As explained below, chess theorists in recent decades have continued to debate the size and nature of White's advantage, if any. Apart from Berliner, they have rejected the idea that White has a forced win from the opening position. Many also reject the traditional
paradigm that Black's objective should be to neutralize White's initiative and obtain equality.
White has an enduring advantage Starting from 2004, GM Larry Kaufman has expressed a more nuanced view than Adams and Berliner, arguing that the initiative stemming from the first move can always be transformed into some sort of enduring advantage, albeit not a decisive one. This has been the consensus for almost as long as players' views on the first-move advantage in chess have been recorded. He wrote in 2020, "I don't believe that White has a forced win in chess, but I do believe that if he starts with 1.e4 and makes no mistakes, he can retain at least the preferable position without allowing an obvious draw for 30 to 40 moves or so, beyond the point to which openings can generally be analyzed. He should normally get positions where it is fairly easy to explain why White is better, even if in many cases a grandmaster can expect to hold the draw against a similar opponent. Black should at least be the one who has to be careful to get the draw." Nonetheless, Kaufman considers it necessary for White to make no mistakes to achieve this evaluation. Kaufman writes that "once White makes one or two second-rate moves I start to look for a black advantage", which is similar to the view offered by the 1786
Traité des Amateurs. Kaufman has tried to compare White's first-move advantage with various positional or material advantages by having engines play games from modified versions of the opening position: he concludes that "if we define 1.00 as the advantage of a clean extra pawn in the opening with all other factors being equal, it takes above a 0.70 advantage in the opening to be more likely to win than to draw with perfect play (or at least with the most perfect play available now)", and that White's first-move advantage on this scale would be "about 0.20" (assuming he is speaking of a linear scale, an advantage of 0.20 gives White 1 win and 6 draws in 7 games, and 1.50, half a minor piece, is already more than enough to start to look for a conversion). Komodo played a six-game match at full knight odds against GM
David Smerdon at the same time control the same year; Smerdon won 5–1 (+5 −1 =0). Thus, there is a large difference between the threshold of being objectively lost, and the threshold of resignability (not being able to create practical chances) in human play.
Black is OK! Starting in 1988, Adorján has argued in a series of books and magazine articles that "Black is OK!" Alone amongst modern writers, Adorján claims that White starts the game with essentially no advantage. He writes, "In my opinion, the only obvious advantage for White is that if he or she plays for a draw, and does so well, then Black can hardly avoid this without taking obvious risks." Adorján goes so far as to claim that, "The tale of White's advantage is a delusion; belief in it is based on mass psychosis." Rowson writes that Adorján's "contention is one of the most important chess ideas of the last two decades ... because it has shaken our assumption that White begins the game with some advantage, and revealed its ideological nature". Rowson rejects Adorján's claim, however, that White has essentially no advantage, reasoning that White is better' and 'Black is OK' need not be mutually exclusive claims". Kaufman writes that he has to disagree with Adorján's claim that "with the right choice of defenses Black should have roughly equal chances", but that Adorján is "correct in the sense that Black need not lose just because he moves second". According to Portisch, for Black, "The root of the problem is that very few people know which are the openings where Black is really OK. Those who find these lines have nothing to fear, as
Black is indeed OK, but only in those variations!" Rowson considers this an important point, Kaufman likewise writes that "White gets a real advantage against all Sicilians other than the Najdorf and Sveshnikov", and that the
Berlin and Marshall defenses to the Ruy Lopez are "very close to equal"; Views on the best openings for Black have played a role in determining what opening moves are more fashionable for White. Kaufman wrote in 2004 that White's "only serious [tries] for advantage in the opening" are 1.e4 and the
Queen's Gambit (by which he means playing d4 and c4 in the first few moves, thus also including diverse Black responses like the King's Indian, the
Nimzo-Indian, the
Modern Benoni, and the Grünfeld). In the 19th century, general opinion was that 1.e4 was obviously the best move and 1...e5 obviously the best reply; but in the first half of the 20th century, the
French Defence (1.e4 e6) became popular, and Kaufman speculates that this led to 1.d4 surpassing 1.e4 in popularity among masters then. is now seen as a "serious alternative" to the Ruy Lopez. As such, elite players currently prefer 1.e4 e5 to 1.e4 c5. Likewise, Watson surmised that Kasparov, when playing Black, bypasses the question of whether White has an opening advantage "by thinking in terms of the concrete nature of the dynamic imbalance on the board, and seeking to seize the initiative whenever possible". Watson observes that "energetic opening play by Black may ... lead to a position so complex and unclear that to speak of equality is meaningless. Sometimes we say 'dynamically balanced' instead of 'equal' to express the view that either player is as likely as the other to emerge from complications with an advantage. This style of opening play has become prevalent in modern chess, with World Champions Fischer and Kasparov as its most visible practitioners." Modern writers also question the idea that White has an enduring advantage. Șubă, in his influential 1991 book
Dynamic Chess Strategy, rejects the notion that the initiative can always be transformed into an enduring advantage. He contends that sometimes the player with the initiative loses it with no logical explanation, and that, "Sometimes you must lose it, just like that. If you try to cling to it, by forcing the issue, your dynamic potential will become exhausted and you won't be able to face a vigorous
counter-attack." Rowson and Watson concur. Watson also observes, "Because of the presumption of White being better, the juncture of the game at which Black frees his game or neutralizes White's plans has often been automatically assumed to give him equality, even though in dynamic openings, the exhaustion of White's initiative very often means that Black has seized it with advantage."
Countervailing advantages Rowson argues that both White and Black have certain advantages:
White's advantages According to Rowson, White's first advantage is that "the first move has some similarities with the first
serve in
tennis in that White can score an '
ace' (for instance with a powerful ), he has more control over the pace and direction of the game, and he has a '
second serve' in that when things go wrong his position is not usually losing." Second, White begins the game with some initiative, although Rowson regards this as a psychological rather than a positional advantage, "and whether it leads to a positional advantage depends on the relative skill of the players." Third, some players are able to use the initiative to "play a kind of powerful '
serve and volley' chess in which Black is flattened with a mixture of deep and prowess." Fourth, "If White wants to draw, it is often not so easy for Black to prevent this. This advantage is particularly acute in cases where there is a possible
threefold repetition, because White can begin the repetition without committing to a draw and Black has to decide whether to deviate before he knows whether White is bluffing." Rowson cites as an example of the last phenomenon the well-regarded
Zaitsev Variation of the
Ruy Lopez. Kaufman mentions this draw, as well as an early one in the
Italian Game (1.e4 e5 2.Nf3 Nc6 3.Bc4 Bc5 4.c3 Nf6 5.d4 exd4 6.cxd4 Bb4+ 7.Bd2 Bxd2+ 8.Nbxd2 d5 9.exd5 Nxd5 10.Qb3 Na5 11.Qa4+ Nc6 12.Qb3), in the context of arguing for his proposed rule change to penalise threefold repetition: he argues that "the majority of repetitions occur when the game isn't otherwise clearly drawn".
Black's advantages Rowson argues that Black also has several advantages. First, "White's alleged advantage is also a kind of obligation to play for a win, and Black can often use this to his advantage." Second, "White's 'extra move' can be a burden, and sometimes White finds himself in a mild form of
zugzwang ('Zugzwang Lite')." Third, although White begins the game with the initiative, if "Black retains a flexible position with good reactive possibilities, this initiative can be absorbed and often passes over to Black." Fourth, "The fact that White moves before Black often gives Black useful information". Șubă likewise argues that White's advantage is actually less than a move, since White must tip his hand first, allowing Black to react to White's plans. Șubă writes, "In terms of the mathematical
games theory, chess is a game of
complete information, and Black's information is always greater—by one move!" Rowson also notes that Black's chances increase markedly by playing good openings, which tend to be those with flexibility and latent potential, "rather than those that give White fixed targets or that try to take the initiative prematurely." He also emphasizes that "White has 'the initiative', not 'the advantage'. Success with Black depends on seeing beyond the initiative and thinking of positions in terms of 'potential'." White has a , while Black often maneuvers his pieces on the last two of the board, but White "has to keep a constant eye on the possible liberating pawn thrusts ...b5 and ...d5." Watson remarks, "Black's goal is to remain elastic and flexible, with many options for his pieces, whereas White can become paralyzed at some point by the need to protect against various dynamic ." He also observes that, "White tends to be as much tied up by Black's latent activity as Black himself is tied up by White's space advantage." An example of this is the following grandmaster game:
Lev Polugaevsky vs.
Ľubomír Ftáčnik,
Lucerne Olympiad 1982
1. Nf3 Nf6 2. c4 c5 3. Nc3 e6 4. g3 b6 5. Bg2 Bb7 6. 0-0 Be7 7. d4 cxd4 8. Qxd4 d6 9. Rd1 a6 10. b3 Nbd7 11. e4 Qb8 12. Bb2 0-0 Șubă wrote of a similar Hedgehog position, "White's position looks ideal. That's the naked truth about it, but the 'ideal' has by definition one drawback—it cannot be improved."
13. Nd2 Rd8 14. a4 Qc7 15. Qe3 Rac8 16. Qe2 Ne5 17. h3 According to Ftáčnik, 17.f4 Neg4 18.Rf1 is better.
h5 18. f4 Ng6 19. Nf3 Now Black breaks open the position in typical Hedgehog fashion.
d5! 20. cxd5 Ftáčnik considers 20.e5 or 20.exd5 preferable.
h4! 21. Nxh4 Nxh4 22. gxh4 Qxf4 23. dxe6 fxe6 24. e5? Ftáčnik recommends instead 24.Rxd8 Rxd8 25.Rd1.
Bc5+ 25. Kh1 Nh5! 26. Qxh5 Qg3 27. Nd5 Other moves get
mated immediately: 27.Bxb7 Qh3#; 27.Qe2 Qxh3#; 27.Qg4 Bxg2#.
Rxd5 28. Rf1 Qxg2+! 29. Kxg2 Rd2+ White resigned. After 30.Kg3 (the only legal response to the
double check), 30...Rg2+ 31.Kf4 Rf8+ forces mate. An examination of reversed and symmetrical openings illustrates White's and Black's respective advantages:
Reversed openings In a "reversed opening", White plays an opening typically played by Black, but with colors reversed and thus an extra
tempo. Evans writes of such openings, "If a defense is considered good for Black, it must be even better for White with a move in hand." Former World Champion
Mikhail Botvinnik reportedly expressed the same view regarding 1.c4 e5 (a reversed Sicilian), as has Kaufman. Watson questions this idea, citing Șubă's thesis that Black, by moving second, has more complete information than White. To explain this
paradox, Watson discusses several different reversed Sicilian lines, showing how Black can exploit the disadvantages of various "extra" moves for White. He concludes, The point is, Black's set-up in the Sicilian is fine as a reactive system, but not worth much when trying to claim the initiative as White. This is true because Black is able to react to the specific plan White chooses; in Șubă's terms, his information is indeed a move greater! Furthermore, he is able to take advantage of dead equal positions which White (hoping to retain the advantage of the first move) would normally avoid. Watson also observes, "Similarly, the
Dutch Defence looks particularly sterile when White achieves the reversed positions a tempo up (it turns out that he has nothing useful to do!); and indeed, many standard Black openings are not very inspiring when one gets them as White, tempo in hand." "once made a deep impression on me by casually dismissing someone's suggestion that he should try 1.f4 (
Bird's Opening) as White. He smiled and said, 'That extra move's gonna hurt me. Indeed, Kaufman's preferred response to the Bird hinges on this point: against a Leningrad Dutch white would play c2–c4 early, but with colours reversed, White's extra move after 1.f4 Nf6 2.Nf3 d5 3.g3 means that Black can exploit the unmoved c-pawn and play the strong 3...c6. Yermolinsky also agrees with
Alekhine's criticism of 1.g3 e5 2.Nf3, a reversed
Alekhine's Defense, in
Réti–Alekhine,
Baden-Baden 1925, writing that Alekhine "understood the difference in opening philosophies for White and Black, and realized they just can't be the same! White is supposed to try for more than just obtaining a comfortable game in reversed colour opening set-ups, and, as the statistics show—surprisingly for a lot of people, but not for me—White doesn't even score as well as Black does in the same positions with his extra tempo and all."
Howard Staunton, generally considered to have been the strongest player in the world from 1843 to 1851, made a similar point over 160 years ago, writing that
Owen's Defense (1.e4 b6) is playable for Black, but that 1.b3 is inferior to "the more customary [first] moves, from its being essentially defensive". The current view is that Owen's Defense is slightly better for White, while 1.b3 is playable but less likely to yield an opening advantage than 1.e4 or 1.d4. Stefan Djuric, Dimitri Komarov, and Claudio Pantaleoni make a similar point regarding
Anderssen's Opening (1.a3): "[...a6 for Black] is a useful pawn move, and it is often a fundamental component in many Black defences. ... It therefore comes as little surprise that some bright spark had the idea of playing these set-ups with an extra tempo. However, it is essential to remember that ...a6 is fundamentally a reactive move that prepares counterplay on the queenside in openings where White has already taken possession of the centre. The problem here is that it is impossible to have counterplay if the other side is not attacking you." They go on to recommend (as they do for the
Clemenz Opening, 1.h3) that Black, faced with such a first move, can aim for a set-up where White's rook-pawn advance is not useful or even a liability. Watson concludes that • "most moves have disadvantages as well as advantages, so an extra move is not always an unqualified blessing"; • "with his extra information about what White is doing, Black can better react to the new situation"; and • because a draw is likely to be more acceptable to Black than to White, White is apt to avoid lines that allow drawish simplifications, while Black may not object to such lines. Accordingly, Watson, Șubă, Evans, and the eminent player and theorist
Aron Nimzowitsch (1886–1935) have all argued that it is in Black's interest to avoid symmetry. General arguments, on the other hand, do not always stand up to concrete analysis. In the 1960s, Bobby Fischer considered the Sicilian (1.e4 c5) to be better than the Open Game (1.e4 e5), because of its asymmetry. He argued that after 1.e4 e5 2.Nf3 Nc6, White is better because he has the move and the attacking rather than defending knight, and is closer to being able to castle; whereas after 1...c5, White cannot play d4 without conceding one of his centre pawns. However, concrete analysis since then has led to the current world elite favouring the Open Game over the Sicilian. Even symmetrical opening lines sometimes illustrate the tenuous nature of White's advantage, in several respects. It is often difficult for White to prove an advantage in symmetrical opening lines. As GM
Bent Larsen wrote, annotating a game that began 1.c4 c5 2.b3 b6, "In symmetrical openings, White has a theoretical advantage, but in many of them it is only theoretical." GM
Andrew Soltis wrote in 2008 that he hates playing against the symmetrical
Petroff's Defense (1.e4 e5 2.Nf3 Nf6), and accordingly varies with 2.Nc3, the
Vienna Game. However, there too he has been unable to find a way to an advantage after the symmetrical 2...Nc6 3.g3 g6 4.Bg2 Bg7, or after 3.Nf3 Nf6 ( to the
Four Knights Game) 4.Bb5 Bb4 5.0-0 0-0 6.d3 d6 7.Bg5 Bg4 8.Nd5 Nd4 9.Nxb4 Nxb5, or 7.Ne2 Ne7 8.c3 Ba5 9.Ng3 c6 10.Ba4 Ng6 11.d4 d5, when 12.exd5 e4 may even favor Black. Watson notes that it is even difficult for White to play noncommittally in a symmetrical position, since almost every move has certain drawbacks. Fischer once went so far as to claim that after 1.Nf3 Nf6 2.g3 g6 3.Bg2 Bg7 4.0-0 0-0 5.d3 d6 (Reinhard–Fischer, Western Open 1963), Believe it or not,' Black stands better! Now, whatever White does, Black will vary it and get an
asymmetrical position and have the superior position due to his better
pawn structure!" However, GM
Paul Keres responded in
CHESS magazine, "We just don't believe it!" In symmetrical positions, as the
Hodgson–
Arkell and
Portisch–
Tal games discussed below illustrate, Black can continue to imitate White as long as he finds it feasible and desirable to do so, and deviate when that ceases to be the case. Further, a particular extra move is sometimes more of a liability than an asset. For example, Soltis notes that the
Exchange French position arising after 1.e4 e6 2.d4 d5 3.exd5 exd5 4.Nf3 Nf6 "is pretty equal". The same position, but with Black's knight moved to e4, arises in Petroff's Defense after 1.e4 e5 2.Nf3 Nf6 3.Nxe5 d6 4.Nf3 Nxe4 5.d4 d5. That position offers White better chances precisely because Black's extra move (...Ne4) allows the advanced knight to become a target for attack. On a guest appearance of the
Lex Fridman Podcast in October 2022, grandmaster and current number-two classical chess player
Hikaru Nakamura believes that Black can maintain sufficient symmetry to force a draw with perfect play. Finally, symmetrical positions may be difficult for the white player for psychological reasons. Watson writes that anyone who tries the Exchange French, "even if he thinks he is playing for a win, assume[s] a psychological burden. White has already ceded the advantage of the first move, and knows it, whereas Black is challenged to find ways to seize the initiative." Two famous examples of White losses in the Exchange French are
M. Gurevich–
Short and Tatai–
Korchnoi. In M. Gurevich–Short, a game between two of the world's leading players, White needed only a draw to qualify for the
Candidates Matches, while Black needed to win. Gurevich played passively and was outplayed by Short, who achieved the necessary win. In Tatai–Korchnoi, the Italian IM fell victim to Korchnoi's whirlwind , losing in just 14 moves. Rowson gives the following example of Black outplaying White from the
Symmetrical Variation of the
English Opening. He remarks, "there is something compelling about Black's
strategy. He seems to be saying: 'I will copy all your good moves, and as soon as you make a bad move, I won't copy you any more! :
Hodgson vs.
Arkell,
Newcastle 2001
1. c4 c5 2. g3 g6 3. Bg2 Bg7 4. Nc3 Nc6 5. a3 a6 6. Rb1 Rb8 7. b4 cxb4 8. axb4 b5 9. cxb5 axb5 (first diagram). Here Rowson remarks, "Both sides want to push their d-pawn and play Bf4/...Bf5, but White has to go first so Black gets to play ...d5 before White can play d4. This doesn't matter much, but it already points to the challenge that White faces here; his most natural continuations allow Black to play the moves he wants to. I would therefore say that White is in 'Zugzwang Lite' and that he remains in this state for several moves."
10. Nf3 d5 10...Nf6 11.0-0 0-0 12.d3 d6 13.Bd2 Bd7 would transpose to the Portisch–Tal game below.
11. d4 Nf6 12. Bf4 Rb6 13. 0-0 Bf5 14. Rb3 0-0 15. Ne5 Ne4 16. h3 h5 Finally breaking the symmetry.
17. Kh2 The position is still almost symmetrical, and White can find nothing useful to do with his extra move. Rowson whimsically suggests 17.h4!?, forcing Black to be the one to break the symmetry.
17... Re8! Rowson notes that this is a useful waiting move, covering e7, which needs protection in some lines, and possibly supporting an eventual ...e5 (see Black's twenty-second move). White cannot copy it, since after 18.Re1 Nxf2 Black would win a
pawn.
18. Be3 Nxe5! 19. dxe5 Rc6! Rowson notes that with his more active pieces, "It looks like Black has some initiative." If now 20.Nxd5, Bxe5 "is at least equal for Black".
20. Nxb5 Bxe5! 20...Nxf2? 21.Qxd5! wins.
21. Nd4 Bxd4 22. Bxd4 e5 Rowson writes, "Now both sides have their trumps, but I think Black has some advantage, due to his extra central control, imposing
knight and prospects for a ."
23. b5 Rc8 24. Bb2 d4 (second diagram). Now White has a difficult game: Rowson analyzes 25.e3?! Nxg3 24.fxg3 Bc2 25.Qf3 Bxb3 26.exd4 Bc4!, winning; 25.g4 hxg4 26.hxg4 Nxf2! 27.Rxf2 Bc2, winning; 25.Qe1!? Rc2! with advantage; and 25.f4 (risky-looking, but perhaps best) Nc3! 26.Bxc3 dxc3 27.Qxd8 Rexd8, and Black is better.
25. b6? Overlooking Black's threat.
25... Nxf2! 26. Qe1 If 26.Rxf2, Bc2
forks White's
queen and
rook.
26... Ne4 27. b7 Rb8 28. g4 hxg4 29. hxg4 Be6 30. Rb5 Nf6! 31. Rxf6 Qxf6 32. Qg3 Bc4 33. g5 Qh8+ 0–1 another Symmetrical English, took a similar course: :
Lajos Portisch vs.
Mikhail Tal,
Candidates Match 1965
1. Nf3 c5 2. c4 Nc6 3. Nc3 Nf6 4. g3 g6 5. Bg2 Bg7 6. 0-0 0-0 7. d3 a6 8. a3 Rb8 9. Rb1 b5 10. cxb5 axb5 11. b4 cxb4 12. axb4 d6 13. Bd2 Bd7 (see first diagram). Once again, White is on move in a symmetrical position, but it is not obvious what he can do with his first-move initiative. Soltis writes, "It's ridiculous to think Black's position is better. But Mikhail Tal said it is easier to play. By moving second he gets to see White's move and then decide whether to match it." Tal himself lost a famous game as White from a symmetrical position in Tal–
Beliavsky,
USSR Championship 1974. ==Tournament and match play==