Order of Battle Armenia To Armenia, the primary regional threat were the Ottoman Empire and other Turkic factions. For them, an Ottoman breakthrough at the
Caucasian Front was equalled with the demise of the Armenian nation. Therein and the fear of foreign incursions was the basis of creating a national military corps, even before gaining independence in 1918. Such a proposal was approved on 11 July 1917 by the provisional government and High Command. The planned Armenian corps was structured not too differently to their later Georgian counterpart, also partially inspired by Russian military doctrines and organisation. Plans were already made in 1917 and roots lied in the Armenian units that had fought for the Russian Empire since 1914. The largest of those (1,500 men strong) was led by
Andranik. In 1917 some 80,000 Armenians were serving in the ranks of the Imperial Russian Army. Nearly as many in the Caucasus. In the
TDFR, the corps was to consist of two infantry divisions, one "special division", one artillery division, one cavalry brigade and an engineer regiment, supplemented by six separate regiments deployed to different areas, including the Tiflis Governorate. One to be assigned for the protection of railroads. The special division was to draw manpower from Armenians who fled the Ottoman Empire. According to leaderships plans, each division would be made up of four infantry regiments with their own artillery and cavalry detachments. The cavalry brigade was to consist of two cavalry regiments and two artillery batteries. In addition several reserve units would be requested and some formed. Implemented, the Armenian army would have been of substantial size. Ultimately, the Armenians succeeded in creating an overall larger fighting force. On 1 January 1918, the Armenian Army comprised about 40,000 personnel and consisted of two rifle divisions, three volunteer brigades, one cavalry brigade and several militia battalions. Their main cadres were formed from people who had served in the period of 1914–1916. The formations were well equipped with machine guns, but lacking in artillery due to shortcomings of experienced and trained personnel in that particular area. The rifle divisions were each equipped with six heavy artillery batteries, while light guns were transferred to the volunteer forces. According to
Denikin, during the summer of 1918, peacetime strength was at 22,000 men and more than 44,000 troops could be mustered in wartime. However those numbers fluctuated heavily and were more likely in the scale of 10,000–15,000. While
Jones mentions three Armenian divisions by end of January and their disposition in detail. A problematic factor were ongoing conflicts like
with Azerbaijan, that drew thousand of bodies in manpower, away from the mainland. By June 1918, after establishing independence, the Armenian army at the time numbered some 12,000 men and gradually grew to 40,000. Its officer corps consisted of Armenians as well as Russians. However
Allen and
Muratoff note that the Armenian forces became weaker and less effective. Their 24 rifle and eight volunteer battalions didn't exceed 16,000 riflemen, 1,000 cavalrymen and 4,000 militia. Battalion sizes ranged from 400 to 600. Because of the
Treaty of Batum, the size of the Armenian corps was further reduced by the end of July 1918, to only one division. This restriction however did not touch separate formations not integrated in the corps and subordinated to the government, such as the volunteer brigade led by Andronik. Despite those setbacks, Armenia was able to create a fully structured corps, beating Georgia to it by many months and into the upcoming war.
Georgia From Georgian perspective, North-Eastern and Eastern advances of the Ottoman forces constituted an imminent threat not only to Akhaltsikhe and Akhalkalaki, but also to Tiflis. During its brief independence, Russia and Turkey remained the main threats to the Republic. In a session on May 25, 1918, the Menshevik government decided that all laws and resolutions established during the short-lived TDFR, would temporarily carry over to the newly formed Republic. Batumi was declared occupied. In June a Georgian army deployed to Abkhazia at request of the Abkhaz Council in order to quell Bolshevik revolts and in the process, took
Sochi as well as
Tuapse from the Red Army. By the time the
Sochi conflict escalated, Georgia was effectively subjected to aggression by both Russian bolsheviks and the Ottoman Empire, which lasted until 1919. The ambitions of those two prompted creation of a cohesive armed force. A draft, which laid out the organisation structure, was presented by General Kvinitadze on 2 June 1918. Three days later on 5 June, official enlistment began on the basis of that new institution. At the time, only able bodies from the ages of 19 to 23 were allowed to serve. By June its German protector sent troops to aid in the training. The memoires of German general
von Kressenstein speak of a stubborn Georgian government, that initially refused the implementation of a regular army accordingly to their demands. Pressure forced them to concede to a model with conscription. The governments original intention was to form two infantry divisions, one Border Guard division, three cavalry regiments and an artillery brigade, leaning towards Red Army structures. The peacetime strength was to be 30–40,000 soldiers. Kvinitadze wanted to create three divisions, so that one could at least defend against potential Ottoman thrusts towards and from the direction of
Batumi,
Artvin,
Ardahan and
Akhaltsikhe. Disagreement between German and Georgian officers delayed approval of a German inspired model until 20 August 1918. The first regular army, as per new law, was to consist of two infantry divisions, one cavalry brigade, one artillery brigade, one support company, one engineer company, one motorized company, one armored company and a fighter group. However it never reached the envisioned size or quality at any time in the First Republics existence. By November 1918, the Georgian military's manpower shortage lied at around 60%, while the army still lacked 80% of the required horses. Despite being in a terrible state, Georgian troops with the assistance of the
People's Guard, managed to stall and fend off further Ottoman and Bolshevik incursions. Throughout 1918, the majority of Georgian forces consisted of militia type formations and only in critical events, such as the Armeno-Georgian war, a large ad-hoc force would be assembled to respond. Vital instruments, such as
military intelligence, were lacking almost completely. Existing People's Guard (also called Workers Guard) units were plagued by disorganisation and ill discipline, sometimes even disobedience. They were often accused of irresponsible behaviour and were being reformed. Its personnel were made up of ideology driven Menshevik party members and the Guard at large, wasn't a cohesive fighting force. It comprised territorial battalions that would be consolidated and assigned competent military leadership, only in the case of war. The relationship between Guard and regular army was described as "not ideal". The Guard enjoyed greater privileges and was heavily politicized, as de facto protector and "sword" of the Menshevik government. While the regular army was subordinated to the Defence Ministry, the entirety of the Guard was directly controlled by the Menshevik dominated parliament. The 2nd Division of the regular army completed its muster not earlier than the end of December 1918, when the war was in its final days. The cavalry brigade failed to form at all. Citations from officers often included remarks of poor quality in the majority rank and file, who were only called in for several days, when rewarding the few stand outs who committed commendable action. Exceptions were the 5th and 6th Infantry Regiments of the 1st Division, that enjoyed superior level of organisation.
Unrest in Lori Following the Turkish retreat from southern Lori in October 1918, Armenian forces gained control of the region, resulting in a border between Armenia and Georgia. In response, the Georgian side bolstered it's garrison in the northern parts. The local populace was required to provide quarters and supplies for Georgian troops and became subject to searches and undisciplined behaviour by the soldiers. In
Uzunlar, the Armenian peasantry resisted the excessive search operations. In response, Georgian troops beat the village commissar and killed an official. A Georgian military investigation confirmed the Georgian soldiers had been the instigators and requested replacement of troops, but concluded that due to the organised nature of resistance, Uzunlar was to be searched and neutralized. By early December, rebellion seemed imminent in northern Lori. Armenian emissaries from Uzunlar traveled to the Georgian headquarters near
Sanahin to protest the violence. General Tsulukidze had the emissaries arrested and sent a detachment to deal with the unrests. His troops were reportedly attacked, while the Armenians of Uzunlar claimed their village was bombarded for two days, while the Georgians claimed the villagers had opened fire. According to Tsulikidze, Armenian troops of the 4th Infantry Regiment operating in disguise were instigating an insurrection. They had disarmed a cavalry unit and the garrison at Uzunlar. Subsequently, a relief force was met with a barrage of fire. The following day an Armenian force of 350 men attacked two Georgian units and partisans crushed several soldiers by boulders rolled down a mountainside. Tsulukidze was convinced that he dealt with regular Armenian army units because orders were submitted in Russian, which was the language used by the Armenian military command. In his view Sanahin itself was in danger. The Armenian side maintained that they had no regular troops involved until mid-December, when the oppression of the local peasantry had become too severe to continue tolerating. General Goguadze, who was in charge of the armoured trains, informed the Georgian government that rails between Sanahin and
Alaverdi had been sabotaged, while Tsulukidze claimed his forces were suppressed by Armenian troops at Alaverdi. The Georgian side accused Armenian villages of harbouring Armenian army units.
Armenian offensive On 13 December, with peaceful negotiations having failed, the government of Armenia ordered General
Drastamat Kanayan to force the Georgian troops out of Lori. Captured documents revealed that Yerevan had made detailed plans to seize territories up to the river Khrami, into Georgia proper. Those seemed verified by the subsequent movements and activities of the Armenian troops. Kanayan commanded a force of 28 infantry companies, four cavalry squadrons, including reserves and was equipped with 26 machine guns and seven mountain cannons. Armenia had fewer men, provisions, and ammunition than Georgia, however their troops held the decisive advantage of surprise and penetrating into friendly territory, enjoying the support from the local Armenian population and partisans. Armenian forces quickly made substantial gains. The 4th, 5th, and 6th Regiments advanced in three columns under Colonels Ter-Nikoghosian, Nesterovskii, and Korolkov, towards the line of villages,
Vorontsovka-
Privolnoye-Opret-Hairum. That afternoon, the Armenians had captured
Haghpat, and General
Varden Tsulukidze had been forced to evacuate from the Georgian headquarters at
Sanahin. By 15 December, the Armenian army captured Vorontsovka, Privolnoye, Sanahin,
Mikhayelovka, Alaverdi, and the heights between Haghpat and Akhova. The Georgians had left behind their dead and wounded. The Armenians had already captured almost a hundred Georgian soldiers, as well as many cavalry mounts, fifty freight cars, a locomotive, and several machine guns and mountain cannons. On 16 December the Armenian left flank, commanded by Ter-Nikoghosian, now advanced from Lori into Georgia proper on
Bolnis-Khachen and Katharinenfeld, while Korolov's right flank captured Hairum. Georgian forces, that consisted mostly of People's Guard units, offered poor resistance at Katharinenfeld and later at Shulaver, which put others forces in danger. The surprise attack at Hairum cost the Georgians an additional 500 men killed, wounded, or taken prisoner. On 17 December, the Georgian 5th and 6th Infantry Regiments were caught in a pincer movement by the two Armenian offensives and were able to escape, but suffered sixty extra casualties, as well as having to abandon two
field guns and twenty five machine guns. The Armenians also captured two fully equipped Georgian armoured trains and Tsulukidze's
personal railway coach at the station of
Akhtala. Tsulukidze had fled back to
Sadakhlu, and by 18 December, the column under Ter-Nikoghosian had taken Bolnis-Khachen. Back in Tiflis, a state of emergency was declared. Reinforcements of a thousand infantrymen, a cavalry squadron, and their final armoured train were sent by Georgian War Minister
Grigol Giorgadze to Sadakhlu on 18 December. Nonetheless, the Armenian right flank continued pursuing the main Georgian force at Sadakhlu, and also captured
Shulaver on 20 December. The Armenians had now approached the Khrami River. Other units moved on Sadakhlu, but came under fire within range of the armored train, and sustained their first heavy losses. However, the rails to the Georgian's rear had been cut, and they were in danger of encirclement. On 22 December, the Armenians again attacked Sadakhlu and captured its station and the village outskirts, but were again forced back by the Georgian troops and their armoured train. Kanayan assembled twelve companies for a full-scale offensive. On 23 December, after hours of intense fighting, the Armenians occupied the strategic village. The Armenians took 132 Georgian POWs, over a hundred freight cars of food and munitions, 2 machine guns, and 3 trains. Casualties on the Armenian side were 7 killed and 11 wounded. After the capture of Sadakhlu, Tsulukidze was relieved of his command and replaced by Major General
Giorgi Mazniashvili. The Armenian army was now within 30 miles of the Georgian capital Tiflis. Armenian forces continued to advance on 24 December, but the next day the Georgians were reinforced by 1,000 new troops and airplanes, which bombed Shulaver. On 25 December, the
Allied delegations in Tiflis had intervened to demand the war come to an end.
Allied intervention An Allied military commission led by Lieutenant Colonels R. P. Jordan (Britain) and P. A. Chardigny (France) had been stationed in Tiflis. Georgian Foreign Minister
Evgeni Gegechkori had appealed to them for intervention on 15 December. Jordan suggested all Armenian and Georgian forces withdraw from the disputed territory, which would be policed by British troops until its status was decided at the
Paris Peace Conference. Gegechkori was in favor of a
status quo ante bellum. The Armenian representatives in Tiflis were not included in these early negotiations. The British and French had only messaged Premier Kajaznuni by 25 December, when diplomat
Arshak Jamalyan was sent to negotiate. Jamalyan protested this one-sided treatment and objected to the annexation of any territories the Armenians controlled. The Allies wired a decision to
Yerevan on 25 December. By this time, all of Lori and much of Borchaly had been controlled by Kanayan's forces: The decision was signed by Rycroft, Chardigny, and Zhordania, who called on both Armenian and Georgian military leaders to cease their activities. The Allies decided to impose the plan with or without the approval of the government of Armenia. Armenian officials decided to agree to the truce, on the condition that they be allowed to send a delegation to Tiflis to resolve any ambiguities in the settlement. A ceasefire was to take place on 31 December 1918.
Georgian counteroffensives and final clashes Both sides attempted to maintain favorable positions before the ceasefire came into effect. The Armenian soldiers had marched for two weeks without rest. No reinforcements could be sent by the government. The supplies of Armenian troops now mostly consisted of bread and munitions captured from the Georgians. An outbreak of
typhus had also occurred. Conversely, the Georgians were able to quickly send reinforcements and plan operations now that hostilities were so close to Tiflis. Several skirmishes took place from 25 to 27 December. Though the Georgian efforts had become more brazen, positions changed little during these days. On 28 December, the Georgians had made a breakthrough when a force of 3,500 instructed by Mazniashvili overtook Shulaver, as well as a number of smaller villages. The Armenians suffered 200 casualties. Over the next two days, the Armenians and Georgians fought over Sadakhlu, which changed hands several times. Eventually the two armies entrenched themselves in a stalemate, with the Armenians in station and Georgians in the town. The final confrontations took place on 31 December, before the ceasefire would come into effect at midnight. The Armenians made strategic gains at their center and right columns, but the typhus-infected left column was pushed back. Late in the afternoon, Armenian soldiers outflanked the Georgians and took the eastern heights of Sadakhlu. In addition, the Armenians had also cut the railway leading Shulaver in
Mamai. At the end of the day, both armies were situated along irregular lines. The north, south, and east of Sadakhlu were controlled by the Armenians, while the Georgians had advanced a considerable distance southwest of the village. ==Persecution of Armenians in Georgia==