Francis Sheehy-Skeffington was shot during Ireland's
1916 Easter Rising and he has sometimes been considered one of its martyrs. In his biography of James Joyce,
Richard Ellmann wrote that Sheehy-Skeffington "died at the hands of the British ... when he quixotically tried to dissuade the soldiers from looting". But Sheehy-Skeffington's death can be more accurately explained as the unlucky consequence of
Dublin Castle's suspicion that he was a Sinn Fein conspirator and Captain John Bowen-Colthurst's violent hostility towards suspected rebel sympathisers.
Timothy Healy's opinion was that Sheehy-Skeffington was shot because he was a witness to Bowen-Colthurst's murder of James Coade.
Political background Francis Sheehy-Skeffington supported
Home Rule for Ireland. After 1913 he also supported his friend Thomas MacDonagh's more separatist
Irish Volunteers; however he grew increasingly critical of the Volunteers' growing militarism, and in an open letter to MacDonagh published in 1915 in his own paper
The Irish Citizen, Sheehy-Skeffington wrote: "As you know, I am personally in full sympathy with the fundamental objects of the Irish Volunteers ... [however,] as your infant movement grows, towards the stature of a full-grown militarism, its essence – preparation to kill – grows more repellent to me." At the outset of the Easter Rising, Sheehy-Skeffington opposed the violent methods of the insurgents, advocating a nonviolent form of civil disobedience, while his wife Hanna actively sympathized with the insurgents and joined the women who brought food to those stationed at the
General Post Office and the
Royal College of Surgeons. In contrast, on the first day of the Rising (Monday 24 April 1916) Francis risked crossfire to aid an English soldier outside
Dublin Castle. As Hanna recalled six years later: "When the outbreak began on Easter Monday my husband was near Dublin Castle. He learned that a British officer had been gravely wounded and was bleeding to death on the cobblestones outside the Castle gate. My husband persuaded a bystander to go with him to the rescue. Together they ran across the square under a hail of fire. Before they reached the spot, however, some British troops rushed out and dragged the wounded man to cover inside the gate."
Attempts to prevent looting Shortly after that incident, Sheehy-Skeffington was seen climbing up onto the steps of
Nelson's Pillar on
Sackville Street and calling upon a group of inner-city paupers to stop looting shops. He was hooted and jeered. His next move was to cross the street, enter the
GPO, and demand to speak to
James Connolly, one of the principal leaders of the insurrection, who was also a labour leader and sympathetic to Sheehy-Skeffington's socialism. Connolly sent out some armed men to quell the looting. The men climbed an overturned tramcar to berate the looters and fired shots over the looters' heads. The next morning, 25 April, Sheehy-Skeffington went back into the city centre and tried to stop the looting. The flyer read: When there are no regular police in the streets, it becomes the duty of citizens to police the streets themselves and to prevent such spasmodic looting as has been taking place in a few streets. Civilians (men and women) who are willing to co-operate to this end are asked to attend at Westmoreland Chambers (over Eden Bros.) at five o'clock this (Tues.) afternoon. The meeting was poorly attended and no one volunteered to help Francis stop the looting. This crowd was made up of inner city poor whom he had been exhorting to refrain from looting and who probably knew him from his speeches on feminism or socialism on the steps of the
Custom House. At the barracks, the adjutant, Lieutenant Morgan (an old school chum) interviewed Sheehy-Skeffington. He told Morgan that he sympathized with the insurgents’ cause, but he was not a Sinn Feiner and was opposed to violence. Unsure how to proceed, Morgan telephoned the garrison adjutant who told him to detain Sheehy-Skeffington for further questioning. Just before 9:00 pm, Captain Bowen-Colthurst searched Sheehy-Skeffington and confiscated papers from him. At the start of World War I, Bowen-Colthurst spent five weeks with the
British Expeditionary Force on the
Western Front (14 August – 19 September 1914), from which he had been sent home wounded and possibly shell-shocked. He had had a brief mental breakdown during the Retreat from Mons and had initiated a disastrous, premature attack at the
First Battle of the Aisne. Aside from his wounds, this behaviour perhaps ensured he was sent home from the front permanently. and light duties, Bowen-Colthurst had been assigned in July 1915 to the Royal Irish Rifles at Portobello Barracks, where his primary duties were training and recruitment. About 10:30 p.m. on the second day of the Rising (25 April), Captain Bowen-Colthurst took Sheehy-Skeffington out of the barracks, as a hostage for a raiding party on the tobacconist shop of Alderman James Kelly, a moderate 'home rule' nationalist. (Bowen-Colthurst’s superior, Major Rosborough, ordered the raid on the shop in the belief that it was the home of the Sinn Fein politician, Alderman Tom Kelly.) The raiding party consisted of an officer (Lieutenant Leslie Wilson) and 40 men led by Bowen-Colthurst, along with Sheehy-Skeffington who had his hands tied behind his back. Before leaving the barracks, Bowen-Colthurst ordered Sheehy-Skeffington to say his last prayers in case he might become a casualty, and when Sheehy-Skeffington refused, Bowen-Colthurst said prayers on his behalf. The troops left the barracks and headed towards Rathmines Road, where they encountered three young people loitering opposite the Church of Mary Immaculate, Refuge of Sinners. On the pretext of the lateness of the hour and that martial law had been proclaimed, Bowen-Colthurst detained and interrogated the three young men. He then impetuously shot one of them: a 19-year-old mechanic named James Coade. Coade was initially left in the road but later that evening, picked up and taken to Portobello Barracks infirmary, where he died early the next morning without regaining consciousness. The party continued down the Lower Rathmines Road, and the soldiers stopped at the Portobello Bridge, where half of the men (under Wilson), along with Sheehy-Skeffington, were left at a guardhouse. Bowen-Colthurst ordered the troops at the guardhouse to monitor the further progress of the raiding party, and if snipers attacked either his or Wilson's party, Sheehy-Skeffington was to be shot.. They and Sheehy-Skeffington were then escorted back to Portobello Barracks and lodged in prison cells.
Summary execution Just after ten on the morning of 26 April, Bowen-Colthurst came to the guardroom and ordered Dickson, McIntyre and Sheehy-Skeffington taken out to an adjacent exercise yard. He announced his intentions to Lieutenant Dobbin, the officer in charge of the guardroom, telling him: "I am taking these prisoners out of the guard room [and] I am going to shoot them. I think it is the right thing to do." He then assembled a squad of seven men in the yard and ordered them to shoot the three prisoners, who until that moment were not aware they were about to die. After killing the three men, the firing squad immediately left the yard, but when movement was detected in Sheehy-Skeffington's leg, Bowen-Colthurst ordered Lieutenant Dobbin to gather another group of four soldiers to fire another volley into him. About half an hour later, after informing the orderly room of his actions, Bowen-Colthurst reported what he had done to Major Rosborough. He said he took responsibility for the shooting and, aware that shooting prisoners was a capital offence, he also said that he "possibly might be hanged for it". There is evidence that a teenaged I.R.B. informant, Patrick Nolan, was also shot during this raid. However, unlike O'Carroll, he was taken to hospital and survived his injuries.
Captain Bowen-Colthurst's reasons Months later, when Countess Markievicz – then in
Mountjoy Prison — first heard of the executions of the leaders of the
Easter Rising, she expressed surprise at only one thing: "Why on earth did they shoot Skeffy?" she is reported to have said. "He didn't believe in fighting." Bowen-Colthurst himself provided an answer to this question in his operations report of 26 April, the day of the shootings. Addressed to the Officer Commanding 3rd Battalion, part of his report was as follows: This morning at about 9 a.m. I proceeded to the Guard Room to examine these two men and I sent for them and for a man called Skeffongton [sic] who was also detained. I had been busy on the previous evening up to about 3 a.m. examining documents found on these men and I recognised from these documents that the three men were all very dangerous characters. I therefore sent for an armed guard of six men and ordered them to load their Rifles and keep their eyes on the prisoners. The Guard Room was full of men and was not a suitable place in my opinion in which to examine the prisoners. I ordered therefore the three prisoners to go into the small court yard of the Guard Room. I regret that I did not have these men hand cuffed and surrounded as the yard was a place from which they might have escaped. When I ordered these three men into the yard I did not however know this. The Guard was some little distance from the prisoners and as I considered that there was a reasonable chance of the prisoners making their escape and knowing the three prisoners (from correspondence captured on them the previous evening ) to be dangerous characters, I called upon the Guard to fire upon them which they did with effect, the three men being killed. The documents found on these three men have been forwarded to the orderly room. On 9 May, Bowen-Colthurst provided a second account to the commanding officer of the battalion with a more anxious tone. This was three days after Bowen-Colthurst's arrest and just before his arraignment on murder/manslaughter charges. The 9 May report in part read as follows: On Tuesday evening, 25th ultimo, I was officially informed that martial law was declared in Dublin. There were three leaders of the rebels in the guard room in Portobello Barracks. The guard room was not safe for these desperate men to be confined in, their rescue from outside would be very easy. On Tuesday and up to Wednesday morning rumours of massacres of police and soldiers from all parts of Dublin were being constantly sent to me from different sources... I also heard that the rebels in the city had opened up depots for the supply and issue of arms, and that a large force of rebels intended to attack Portobello Barracks, which was held only by a few troops...I believed that it was known that these leaders were confined in the barracks, and that possibly the proposed attack on the barracks was with view to their release... I had no knowledge of any reinforcements arriving from England, and did not believe it possible for troops to arrive in time to prevent a general massacre. I knew of the sedition which had been preached in Ireland for years past and of the popular sympathy with rebellion... On the Wednesday morning 26 April all this was in my mind. I was very much exhausted and unstrung after practically a sleepless night, and I took the gloomiest view of the situation and felt that only desperate measures would save the situation. When I saw the position described in my previous report I felt I must act quickly, and believing I had the power under martial law, I felt, under the circumstances, that it was clearly my duty to have the ring-leaders shot. It was a terrible ordeal for me, but I nerved myself to carry out what was for me at the time a terrible duty.
Burial and coverup When Bowen-Colthurst had informed him of the shootings, Rosborough asked the barracks adjutant to telephone both the Garrison Adjutant at Dublin Castle and HQ Irish Command. Shortly after, Dublin Castle sent instructions to wrap the men in sheets (coffins were in short supply) and bury them within the barracks. This was done at 11:15 p.m. (26 April) with Father O'Loughlin, the military chaplain, in attendance. (The bodies were later reinterred, Sheehy-Skeffington at
Glasnevin Cemetery on 8 May 1916.) According to a 1935 letter from a 'Father Scannell' to Hanna Sheehy-Skeffington, Bowen-Colthurst himself had made "frantic efforts to wipe out all the traces of his crime". Father Scannell alleged that Bowen-Colthurst detained several bricklayers from a nearby building site, and ordered them to repair the broken and bullet-impacted bricks in the wall behind where the executed men had stood. , Dublin.
Denial and raid Hanna Sheehy-Skeffington was not initially told about her husband's detention or his death. She went around Dublin seeking to find where her husband was, and heard rumours of his fate. Her two sisters then offered to visit Portobello Barracks on Friday, April 28, and make inquiries. Upon revealing their business, the two sisters were threatened with arrest as "Sinn Féiners", and questioned by Captain Bowen-Colthurst. Bowen-Colthurst denied any knowledge as to the fate of Francis Sheehy-Skeffington, and had them escorted out of the barracks. Later on Friday, Hanna learned the dreadful news from the father of James Coade, and the news was confirmed to her by Father O'Loughlin. But Vane was an irritant to his military superiors. When Colonel McCammond, the Portobello Barracks commander, returned from sick leave on 1 May, he removed responsibility for Portobello's defences from Vane and appointed Bowen-Colthurst in his stead. Vane objected and then tried to arrange a meeting with General Maxwell at his HQ but had to content himself with talking to the Chief Intelligence Officer, Major Price. Vane told Price about the events at Portobello but he was not happy with Price's response.
Court martial of Bowen-Colthurst Vane travelled to London and on 3 May he met the
Secretary of State for War,
Lord Kitchener, in
Downing Street. A telegram was sent to
Sir John Maxwell, commander-in-chief of British forces in Ireland, ordering the arrest of Bowen-Colthurst. Bowen-Colthurst was preparing to conduct a 55-man detachment to Newry Barracks when the order came through (6 May) that he be placed under 'open' arrest. On 11 May he was placed under "close arrest". Bowen-Colthurst was charged with the murders of Dickson, McIntyre and Sheehy-Skeffington, but to be tried by
court martial, despite the Army Act's stipulation that any soldier charged with murder committed in the United Kingdom could be tried only in a civilian, not a military court. Four days before the court martial, Dr R. Leeper and Dr A. Parsons assessed Bowen-Colthurst's mental condition. During the examination, talking about the shootings at the barracks, Bowen-Colthurst recalled his activities on the night of 25 April, after the raid on Kelly's was completed and his prisoners had been secured in cells. He said that he had gone to bed at three o'clock in the morning but stayed up till four reading his Bible, focusing in particular on the verse from St. Luke (19:27): 'And these my enemies which will not have me to rule over them, bring them forth and slay them.' This passage and its apparent effect on Bowen-Colthurst subsequently became part of Dr Parson's medical testimony at the court martial. The court martial took place 6/7 June at Richmond Barracks, Dublin.Major-General, Lord Cheylesmore (
Herbert Eaton, 3rd Baron Cheylesmore) was the President of the Court and there were over a hundred spectators. Timothy Healy and P. A. O'Connor White attended on behalf of Hanna Sheehy-Skeffington but they took no part in the proceedings. Bowen-Colthurst pleaded 'Not guilty'. Testifying about the circumstances of the shootings, several witnesses described Bowen-Colthurst as being 'excited', 'very excited', or 'highly excited'. Once the prosecution and defence counsel had established the uncontested facts of the case, a succession of army officers testified to Bowen-Colthurst's kindness and decency but also to his occasional eccentricity, excitability and impulsiveness. Major General
Wilkinson Bird, Bowen-Colthurst's commander in the British Expeditionary Force, described his nervous breakdown during the
Retreat from Mons. Four expert medical witnesses agreed on Bowen-Colthurst's past (August 1914 – April 1915) and current mental fragility, but they were less certain about his mental condition on the day of the shootings. Dr Leeper testified that he could not give an opinion on Bowen-Colthurst's 26 April mental state because he had not been there at the time. The authors of the medical report, Captain Lawless and Major Purser, said that while it was impossible to say positively what Bowen-Colthurst's mental condition was on 26 April, they had no doubt that at the present time he was mentally unsound. Captain Lawless said that it was highly probable that Bowen-Colthurst's mental state on 26 April had been the same as his present condition, and he did not think that Bowen-Colthurst was responsible for his actions on that date. Major Purser concurred with this opinion. Defence counsel argued that since the character witnesses had said that he was by nature kind and honourable, Bowen-Colthurst
must have been insane when he executed the three prisoners, particularly in the light of 'an unbalanced tendency in the prisoner's mind' that had been evident for a number of years. At the culmination of his closing address, defence counsel attempted to establish that Bowen-Colthurst was deranged on the night before the barracks shooting. He said Bowen-Colthurst's taking Sheehy-Skeffington hostage was 'the strangest thing any man of sixteen years' experience in the army could do... the act of a man whose mind was completely unstrung.' Defence counsel also said that Bowen-Colthurst's rifle firing in the air during the raid on Kelly's showed that he had completely lost his reason. Both statements rested on premises that turned out to be false. Hostage taking was not, in fact, unknown in the British army and Bowen-Colthurst was not firing his rifle wildly in the air on the way to Kelly's shop. Bowen-Colthurst did not testify at the court martial. In his closing address, the prosecutor asked the court to consider Bowen-Colthurst's mental state at the time of the shootings. He said that witnesses had described Bowen-Colthurst as impulsive and excited, but that impulsiveness and excitement were not the same as insanity. The prosecutor noted that the onus of proof for an insanity defence lay on the accused, but that there was no evidence Bowen-Colthurst had not been able to distinguish right from wrong, and that he knew what he was doing when he ordered the men to be shot. In his summary, the judge advocate reviewed the evidence and explained the possible verdicts, including the conditions required for a finding of 'guilty but insane'. Bowen-Colthurst's service record was then read out, highlighting his South Africa Medal and his medal for service in the
British expedition to Tibet of 1904. At the request of defence counsel, the Adjutant read into the record that Captain Colthurst and his machine-gun detachment were
mentioned in dispatches during the Tibet Expedition, and the proceedings concluded. Three days after the trial, it was officially announced that Bowen-Colthurst had been found guilty, but insane at the time he committed the murders. He was sentenced to indefinite detention in an insane asylum and admitted to
Broadmoor Asylum for the Criminally Insane on 4 July. There were doubts about the impartiality of the court martial. Hanna Sheehy-Skeffington's solicitor wrote to Prime Minister Asquith to complain about the prosecutor's conduct of the case. Though Rosborough’s testimony alluded to Bowen-Colthurst's 26 April report, the court ignored this document. There was no mention of Coade. Similarly off limits were Bowen-Colthurst's actions after the executions, most notably the murder of
Richard O'Carroll. Important witnesses (Colonel McCammond, Lieutenants Tooley and Gibbon, Sergeant Claxton and others), who might have provided different views of Bowen-Colthurst's character and mental state, were not summoned to give evidence. Most importantly, the medical evidence had not
clearly established Bowen-Colthurst's insanity at the time of the shootings, the standard of proof for insanity required by Chapter VII (Section 9) of the Manual of Military Law.
Royal Commission Hanna Sheehy-Skeffington was not happy with the process or the verdict of the court martial. She lobbied Irish MPs and she badgered Prime Minister Asquith into holding a formal inquiry into Bowen-Colthurst's actions and the army's response.
The Royal Commission on the Arrest... and subsequent treatment... of Sheehy Skeffington... Dickson and...McIntyre was chaired by
Sir John Simon (a former
Attorney General and
Home Secretary), and held hearings on 23–31 August 1916 in a public courtroom at the
Four Courts in Dublin. Thirty-eight witnesses were examined, including Hanna Sheehy-Skeffington. The report of this Commission constitutes the principal source of facts about the events leading to the death of Sheehy-Skeffington. Though much of the evidence presented at the oral hearings did not appear in the final report, the oral hearings were well reported in the Dublin newspapers. The Royal Commission examined the circumstances of Dickson's, McIntyre's and Sheehy-Skeffington's deaths but not why they were killed. The Commission chairman's view was that as a court martial had already determined that Bowen-Colthurst was insane, there could be no further discussion of his mental state and motives. However, the Commission report did present a plausible narrative of Bowen-Colthurst's actions. The evidence presented to the Commission was much the same as the testimony at the court martial. But during the Commission hearings, the murder of James Coade was brought to light. Timothy Healy, counsel for the Sheehy-Skeffington family, established that Sheehy-Skeffington had witnessed Coade's killing. Mr J. P. Brennan, solicitor for Patrick McIntyre, established that Sheehy-Skeffington had had the opportunity to talk to Dickson and McIntyre while they were being escorted back to Portobello Barracks. However, the Commission reported that it was unable to arrive at any conclusions about a possible link between Coade's and Sheehy-Skeffington's murders. The crucial court martial testimony of Lieutenant Leslie Wilson, who had accompanied Bowen-Colthurst on the raid on Kelly's, was shown to have been unreliable. Wilson also told the commission panel that he thought it was quite legal to use Sheehy-Skeffington as a hostage and did not consider the instruction to shoot him if Colthurst's party was fired on as 'strange'. The Commission determined that Bowen-Colthurst's account (in his April 26 report) of the shootings at the barracks was 'entirely untrue'. Regarding Bowen-Colthurst's captives, the Commission report noted that 'No documents or correspondence whatever were found on the prisoners that showed them to be "dangerous characters"; and that any documents found on them could be thoroughly examined in a few minutes' The Commission also examined Bowen-Colthurst's second (9 May) report, a more personal account of his actions than the 26 April report. In his 9 May report, Bowen-Colthurst wrote of the precarious position of the undermanned Portobello Barracks, being threatened by rebel forces who might rescue the three rebel 'ringleaders' from the guard room. Bowen-Colthurst then described his own precarious mental condition at the time as 'very much exhausted and unstrung after a practically sleepless night.' He wrote that he believed he had the power under martial law to have the three prisoners shot, and he ended his report by describing the shootings as 'a terrible duty'. The Commissioners dismissed his claim that the three men might escape from the guard room, and they addressed his (and others') misunderstanding of martial law in the conclusions of their report. The Commission's report documented the raids on Dickson's and Sheehy-Skeffington's houses. Rosborough authorised the first raid, on Dickson's house early in the evening of 26 April. Captain Murphy with two officers and 25 men conducted the operation. Bowen-Colthurst took part in the second raid, nominally led by Colonel Allatt, on Sheehy-Skeffington's house on the evening of 28 April. The Commission determined that this was the occasion Bowen-Colthurst found the allegedly incriminating document that he certified as being found on Sheehy-Skeffington when he was arrested. The Commission report characterized both raids as disreputable attempts to find evidence to justify the shootings after the fact. An issue that was not discussed by the Commission panel was the shooting of
Richard O'Carroll two hours after the shootings at Portobello. Bowen-Colthurst dealt with this briefly (without naming O'Carroll) in the second half of his 26 April report. Sir John Simon stopped Healy from reading the relevant part of the report into the record (but not before Healy had identified O'Carroll as the victim), ruling that it was outside the terms of reference of the Commission. Timothy Healy asked Colonel McCammond why 'having taken the view that the prisoners were shot in the wrong', he allowed Bowen-Colthurst to remain [29 April-6 May] in his command? The Court ruled that this question also was outside the Commission's terms of reference. Healy attempted to have Bowen-Colthurst brought to testify at the Commission hearings. In their report, the Commissioners noted that as he was confined in Broadmoor Criminal Lunatic Asylum, they felt themselves 'debarred from taking his evidence'. The Commission report concluded with three 'general observations'. In the first, the Commission absolved Irish Command of responsibility for the murders, declaring itself 'satisfied that the state of things which rendered Captain Bowen-Colthurst's conduct possible was largely caused by the unfortunate but inevitable absence through serious illness of Colonel McCammond, the only officer in the barracks whom Captain Colthurst would not have considered himself at liberty to ignore.' In its second observation, the report singled out Colthurst's 28 April raid on Mrs Sheehy-Skeffington's house as being particularly discreditable, especially in the light of his earlier treatment of Mrs Sheehy-Skeffington's sisters at Portobello Barracks. The army authorities had been understandably nervous about Bowen-Colthurst's court martial and its ramifications. The Manual of Military Law advocated the ruthless suppression of insurrection and conditionally offered an 'Act of Indemnity' to any soldier for any illegal acts committed while martial law was in effect. In its third observation, the Commissioners attempted to distance the army authorities from the apparent misapplication of martial law by Bowen-Colthurst. Their report ascribed the complicity of the soldiers involved in Bowen-Colthurst's misconduct to a misunderstanding of martial law. The Commission report concluded with an admonition: The shooting of unarmed and unresisting civilians without trial constitutes the offence of murder, whether martial law has been proclaimed or not. We should have deemed it superfluous to point this out were it not that the failure to realise and apply this elementary principle seems to explain the free hand which Captain Bowen-Colthurst was not restrained from exercising throughout the period of crisis. He went on to be involved with the
Boy Scouts, then retired from public life in 1927 and died in 1934. Captain Bowen-Colthurst spent 19 months at
Broadmoor Hospital but he did not change his views on how to deal with suspected rebels. He was released under medical supervision on 26 January 1918 and provided with a military pension. Bowen-Colthurst emigrated in April 1919 to the Canadian province of
British Columbia, where he lived until his death in 1965. After a funeral at Our Redeemer Lutheran Church, he was buried in Lakeview Cemetery,
Penticton. His obituary did not mention his role in the Easter Rising.
Hanna Sheehy-Skeffington was offered financial compensation by the British government in 1916, but she refused it because it came on the condition that she cease to speak and write about the murder. She became increasingly
nationalist-minded, and supported the
Anti-Treaty IRA during the
Irish Civil War. She refused to send her son Owen to any school with a pro-Treaty ethos, and therefore opted to place him in the secular
Sandford Park School when it was founded in 1922. Her sister's son
Conor Cruise O'Brien was also placed there. Hanna died in 1946.
Owen Sheehy-Skeffington became a lecturer in French at
Trinity College, and, beginning in 1954, an
Irish Senator. ==See also==