Early rule : 1
yuan Guangxu (光绪元宝),
Hupei Province (1895–1907) Even after the Guangxu Emperor began formal rule he found that the power structure of the Qing court still depended on Empress Dowager Cixi, and he did not know how far his own authority extended. The emperor tried to take a leading role in the government, especially after she began spending several months of the year at the
Summer Palace starting from 1891, but he never became capable of skillfully managing imperial court politics. The decisions that he made and the administrative process continued to be overseen by the empress dowager. Weng Tonghe reportedly observed that while the emperor attended to day-to-day state affairs, in more difficult cases the emperor and the Grand Council sought Cixi's advice. She also decided on appointments to the Grand Council and the
Six Ministries. In December 1890 the emperor issued a decree stating that he wanted to have an immediate audience with the foreign diplomatic corps in Beijing and to make this an annual occurrence going forward. They presented a list of conditions for the protocol at the ceremony, and it was accepted by the Qing. The audience took place on 5 March 1891, with the Guangxu Emperor receiving the foreign ministers to China at an audience in the "Pavilion of Purple Light", in what is now part of
Zhongnanhai, something that had also been done by the Tongzhi Emperor in 1873. That summer, under pressure from the
foreign legations and in response to revolts in the Yangtze River valley that were targeting Christian missionaries, the emperor issued an edict ordering Christians to be placed under state protection. The audience of foreign diplomats with the Gaungxu Emperor became more frequent after that. He received the new Austro-Hungarian minister in a special audience in October 1891, the British minister in December 1892, and the German and Belgian ministers in 1893. The Guangxu Emperor followed his principle of frugality in early 1892, when he tried to implement a series of draconian measures to reduce expenditures by the
Imperial Household Department, which proved to be one of his few administrative successes. This dispute over the budget continued until early 1894. But its other effects were humiliating and alienating senior Manchu officials in the bureaucracy, who remained in contact with Cixi, and reducing his potential allies at the imperial court. The Guangxu Emperor inherited the system of the Qing dynasty that had emerged in 1861, at the start of the Tongzhi Emperor's reign. The source of authority were the two empresses dowager, while the young emperor had a secondary role, and the princes and ministers were responsible for actually running the machinery of the government. When Empress Dowager Cixi retired, Guangxu had control over the administration of the empire and she did not interfere with his actions, but the princes and ministers advised him to bring back the old system in 1894, at the start of the tensions with Japan.
Foreign crises The summer of 1894 saw the outbreak of the
First Sino-Japanese War over influence in Korea. The Guangxu Emperor was reportedly eager for the war against Japan and became associated with the pro-war faction in the imperial court, which believed that China would easily win. This was in contrast to the Empress Dowager Cixi and Viceroy
Li Hongzhang, who both wanted to reach a peaceful resolution. The conflict was also an opportunity for the emperor to make his own decisions instead of remaining influenced by the empress dowager. After the Japanese
attacked and sank a Chinese warship on 25 July without any declaration of war, the ministers of the Qing emperor advised him to declare war on Japan. In that document, made on 1 August, the Guangxu Emperor accused Japan of sending armies to force the
king of Korea to change his system of government and of violating international law. He also used the term "dwarfs" for the Japanese, an ancient Chinese derogatory term, reflecting the widespread contemptuous view of Japan that many Qing officials had. China suffered major defeats within two days in September 1894 at the
Battle of Pyongyang and the
Battle of the Yalu River, largely destroying the
Huai Army and the
Beiyang Fleet, the Qing dynasty's best military forces. The Guangxu Emperor was angry and wanted to go to the front at once to personally take command of the troops, but he was talked out of it by his advisors. The emperor met with a German military advisor who had been present at the Battle of the Yalu, Constantin von Hanneken, to learn what exactly happened, suggesting that he may have not trusted his ministers to tell him the truth. He also signed edicts calling for the execution of generals who were defeated. During the war, even though the Guangxu Emperor was nominally the sovereign ruler of the Qing Empire, officials often ignored him and instead sent their
memorials to Cixi for her approval. Eventually, two sets of Grand Council memoranda were created, one for the emperor and the other for the empress dowager, a practice that continued until it was rendered unnecessary by the events in the autumn of 1898. In February 1895, as peace negotiations with the Japanese were underway, the Guangxu Emperor spoke with his top negotiator before he met with the Japanese, Li Hongzhang, and allegedly told him during their conversation that China needed large scale reforms. In April, after the
Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed but before it was ratified by the Qing government, the treaty's severe terms for China were publicized. Government bureaucrats throughout the empire urged the imperial court to reject it and continue fighting. The emperor did not want to take responsibility for ratifying the treaty, and neither did the Empress Dowager Cixi, who may have wanted to use the defeat against Japan to undermine Guangxu. He tried to shift the responsibility in an edict by asking two officials,
Liu Kunyi and
Wang Wenshao, to give their opinion on whether to accept the treaty, because they had told him that the Chinese military was capable of achieving victory. Eventually the Guangxu Emperor ratified it. The emperor and the Qing government faced further humiliation in late 1897 when the
German Empire used the murders of two priests in the province of
Shandong as an excuse to occupy
Jiaozhou Bay (including
Qingdao), prompting a "scramble for concessions" by other foreign powers. Germany sent a naval squadron under command of the brother of Emperor
Wilhelm II, the admiral
Prince Heinrich, who was later received by the Qing monarch at the Summer Palace in May 1898. Germany's example was followed by demands from Russia, Britain, France, and Japan. China's relatively weak forces were not in a position to challenge them, and the United States, which was
opposed to European concessions, was distracted by events in
Cuba and the
Spanish–American War. In the six months between November 1897 and May 1898 China had received unprecedented demands from foreign powers. After the Qing Empire's defeat to Japan and forced agreement to the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the Guangxu Emperor reportedly expressed his wish to abdicate. He wrote that by giving away
Taiwan to Japan, as the treaty required, he was going to lose the "unity of the people". The emperor felt that he was unworthy of his ancestors because he failed as a leader, which was made worse after he was also forced to give concessions to the European powers in 1897–98. Luke Kwong wrote that this was part of what drove the Guangxu Emperor to begin the Hundred Days' Reform in the summer of 1898, because he saw taking radical action to revitalize the Qing dynasty as the only way to make up for his perceived failure. Already in December 1897 the emperor wrote an edict that asked bureaucrats with military knowledge to recommend reforms that could be made. Between 1895 and 1898 he had multiple private meetings with
Yuan Shikai, which was uncommon for an official of his rank. Yuan presented the emperor with a plan to create a Western-style army for the Qing in August 1895, and was appointed by him that December to establish and lead a unit that would become the basis for the future
Beiyang Army. The Guangxu Emperor was impressed with Yuan, and he had been recommended to the monarch by many other senior officials.
Hundred Days' Reform Following the war and the scramble for concessions, there was growing support for reform in China among the gentry and the nobility in the spring of 1898. In April the emperor was presented with a memorial to the throne signed by young metropolitan officials and
jinshi graduates that urged him to not trust his ministers and deal with the foreign powers on his own. In early June 1898 the grand councilor Weng Tonghe introduced the Guangxu Emperor to the reformist official
Kang Youwei, and the emperor was impressed by him, especially after reading Kang's two books about the reforms in Russia by
Peter the Great and in Japan by the
Meiji Emperor. He personally met with Kang on 14 June, and started issuing reform decrees on 11 June. The first order, the edict of 11 June 1898, declared the intent of the Qing emperor to pursue reform as response to calls from certain officials since the war with Japan, and asked every one of his subjects to contribute to strengthening China, a project that was going to be based on "Western learning" while maintaining respect for traditional morals. Guangxu also received Cixi's approval for the edict. Between June and September 1898 the emperor carried out the
Hundred Days' Reform, aimed at a series of sweeping political, legal and social changes. The goal was to make China a modern constitutional empire, but still within the traditional framework, as with Japan's
Meiji Restoration. The emperor's initial focus was establishing the
Imperial University in Beijing and reforming the education system. The last part of his edict of 11 June instructed the Grand Council and the
Zongli Yamen, the Qing dynasty's foreign office, to establish the Imperial University right away. The Guangxu Emperor then issued edicts for a massive number of far-reaching modernizing reforms with the help of more progressive officials such as Kang Youwei and
Liang Qichao. Changes ranged from infrastructure to industry and the
civil examination system. Other edicts were for the construction of the Lu-Han railway, a system of budgets similar to that of Western governments, the replacement of the
Green Standard Army with a Western-style
national army based on conscription, and the creation of a naval academy. Among the lesser known measures that the Guangxu Emperor wanted to take was his naval armament program, which called for China to have a navy of 21
battleships. The emperor also required court bureaucrats to read the writings of the earlier reformist official
Feng Guifen and present a report on his suggestions in ten days, encouraged imperial princes to study abroad, and tried to streamline the government by firing 5,000 state employees. One of the early stumbling blocks for this effort happened on 15 June, when the Guangxu Emperor suddenly dismissed the grand councilor Weng Tonghe from all of his posts, even though he had been the one to draft his first reform edict. It has been debated by historians what the immediate reason for the action was, but it occurred after Weng had been a voice of caution leading up the summer of 1898, and he may have been seen by the emperor as an obstacle to his plans. The emperor was also impatient and wanted immediate results, so he may have fired him in an emotional moment. On several occasions he also tried to write his edicts in a way that would intimidate other officials, which undermined his own call for unity on the project. Overall, there was no coherent structure to the Hundred Days' Reform, and the Guangxu Emperor was frantically trying to begin as many changes as he could with his edicts, causing the bureaucracy to be overwhelmed by the large number of edicts being written. Although the decrees between June and August were largely accepted and were creating the basis for reform, starting in September they began targeting the positions of the Manchu nobility and the gentry. These were not only too sudden for a China still under significant
neo-Confucian influence and other elements of
traditional culture, but later came into conflict with Cixi, who held real power. Many officials, deemed useless and dismissed by the Guangxu Emperor, begged her for help. But the decisive response by Empress Dowager Cixi was caused by the accusation from the official Yang Chongyi that the Guangxu Emperor had committed treason by inviting the former Japanese prime minister
Itō Hirobumi to advise him (Itō was in China at the time to meet with the emperor). Yang claimed that Guangxu had done this on the advice of Kang Youwei and the wanted revolutionary
Sun Yat-sen. Guangxu was unable to effectively defend himself to Cixi from Yang's accusation. Both sides began plotting to take action against each other. Some of the reformers around the emperor asked
Yuan Shikai to use the
Beiyang Army to arrest Cixi and to execute
Ronglu, a member of the conservative faction who had been appointed to command the military forces in Zhili earlier. According to one account, this was a decree that was issued by the Guangxu Emperor. But Yuan later said that the schemers could not convince him that it was really from the emperor, and when Yuan met with him on 20 September, Guangxu did not say anything about it to Yuan. He then left the emperor to meet with Ronglu and told him about the plot by the reformers, also telling him the emperor had nothing to do with it. Ronglu then met with Cixi and other ministers and princes, and started taking action. On the 21st the Guangxu Emperor was detained and met with Empress Dowager Cixi. The following day, he issued a decree that asked Cixi to take control of the government, who proceeded to remove the reform-minded officials and replaced them with conservative loyalists. An edict on 26 September undid some of the more radical changes the emperor had made, while keeping in place those reforms that did not go directly against Qing tradition. Lei Chia-sheng (雷家聖), a Taiwanese history professor, proposes an alternative view: that the Guangxu Emperor might have been led into a trap by the reformists led by
Kang Youwei, who in turn was in Lei's opinion tricked by British missionary
Timothy Richard and former Japanese prime minister
Itō Hirobumi into agreeing to appoint Itō as one of many foreign advisors. British ambassador
Claude MacDonald claimed that the reformists had actually "much injured" the
modernization of China. Lei claims that Cixi learned of the plot and decided to put an end to it to prevent China from coming under foreign control. == Under house arrest after 1898 ==