsequently, the Navy announced a new bidding process for the next three ships, the winner building two ships and the loser building one. In the
26 September 2008 U.S. presidential debate, Senator
John McCain (R-AZ) cited the LCS as an example of botched contracting driving up costs unnecessarily. In March 2009, then-Secretary of the Navy
Donald C. Winter announced that LCS-3 would be named after
Fort Worth, Texas, and the fourth ship would be named
Coronado after
Coronado, California. The contracts for LCS-3 and LCS-4 were renewed in early 2009. In April 2009, the Navy announced its revised procurement plan that three ships be funded in the FY 2010 budget; officials also hinted that the Navy may not down-select to one design for further orders, pointing out complementary features of the two designs. Former Secretary of the Navy
John Lehman called for
fixed-price contracts to be adopted. Pressure mounted in Congress for the Navy to control the cost: in June 2009, during a hearing of the
House Armed Services Seapower Subcommittee, Subcommittee Chairman
Gene Taylor, D-Miss, said that other contractors would be keen to build LCS as the subcommittee added language requiring the Navy to open bidding if either lead contractor walked away from the offered $460 million fixed price contracts. In response, the
Naval Sea Systems Command conducted a study on whether reducing the top speed requirement from 40 knots to 30 could help keep the ships under the price cap. The Congress asked the Navy to study improvement programs on existing ships in place of the LCS program. In June 2009,
Vice Admiral Barry McCullough, USN testified in a
Senate Armed Services Committee meeting that the
Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates and
Avenger-class minesweepers were too worn out to cover the gap if the LCS suffered further delays. Retired
Admiral James Lyons, USN called for a $220 million common design with the U.S. Coast Guard's
National Security Cutter (NSC) program to save costs and meet "limited warfare requirements". A Huntington-Ingalls study found that the NSC would be a better match for the listed mission set while lacking the LCS's mission modules to perform many missions. In May 2012,
Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems released a study that claimed seven LCS can more efficiently perform
anti-piracy patrols in the Western Indian Ocean than a fleet of 20 conventional ships for a quarter of the cost. To help reduce cost of each ships, in September 2009, Navy Acquisition Chief
Sean Stackley and Vice Admiral Barry McCullough indicated that only one contractor would be offered a fixed price contract in 2010 for up to ten ships, followed by an offer to build five additional ships of the same design as the first contract to the secondary builder. The Congress agreed with the Navy on this plan. On 23 August 2010, the U.S. Navy announced a delay in awarding the contract for 10 ships until the year's end. FY 2010 budget documents revealed that the total costs of the two lead ships had risen to $637 million for
Freedom and $704 million for
Independence. On 16 January 2010,
Independence was commissioned in Mobile, Alabama. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that deploying the first two ships will delay the overall program because these two ships were not available for testing and development so changes may have to be made in the second pair of ships during construction instead of in advance. The U.S. Navy responded that "Early deployment brought LCS operational issues to the forefront much sooner than under the original schedule, some of which would not have been learnt until two years on." In 2013,
Under Secretary of the Navy Robert O. Work explained that cost overruns were partly due to the shipbuilders' bidding to American Bureau of Shipping commercial standards, the Navy changed this to Level I survivability standards for greater crew survivability, although the ships were not expected to operate after being hit. The Navy acknowledged that their failure to communicate clearly that the experimental and developmental nature of the first two ships caused a perception that the overall LCS program was in worse shape. A GAO report in July 2014 found that the annual cost to operate an LCS was $79 million, compared to $54 million to operate a larger frigate. Navy Secretary Ray Mabus pointed out that new vessels traditionally start off costing more to operate because of difficulties with building and testing ships simultaneously; GAO reports of new warships since the 1960s support this claim. As more littoral combat ships are built and enter service, Mabus said operational costs will decline to acceptable limits. On 2 November 2016 the Pentagon blocked publication of cost overruns on both designs. On 2 December 2016, it was reported that the GAO was critical of the LCS's ability to complete a navy requirement of 30 consecutive days underway without a critical failure of one or more essential subsystems. DOT&E Michael Gilmore states that the current LCS fleet "have a near-zero chance" of meeting this requirement.
Building both designs Instead of declaring a winner out of the two competing designs, the U.S. Navy in November 2010 asked the Congress to allow for the order of ten of each design. U.S. Senator
Carl Levin (D-MI) said that the change was made because both bids were under the Congressional price cap. Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell said that unlike the possibility of splitting orders for projects like
KC-X or the
General Electric/Rolls-Royce F136, the Pentagon had already paid the development cost for both designs so there was no further development required for both designs and have them compete for future orders. In December 2010, the Government Accountability Office identified some problems with the designs including extremely long crew training time, unrealistic maintenance plans, and the lack of comprehensive risk assessment. On 13 December 2010, both production teams extended their contract offers until 30 December in order to give more time for the Navy to push through the plan. The Navy would be forced to award the contract to only one team if it failed to secure Congressional approval. The Navy budgeted $490 million for each ship while the Congressional Budget Office projected a cost of $591 million for each ship. Navy acquisition chief Sean Stackley testified to a Senate panel that the actual price range was $440 to $460 million. A day before the offer's expiration, both Lockheed Martin and Austal USA received Navy contracts for an additional ten ships of their designs; two ships of each design being built each year between 2011 and 2015. Lockheed Martin's LCS-5 had a contractual price of $437 million, Austal USA's contractual price for LCS-6 was $432 million. On 29 December 2010, Department of Navy Undersecretary Sean Stackley noted that the program was well within the Congressional cost cap of $480 million per ship. The average per-ship target price for Lockheed ships is $362 million, Stackley said, with a goal of $352 million for each Austal USA ships. Government-furnished equipment (GFE), such as weapons, add about $25 million per ship; another $20 million for change orders, and "management reserve" is also included. Stackley declared the average cost to buy an LCS should be between $430 million and $440 million. In the fiscal year 2011, the unit cost was $1.8 billion and the program cost $3.7 billion. In May 2012, Robert Work said that the two designs may each be best suited to different theaters, the LCS-1 design being better suited for the enclosed waters of the Middle East, while the LCS-2 design for the Pacific Ocean's open waters. In order to increase commonality, the Navy will force both types to use the same combat system electronics. The handoff from General Dynamics to Austal of management for the
Independence class led to a 13-month schedule slip as the company struggled with building the
JHSV ships at the same facilities. In May 2013, the GAO called for a pause in ship construction until issues with the sea frames and modules were resolved. In August 2013, the USN revealed plans to reduce the procurement rate in 2016.
Operational issues A 2012 report by Rear Admiral
Samuel Perez, USN, found that the ships lacked the manpower and firepower to complete the missions required by regional combatant commanders. The report found that the LCS is "ill-suited for combat operations against anything but" small, fast boats not armed with anti-ship missiles. It also found that the excessive beam (width) of the trimaran
Independence-class ships may pose a "navigational challenge in narrow waterways and tight harbors". The report also found that the contractor-based maintenance scheme for the ships had led to poorly supervised and unaccountable contractors leaving problems unresolved. As contract workers are required to be American, they must be flown out to any foreign ports visited by an LCS. A special panel was appointed to investigate "challenges identified". Twenty more bunks were installed to allow for a larger crew. In 2013, Captain Kenneth Coleman, the U.S. Navy's requirements officer for the program, identified the LCS as being especially vulnerable to tactical aircraft armed with standoff anti-ship missiles. Vice Admiral
Thomas H. Copeman III is reported to be considering an upsized "Super" LCS, with space to install needed firepower, because he noted that the 57 mm main gun was more suitable to a patrol boat than a frigate. Austal's vice president for sales, Craig Hooper, suggested that the ships should instead be used for
UAV operations. Navy Secretary Ray Mabus has called the lack of identified missions for the LCS "one of its greatest strengths". The various modules all use the same
Internet Protocol formats. In 2013, Congressional auditors found that the ships lacked robust communications systems and a USN review "uncovered classified deficiencies" in the ship's
cyberdefenses. At a July 2013 hearing, the House Armed Services Committee's seapower subcommittee argued with Vice Admiral
Richard W. Hunt on how the LCS would be employed if tensions with North Korea or China led to a confrontation in the Western Pacific. Hunt said the ships are designed in accordance with the Navy's survivability standards, and that the LCS would be used during the initial phase in the theatre and sense the environment before hostilities occur. Detractors claim the LCS is not survivable enough for long-range threats that China possesses; LCSs are built to the Navy's survivability category Level I+, higher than Level I patrol craft and mine warfare ships, but lower than the Level II
Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate they are replacing. The Navy has said the LCS was designed to pull out of combat upon sustaining damage. The baseline LCS seaframe designs have a better air and missile defense capability than the partially disarmed and now retired Perry class, which somewhat counters claims that LCS is "unsurvivable". Other observers suggest that the ships' lifecycle costs and resilience challenges result from the optimal-manning concept, which increases the Navy's dependence on contractors and diminishes opportunities to monitor and repair engineering systems during operations. The deployment of USS
Freedom was seen by the Navy as an opportunity to test the ship and operational concepts in the real-world. The Navy was about to conclude a war game at the Naval War College to examine ways of exploiting LCS capabilities in Western Pacific and other scenarios. Hunt added that the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) mission package would play an important role in protecting aircraft carriers and amphibious ships, and the mine countermeasures (MCMs) mission package would also provide necessary port security and waterway patrol capability following combat operations. The GAO also found that both designs were overweight and underperforming.
Revised requirements and designs (right) passes A 2013 DOT&E report on the two LCSs raised doubts about their survivability, as they did not include features for sustained combat operations. Concerned that the LCS would make up one-sixth of the Navy's 300-ship force, Secretary of Defense
Chuck Hagel directed the Navy to submit alternative proposals for a versatile surface combatant comparable to a frigate. Options considered included the in use by the U.S. Coast Guard, three variants of differing size, an Aegis-equipped version of the , and lastly, an American-built version of the
Spanish Navy's
F-100-class frigate. Lockheed Martin responded with a variant of their
Freedom-class LCS; upgrades included an increase in length to , vertical launch systems for
Standard Missile 2 missiles or the
Standard Missile 6, and the
SPY-1F Aegis radar or an
Air Missile Defense Radar derivative. Austal USA submitted a modified
Independence-class ship, replacing the LCS' mission modules with permanent systems like a towed array sonar, torpedoes, vertical launch anti-submarine rockets, and aviation capability to support MH-60 helicopters. Like Lockheed's submission, it had a vertical launch system for Standard missiles, a 76 mm gun in place of the 57 mm gun, and could take on an Aegis or ADMR radar.
Huntington Ingalls Industries submitted a larger, more heavily armed Legend-class cutter.
General Dynamics provided an unspecified response. Results from the Navy task force on LCS upgrades, capabilities, costs, and alternative options were completed by July 2014 for the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to review. In December 2014, Hagel accepted the Navy's recommendation to base the remaining 20 SSCs on more powerful versions of both existing LCS designs. The new SSC was planned to have an improved 3D air defense radar, air defense decoys, better electronic warfare systems, over-the-horizon anti-ship missiles, multi-function towed array sonar, torpedo defenses, additional armor, and less displacement than Flight 0 vessels. The new SSC would now focus on anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare, with mine countermeasures handled by existing LCSs. It would retain the ability to carry mission modules and LCS mission package equipment, including 30 mm and 57 mm cannons, Hellfire missiles, RHIBs, and the ASW variable-depth sonar. Other planned enhancements include spaced armor, installation of
Mk 38 Mod 2 25 mm chain guns, improved decoy systems, the SeaRAM missile interceptor, a "lite" version of the
Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP), and improved signature management through
degaussing. This new SSC was projected to cost $60–$75 million more than a Flight 0 LCS, with procurement beginning by 2019. Hagel also directed the Navy to study which improvements could be fitted to completed and incomplete LCSs. This new design would decision prioritize surface and submarine defenses over anti-aircraft or missile defense, which would be left instead to large surface combatants. Contrary to industry submissions and advice from naval experts, vertical launch systems were not included in the new designs for reasons of weight and cost. In January 2015, the Navy announced that the up-gunned LCS would be reclassified as a frigate. Hull designations were changed from LCS to FF, including LCSs back-fitted with modifications. To free up weight for the new systems, the frigates removed LCS equipment that was no longer needed, such as the handling equipment needed to launch and recover the RMMV for the MCM mission package. To accommodate the changes while using the same hull designs, the original LCS high sprint speed was dropped. The LCS' two 11-meter RHIBs were replaced with two 7-meter equivalents. A September 2015 report indicated that the first 24 ships would retain the basic design principles of the LCS program, with upgrades where needed. This group would be considered "Block 0" and retain the "LCS" designation, for the time being. Ships 25 to 32, "Block 1" would include significant upgrades and design changes, inline with the intended capabilities of the last 20 ships of the total 52-ship procurement, these being the new "Fast Frigate" class as designated by then Secretary of the Navy
Ray Mabus. The new frigates would be larger, with increased defensive and survivability capabilities. In July 2017, the Navy issued a request for information for a new multi-mission guided-missile frigate (FFG(X)) that would be more capable than the modified LCS design. In April 2020, the Navy selected a design based on the Italian/French FREMM multi-purpose frigate for its new frigate program, named the
Constellation class (FFG-62). The plan to build enhanced versions of the LCS and redesignate them as frigates was later determined to be little more than a rebranding effort and was ultimately abandoned in favor of the new frigate program.
Reduced procurement and early retirement In December 2015, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter ordered the Navy to reduce the planned procurement of LCS and FF ships from 52 to 40, and down-select to one variant by FY 2019. The intent of this cut was to reallocate funds to other priorities, including buying more
F-35C Lightning II and
F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighters, and SM-6 missiles, accelerating Flight III
Arleigh Burke-class destroyer DDG-51 acquisition, and expanding development of the Virginia Payload Module (VPM) for the Block V . Though fewer ships would be available in some instances, those needs were expected to be met by higher-end vessels. In February 2020, media reports stated that the U.S. Navy proposed to retire the first four LCSs in 2021 as part of a cost-savings measure. If approved, these would have been USS
Freedom and USS
Fort Worth from the
Freedom class, and USS
Independence and USS
Coronado from the
Independence class. In June 2021,
Naval News reported that, in a report to Congress, the Navy planned to inactivate
Fort Worth,
Coronado,
Detroit and
Little Rock in Fiscal Year 2022 and put them on the Out of Commission in Reserve (OCIR) list. In the final budget Congress forbade the Navy from retiring the three
Freedom class ships in Fiscal Year 2022. By May 2022, the Navy shifted its plans to decommission nine LCS warships in Fiscal Year 2023, citing their ineffective anti-submarine warfare system, their inability to perform any of the Navy's missions, constant breakdowns, and structural failures in high-stress areas of the ships. As of January 2026, in light of China's expanding fleet, the Navy had canceled plans to retire seven LCS hulls and will keep a fleet of 28 of the ships. It envisions their use in the mine clearing mission, replacing the
Avenger class and is experimenting with using them as a support platform for robotic aircraft and ships. ==Foreign sales==