leaving for the Eastern Front from
Hellerup railway station in Copenhagen. Historically, Denmark had a large amount of interaction with Germany. In 1920 the country regained possession of the northern part of
Schleswig after losing the provinces during the
Second Schleswig War in 1864. The Danish people were divided about what the best policy toward Germany might be. Few were ardent Nazis; some explored the economic possibilities of providing the German occupiers with supplies and goods; others eventually formed resistance groups towards the latter part of the war. The majority of Danes were unwillingly compliant towards the Germans. Due to the relative ease of the occupation and copious amount of dairy products, Denmark earned the nickname
the Cream Front (). As a result of the cooperative attitude of the Danish authorities, German officials claimed that they would "respect Danish sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as neutrality." there was serious concern that the Danish economy was so dependent upon trade with Britain that the occupation would create an economic collapse, and Danish officials capitalized on that fear to get early concessions for a reasonable form of cooperation; they also hoped to score propaganda points by making Denmark, in
Hitler's words, "a model
protectorate"; on top of these more practical goals,
Nazi race ideology held that Danes were "fellow Nordic
Aryans," and could therefore to some extent be trusted to handle their domestic affairs. These factors combined to allow Denmark a very favourable relationship with Nazi Germany. The government remained somewhat intact, and the parliament continued to function more or less as it had before. They were able to maintain much of their former control over domestic policy. The police and
judicial system remained in Danish hands, and unlike most occupied countries, King
Christian X remained in the country as Danish head of state. The German Reich was formally represented by a '''' ('
Reich Plenipotentiary'), i.e. a diplomat accredited to the sovereign, a post awarded to
Cecil von Renthe-Fink, the German ambassador, and then in November 1942 to the lawyer and SS general
Werner Best. Danish public opinion generally backed the new government, particularly after the fall of France in June 1940. There was a general feeling that the unpleasant reality of German occupation must be confronted in the most realistic way possible, given the international situation. Politicians realized that they would have to try hard to maintain Denmark's privileged position by presenting a united front to the German authorities, so all of the mainstream democratic parties formed a new government together. Parliament and the government agreed to work closely together. • On 22 June 1941, when Germany commenced its
attack on the Soviet Union, the German authorities in Denmark demanded that Danish
communists should be arrested. The Danish government complied and using secret registers, the Danish police in the following days arrested 339 communists. Of these 246, including the three communist members of the Danish parliament, were imprisoned in the
Horserød camp, in violation of the Danish constitution. On 22 August 1941, the Danish parliament passed the
Communist Law, outlawing
the Communist Party and communist activities, in another violation of the Danish constitution. In 1943, about half of the communists were transferred to
Stutthof concentration camp, where 22 of them died. • Following Germany's assault on the Soviet Union, Denmark joined the
Anti-Comintern Pact, together with the fellow
Nordic state of
Finland. As a result, many communists were found among the first members of the
Danish resistance movement. •
Industrial production and trade was, partly due to geopolitical reality and economic necessity, redirected toward Germany. An overriding concern was a German fear of creating a burden if the Danish economy collapsed as it did after World War I. This sensitivity to Denmark's heavy reliance on foreign trade informed the German decision before the occupation to allow the Danes passage through their blockade. Denmark had traditionally been a major trading partner of both Britain and Germany. Many government officials saw expanded trade with Germany as vital to maintaining social order in Denmark. Much of the fleet remained in port, but in Danish hands. In at least two towns, the army created secret weapons caches on 10 April 1940. On 23 April 1940, members of the Danish military intelligence established contacts with their British counterparts through the British diplomatic mission in Stockholm. They began dispatching intelligence reports to Britain by Autumn 1940. This traffic became regular and continued until the Germans dissolved the Danish army in 1943. In return for these concessions, the Danish cabinet rejected German demands for legislation discriminating against Denmark's Jewish minority. Demands to introduce the death penalty were likewise rebuffed, and so were German demands to allow German military courts jurisdiction over Danish citizens. Denmark also rejected demands for the transfer of Danish army units to German military use. Stauning remained
prime minister until his death in 1942, as head of a
coalition cabinet encompassing all major political parties (the exceptions being the tiny Nazi party, and the Communist Party, which was outlawed in 1941).
Vilhelm Buhl replaced him briefly, only to be replaced by foreign minister
Erik Scavenius, who had been the main link to the Nazi authorities throughout the war. Scavenius was a diplomat, not an elected politician, and had an
elitist approach to government. The economic consequences of the occupation were also mitigated by German-Danish cooperation. Inflation rose sharply in the first year of the war, as the German Army spent a large amount of German military currency in Denmark, most importantly on military installations and troop deployments. Due to the Occupation, the National Bank of Denmark was compelled to exchange German currency for Danish notes, effectively granting the Germans a gigantic unsecured loan with only vague promises that the money would eventually be paid, something which never happened. The Danish government was later able to renegotiate the Germans' arbitrary exchange rate between the German military currency and the
Danish krone to reduce this problem. The authorities would not enact special laws concerning Jews, and their civil rights remained equal with those of the rest of the population. German authorities became increasingly exasperated with this position but concluded that any attempt to remove or mistreat Jews would be "politically unacceptable." Even the
Gestapo officer Werner Best, plenipotentiary in Denmark from November 1942, believed that any attempt to remove the Jews would be enormously disruptive to the relationship between the two governments and recommended against any action concerning the Jews of Denmark. Christian X remained in Denmark throughout the war, a symbol of courage much appreciated by his subjects.
Collaborators in 1944. Among the attendees were Dr.
Werner Best and the
Free Corps Denmark commander and
Schalburg Corps founder,
Knud Børge Martinsen.
Free Corps Denmark On 29 June 1941, days after the
invasion of the USSR,
Free Corps Denmark () was founded as a corps of Danish volunteers to fight against the Soviet Union.
Free Corps Denmark was set up at the initiative of the
SS and
DNSAP who approached Lieutenant-Colonel
C.P. Kryssing of the Danish army shortly after the invasion of the USSR had begun. The Nazi paper '''' proclaimed the creation of the corps on 29 June 1941. According to Danish law, it was not illegal to join a foreign army, but active recruiting on Danish soil was illegal. The SS disregarded this law and began recruitment, predominantly recruiting Danish Nazis and members of the German-speaking minority. On 20 November 1941, five months after the invasion of the USSR, the Danish government received a German "invitation" to join the
Anti-Comintern Pact. Finland accepted reluctantly on 25 November and stated that it presumed that Denmark would also attend the ceremony (effectively conditioning its own attendance). Erik Scavenius argued that Denmark should sign the pact but the Cabinet ministers refused, stating that this would violate the policy of neutrality. Scavenius reported this decision to Renthe-Fink. Fink replied on 21 November that "Germany would be unable to comprehend" a Danish rejection and demanded this decision be reversed before the end of the day. He assured Scavenius that the pact contained neither "political or other obligations" (i.e., going to war with the USSR). At a cabinet meeting the same day, it was suggested to seek written confirmation of this promise in an addendum to the protocol. Stauning agreed on these terms since it would effectively make the signing meaningless. The Danish foreign office drew up a list of four terms that stated that Denmark only committed itself to "police action" in Denmark and that the nation remained neutral. The German foreign ministry agreed to the terms, provided that the protocol was not made public, which was the intent of the Danish foreign ministry. As Berlin grew tired of waiting,
Joachim von Ribbentrop called Copenhagen on 23 November threatening to "cancel the peaceful occupation" unless Denmark complied. On 23 November, the '''' in Denmark was put on alert, and Renthe-Fink met Stauning and Foreign Minister
Munch at 10 AM stating that there would be no room for "parliamentary excuses". If the German demands were not met Germany "would no longer be committed by the promises given on 9 April 1940" (the threat of a state of war, a Nazi government, and territorial dismemberment). In a Cabinet meeting at 2 PM that day, Stauning, Scavenius, Munch and two additional ministers advocated accession; seven ministers opposed. In a meeting the same day in the Nine Man committee, three more ministers caved in, most notably Vilhelm Buhl, stating "Cooperation is the last shred of our defence". Prime Minister Stauning's notes from the day stated:
The objective is a political positioning. But this was established by the occupation. The danger of saying no—I would not like to see a Terboven here. Sign with addendum—that modifies the pact. Scavenius boarded a train and headed for Berlin, where he arrived on Monday 24 November. The next crisis came when he was met by Renthe-Fink, who informed him that Ribbentrop had informed Fink that there had been a "misunderstanding" regarding the four clauses and that clause 2 would be deleted. This had specified that Denmark only had police-like obligations. Scavenius had a strict mandate not to change a sentence and stated that he would be unable to return to Copenhagen with a different content from the one agreed upon, but that he was willing to reopen negotiations to clarify the matter further. This reply enraged Ribbentrop (and rumours claim that he was considering ordering the SS to arrest Scavenius). The task fell to German diplomat
Ernst von Weizsäcker to patch up a compromise. He watered down the wording but left the content pretty intact. Nonetheless, for Scavenius it was a strong setback that the four clauses would now only get the status of a unilateral Danish declaration ('''') with a comment on it by Fink that its content "no doubt" was in compliance with the pact. Furthermore, he was instructed to give a public speech while abstaining from mentioning the four clauses but only making general statements about Denmark's status as a neutral nation. Scavenius signed the pact. At the following reception, the Italian ambassador described Scavenius as "a fish dragged on land ... a small old gentleman in a suit asking himself how on earth he got to this place". Lidegaard comments that the old man remained defiant: during a conversation with Ribbentrop in which the latter complained about the "barbarous cannibalism" of Russian POWs, Scavenius rhetorically asked if that statement meant that Germany didn't feed her prisoners. When news of the signing reached Denmark, it left the population outraged, and rumours immediately spread about what Denmark had now committed itself to. The cabinet sent a car to pick up Scavenius at the ferry, to keep him from needing to ride the train alone to Copenhagen. At the same time a large demonstration gathered outside of
Parliament, which led the Minister of Justice, to remark that he did not like to see Danish police beating up students singing patriotic songs. When Scavenius had returned to Copenhagen, he asked the cabinet to debate once and for all where the red lines existed in Danish relations with Germany. This debate concluded that three red lines existed: • No legislation discriminating against Jews, • Denmark should never join the
Axis Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan, • No unit of the Danish army should ever fight against foreign forces. To the surprise of many, Scavenius accepted these instructions without hesitation.
The 1942 telegram crisis In October 1942, Hitler transmitted a long, flattering birthday telegram to King Christian. The King replied with a simple ''
("Giving my best thanks. King Christian") sending the Führer'' into a state of rage at this deliberate slight, and seriously damaging Danish relations with Germany. Hitler immediately recalled his ambassador and expelled the Danish ambassador from Germany. The plenipotentiary, Renthe-Fink, was replaced by Werner Best and orders to crack down in Denmark were issued. Hitler also demanded that Erik Scavenius become prime minister, and all remaining Danish troops were ordered out of Jutland. == Increasing resistance after the August 1943 crisis==