1962–64 For two years, two months and twenty-three days Mourão was "a good organizer, considered courageous and impetuous" at civil and military circles and at state and national levels. He thought he was the protagonist of the "greatest conspiracy in the Americas". However, he was neither its origin nor its owner. Movements against Goulart already existed in the complex formed by the
Institute of Research and Social Studies (IPES), the
Brazilian Institute of Democratic Action (IBAD) and the Superior School of War, representing the "modernizing" officers and their allies in the national elite. Even acting almost alone, Mourão's advances were parallel to those of this complex, which sought to control and employ him. He was a "bait", diverting the attention of the government — his conspiracy was open and well known — and instilled the spirit of the garrisons against Goulart, but he was also feared for his impetuosity, which they tried to neutralize so that his efforts would not be lost in a sudden movement. Furthermore, his disrepute among officers continued into the 1960s. Mourão also confirmed to Hélio Silva that he knew about the conspirators contact with the United States and the possibility of an American navy squadron approaching the Brazilian coast.
In Santa Maria Mourão's first contact was with his chief of staff, Ramão de Menna Barreto. Mourão verified the loyalty of his subordinates and established contacts within Rio Grande do Sul. He secured most of Third Army – the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions, the 5th and 6th Infantry Divisions and the Artillery Division of the 6th Infantry Division. He did not touch the 1st Cavalry Division of Oromar Osório, to his west in
Santiago, as Osório was "entirely dedicated to the President". In June, he already had general Penha Brasil, from the 3rd Army, and Nélson de Melo, from the 2nd, but he did not reach the Ministry of War (João Segadas Viana), the 1st (Osvino) and 4th Armies (Costa e Silva), and the Military Cabinet (Amaury Kruel). In addition to the emissaries and meetings in the
south, Mourão made several trips to São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. He sought funding for the opposition in the
electoral campaign and in Rio de Janeiro he enlisted admiral Sílvio Heck to his cause, capable of capturing other high ranking officials including marshal Odylio Denys. IPESUL, the branch of IPES in Rio Grande do Sul, was in control: Menna Barreto was a member and Penha Brasil was linked to IBAD. In July, however, command of the Third Army passed to Jair Dantas Ribeiro, who was loyal to the government and now had the two strongest armies (1st and 3rd) guaranteed. Mourão feared a coup by Goulart if the
Chamber of Deputies did not anticipate the plebiscite, but the Chamber granted it and would soon restore presidential powers. Mourão then preached to the troops that "with such powers he [Goulart] will carry out his coup" and thought of an offensive against
Porto Alegre, the "
Plano Junção" (Junction Plan). In reaction to a government move, such as the closing of Congress, the 3rd Infantry Division would leave behind a unit to guard the southwest against the 1st Cavalry Division and jump all at once northwest of Porto Alegre, on the north bank of the
Jacuí River. There, it would join the 6th Infantry Division and, collaborating with anti-Brizola elements from Rio Grande do Sul's
Military Brigade, it would invade the Third Army's HQ. In Mourão's meetings with Rio Grande do Sul governor Ildo Meneghetti, the idea of what would become
Operation Farroupilha was born. However, in November Amaury Kruel, the Minister of War, informed him that he would take over the 2nd Military Region in São Paulo. Mourão left for São Paulo in March 1963. Jair Dantas noticed his conspiratorial work, but called it "national security studies".
In São Paulo Mourão assumed command of the 2nd Military Region on 15 March 1963 and would remain there until 21 August of the same year. In consultation with a cardiologist, he heard that he was "our last hope": his name was already known in São Paulo's high society as an anti-Goulart force. São Paulo did not have a strong military garrison, but it was a good environment for civilian mobilization. This task was delegated to reserve general Sebastião Dalísio Menna Barreto and a civilian General Staff, as the conspiracy was bigger, coming to the attention of the
CIA. The civilian articulation was enough to foresee the formation of paramilitary forces. IPES was stronger and exercised greater control. The population had been ideologically influenced from a long time. Mourão brought many garrisons from São Paulo to his side and made contact with the 6th Military Region, in
Bahia. He drew up new military plans: the 2nd Army HQ would be taken over, and its commander, Peri Constant Bevilacqua, would either accept command of the operation or be deposed. Ideally, he would accept. The revolutionary leader would be an army general like Cordeiro de Farias or Nelson de Melo. A task force — three infantry battalions, one from
São Paulo's Military Police and a group of howitzers — would leave at 7:00 PM and travel down
Via Dutra as quickly as possible towards
Guanabara, arriving at least as far as
Barra do Piraí. All the rest of the available force would follow behind and the Third Army, already influenced, would come as reinforcement. There would be stop lines if the First Army counterattacked. Mourão's ultimate goal was: Mourão had a military and a civilian General Staff, with extensive connections in the São Paulo elite. On the home front there would be "censorship of all telephones", "occupation of all unions and arrest of communist and union leaders" and the prevention of sabotage. Civilians prioritized psychological preparedness and mobilization. Mourão wanted a paramilitary Civil Guard to garrison points, freeing up forces. To this end, short barrel 22 caliber carbines for riots were manufactured by
IMBEL in
Itajubá. In July, in a meeting with Carlos Lacerda (now governor of Guanabara),
Júlio de Mesquita Filho, owner of
O Estado de S. Paulo, and
Adhemar de Barros, governor of São Paulo, they suggested that Mourão succeed Goulart within Jânio's five-year period. In another meeting with judge Antônio Neder and admiral Heck, marshal Odylio Denys went further and saw Mourão as the future dictator, but Mourão insisted he was a democrat. That same month Mourão found out that he would be removed from São Paulo for conspiring against the government. His new destination, the 4th Military Region/Infantry Division, in Minas Gerais, was militarily less dangerous. In order to dispel suspicions, he angrily left a ceremony in which the Secretary of Justice of the State declared that there was "a communist movement led from the
Alvorada Palace, by the President of the Republic himself". The act was not convincing and in these final months São Paulo already lost strength, with the military conspiracy flowing to general Agostinho Cortes, linked to Golbery and IPES. On 21 August, Mourão left command of the 2nd Military Region.
In Juiz de Fora The transfer to Minas Gerais was a punishment, taking Mourão to a less relevant command. Had it not been for his friendship with Jair Dantas Ribeiro, now Minister of War, Mourão might have received a bureaucratic position. He took over the 4th Military Region/Infantry Division, in Juiz de Fora, on 28 August 1963. There he found a weak garrison and little "revolutionary" talk, but he was closer to Guanabara and was the highest military authority in the state. The social scene was the same and so was the strong structure of IPES. The CIA noted that his arrival could interfere with the succession game. In his home state he had contact with two presidential candidates: Juscelino Kubitschek and governor Magalhães Pinto (
UDN), the latter was one of the three great figures of the coup in Minas Gerais. He also had contact with general Carlos Luís Guedes, his subordinate, with the Divisional Infantry in Belo Horizonte. Upon his arrival, Mourão explained his intentions to Pinto and Guedes and they worked together. Guedes contributed to the
Military Police of Minas Gerais (PMMG), incorporated into the coup plans. But their interests were not the same: Guedes was aligned with IPES and acted to restrict Mourão. The two generals had a terrible relationship. Magalhães, in turn, is quoted as being aligned with IPES or as an ally of Mourão and having separate ambitions. Mourão sounded out allies, finding, among others, lieutenant colonel Everaldo José da Silva. He formed a "Revolutionary General Staff" and preached to his commanders, discussing the reality of the country and criticizing the government. In Juiz de Fora, even civilians — "teachers, businessmen, dentists, lawyers, doctors and taxi drivers" — were invited to lectures at the 4th Military Region/Infantry Division's HQ. According to Mourão, it accelerated the instruction of the troops, but it was not noticed. Mourão visited Rio de Janeiro several times; he received private airline tickets without the government's knowledge. Everaldo and Mourão still had contact with the civilian General Staff in São Paulo. Deeming the government a "house of cards", Mourão was in a hurry to act. He wanted "
Operation Popeye", a surprise attack on Rio de Janeiro, crossing the borders at night. As Guedes preferred to proclaim the rebellion and defend the State, which Mourão judged impossible with the available military strength and the state's vast borders, in December Mourão recruited general Antônio Carlos Muricy to lead the operation.
March 1964 The events of the month – the
central rally in Rio de Janeiro and those by Brizola and
Miguel Arraes in Belo Horizonte and Juiz de Fora – reinforced Mourão's conviction in the advance of communism and reached its climax with the
Revolt of the sailors in
Holy Week. On the 27th, Friday, Mourão was called to Belo Horizonte due to the repercussions of the revolt. Magalhães Pinto, the civilian leader of the "revolution", promised to deliver a manifesto demanding the deposition of the president, giving the necessary political support to the military deployment already on Saturday night, erupting in Rio de Janeiro at dawn on Sunday. However, a dispute arose for protagonism within the movement, with Magalhães seeking to maximize his electoral gain in 1965. Both suspected that each other wanted to steal the laurels of victory. The following day, the governor visited Juiz de Fora empty-handed and there was no rush. Mourão insisted on receiving the manifesto so that he could move the troops; instead, on the 30th, Magalhães published a manifesto in Belo Horizonte, without asking for the president's deposition, and Mourão found out through a telephone call from Guedes. He was indignant with both. In Belo Horizonte they were already in revolt, putting themselves in danger, as Mourão could crush them supported by the First Army or the government, if it realized what was happening, could crush Minas Gerais. Suspecting that the vague terms of the governor's manifesto were Magalhães way of keeping himself away from the movement in case of failure, in his memoirs Mourão called him a traitor and claimed to have ordered Guedes to arrest him, who did not want to obey. The testimonies of Mourão and Guedes contradict each other about these last days. Guedes considered Mourão undecided, in agreement with the report by Rubens Bayma Denys, the son of Odílio Denys, who participated in the meeting on the 28th. Guedes also claimed to have sent two retired generals to Juiz de Fora to take over from Mourão if he gave up. According to Guedes, he and Magalhães wanted to leave on the 30th, while Mourão, at that point, only accepted a start in April. Finally, receiving the manifesto at dawn on the 31st by the governor's emissaries and seeing it without the demand for his deposition, Mourão himself launched the coup by launching telephone calls at 5:00 AM. What allowed him to make the final decision independently of Magalhães and Guedes was having the troops in his hands thanks to the anticommunist proselytism carried out in the previous months. He also took care not to act alone: on the 28th he sent lieutenant colonel Everaldo to São Paulo to see if he could count on the commander of the Second Army, Amaury Kruel. In the absence of a response, Everaldo went to Rio de Janeiro to meet with Amaury's brother, Riograndino Kruel, who gave his endorsement. The outbreak on 31 March was carried out over the heads of the conspirators in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, who wanted a later date. The precipitation of the coup was alternatively interpreted among other soldiers as necessary to break the inertia or as a delaying factor in the adhesion of other forces. Many soldiers censured Mourão for ignoring the authority of Castelo Branco and Costa e Silva, whom he made amends for, and consider him untimely, but some believed that it was not an impetuous act, but the culmination of a long process. According to José Antônio Barbosa de Moraes, one of his General Staff officers, the move was not precipitated as Mourão “did not know any predetermined time”. The extensive preparations put in place at the time of the outbreak show that the decision was not passionate.
Night of 31 March Around 2:00 AM or after 2:30 AM Mourão Filho received the governor's secretaries,
José Maria Alkmin and Monteiro de Castro. They brought the manifesto, which was as disappointing as he'd expected - "With this manifesto I won't remove even a soldier from the barracks". Such was the disapproval received that they left in 10 minutes, without time to hear him read his own manifesto and without realizing that he intended to "push the button" in a few hours. With a lit pipe, he wrote in his diary in a farewell tone and doubting whether he would succeed. "The whole Army comes against me". At 04–05:00 AM, in pajamas and a red silk robe, he occupied the telephone station in Juiz de Fora with the Military Police and sent phone calls across the country: • To major Antônio Cúrcio Neto to put the troops on standby, order repeated at 06:30; • To Guedes, to start his part in the plan of operations, dispatch a battalion to Juiz de Fora; and arrest the governor if he gave up (information present in the memoirs of both); • To deputy Armando Falcão to warn Carlos Lacerda; • To admiral Sílvio Heck to act in the Navy; • To colonels Jaime Portela de Melo and Ramiro Gonçalves to advise their companions in Rio de Janeiro to come to Juiz de Fora. They did not come, and Mourão found them newly installed in bureaucratic positions when he arrived in Rio de Janeiro; • To reserve general José Varonil de Albuquerque Lima, the son-in-law of Maria Tavares Bastos, Mourão's wife, to notify the companions who wanted to come, and to send Maria's brother-in-law to the place in
Teresópolis, where he would send her; • To doctor José Paranhos do Rio Branco to notify Ademar de Barros and part of the officers in São Paulo. There are version differences about the phone calls. Jaime Portela de Melo denies that he was called to Minas Gerais, but claims that he was instructed to alert Costa e Silva. Ending the calls at 06:40, Mourão woke up judge Neder and sent his wife Maria to Teresópolis, away from the imminent conflict and before the loyalists blocked the road.
In campaign |right With the PMMG and the Federal Army in Minas Gerais under his command, Mourão carried out operations "Silêncio", controlling telecommunications, "Gaiola", arresting "suspicious elements" already monitored by the police, and "Popeye", moving troops against Rio de Janeiro and
Brasília. This movement took time: the bulk of the "Tiradentes Detachment" formed to invade Rio de Janeiro and placed under the command of Muricy only arrived at the
Paraibuna River, on the Rio de Janeiro border, at 17:00. The commander of the 10th Infantry Regiment did not join and had to be replaced. A battalion of the 12th Infantry Regiment sent from Belo Horizonte by Guedes did not arrive in Juiz de Fora until 22:00 and, moreover, lacking personnel. Mourão denied that he was in rebellion, but as soon as the Detachment arrived at the border, from Juiz de Fora he issued his manifesto: the President "must be removed from the Power he abuses, in order, according to the Law, to operate his succession, maintaining the legal order". The manifesto associated the president with communism, but according to Mourão, this was added by judge Antônio Neder and was not his own writing, as he did not consider Goulart a communist. The federal government, in turn, announced his dismissal and the sending of forces from the First Army to suffocate him; these forces were stronger than those of Mourão's 4th Division and the PMMG. The first, the 1st Battalion of
Caçadores from
Petrópolis, set up a front line against the Tiradentes Detachment that night. Informed that lieutenant colonel Kerensky, commander of the loyalist battalion, intended to start negotiations, Mourão went to Muricy's command post on the banks of the Paraibuna. There he also found a lieutenant of the 1st Battalion of
Caçadores who promised to return with his platoon. The defections weakened Kerensky's battalion, which retreated. "Fight or join". Mourão returned at dawn on 1 April to Juiz de Fora, where he was informed that the Second Army had joined the rebellion. Later it was discovered that Amaury Kruel offered Goulart to crush the 4th Infantry Division, but judged that his past in São Paulo would prevent the São Paulo troops from facing it. Mourão was overjoyed at the news, at dawn, of the accession of the next loyalist echelon, the 1st Infantry Regiment.
Entering Rio de Janeiro Finally, Goulart fled from Rio de Janeiro and at 3:00 PM general Milton, head of the EM of the 1st Army, asked him to surrender. When Muricy announced that the road was clear, Mourão left the HQ and found him at the level of Belvedere do Grinfo. Mourão worried that Kruel would take over the government – "That would be the end". By his side were Neder and his wife Maria. She did not want to take refuge in Teresópolis and accepted the risk of remaining in the revolted territory. On the car radio they heard that Costa e Silva had taken over the empty Ministry of War and appointed general Ururahy to the First Army. "They are taking my positions! This position was mine! I should have been the commander of the First Army!" As the most senior general in the Army and "the undisputed Military Leader of the Revolution, entering Guanabara victorious, at the head of my troops", Mourão considered the First Army to be his by right. Ururahy was out of commission and had done nothing for the revolt. For Muricy, Mourão wanted to have been the minister, or even the president. However, due to respect for the hierarchy, Mourão could only present himself to Costa e Silva, as Muricy suggested, since it was no longer possible to invade the Army HQ. Muricy followed behind to also argue with Costa e Silva, under Maria's insistence — "go upstairs and see Mourão, because they're going to wrap him up". He defined her as "very ambitious". In the middle of the night Mourão showed up at the Duque de Caxias Palace, where he found Costa e Silva sleeping. Mourão Filho could only recognize Costa e Silva's authority, deny that he had ambitions and protest that it would have been more delicate to wait a little longer before Ururahy's appointment. He wanted to withdraw his troops after midday, but accepted Costa e Silva's request to leave them in Guanabara for a few more days. They had a second conversation at 09–10:00, already on the 9th floor. Mourão was offered command of
Petrobras to purge the communists present there. At the headquarters of the state-owned company, he discovered that only the president would have authority for such an offer. Muricy, Magalhães Pinto and Guedes were unable to convince the new Minister of War to change his decision. For Muricy, Guedes and Magalhães Pinto, the decision to install Ururahy in the First Army and send Mourão Filho to Petrobras was a way of marginalizing the Minas Gerais conspirators. According to brigadier João Paulo Moreira Burnier, Costa e Silva did not trust leaving the First Army in the hands of Mourão due to his impetuosity in launching the coup. Mourão, in turn, resigned himself to fatigue, concern for Kruel — who, at least, did not come to power either — and for thinking that Costa e Silva, although illegitimate, was his hierarchical superior and "the legal order possible to get". He accepted the decision even though he feared the "Supreme Commander General" — "this title has the flavor of a Spanish dictator". Mourão remained in Rio de Janeiro for a few more days. According to him, on the 3rd he was sought out by generals who supported Castelo Branco, including marshal Ademar de Queirós: However, the suggestion came to nothing. On the 4th, Juscelino Kubitschek asked Mourão whether he should support Castelo Branco's candidacy for the Presidency. "Support Castello; I guarantee you will not be a candidate for 1965". Some deputies wanted to launch Mourão's name to the presidency, but he refused; his preferred military candidate would be marshal Eurico Gaspar Dutra. On the 6th, Mourão returned to Juiz de Fora with his troops, surrounded by celebration, but empty-handed, considering himself defeated. Guedes and Magalhães Pinto condemned his decision not to invade the Army HQ. The delegation of command to Muricy also weighed in his loss of space. He might have been more successful commanding the troops himself and taking the Ministru of War. In turn, Mourão speculated that the governor could have become president if he had come to Juiz de Fora and headed a provisional government, naming him Minister of War. Mourão claimed that, "If I had known general Costa e Silva as I do today, I would have expelled him from the General Headquarters"; "That's when Brazil's disgrace began. I had taken the nation out of one abyss and thrust it into another". == Final years ==