From 1949 the central government began to cede power to communal local governments, seeking to decentralise the government and work towards a
withering away of the state. In the system of local self-government, higher-level bodies could supervise compliance with the law by lower-level bodies, but could not issue orders to them.
Edvard Kardelj declared in the
Assembly of Yugoslavia "that no perfect bureaucratic apparatus, however brilliant the people at the top, can build socialism. Socialism can grow only from the initiatives of the masses of the people."
Rankovićism disagreed with this decentralisation, viewing it as a threat to the stability of Yugoslavia. Other socialist states also criticised this move for deviating from
Marxism-Leninism with declarations that it "is an outright denial of the teachings of Marxism-Leninism and the universal laws on the construction of socialism." The
League of Communists of Yugoslavia retained solid power; the legislature did little more than rubber stamp decisions already made by the LCY's Politburo. The
secret police, the
State Security Administration (UDBA), while operating with considerably more restraint than its counterparts in the rest of Eastern Europe, was nonetheless a feared tool of government control. UDBA was particularly notorious for assassinating suspected "enemies of the state" who lived in exile overseas. The media remained under restrictions that were onerous by Western standards, but still had more latitude than their counterparts in other Communist countries. Nationalist groups were a particular target of the authorities, with numerous arrests and prison sentences handed down over the years for separatist activities. Although the Soviets revised their attitudes under Nikita Khrushchev during the process of
de-Stalinization and sought to normalize relations with the Yugoslavs while obtaining influence in the Non-Aligned Movement, the answer they got was never enthusiastic and the Soviet Union never gained a proper outlet to the
Mediterranean Sea. At the same time, the Non-Aligned states failed to form a third Bloc, especially after the split at the outcome of the
1973 oil crisis. Industry was nationalized, agriculture
forcibly collectivized, and a rigid industrialization program based on the
Soviet model was adopted. Yugoslav and Soviet companies signed contracts for numerous joint ventures. According to the American historian
Adam Ulam, in no other country in the
Eastern Bloc was Sovietization "as rapid and as ruthless as in Yugoslavia". Despite the initial thaw between the USSR and the Yugoslavian authorities following the signing of the
Belgrade declaration, relations became tense again between the two countries after Yugoslavia sheltered
Imre Nagy following the invasion of Hungary. Tito initially approved the Soviet military intervention in his letter to Khrushchev due to fears of
Hungarian Revolution provoking a similar anti-communist and nationalist movement in Yugoslavia. Still, Tito later sheltered Nagy to prove Yugoslavia's sovereign status and non-aligned foreign policy to gain sympathy from the international community. The abduction and the execution of Nagy by the Hungarian government under
János Kádár cooled the bilateral relationship between Yugoslavia and Hungary, despite Tito's initial support and recommendations of Kadar as the successor of
Mátyás Rákosi and Nagy. Yugoslavia backed
Czechoslovakia's leader
Alexander Dubček during the 1968
Prague Spring and then cultivated a special (albeit incidental) relation with the maverick Romanian President
Nicolae Ceaușescu. Titoism was similar to Dubček's
socialism with a human face, while Ceaușescu attracted sympathies for his refusal to condone (and take part in) the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which briefly seemed to constitute a
casus belli between
Romania and the Soviets. After a significant expansion of the private sector in the 1950s and 1960s and a shift towards a more
market-oriented economy, the Yugoslavian leadership did put a halt to overt capitalist attempts (such as
Stjepan Mesić's experiment with
privatization in
Orahovica) and crushed the
dissidence of liberal or democratic socialist thinkers such as the former leader
Milovan Đilas, while it also clamped down on centrifugal attempts, promoting
Yugoslav patriotism. Although still claimed as official policies, nearly all aspects of Titoism went into rapid decline after Tito's death in 1980, being replaced by the rival policies of constituent republics. During the late 1980s, nationalism was again on the rise one decade after the
Croatian Spring, and inter-republic ethnic tensions escalated. == Reception ==