The underlying questions are whether we possess the control over our actions we feel we have, and if so, what sort or amount of control do we exercise over our voluntary behavior. These ancient philosophical problems predate the early Greek
stoics (for example,
Chrysippus), and some modern philosophers still lament the lack of progress over all these centuries. On one hand, humans have a strong sense of freedom, agency, and self-determination, which leads to a natural belief in free will and a sense of self. On the other hand, an intuitive feeling of free will could be mistaken. It is difficult to reconcile the intuitive evidence that conscious decisions are causally effective with the view that the physical world can be explained entirely by
physical law. The conflict between intuitively felt freedom and natural law arises when either
causal closure or
physical determinism (
nomological determinism) is asserted. With causal closure, no physical event has a cause outside the physical domain, and with physical determinism, the future is determined entirely by preceding events (cause and effect). The puzzle of reconciling 'free will' with a deterministic universe is known as the
problem of free will or sometimes referred to as the
dilemma of determinism. This dilemma leads to a
moral dilemma as well: the question of how to assign
responsibility for actions if they are caused entirely by past events. Compatibilists maintain that mental reality is not of itself causally effective. Classical
compatibilists have addressed the dilemma of free will by arguing that free will holds as long as humans are not externally constrained or coerced. Modern compatibilists make a distinction between freedom of will and freedom of
action, that is, separating
freedom of choice from the freedom to enact it. Given that humans all experience a sense of free will, some modern compatibilists think it is necessary to accommodate this intuition. Compatibilists often associate freedom of will with the
ability to make rational decisions. A different approach to the dilemma is that of
incompatibilists, namely, that if the world is deterministic, then our feeling that we are free to choose an action is simply an
illusion.
Metaphysical libertarianism is the form of incompatibilism which posits that
determinism is false and free will is possible (at least some people have free will). Below are the classic arguments bearing upon the dilemma and its underpinnings.
Incompatibilism Incompatibilism is the position that free will and determinism are logically incompatible, and that the major question regarding whether or not people have free will is thus whether or not their actions are determined. "Hard determinists", such as
d'Holbach, are those incompatibilists who accept determinism and reject free will. In contrast, "
metaphysical libertarians", such as
Thomas Reid,
Peter van Inwagen, and
Robert Kane, are those incompatibilists who accept free will and deny determinism, holding the view that some form of indeterminism is true. Another view is that of "hard incompatibilists", who hold that free will is incompatible with both
determinism and
indeterminism. Traditional arguments for incompatibilism are based on an "
intuition pump": if a person is like other mechanical things that are determined in their behavior such as a wind-up toy, a billiard ball, a puppet, or a robot, then people must not have free will. This argument has been rejected by compatibilists such as
Daniel Dennett on the grounds that, even if humans have something in common with these things, it remains possible and plausible that we are different from such objects in important ways. This argument has also been challenged by compatibilist philosophers. A third argument for incompatibilism was formulated by
Carl Ginet in the 1960s and has received much attention in the modern literature. The simplified argument runs along these lines: if determinism is true, then we have no control over the events of the past that determined our present state and no control over the laws of nature. Since we can have no control over these matters, we also can have no control over the
consequences of them. Since our present choices and acts, under determinism, are the necessary consequences of the past and the laws of nature, then we have no control over them and, hence, no free will. This is called the
consequence argument.
Peter van Inwagen remarks that C. D. Broad had a version of the consequence argument as early as the 1930s. The difficulty of this argument for some compatibilists lies in the fact that it entails the impossibility that one could have chosen other than one has. For example, if Jane is a compatibilist and she has just sat down on the sofa, then she is committed to the claim that she could have remained standing, if she had so desired. But it
follows from the consequence argument that, if Jane had remained standing, she would have either generated a contradiction, violated the laws of nature, or changed the past. Hence, compatibilists are committed to the existence of "incredible abilities", according to Ginet and van Inwagen. One response to this argument is that it equivocates on the notions of abilities and necessities, or that the free will evoked to make any given choice is really an illusion and the choice had been made all along, oblivious to its "decider". Using
T,
F for "true" and "false" and
? for undecided, there are exactly nine positions regarding determinism/free will that consist of any two of these three possibilities:
Incompatibilism may occupy any of the nine positions except (5), (8) or (3), which last corresponds to
soft determinism. Position (1) is
hard determinism, and position (2) is
libertarianism. (1) adds to the table the contention that
D implies
FW is untrue, and (2) adds the contention that
FW implies
D is untrue. Position (9) may be called
hard incompatibilism if one interprets
? as meaning both concepts are of dubious value.
Compatibilism itself may occupy any of the nine positions—that is, there is no logical contradiction between determinism and free will, and either or both may be true or false in principle. But
compatibilism is most commonly understood to hold that some form of determinism is true and yet we have some form of free will, position (3). is
determined completely by laws of physics.
Alex Rosenberg makes an extrapolation of physical determinism as inferred on the macroscopic scale by the behaviour of a set of dominoes to neural activity in the brain where "If the brain is nothing but a complex physical object whose states are as much governed by physical laws as any other physical object, then what goes on in our heads is as fixed and determined by prior events as what goes on when one domino topples another in a long row of them."
Physical determinism is disputed by prominent
interpretations of quantum mechanics, and while not necessarily representative of intrinsic
indeterminism in nature, fundamental limits of precision in measurement are inherent in the
uncertainty principle. Below these positions are examined in more detail. Corresponding to each of these different meanings, there arises a different problem for free will. Hard determinism is the claim that
determinism is true, and that it is
incompatible with free will, so free will does not exist. Although hard determinism generally refers to
nomological determinism (see causal determinism below), it can include all forms of determinism that necessitate the future in its entirety. A good way to conceptualize this is to think about how scientists know the speed and position of planets. Using known laws of orbital dynamics, scientists know where the planet will be in the future at any given time. This concept is then extrapolated to include everything in the universe. ;
Logical determinism: The notion that all
propositions, whether about the past, present or future, are either true or false. The problem of free will, in this context, is the problem of how choices can be free, given that what one does in the future is already determined as true or false in the present. The problem of free will, in this context, is the problem of how our actions can be free if there is a being who has determined them for us in advance, or if they are already set in time. Other forms of determinism are more relevant to compatibilism, such as
biological determinism, the idea that all behaviors, beliefs, and desires are fixed by our genetic endowment and our biochemical makeup, the latter of which is affected by both genes and environment,
cultural determinism and
psychological determinism. Despite this, hard determinism has grown less popular in present times, given scientific suggestions that determinism is false.
Metaphysical libertarianism , which claims that some non-physical
mind, will, or
soul overrides physical
causality. Physical determinism implies there is only one possible future and is therefore not compatible with libertarian free will. As consequent of incompatibilism, metaphysical libertarian explanations that do not involve dispensing with
physicalism require physical indeterminism, such as probabilistic subatomic particle behavior – theory unknown to many of the early writers on free will. Incompatibilist theories can be categorised based on the type of indeterminism they require; uncaused events, non-deterministically caused events, and agent/substance-caused events.
Non-causal theories Non-causal accounts of incompatibilist free will do not require a free action to be caused by either an agent or a physical event. They either rely upon a world that is not causally closed, or physical indeterminism. Non-causal accounts often claim that each intentional action requires a choice or volition—a willing, trying, or endeavoring on behalf of the agent (such as the cognitive component of lifting one's arm). Such intentional actions are interpreted as free actions. It has been suggested, however, that such acting cannot be said to exercise control over anything in particular. According to non-causal accounts, the causation by the agent cannot be analysed in terms of causation by mental states or events, including desire, belief, intention of something in particular, but rather is considered a matter of spontaneity and creativity. The exercise of intent in such intentional actions is not that which determines their freedom; rather, intentional actions are self-generating. The "actish feel" of some intentional actions do not "constitute that event's activeness, or the agent's exercise of active control"; rather, they "might be brought about by direct stimulation of someone's brain, in the absence of any relevant desire or intention on the part of that person". This is intended to provide an indeterminate set of possibilities to choose from, while not risking the introduction of
luck (random decision making). The selection process is deterministic, although it may be based on earlier preferences established by the same process. Deliberative indeterminism has been referenced by
Daniel Dennett and
John Martin Fischer. An obvious objection to such a view is that an agent cannot be assigned ownership over their decisions (or preferences used to make those decisions) to any greater degree than that of a compatibilist model.
Centred accounts propose that for any given decision between two possibilities, the strength of reason will be considered for each option, yet there is still a probability the weaker candidate will be chosen. An obvious objection to such a view is that decisions are explicitly left up to chance, and origination or responsibility cannot be assigned for any given decision.
Efforts of will theory is related to the role of will power in decision making. It suggests that the indeterminacy of agent volition processes could map to the indeterminacy of certain physical events – and the outcomes of these events could therefore be considered caused by the agent. Models of
volition have been constructed in which it is seen as a particular kind of complex, high-level process with an element of physical indeterminism. An example of this approach is that of
Robert Kane, where he hypothesizes that "in each case, the indeterminism is functioning as a hindrance or obstacle to her realizing one of her purposes – a hindrance or obstacle in the form of resistance within her will which must be overcome by effort." According to Robert Kane such "ultimate responsibility" is a required condition for free will. An important factor in such a theory is that the agent cannot be reduced to physical neuronal events, but rather mental processes are said to provide an equally valid account of the determination of outcome as their physical processes (see
non-reductive physicalism). Although at the time
quantum mechanics (and physical
indeterminism) was only in the initial stages of acceptance, in his book
Miracles: A preliminary study C.S. Lewis stated the logical possibility that if the physical world were proved indeterministic this would provide an entry point to describe an action of a non-physical entity on physical reality.
Indeterministic physical models (particularly those involving
quantum indeterminacy) introduce random occurrences at an atomic or subatomic level. These events might affect brain activity, and could seemingly allow
incompatibilist free will if the apparent indeterminacy of some mental processes (for instance, subjective perceptions of control in conscious
volition) map to the underlying indeterminacy of the physical construct. But this relationship requires a causative role over probabilities that is questionable, and it is far from established that brain activity responsible for human action can be affected by such events. Moreover, these incompatibilist models depend upon the relationship between action and conscious volition, as studied in the
neuroscience of free will. It is evident that observation may disturb the outcome of the observation itself, rendering limited our ability to identify causality.
Niels Bohr, one of the main architects of quantum theory, suggested, however, that there is no connection between indeterminism of nature and freedom of will.
Agent/substance-causal theories Agent/substance-causal accounts of incompatibilist free will rely upon substance dualism in their description of mind. The agent is assumed power to intervene in the physical world. Agent (substance)-causal accounts have been suggested by both
George Berkeley and
Thomas Reid. It is required that what the agent causes is not causally determined by prior events. It is also required that the agent's causing of that event is not causally determined by prior events. A number of problems have been identified with this view. First, it is difficult to establish the reason for any given choice by the agent, which suggests they may be random or determined by
luck (without an underlying basis for the decision). Second, it has been questioned whether physical events can be caused by an external substance or mind—a common problem associated with
interactionalist dualism.
Hard incompatibilism Hard incompatibilism is the idea that free will cannot exist, whether the world is deterministic or not.
Derk Pereboom has defended hard incompatibilism, identifying a variety of positions where free will is irrelevant to indeterminism/determinism, among them the following: :#Determinism (D) is true, D does not imply we lack free will (F), but in fact we do lack F. :#D is true, D does not imply we lack F, but in fact we don't know if we have F. :#D is true, and we do have F. :#D is true, we have F, and F implies D. :#D is unproven, but we have F. :#D isn't true, we do have F, and would have F even if D were true. :#D isn't true, we don't have F, but F is compatible with D. ::::::Derk Pereboom,
Living without Free Will, The contemporary philosopher
Galen Strawson agrees with Locke that the truth or falsity of determinism is irrelevant to the problem. He argues that the notion of free will leads to an infinite regress and is therefore senseless. According to Strawson, if one is responsible for what one does in a given situation, then one must be responsible for the way one is in certain mental respects. But it is impossible for one to be responsible for the way one is in any respect. This is because to be responsible in some situation
S, one must have been responsible for the way one was at
S−1. To be responsible for the way one was at
S−1, one must have been responsible for the way one was at
S−2, and so on. At some point in the chain, there must have been an act of origination of a new causal chain. But this is impossible. Man cannot create himself or his mental states
ex nihilo. This argument entails that free will itself is absurd, but not that it is incompatible with determinism. Strawson calls his own view "pessimism" but it can be classified as
hard incompatibilism.
Destiny and fate Destiny or fate is a predetermined course of events. It may be conceived as a predetermined future, whether in general or of an individual. It is a concept based on the belief that there is a fixed natural order to the cosmos. Although often used interchangeably, the words "fate" and "destiny" have distinct connotations.
Fate generally implies there is a set course that cannot be deviated from, and over which one has no control. Fate is related to
determinism, but makes no specific claim of physical determinism. Even with physical indeterminism an event could still be fated externally (see for instance
theological determinism). Destiny likewise is related to determinism, but makes no specific claim of physical determinism. Even with physical indeterminism an event could still be destined to occur.
Destiny implies there is a set course that cannot be deviated from, but does not of itself make any claim with respect to the setting of that course (i.e., it does not necessarily conflict with
incompatibilist free will). Free will if existent could be the mechanism by which that destined outcome is chosen (determined to represent destiny).
Logical determinism Discussion regarding destiny does not necessitate the existence of supernatural powers. Logical
determinism or determinateness is the notion that all propositions, whether about the past, present, or future, are either true or false. This creates a unique problem for free will given that propositions about the future already have a truth value in the present (that is it is already determined as either true or false), and is referred to as the
problem of future contingents.
Omniscience Omniscience is the capacity to know everything that there is to know (included in which are all future events), and is a property often attributed to a creator deity. Omniscience implies the existence of destiny. Some authors have claimed that free will cannot coexist with omniscience. One argument asserts that an omniscient creator not only implies destiny but a form of high level
predeterminism such as hard
theological determinism or
predestination – that they have independently fixed all events and outcomes in the universe in advance. In such a case, even if an individual could have influence over their lower level physical system, their choices in regard to this cannot be their own, as is the case with libertarian free will. Omniscience features as an
incompatible-properties argument for the existence of
God, known as the
argument from free will, and is closely related to other such arguments, for example the incompatibility of
omnipotence with a good creator deity (i.e. if a deity knew what they were going to choose, then they are responsible for letting them choose it).
Predeterminism Predeterminism is the idea that all events are determined in advance. Predeterminism is the
philosophy that all events of
history, past, present and future, have been decided or are known (by
God,
fate, or some other force), including human actions. Predeterminism is frequently taken to mean that human actions cannot interfere with (or have no bearing on) the outcomes of a pre-determined course of events, and that one's destiny was established externally (for example, exclusively by a creator deity). The concept of predeterminism is often argued by invoking
causal determinism, implying that there is an unbroken
chain of prior occurrences stretching back to the origin of the universe. In the case of predeterminism, this chain of events has been pre-established, and human actions cannot interfere with the outcomes of this pre-established chain. Predeterminism can be used to mean such pre-established causal determinism, in which case it is categorised as a specific type of
determinism. It can also be used interchangeably with causal determinism – in the context of its capacity to determine future events. Despite this, predeterminism is often considered as independent of causal determinism. The term predeterminism is also frequently used in the context of biology and heredity, in which case it represents a form of
biological determinism. The term predeterminism suggests not just a determining of all events, but the prior and deliberately conscious determining of all events (therefore done, presumably, by a conscious being). While determinism usually refers to a naturalistically explainable causality of events, predeterminism seems by definition to suggest a person or a "someone" who is controlling or planning the causality of events before they occur and who then perhaps resides beyond the natural, causal universe.
Predestination asserts that a supremely powerful being has indeed fixed all events and outcomes in the universe in advance, and is a famous doctrine of the
Calvinists in
Christian theology. Predestination is often considered a form of hard
theological determinism. Predeterminism has therefore been compared to
fatalism. Fatalism is the idea that everything is fated to happen, so that humans have no control over their future.
Theological determinism Theological determinism is a form of
determinism stating that all events that happen are pre-ordained, or
predestined to happen, by a
monotheistic deity, or that they are destined to occur given its
omniscience. Two forms of theological determinism exist, here referenced as strong and weak theological determinism. • The first one, strong theological determinism, is based on the concept of a
creator deity dictating all events in history: "everything that happens has been predestined to happen by an omniscient, omnipotent divinity." • The second form, weak theological determinism, is based on the concept of divine foreknowledge – "because
God's omniscience is perfect, what God knows about the future will inevitably happen, which means, consequently, that the future is already fixed." There exist slight variations on the above categorisation. Some claim that theological determinism requires
predestination of all events and outcomes by the divinity (that is, they do not classify the weaker version as 'theological determinism' unless libertarian free will is assumed to be denied as a consequence), or that the weaker version does not constitute 'theological determinism' at all. Theological determinism can also be seen as a form of
causal determinism, in which the antecedent conditions are the nature and will of God. With respect to free will and the classification of theological compatibilism/incompatibilism below, "theological determinism is the thesis that God exists and has infallible knowledge of all true propositions including propositions about our future actions," more minimal criteria designed to encapsulate all forms of theological determinism.
Thomas Aquinas, and
C.S. Lewis. • Deny the
Principle of Alternate Possibilities: "If you cannot do otherwise when you do an act, you do not act freely." For example, a human observer could in principle have a machine that could detect what will happen in the future, but the existence of this machine or their use of it has no influence on the outcomes of events. In the definition of
compatibilism and
incompatibilism, the literature often fails to distinguish between physical determinism and higher level forms of determinism (predeterminism, theological determinism, etc.) As such, hard determinism with respect to theological determinism (or "Hard Theological Determinism" above) might be classified as hard incompatibilism with respect to physical determinism (if no claim was made regarding the internal causality or determinism of the universe), or even compatibilism (if freedom from the constraint of determinism was not considered necessary for free will), if not hard determinism itself. By the same principle, metaphysical libertarianism (a form of incompatibilism with respect to physical determinism) might be classified as compatibilism with respect to theological determinism (if it was assumed such free will events were pre-ordained and therefore were destined to occur, but of which whose outcomes were not "predestined" or determined by God). If hard theological determinism is accepted (if it was assumed instead that such outcomes were predestined by God), then metaphysical libertarianism is not, however, possible, and would require reclassification (as hard incompatibilism for example, given that the universe is still assumed to be indeterministic – although the classification of hard determinism is technically valid also). Cartesian dualism implies that the physical world is not deterministic – and in which external mind controls (at least some) physical events, providing an interpretation of
incompatibilist free will. Stemming from Cartesian dualism, a formulation sometimes called
interactionalist dualism suggests a two-way interaction, that some physical events cause some mental acts and some mental acts cause some physical events. One modern vision of the possible separation of mind and body is the
"three-world" formulation of
Popper. Cartesian dualism and Popper's three worlds are two forms of what is called
epistemological pluralism, that is the notion that different epistemological methodologies are necessary to attain a full description of the world. Other forms of epistemological pluralist dualism include
psychophysical parallelism and
epiphenomenalism. Epistemological pluralism is one view in which the mind-body problem is
not reducible to the concepts of the natural sciences. A contrasting approach is called
physicalism. Physicalism is a
philosophical theory holding that everything that
exists is no more extensive than its
physical properties; that is, that there are no non-physical substances (for example physically independent minds). Physicalism can be reductive or non-reductive.
Reductive physicalism is grounded in the idea that everything in the world can actually be reduced analytically to its fundamental physical, or material, basis. Alternatively,
non-reductive physicalism asserts that mental properties form a separate ontological class to physical properties: that mental states (such as
qualia) are not ontologically reducible to physical states. Although one might suppose that mental states and neurological states are different in kind, that does not rule out the possibility that mental states are correlated with neurological states. In one such construction,
anomalous monism, mental events
supervene on physical events, describing the
emergence of mental properties correlated with physical properties – implying causal reducibility. Non-reductive physicalism is therefore often categorised as
property dualism rather than
monism, yet other types of property dualism do not adhere to the causal reducibility of mental states (see epiphenomenalism).
Incompatibilism requires a distinction between the mental and the physical, being a commentary on the incompatibility of (determined) physical reality and one's presumably distinct experience of will. Secondarily,
metaphysical libertarian free will must assert influence on physical reality, and where mind is responsible for such influence (as opposed to ordinary system randomness), it must be distinct from body to accomplish this. Both substance and property dualism offer such a distinction, and those particular models thereof that are not causally inert with respect to the physical world provide a basis for illustrating incompatibilist free will (i.e. interactionalist dualism and non-reductive physicalism). It has been noted that the
laws of physics have yet to resolve the
hard problem of consciousness: "Solving the hard problem of consciousness involves determining how physiological processes such as ions flowing across the nerve membrane
cause us to have experiences." According to some, "Intricately related to the hard problem of consciousness, the hard problem of free will represents
the core problem of conscious free will: Does conscious volition impact the material world?" Others however argue that "
consciousness plays a far smaller role in human life than Western culture has tended to believe."
Compatibilism was a classical compatibilist. Compatibilists maintain that determinism is compatible with free will. They believe freedom can be present or absent in a situation for reasons that have nothing to do with metaphysics. For instance,
courts of law make judgments about whether individuals are acting under their own free will under certain circumstances without bringing in metaphysics. Similarly,
political liberty is a non-metaphysical concept. Likewise, some compatibilists define free will as freedom to act according to one's determined motives without hindrance from other individuals. So for example Aristotle in his
Nicomachean Ethics, and the Stoic Chrysippus. In contrast, the
incompatibilist positions are concerned with a sort of "metaphysically free will", which compatibilists claim has never been coherently defined. Compatibilists argue that determinism does not matter; though they disagree among themselves about what, in turn,
does matter. To be a compatibilist, one need not endorse any particular conception of free will, but only deny that determinism is at odds with free will. Although there are various impediments to exercising one's choices, free will does not imply freedom of action. Freedom of choice (freedom to select one's will) is logically separate from freedom to
implement that choice (freedom to enact one's will), although not all writers observe this distinction.
Free will as lack of physical restraint Most "classical compatibilists", such as
Thomas Hobbes, claim that a person is acting on the person's own will only when it is the desire of that person to do the act, and also possible for the person to be able to do otherwise,
if the person had decided to. Hobbes sometimes attributes such compatibilist freedom to each individual and not to some abstract notion of
will, asserting, for example, that "no liberty can be inferred to the will, desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to doe." In articulating this crucial proviso,
David Hume writes, "this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains." Similarly,
Voltaire, in his
Dictionnaire philosophique, claimed that "Liberty then is only and can be only the power to do what one will." He asked, "would you have everything at the pleasure of a million blind caprices?" For him, free will or liberty is "only the power of acting, what is this power? It is the effect of the constitution and present state of our organs." Compatibilism has also been defended by
Christian List. List makes a distinction between "physical possibility" and "agential possibility", and argues that free will is a higher-level phenomenon on par with agency and intentionality, rather than a physical one.
Free will as a psychological state Compatibilism often regards the agent free as virtue of their reason. Some explanations of free will focus on the internal causality of the mind with respect to higher-order brain processing – the interaction between conscious and unconscious brain activity. Likewise, some modern compatibilists in
psychology have tried to revive traditionally accepted struggles of free will with the formation of character. Compatibilist free will has also been attributed to our natural
sense of agency, where one must believe they are an agent in order to function and develop a
theory of mind. The notion of levels of decision is presented in a different manner by Frankfurt. Others argue that Frankfurt offers no adequate explanation of how the various levels in the hierarchy mesh together.
Free will as unpredictability In
Elbow Room, Dennett presents an argument for a compatibilist theory of free will, which he further elaborated in the book
Freedom Evolves. The basic reasoning is that, if one excludes God, an infinitely powerful
demon, and other such possibilities, then because of
chaos and epistemic limits on the precision of our knowledge of the current state of the world, the future is ill-defined for all finite beings. The only well-defined things are "expectations". The ability to do "otherwise" only makes sense when dealing with these expectations, and not with some unknown and unknowable future. According to Dennett, because individuals have the ability to act differently from what anyone expects, free will can exist. More sophisticated analyses of compatibilist free will have been offered, as have other critiques. is a
physicalist approach to studying human
cognition and
consciousness in which the mind is simply part of nature, perhaps merely a feature of many very complex self-programming feedback systems (for example,
neural networks and
cognitive robots), and so must be studied by the methods of empirical science, such as the
behavioral and
cognitive sciences (
i.e. neuroscience and
cognitive psychology). Cognitive naturalism stresses the role of neurological sciences. Overall brain health,
substance dependence,
depression, and various
personality disorders clearly influence mental activity, and their impact upon
volition is also important. The neuroscience of free will places restrictions on both compatibilist and incompatibilist free will conceptions. Compatibilist models adhere to models of mind in which mental activity (such as deliberation) can be reduced to physical activity without any change in physical outcome. Although compatibilism is generally aligned to (or is at least compatible with) physicalism, some compatibilist models describe the natural occurrences of deterministic deliberation in the brain in terms of the first person perspective of the conscious agent performing the deliberation.
Non-naturalism Alternatives to strictly
naturalist physics, such as
mind–body dualism positing a mind or soul existing apart from one's body while perceiving, thinking, choosing freely, and as a result acting independently on the body, include both traditional religious metaphysics and less common newer compatibilist concepts. Also consistent with both autonomy and
Darwinism, they allow for free personal agency based on practical reasons within the laws of physics. While less popular among 21st-century philosophers, non-naturalist compatibilism is present in most if not almost all religions.
Other views Some philosophers' views are difficult to categorize as either compatibilist or incompatibilist, hard determinist or libertarian. For example,
Nietzsche criticized common conceptions of free will- arguing that effects of destiny are inescapable- while at the same time criticizing determinism and compatibilism. He wrote of "amor fati" - loving ones fate.
Ted Honderich holds the view that "determinism is true, compatibilism and incompatibilism are both false" and the real problem lies elsewhere. Honderich maintains that determinism is true because quantum phenomena are not events or things that can be located in space and time, but are
abstract entities. Further, even if they were micro-level events, they do not seem to have any relevance to how the world is at the macroscopic level. He maintains that incompatibilism is false because, even if indeterminism is true, incompatibilists have not provided, and cannot provide, an adequate account of origination. He rejects compatibilism because it, like incompatibilism, assumes a single, fundamental notion of freedom. There are really two notions of freedom: voluntary action and origination. Both notions are required to explain freedom of will and responsibility. Both determinism and indeterminism are threats to such freedom. To abandon these notions of freedom would be to abandon moral responsibility. On the one side, we have our intuitions; on the other, the scientific facts. The "new" problem is how to resolve this conflict.
Free will as an illusion thought that there is no free will. :"Experience teaches us no less clearly than reason, that men believe themselves free, simply because they are conscious of their actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those actions are determined."
Baruch Spinoza,
Ethics David Hume discussed the possibility that the entire debate about free will is nothing more than a merely "verbal" issue. He suggested that it might be accounted for by "a false sensation or seeming experience" (a
velleity), which is associated with many of our actions when we perform them. On reflection, we realize that they were necessary and determined all along. claimed that phenomena do not have freedom of the will, but the will as
noumenon is not subordinate to the laws of necessity (causality) and is thus free. According to
Arthur Schopenhauer, the actions of humans, as
phenomena, are subject to the
principle of sufficient reason and thus liable to necessity. Thus, he argues, humans do not possess free will as conventionally understood. However, the
will [urging, craving, striving, wanting, and desiring], as the
noumenon underlying the phenomenal world, is in itself groundless: that is, not subject to time, space, and causality (the forms that governs the world of appearance). Thus, the will, in itself and outside of appearance, is free. Schopenhauer discussed the puzzle of free will and moral responsibility in
The World as Will and Representation, Book 2, Sec. 23: Schopenhauer elaborated on the topic in Book IV of the same work and in even greater depth in his later essay
On the Freedom of the Will. In this work, he stated, "You can do what you will, but in any given moment of your life you can
will only one definite thing and absolutely nothing other than that one thing."
Free will as "moral imagination" Rudolf Steiner, who collaborated in a complete edition of Arthur Schopenhauer's work, wrote
The Philosophy of Freedom, which focuses on the problem of free will. Steiner (1861–1925) initially divides this into the two aspects of freedom:
freedom of thought and
freedom of action. The controllable and uncontrollable aspects of decision making thereby are made logically separable, as pointed out in the introduction. This separation of
will from
action has a very long history, going back at least as far as
Stoicism and the teachings of
Chrysippus (279–206 BCE), who separated external
antecedent causes from the internal disposition receiving this cause. Steiner then argues that inner freedom is achieved when we integrate our sensory impressions, which reflect the outer appearance of the world, with our thoughts, which lend coherence to these impressions and thereby disclose to us an understandable world. Acknowledging the many influences on our choices, he nevertheless points out that they do not preclude freedom unless we fail to recognise them. Steiner argues that outer freedom is attained by permeating our deeds with
moral imagination. "Moral" in this case refers to action that is willed, while "imagination" refers to the mental capacity to envision conditions that do not already hold. Both of these functions are necessarily conditions for freedom. Steiner aims to show that these two aspects of inner and outer freedom are integral to one another, and that true freedom is only achieved when they are united. For Steiner, will is free only when motive (purpose) and mobile (driving force, cause) coincide.
Free will as a pragmatically useful concept William James' views were ambivalent. While he believed in free will on "ethical grounds", he did not believe that there was evidence for it on scientific grounds, nor did his own introspections support it. Ultimately he believed that the problem of free will was a metaphysical issue and, therefore, could not be settled by science. Moreover, he did not accept incompatibilism as formulated below; he did not believe that the indeterminism of human actions was a prerequisite of moral responsibility. In his work
Pragmatism, he wrote that "instinct and utility between them can safely be trusted to carry on the social business of punishment and praise" regardless of metaphysical theories. He did believe that indeterminism is important as a "doctrine of relief" – it allows for the view that, although the world may be in many respects a bad place, it may, through individuals' actions, become a better one. Determinism, he argued, undermines
meliorism – the idea that progress is a real concept leading to improvement in the world. According to Hume, 'causation' is on weak grounds: "Once we realise that 'A must bring about B' is tantamount merely to 'Due to their constant conjunction, we are psychologically certain that B will follow A,' then we are left with a very weak notion of necessity." This empiricist view was often denied by trying to prove the so-called
apriority of causal law (i.e. that it precedes all experience and is rooted in the construction of the perceivable world): •
Kant's proof in
Critique of Pure Reason (which referenced time and time ordering of causes and effects) •
Schopenhauer's proof from
The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (which referenced the so-called intellectuality of representations, that is, in other words, objects and
qualia perceived with senses) In the 1780s
Immanuel Kant suggested at a minimum our decision processes with moral implications lie outside the reach of everyday causality, and lie outside the rules governing material objects. "There is a sharp difference between moral judgments and judgments of fact... Moral judgments... must be
a priori judgments." Freeman introduces what he calls "circular causality" to "allow for the contribution of self-organizing dynamics", the "formation of macroscopic population dynamics that shapes the patterns of activity of the contributing individuals", applicable to "interactions between neurons and neural masses... and between the behaving animal and its environment". In this view, mind and neurological functions are tightly coupled in a situation where feedback between collective actions (mind) and individual subsystems (for example,
neurons and their
synapses) jointly decide upon the behaviour of both.
Free will according to Thomas Aquinas Thirteenth century philosopher
Thomas Aquinas viewed humans as pre-programmed (by virtue of being human) to seek certain goals, but able to choose between routes to achieve these goals (our Aristotelian
telos). His view has been associated with both compatibilism and libertarianism. In facing choices, he argued that humans are governed by
intellect,
will, and
passions. The will is "the primary mover of all the powers of the soul... and it is also the efficient cause of motion in the body." Choice falls into five stages: (i) intellectual consideration of whether an objective is desirable, (ii) intellectual consideration of means of attaining the objective, (iii) will arrives at an intent to pursue the objective, (iv) will and intellect jointly decide upon choice of means (v) will elects execution. Free will enters as follows: Free will is an "appetitive power", that is, not a cognitive power of intellect (the term "appetite" from Aquinas's definition "includes all forms of internal inclination"). He states that judgment "concludes and terminates counsel. Now counsel is terminated, first, by the judgment of reason; secondly, by the acceptation of the appetite [that is, the free-will]." A compatibilist interpretation of Aquinas's view is defended thus: "Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature."
Free will as a pseudo-problem Historically, most of the philosophical effort invested in resolving the dilemma has taken the form of close examination of definitions and ambiguities in the concepts designated by "free", "freedom", "will", "choice" and so forth. Defining 'free will' often revolves around the meaning of phrases like "ability to do otherwise" or "alternative possibilities". This emphasis upon words has led some philosophers to claim the problem is merely verbal and thus a pseudo-problem. In response, others point out the complexity of decision making and the importance of nuances in the terminology. ==Eastern philosophy==