In April 1955 Churchill retired, and Eden succeeded him as prime minister. Eden was well known due to his long wartime service and his public profile as a senior statesman. His statement, “Peace comes first, always,” reflected his emphasis on diplomacy and was widely reported at the time. On taking office he immediately called
a general election for 26 May 1955, at which he increased the Conservative majority from seventeen to sixty, an increase in majority that broke a ninety-year record for any British government. This election remains the last in which the Conservatives won the majority share of the votes in Scotland. However, Eden had never held a domestic portfolio and had little experience in economic matters. He left these areas to his lieutenants such as
Rab Butler, and concentrated largely on foreign policy, forming a close relationship with US President
Dwight Eisenhower. Eden's attempts to maintain overall control of the Foreign Office drew widespread criticism. Eden has the distinction of being the British prime minister to oversee the lowest
unemployment figures of the
post-Second World War era, with unemployment standing at just over 215,000—barely one per cent of the workforce—in July 1955.
Suez (1956) The alliance with the US proved not universal, however, when in July 1956
Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of
Egypt, nationalised the
Suez Canal, following the withdrawal of Anglo-American funding for the
Aswan Dam. Eden believed the nationalisation was in violation of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty that Nasser had signed with the British and French governments in October 1954. This view was shared by Labour leader
Hugh Gaitskell and Liberal leader
Jo Grimond. In 1956 the Suez Canal was of vital importance since over two-thirds of the oil supplies of Western Europe (60 million tons annually) passed through it on 15,000 ships a year, one-third of them British; three-quarters of all Canal shipping belonged to NATO countries. Britain's total oil reserve at the time of the nationalisation was enough for only six weeks. The Soviet Union was certain to veto any sanctions against Nasser at the United Nations. Britain and a conference of other nations met in London following the nationalisation in an attempt to resolve the crisis through diplomatic means. However, the Eighteen Nations Proposals, including an offer of Egyptian representation on the board of the
Suez Canal Company and a share of profits, were rejected by Nasser. Eden feared that Nasser intended to form an Arab Alliance that would threaten to cut off oil supplies to Europe and, in conjunction with France, decided Nasser should be removed from power. Most people believed that Nasser was acting from legitimate patriotic concerns and the nationalisation was determined by the Foreign Office to be deliberately provocative but not illegal. The Attorney General, Sir
Reginald Manningham-Buller, was not asked for his opinion officially but made known his view that the government's contemplated armed strike against Egypt would be unlawful.
Anthony Nutting recalled that Eden told him, "What's all this nonsense about isolating Nasser or 'neutralising' him as you call it? I want him destroyed, can't you understand? I want him murdered, and if you and the Foreign Office don't agree, then you'd better come to the cabinet and explain why." When Nutting pointed out that they had no alternative government to replace Nasser, Eden apparently replied, "I don't give a damn if there's anarchy and chaos in Egypt." At a private meeting at Downing Street on 16 October 1956 Eden showed several ministers a plan submitted two days earlier by France. Israel would invade Egypt, Britain and France would give an ultimatum telling both sides to stop and, when one refused, send in forces to enforce the ultimatum, separate the two sides – and occupy the Canal and get rid of Nasser. When Nutting suggested the Americans should be consulted, Eden replied, "I will not bring the Americans into this ... Dulles has done enough damage as it is. This has nothing to do with the Americans. We and the French must decide what to do and we alone." Eden openly admitted his view of the crisis was shaped by his experiences in the two world wars, writing, "We are all marked to some extent by the stamp of our generation. Mine is that of the
assassination in Sarajevo and all that flowed from it. It is impossible to read the record now and not feel that we had a responsibility for always being a lap behind ... Always a lap behind, a fatal lap." There was no question of the pathway to an immediate military response to the crisis –
Cyprus had no deep-water harbours, which meant that
Malta, several days' sailing from Egypt, would have to be the main concentration point for an invasion fleet if the Libyan government would not permit a land invasion from its territory. Unlike French prime minister
Guy Mollet, who saw regaining the Canal as the primary objective, Eden believed the real need was to remove Nasser from office. He hoped that if the Egyptian army was swiftly and humiliatingly defeated by the Anglo-French forces the Egyptian people would rise up against Nasser. Eden told Field Marshal
Bernard Montgomery that the overall aim of the mission was simply, "To knock Nasser off his perch." In the absence of a popular uprising, Eden and Mollet would say that Egyptian forces were incapable of defending their country and therefore Anglo-French forces would have to return to guard the canal. Eden believed that if Nasser were seen to get away with seizing the canal then Egypt and other Arab countries might move closer to the Soviet Union. At that time, the Middle East accounted for 80–90 percent of Western Europe's oil supply. Other Middle East countries might also be encouraged to nationalise their oil industries. The invasion, he contended at the time, and again in a 1967 interview, was aimed at maintaining the sanctity of international agreements and at preventing future unilateral denunciation of treaties. In September 1956 a plan was drawn up to reduce the flow of water in the
Nile by using dams in an attempt to damage Nasser's position. However, the plan was abandoned because it would take months to implement, and due to fears that it could affect other countries such as
Uganda and
Kenya. On 25 September 1956 the
Chancellor of the Exchequer,
Harold Macmillan, met informally with President Eisenhower at the White House. He misread Eisenhower's determination to avoid war and told Eden that the Americans would not in any way oppose the attempt to topple Nasser. Though Eden had known Eisenhower for years and had many direct contacts during the crisis, he also misread the situation. The Americans saw themselves as the champion of
decolonisation and refused to support any move that could be seen as imperialism or colonialism. Eisenhower felt the crisis had to be handled peacefully; he told Eden that American public opinion would not support a military solution. Eden and other leading British officials incorrectly believed Nasser's support for Palestinian militia against Israel, as well as his attempts to destabilise pro-western regimes in Iraq and other Arab states, would deter the US from intervening with the operation. Eisenhower specifically warned that the Americans and the world would be "outraged" unless all peaceful routes had been exhausted, and even then "the eventual price might become far too heavy". At the root of the problem was the fact that Eden felt that Britain was still an independent world power. His lack of sympathy for British integration into Europe, manifested in his
scepticism about the fledgling
European Economic Community (EEC), was another aspect of his belief in Britain's independent role in world affairs. Israel invaded the
Sinai Peninsula at the end of October 1956. Britain and France moved in ostensibly to separate the two sides and bring peace, but in fact to regain control of the canal and overthrow Nasser. The United States immediately and strongly opposed the invasion. The United Nations denounced the invasion, the Soviets were bellicose, and only New Zealand, Australia, West Germany and South Africa spoke out for Britain's position. The Suez Canal was of lesser economic importance to the US, which at the time acquired only 15 per cent of its oil through that route, compared to well over half of the total oil supply to Britain. Eisenhower wanted to broker international peace in "fragile" regions. He did not see Nasser as a serious threat to the West, but he was concerned that the Soviets, who were well known to want a permanent warm water base for their
Black Sea Fleet in the Mediterranean, might side with Egypt. Eisenhower feared a pro-Soviet backlash amongst the Arab nations if, as seemed likely, Egypt suffered an humiliating defeat at the hands of the British, French and Israelis. Eden, who faced domestic pressure from his party to take action, as well as stopping the decline of British influence in the Middle East, Eden was forced to bow to American diplomatic and financial pressure, and protests at home, by calling a ceasefire when Anglo-French forces had captured only of the of the canal. With the US threatening to withdraw its financial support for the
pound sterling, the cabinet divided and the Chancellor of the Exchequer
Harold Macmillan threatening to resign unless an immediate ceasefire was called, Eden was under immense pressure. He considered defying the calls until the commander on the ground told him it could take up to six days for the Anglo-French troops to secure the entire Canal zone. Therefore, a ceasefire was called at quarter past midnight on 7 November. In his 1987 memoir
Spycatcher, the
MI5 officer
Peter Wright said that, following the imposed ending to the military operation, Eden reactivated the assassination option for a second time. However, all MI6 agents in Egypt had been caught by Nasser’s
General Intelligence Service, and a new operation, using renegade Egyptian officers, was drawn up. It failed principally because the cache of weapons which had been hidden on the outskirts of Cairo was found to be defective. Suez badly damaged Eden's reputation for statesmanship, and led to a breakdown in his health. He went on holiday to the
Colony of Jamaica in November 1956, at a time when he was still determined to soldier on as prime minister. His health, however, did not improve, and during his absence from London, Macmillan and
Rab Butler worked to manoeuvre him out of office. On the morning of the ceasefire Eisenhower agreed to meet with Eden to publicly resolve their differences, but this offer was later withdrawn after Secretary of State Dulles advised that it could inflame the Middle Eastern situation further.
The Observer accused Eden of lying to Parliament over the Suez Crisis, while MPs from all parties criticised his calling a ceasefire before the canal was taken. Churchill, while publicly supportive of Eden's actions, privately criticised his successor for not seeing the military operation through to its conclusion. Eden easily survived a vote of confidence in the Commons on 8 November. On his return from Jamaica on 14 December, Eden still hoped to continue as prime minister. He had lost his traditional base of support on the Tory left and amongst moderate opinion nationally, but appears to have hoped to rebuild a new base of support amongst the Tory right. However, his political position had eroded during his absence. He wished to make a statement attacking Nasser as a puppet of the Soviets, attacking the United Nations and speaking of the "lessons of the 1930s", but was prevented from doing so by Macmillan, Butler and
Lord Salisbury. On his return to the Commons on 17 December, he slipped into the chamber largely unacknowledged by his own party. One Conservative MP rose to wave his
Order Paper, only to have to sit down in embarrassment whilst Labour MPs laughed. On 18 December he addressed the
1922 Committee (Conservative backbenchers), declaring "as long as I live, I shall never apologise for what we did", but was unable to answer a question about the validity of the
Tripartite Declaration of 1950 (which he had in fact reaffirmed in April 1955, two days before becoming prime minister).
John Charmley writes "Ill-health ... provide(d) a dignified reason for an action (i.e. resignation) which would, in any event, have been necessary." Rothwell writes that "mystery persists" over exactly how Eden was persuaded to resign, although the limited evidence suggests that Butler, who was expected to succeed him as prime minister, was at the centre of the intrigue. Rothwell writes that Eden's fevers were "nasty but brief and not life-threatening" and that there may have been "manipulation of medical evidence" to make Eden's health seem "even worse" than it was. Macmillan wrote in his diary that "nature had provided a real health reason" when a "diplomatic illness" might otherwise have had to be invented. David Carlton (1981) even suggested that the Palace might have been involved, a suggestion discussed by Rothwell. As early as spring 1954 Eden had been indifferent to cultivating good relations with the new Queen. Eden is known to have favoured a Japanese- or
Scandinavian-style monarchy (i.e. with no involvement in politics) and in January 1956 he had insisted that
Nikita Khrushchev and
Nikolai Bulganin should spend only the minimum amount of time in talks with the Queen. Evidence also exists that the Palace was concerned at not being kept fully informed during the Suez Crisis. In the 1960s Clarissa Eden was observed to speak of the Queen "in an extremely hostile and belittling way", and in an interview in 1976, Eden commented that he "would not claim she was pro-Suez". Although the media expected Butler would get the nod as Eden's successor, a survey of the cabinet taken for the Queen showed Macmillan was the nearly unanimous choice, and he became prime minister on 10 January 1957. Shortly afterwards Eden and his wife left England for a holiday in New Zealand.
Britain–France rejected plan for union British Government cabinet papers from September 1956, during Eden's premiership, have shown that French Prime Minister
Guy Mollet approached the British Government suggesting the idea of an
economic and political union between France and Britain. This was a similar offer, in reverse, to that made by Churchill (drawing on a plan devised by
Leo Amery) in June 1940. Mollet‘s offer was referred to by Sir
John Colville, Churchill's former private secretary, in his collected diaries,
The Fringes of Power (1985), his having gleaned the information in 1957 from Air Chief Marshal Sir
William Dickson during an air flight (and, according to Colville, after several whiskies and soda). Mollet's request for Union with Britain was rejected by Eden, but the additional possibility of France joining the
Commonwealth of Nations was considered, although similarly rejected. Colville noted, in respect of Suez, that Eden and his Foreign Secretary
Selwyn Lloyd "felt still more beholden to the French on account of this offer". ==Retirement==