DF-21

As director of the National Defense Science and Technology Commission (NDSTC) Zhang Aiping contended that JL-1 weapons must also "go ashore" and be adapted to a solid fuel land-based missile, the DF-21. This development effort was delayed when Zhang stepped down from the NDSTC, following Deng Xiaoping's removal from office in early 1976. The DF-21A was operational by 1996 and has improved accuracy with an estimated CEP of 100~300 m. Revealed in 2006, the DF-21C is a terminally guided version and accuracy estimated to be 50~100m. The missile was the first dual-capable version, able to be armed with either a nuclear or conventional warhead. In 2010, the DF-21C was being deployed in central Western China. == DF-21D (CSS-5 Mod-4) Anti-ship ballistic missile ==

Development This is an anti-ship ballistic missile that has a maximum range exceeding , according to the U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center. The Intelligence Center did not believe it was deployed in 2009. The US Department of Defense stated in 2010 that China has developed and reached initial operating capability (IOC) of a conventionally armed high hypersonic land-based anti-ship ballistic missile based on the DF-21. This is the first ASBM and weapon system capable of targeting a moving aircraft carrier strike group from long-range, land-based mobile launchers. The DF-21D is thought to employ maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRVs) with a terminal guidance system. Such a missile may have been tested in 2005–6, and the launch of the Jianbing/Yaogan satellites would give the Chinese targeting information from SAR (synthetic-aperture radar) and visual imaging respectively. The upgrades enhance China's ability to prevent US carriers from operating in the Taiwan Strait. Some have also suggested China could develop a DF-21D with multiple reentry vehicles. To support this, a test range in the Taklamakan Desert has been seen on satellite, possibly used to test the DF-21 (and sister missiles). This facility, which features high-fidelity mock-ups of U.S. warships, is used to analyze the missile's reentry vehicle, guidance systems, and impact. The targets are part of the People's Liberation Army's efforts to develop its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. Guidance and navigation Between 2009 and 2012, China launched a series of satellites to support its ASBM efforts: • Yaogan-VII electro-optical satellite - 9 December 2009 • Yaogan-VIII synthetic aperture radar satellite - 14 December 2009 • Yaogan-IX Naval Ocean Surveillance System (NOSS) constellation (3 satellites in formation) - 5 March 2010. • Yaogan-XVI Naval Ocean Surveillance System (NOSS) constellation - 25 November 2012 China was reported to be working on an over-the-horizon radar in 2013 to locate the targets for the ASBM. An apparent test of the missile was made against a target in the Gobi Desert in January 2013. Re-entry vehicle In 2014, the U.S. Navy reported that images that have appeared on the internet showed similarities of a DF-21D re-entry vehicle to the American Pershing II missile's RV, which was withdrawn from service in 1988. The Pershing II's RV weighed and was fitted with four control fins to perform a 25-G pull-up after reentering the atmosphere, traveling at Mach 8 and then gliding to the target to pitch into a terminal dive. Army training manuals about the missile are available on the internet and public open-source literature extensively describes it; the DF-21 has a comparable range and payload. Though much is made of the DF-21D's damage infliction ability based solely on velocity and kinetic energy, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute has calculated that the energy of an inert RV impacting at Mach 6 had similar energy to the combined kinetic and explosive power of the American subsonic Harpoon anti-ship missile, which is one-quarter the energy of the Russian supersonic Kh-22 missile traveling at Mach 4 with a warhead. Impact on naval warfare In 2009, the United States Naval Institute stated that there was "currently ... no defense against [a warhead able to destroy an aircraft carrier in one hit]" if it worked as theorized. It was reported in 2010 that China was finalizing development of a MaRV warhead for the DF-21. The United States Navy has responded by switching its focus from a close blockade force of shallow water vessels to return to building deep water ballistic missile defense (BMD) destroyers. The United States also has a large network optimized for tracking ballistic missile launches which may give carrier groups sufficient warning in order to move away from the target area while the missile is in flight. Kinetic defenses against the DF-21D would be difficult. The Navy's primary ballistic missile interceptor, the SM-3, would not be effective since it is designed to intercept missiles in the mid-course phase in space, so it would have to be launched almost immediately to hit before reentry or from an Aegis ship positioned under its flight path. The SM-2 Block 4 can intercept missiles reentering the atmosphere, but the warhead will be performing high-G maneuvers that may complicate interception. By 2016, the US Navy was testing the vastly more capable SM-6, which is designed to intercept ballistic missiles in the terminal phase. The SM-6 began deployment in 2013. Use of such a missile has been said by some experts to potentially lead to nuclear exchange, regional arms races with India and Japan, and the end of the INF Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union, to which the People's Republic of China is not a party. Skepticism The emergence of the DF-21D has some analysts claiming that the "carrier killer" missiles have rendered the American use of aircraft carriers obsolete, as they are too vulnerable in the face of the new weapon and not worth the expense. Military leaders in the U.S. Navy and Air Force, however, do not see it as a "game changer" to completely count carriers out. First, the missile may not be able to single-handedly destroy its target, as the warhead is believed to only be enough to inflict a "mission kill" that makes a carrier unable to conduct flight operations. Secondly, there is the problem of finding its target. The DF-21D has a range estimated between , so a carrier battle group would need to be located through other means before launching. Over-the-horizon radars cannot pinpoint a carrier's exact location, and would have to be used in conjunction with Chinese recon satellites. Though recon aircraft and submarines could also be used to look for the carrier, they are vulnerable to the carrier battle group's defenses. The DF-21D may also not be as fast as theorized. While ballistic missiles reenter the atmosphere at speeds between Mach 8–15 at an altitude of , increasing air resistance in the denser low-atmosphere region reduces terminal speed to around Mach 2 at . It cannot acquire its target until this point due to ionization blockage, leaving a relatively short time to actually search for a ship. This could enable the target to leave the area if the missile is detected soon enough before it engages its terminal sensors, and the slower speed upon reentry leaves it vulnerable to missile interceptors. Appearances and deployments The missile was shown to the public during the 2025 China Victory Day Parade. On 26 August 2020, along with a DF-26B, a DF-21D was launched into an area of the South China Sea between Hainan and the Paracel Islands, one day after China said that an American U-2 spy plane entered a no-fly zone without its permission during a Chinese live-fire naval drill in Bohai Sea off its north coast and came as Washington blacklisted 24 Chinese companies and targeted individuals it said were part of construction and military activities in the South China Sea. US officials subsequently assessed that the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) had fired four medium-range ballistic missiles in total. The missile tests drew criticism from Japan, the Pentagon and Taiwan. == DF-26 ==

The DF-26 is an enhancement of the DF-21 with range increased to more than . Its existence was officially confirmed by the Chinese state in the mid-2010s, but it had already been in service for several years. On 26 August 2020, a DF-26B was fired from Qinghai province into an area between Hainan and the Paracel Islands as a response to a U.S. U-2 spy plane entering into a no-fly zone during a Chinese live-fire naval drill the day earlier. == SC-19 ==

The SC-19 is the anti-satellite and anti-ballistic missile version of the DF-21. Multiple tests of the missile have been conducted. It is capable of targeting ballistic missiles and satellites outside of the Earth's atmosphere. == KF-21 ==

The "KF-21" (possible Chinese designation, NATO designation: CH-AS-X-13) is reported to be an air-launched variant of the DF-21 with a nuclear or anti-ship role. It is a two-stage missile, with its weight may be reduced by using composite materials. The War Zone reported two possible warhead configurations; a DF-21D-style "double-cone" tip, and a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) similar to the DF-ZF on the DF-17 missile. ==Saudi Arabian purchase==

The DF-21 may have been exported to Saudi Arabia. In January 2014, Newsweek reported that the missiles were purchased in 2007. Conventionally-armed DF-3 missiles were bought by Saudi Arabia in 1988, but were not used during the 1990-1991 Gulf War due to their poor accuracy and the potential for collateral damage. Saudi Arabia wanted the shorter-ranged but much more accurate DF-21 as an upgrade. The United States approved of the purchase on the condition that the missiles were conventionally-armed. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) examined the modified nosecones and concluded that nuclear warheads that might be purchased from China or Pakistan could not be fitted. == See also ==