There is considerable debate about the factors which affect (e.g., promote or limit) democratization. Factors discussed include economic, political, cultural, individual agents and their choices, international and historical.
Economic factors Economic development and modernization theory Scholars such as
Seymour Martin Lipset; Carles Boix,
Susan Stokes, Dietrich Rueschemeyer,
Evelyne Stephens, and John Stephens argue that
economic development increases the likelihood of democratization. Initially argued by Lipset in 1959, this has subsequently been referred to as
modernization theory. According to Daniel Treisman, there is "a strong and consistent relationship between higher income and both democratization and democratic survival in the medium term (10–20 years), but not necessarily in shorter time windows."
Robert Dahl argued that market economies provided favorable conditions for democratic institutions. A higher
GDP/capita correlates with democracy. Some Who? claim the wealthiest democracies have never been observed to fall into authoritarianism. The rise of Hitler and of the Nazis in Weimar Germany can be seen as an obvious counter-example. Although, in early 1930s, Germany was already an advanced economy. By that time, the country was also living in a state of economic crisis virtually since the first World War (in the 1910s). A crisis that was eventually worsened by the effects of the Great Depression. There is also the general observation that democracy was very rare before the industrial revolution. Empirical research thus led many to believe that economic development either increases chances for a transition to democracy, or helps newly established democracies consolidate. One study finds that economic development prompts democratization but only in the medium run (10–20 years). This is because development may entrench the incumbent leader while making it more difficult for him deliver the state to a son or trusted aide when he exits. However, the debate about whether democracy is a consequence of wealth is far from conclusive. Another study suggests that economic development depends on the political stability of a country to promote democracy. Clark, Robert and Golder, in their reformulation of Albert Hirschman's model of
Exit, Voice and Loyalty, explain how it is not the increase of wealth in a country
per se which influences a democratization process, but rather the changes in the socio-economic structures that come together with the increase of wealth. They explain how these structural changes have been called out to be one of the main reasons several European countries became democratic. When their socioeconomic structures shifted because modernization made the agriculture sector more efficient, bigger investments of time and resources were used for the manufacture and service sectors. In England, for example, members of the gentry began investing more in commercial activities that allowed them to become economically more important for the state. These new kinds of productive activities came with new economic power. Their assets became more difficult for the state to count and hence, more difficult to tax. Because of this, predation was no longer possible and the state had to negotiate with the new economic elites to extract revenue. A sustainable bargain had to be reached because the state became more dependent on its citizens remaining loyal, and with this, citizens now had the leverage to be taken into account in the decision making process for the country.
Adam Przeworski and
Fernando Limongi argue that while economic development makes democracies less likely to turn authoritarian, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that development causes democratization (turning an authoritarian state into a democracy). Economic development can boost public support for authoritarian regimes in the short-to-medium term.
Andrew J. Nathan argues that China is a problematic case for the thesis that economic development causes democratization. Michael Miller finds that development increases the likelihood of "democratization in regimes that are fragile and unstable, but makes this fragility less likely to begin with." There is research to suggest that greater urbanization, through various pathways, contributes to democratization. Numerous scholars and political thinkers have linked a large
middle class to the emergence and sustenance of democracy, whereas others have challenged this relationship. In "Non-Modernization" (2022),
Daron Acemoglu and
James A. Robinson argue that modernization theory cannot account for various paths of political development "because it posits a link between economics and politics that is not conditional on institutions and culture and that presumes a definite endpoint—for example, an 'end of history'." A meta-analysis by
Gerardo L. Munck of research on Lipset's argument shows that a majority of studies do not support the thesis that higher levels of economic development leads to more democracy. A 2024 study linked industrialization to democratization, arguing that large-scale employment in manufacturing made mass mobilization easier to occur and harder to repress.
Capital mobility Theories on causes to democratization such as economic development focuses on the aspect of gaining capital. Capital mobility focuses on the movement of money across borders of countries, different financial instruments, and the corresponding restrictions. In the past, there have been multiple theories as to what the relationship is between capital mobility and democratization. The "doomsway view" is that capital mobility is an inherent threat to underdeveloped democracies by the worsening of economic inequalities, favoring the interests of powerful elites and external actors over the rest of society. This might lead to depending on money from outside, therefore affecting the economic situation in other countries.
Sylvia Maxfield argues that a bigger demand for transparency in both the private and public sectors by some investors can contribute to a strengthening of democratic institutions and can encourage democratic consolidation. A 2016 study found that
preferential trade agreements can increase democratization of a country, especially trading with other democracies. A 2020 study found increased trade between democracies reduces
democratic backsliding, while trade between democracies and autocracies reduces democratization of the autocracies. Trade and capital mobility often involve international organizations, such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF),
World Bank, and
World Trade Organization (WTO), which can condition financial assistance or trade agreements on democratic reforms.
Classes, cleavages and alliances Sociologist
Barrington Moore Jr., in his influential
Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (1966), argues that the distribution of power among classes – the peasantry, the bourgeoisie and the landed aristocracy – and the nature of alliances between classes determined whether democratic, authoritarian or communist revolutions occurred. Moore also argued there were at least "three routes to the modern world" – the liberal democratic, the fascist, and the communist – each deriving from the timing of industrialization and the social structure at the time of transition. Thus, Moore challenged modernization theory, by stressing that there was not one path to the modern world and that economic development did not always bring about democracy. Many authors have questioned parts of Moore's arguments. Dietrich Rueschemeyer,
Evelyne Stephens, and John D. Stephens, in
Capitalist Development and Democracy (1992), raise questions about Moore's analysis of the role of the bourgeoisie in democratization. Eva Bellin argues that under certain circumstances, the bourgeoisie and labor are more likely to favor democratization, but less so under other circumstances. Samuel Valenzuela argues that, counter to Moore's view, the landed elite supported democratization in Chile. A comprehensive assessment conducted by James Mahoney concludes that "Moore's specific hypotheses about democracy and authoritarianism receive only limited and highly conditional support." A 2020 study linked democratization to the
mechanization of agriculture: as landed elites became less reliant on the repression of agricultural workers, they became less hostile to democracy. According to political scientist
David Stasavage, representative government is "more likely to occur when a society is divided across multiple political cleavages." A 2021 study found that constitutions that emerge through pluralism (reflecting distinct segments of society) are more likely to induce liberal democracy (at least, in the short term).
Political-economic factors Rulers' need for taxation Robert Bates and Donald Lien, as well as David Stasavage, have argued that rulers' need for taxes gave asset-owning elites the bargaining power to demand a say on public policy, thus giving rise to democratic institutions.
Montesquieu argued that the mobility of commerce meant that rulers had to bargain with merchants in order to tax them, otherwise they would leave the country or hide their commercial activities. Scott additionally asserts that exit may not solely include physical exit from the territory of a coercive state, but can include a number of adaptive responses to coercion that make it more difficult for states to claim sovereignty over a population. These responses can include planting crops that are more difficult for states to count, or tending livestock that are more mobile. In fact, the entire political arrangement of a state is a result of individuals adapting to the environment, and making a choice as to whether or not to stay in a territory. If individuals have plausible exit options then they are better able to constrain a government's arbitrary behaviour through threat of exit. This expectation is in line with the empirical research showing that democracy is more stable in egalitarian societies. In their 2019 book
The Narrow Corridor and a 2022 study in the
American Political Science Review, Acemoglu and Robinson argue that the nature of the relationship between elites and society determine whether stable democracy emerges. When elites are overly dominant, despotic states emerge. When society is overly dominant, weak states emerge. When elites and society are evenly balance, inclusive states emerge.
Natural resources Research shows that oil wealth lowers levels of democracy and strengthens autocratic rule. According to Michael Ross,
petroleum is the sole resource that has "been consistently correlated with less democracy and worse institutions" and is the "key variable in the vast majority of the studies" identifying some type of
resource curse effect. A 2014 meta-analysis confirms the negative impact of oil wealth on democratization. Thad Dunning proposes a plausible explanation for Ecuador's return to democracy that contradicts the conventional wisdom that natural resource rents encourage authoritarian governments. Dunning proposes that there are situations where natural resource rents, such as those acquired through oil, reduce the risk of distributive or social policies to the elite because the state has other sources of revenue to finance this kind of policies that is not the elite wealth or income. And in countries plagued with high inequality, which was the case of Ecuador in the 1970s, the result would be a higher likelihood of democratization. In 1972, the military coup had overthrown the government in large part because of the fears of elites that redistribution would take place. That same year, oil became an increasing financial source for the country.
Cultural factors Values and religion It is claimed by some that certain cultures are simply more conducive to democratic values than others. This view is likely to be
ethnocentric. Typically, it is
Western culture which is cited as "best suited" to democracy, with other cultures portrayed as containing values which make democracy difficult or undesirable. This argument is sometimes used by undemocratic regimes to justify their failure to implement democratic reforms. Today, however, there are many non-Western democracies. Examples include India, Japan, Indonesia, Namibia, Botswana, Taiwan, and South Korea. Research finds that "Western-educated leaders significantly and substantively improve a country's democratization prospects". Huntington presented an influential, but also controversial arguments about Confucianism and Islam. Huntington held that "In practice Confucian or Confucian-influenced societies have been inhospitable to democracy." He also held that "Islamic doctrine ... contains elements that may be both congenial and uncongenial to democracy," but generally thought that Islam was an obstacle to democratization. In contrast,
Alfred Stepan was more optimistic about the compatibility of different religions and democracy.
Steven Fish and
Robert Barro have linked Islam to undemocratic outcomes. However, Michael Ross argues that the lack of democracies in some parts of the Muslim world has more to do with the adverse effects of the resource curse than Islam. Lisa Blaydes and Eric Chaney have linked the democratic divergence between the West and the Middle-East to the reliance on
mamluks (slave soldiers) by Muslim rulers whereas European rulers had to rely on local elites for military forces, thus giving those elites bargaining power to push for representative government. Robert Dahl argued, in
On Democracy, that countries with a "democratic political culture" were more prone for democratization and democratic survival. Other scholars have however challenged the notion that small states and homogeneity strengthen democracy. A 2012 study found that areas in Africa with Protestant missionaries were more likely to become stable democracies. A 2020 study failed to replicate those findings. Sirianne Dahlum and Carl Henrik Knutsen offer a test of the Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel revised version of modernization theory, which focuses on cultural traits triggered by economic development that are presumed to be conducive to democratization. They find "no empirical support" for the Inglehart and Welzel thesis and conclude that "self-expression values do not enhance democracy levels or democratization chances, and neither do they stabilize existing democracies."
Education It has long been theorized that education promotes stable and democratic societies. Research shows that education leads to greater political tolerance, increases the likelihood of political participation and reduces inequality. One study finds "that increases in levels of education improve levels of democracy and that the democratizing effect of education is more intense in poor countries". Wider adoption of
voting advice applications can lead to increased education on politics and increased
voter turnout.
Social capital and civil society , including
volunteering, is conducive to democratization. These volunteers are cleaning up after the 2012
Hurricane Sandy.
Civil society refers to a collection of non-governmental organizations and institutions that advance the interests, priorities and will of citizens.
Social capital refers to features of social life—networks, norms, and trust—that allow individuals to act together to pursue shared objectives. The anthropologist
Joseph Henrich makes a complementary argument but one that emphasizes not just the importance of how various kinds of associations create bridging social capital but also the importance of the
absence of intensive kin-based institutions.
Sheri Berman has rebutted Putnam's theory that civil society contributes to democratization, writing that in the case of the Weimar Republic, civil society facilitated the rise of the Nazi Party. According to Berman, Germany's democratization after World War I allowed for a renewed development in the country's civil society; however, Berman argues that this vibrant civil society eventually weakened democracy within Germany as it exacerbated existing social divisions due to the creation of exclusionary community organizations. Yale University political scientist Daniel Mattingly argues civil society in China helps the authoritarian regime in China to cement control. Clark, M. Golder, and S. Golder also argue that despite many believing democratization requires a
civic culture, empirical evidence produced by several reanalyses of past studies suggest this claim is only partially supported. A 2016 study found that about a quarter of all cases of democracy protests between 1989 and 2011 lead to democratization.
Theories based on political agents and choices Elite-opposition negotiations and contingency Scholars such as
Dankwart A. Rustow,
Guillermo O'Donnell and
Philippe C. Schmitter in their classic
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (1986), argued against the notion that there are structural "big" causes of democratization. These scholars instead emphasize how the democratization process occurs in a more contingent manner that depends on the characteristics and circumstances of the elites who ultimately oversee the shift from authoritarianism to democracy. O'Donnell and Schmitter proposed a strategic choice approach to transitions to democracy that highlighted how they were driven by the decisions of different actors in response to a core set of dilemmas. The analysis centered on the interaction among four actors: the hard-liners and soft-liners who belonged to the incumbent authoritarian regime, and the moderate and radical oppositions against the regime. This book not only became the point of reference for a burgeoning academic literature on
democratic transitions, it was also read widely by political activists engaged in actual struggles to achieve democracy. Adam Przeworski, in
Democracy and the Market (1991), offered the first analysis of the interaction between rulers and opposition in transitions to democracy using rudimentary
game theory. and he emphasizes the interdependence of political and economic transformations.
Elite-driven democratization Scholars have argued that processes of democratization may be elite-driven or driven by the authoritarian incumbents as a way for those elites to retain power amid popular demands for representative government. If the costs of repression are higher than the costs of giving away power, authoritarians may opt for democratization and inclusive institutions. According to a 2020 study, authoritarian-led democratization is more likely to lead to lasting democracy in cases when the party strength of the authoritarian incumbent is high. However, Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo argue that democratizing rules implemented by outgoing authoritarians may distort democracy in favor of the outgoing authoritarian regime and its supporters, resulting in "bad" institutions that are hard to get rid of. According to Michael K. Miller, elite-driven democratization is particularly likely in the wake of major violent shocks (either domestic or international) which provide openings to opposition actors to the authoritarian regime. Sharun Mukand and
Dani Rodrik dispute that elite-driven democratization produce liberal democracy. They argue that low levels of inequality and weak identity cleavages are necessary for liberal democracy to emerge. A 2020 study by several political scientists from German universities found that democratization through bottom-up peaceful protests led to higher levels of democracy and democratic stability than democratization prompted by elites. The three dictatorship types, monarchy, civilian and military have different approaches to democratization as a result of their individual goals. Monarchic and civilian dictatorships seek to remain in power indefinitely through hereditary rule in the case of monarchs or through oppression in the case of civilian dictators. A military dictatorship seizes power to act as a caretaker government to replace what they consider a flawed civilian government. Military dictatorships are more likely to transition to democracy because at the onset, they are meant to be stop-gap solutions while a new acceptable government forms. Research suggests that the threat of civil conflict encourages regimes to make democratic concessions. A 2016 study found that drought-induced riots in Sub-Saharan Africa lead regimes, fearing conflict, to make democratic concessions.
Scrambled constituencies Mancur Olson theorizes that the process of democratization occurs when elites are unable to reconstitute an autocracy. Olson suggests that this occurs when constituencies or identity groups are mixed within a geographic region. He asserts that this mixed geographic constituencies requires elites to for democratic and representative institutions to control the region, and to limit the power of competing elite groups.
Death or ouster of dictator One analysis found that "Compared with other forms of leadership turnover in autocracies—such as coups, elections, or term limits—which lead to regime collapse about half of the time, the death of a dictator is remarkably inconsequential. ... of the 79 dictators who have died in office (1946–2014)... in the vast majority (92%) of cases, the regime persists after the autocrat's death."
Women's suffrage One of the critiques of Huntington's periodization is that it doesn't give enough weight to universal suffrage. Pamela Paxton argues that once women's suffrage is taken into account, the data reveal "a long, continuous democratization period from 1893–1958, with only war-related reversals."
International factors War and national security Jeffrey Herbst, in his paper "War and the State in Africa" (1990), explains how democratization in European states was achieved through political development fostered by war-making and these "lessons from the case of Europe show that war is an important cause of
state formation that is missing in Africa today." Herbst writes that war and the threat of invasion by neighbors caused European state to more efficiently collect revenue, forced leaders to improve administrative capabilities, and fostered state unification and a sense of national identity (a common, powerful association between the state and its citizens).
War and peace Wars may contribute to the
state-building that precedes a transition to democracy, but war is mainly a serious obstacle to democratization. While adherents of the
democratic peace theory believe that democracy causes peace, the
territorial peace theory makes the opposite claim that peace causes democracy. In fact, war and territorial threats to a country are likely to increase
authoritarianism and lead to autocracy. This is supported by historical evidence showing that in almost all cases, peace has come before democracy. A number of scholars have argued that there is little support for the hypothesis that democracy causes peace, but strong evidence for the opposite hypothesis that peace leads to democracy.
Christian Welzel's human empowerment theory posits that existential security leads to emancipative cultural values and support for a democratic political organization. This is in agreement with theories based on
evolutionary psychology. The
regality theory finds that people develop a psychological preference for a strong leader and an
authoritarian form of government in situations of war or perceived collective danger. On the other hand, people will support
egalitarian values and a preference for democracy in situations of peace and safety. The consequence of this is that a society will develop in the direction of
autocracy and an authoritarian government when people perceive collective danger, while the development in the democratic direction requires collective safety.
International institutions A number of studies have found that international institutions have helped facilitate democratization.
Thomas Risse wrote in 2009, "there is a consensus in the literature on Eastern Europe that the
EU membership perspective had a huge anchoring effects for
the new democracies." Scholars have also linked
NATO expansion with playing a role in democratization. international forces can significantly affect democratization. Global forces like the diffusion of democratic ideas and pressure from international financial institutions to democratize have led to democratization.
Promotion, foreign influence, and intervention The European Union has contributed to the spread of democracy, in particular by encouraging democratic reforms in aspiring member states.
Thomas Risse wrote in 2009, "there is a consensus in the literature on Eastern Europe that the EU membership perspective had a huge anchoring effects for the new democracies." A 2002 study found that membership in
regional organizations "is correlated with transitions to democracy during the period from 1950 to 1992." A 2004 study found no evidence that foreign aid led to democratization. Democracies have sometimes been imposed by military intervention, for example in
Japan and
Germany after World War II. In other cases,
decolonization sometimes facilitated the establishment of democracies that were soon replaced by authoritarian regimes. For example, Syria, after gaining independence from
French mandatory control at the beginning of the
Cold War, failed to
consolidate its democracy, so it eventually collapsed and was replaced by a
Ba'athist dictatorship. Robert Dahl argued in
On Democracy that foreign interventions contributed to democratic failures, citing Soviet interventions in Central and Eastern Europe and U.S. interventions in Latin America.
Historical factors Historical legacies In seeking to explain why North America developed stable democracies and Latin America did not, Seymour Martin Lipset, in
The Democratic Century (2004), holds that the reason is that the initial patterns of colonization, the subsequent process of economic incorporation of the new colonies, and the wars of independence differ. The divergent histories of Britain and Iberia are seen as creating different cultural legacies that affected the prospects of democracy. A related argument is presented by
James A. Robinson in "Critical Junctures and Developmental Paths" (2022).
Sequencing and causality Scholars have discussed whether the order in which things happen helps or hinders the process of democratization. An early discussion occurred in the 1960s and 1970s. Dankwart Rustow argued that "'the most effective sequence' is the pursuit of national unity, government authority, and political equality, in that order." Eric Nordlinger and Samuel Huntington stressed "the importance of developing effective governmental institutions before the emergence of mass participation in politics." In the 2010s, the discussion focused on the impact of the sequencing between state building and democratization.
Francis Fukuyama, in
Political Order and Political Decay (2014), echoes Huntington's "state-first" argument and holds that those "countries in which democracy preceded modern state-building have had much greater problems achieving high-quality governance." This view has been supported by
Sheri Berman, who offers a sweeping overview of European history and concludes that "sequencing matters" and that "without strong states...liberal democracy is difficult if not impossible to achieve." However, this state-first thesis has been challenged. Relying on a comparison of Denmark and Greece, and quantitative research on 180 countries across 1789–2019, Haakon Gjerløw, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Tore Wig, and Matthew C. Wilson, in
One Road to Riches? (2022), "find little evidence to support the stateness-first argument." Based on a comparison of European and Latin American countries,
Sebastián Mazzuca and Gerardo Munck, in
A Middle-Quality Institutional Trap (2021), argue that counter to the state-first thesis, the "starting point of political developments is less important than whether the State–democracy relationship is a virtuous cycle, triggering causal mechanisms that reinforce each." In sequences of democratization for many countries, Morrison et al. found elections as the most frequent first element of the sequence of democratization but found this ordering does not necessarily predict successful democratization. The
democratic peace theory claims that democracy causes peace, while the
territorial peace theory claims that peace causes democracy. ==Notes==