Widespread use of encryption increases the costs of
surveillance, so the government policies aim to regulate the use of the strong cryptography. In the 2000s, the effect of encryption on the surveillance capabilities was limited by the ever-increasing share of communications going through the global social media platforms, that did not use the strong encryption and provided governments with the requested data. Murphy talks about a legislative balance that needs to be struck between the power of the government that are broad enough to be able to follow the quickly-evolving technology, yet sufficiently narrow for the public and overseeing agencies to understand the future use of the legislation.
USA The initial response of the US government to the expanded availability of cryptography was to treat the cryptographic research in the same way the
atomic energy research is, i.e., "
born classified", with the government exercising the legal control of dissemination of research results. This had quickly found to be impossible, and the efforts were switched to the control over deployment (export, as prohibition on the deployment of cryptography within the US was not seriously considered). The export control in the US historically uses two tracks: • military items (designated as "munitions", although in practice the items on the
United States Munitions List do not match the common meaning of this word). The export of munitions is controlled ty the
Department of State. The restrictions for the munitions are very tight, with individual export licenses specifying the product and the actual customer; •
dual-use items ("commodities") need to be commercially available without excessive paperwork, so, depending on the destination, broad permissions can be granted for sales to civilian customers. The licensing for the dual-use items is provided by the
Department of Commerce. The process of moving an item from the munition list to commodity status is handled by the Department of State. Since the original applications of cryptography were almost exclusively military, it was placed on the munitions list. With the growth of the civilian uses, the dual-use cryptography was defined by
cryptographic strength, with the strong encryption remaining a munition in a similar way to the guns (
small arms are dual-use while artillery is of purely military value). This classification had its obvious drawbacks: a major bank is arguably just as systemically important as a military installation, and restriction on publishing the strong cryptography code run against the
First Amendment, so after experimenting in 1993 with the
Clipper chip (where the US government kept special decryption keys in
escrow), in 1996 almost all cryptographic items were transferred to the Department of Commerce.
EU The position of the EU, in comparison to the US, had always been tilting more towards privacy. In particular, EU had rejected the
key escrow idea as early as 1997.
European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) holds the opinion that the
backdoors are not efficient for the legitimate surveillance, yet pose great danger to the general digital security.
Five Eyes The
Five Eyes (post-
Brexit) represent a group of states with similar views one the issues of security and privacy. The group might have enough heft to drive the global agenda on the
lawful interception. The efforts of this group are not entirely coordinated: for example, the 2019 demand for Facebook not to implement
end-to-end encryption was not supported by either Canada or New Zealand, and did not result in a regulation.
Russia President and government of Russia in 90s has issued a few decrees formally banning uncertified cryptosystems from use by government agencies. Presidential decree of 1995 also attempted to ban individuals from producing and selling cryptography systems without having appropriate license, but it wasn't enforced in any way as it was suspected to be contradictory the
Russian Constitution of 1993 and wasn't a law per se. The decree of No.313 issued in 2012 further amended previous ones allowing to produce and distribute products with embedded cryptosystems and requiring no license as such, even though it declares some restrictions.
France had quite strict regulations in this field, but has relaxed them in recent years. == Examples ==