Origins to reveal to Europe the manufacturing methods of
Chinese porcelain in 1712, is sometimes considered an early case of industrial espionage. Economic and industrial espionage has a long history. Father
Francois Xavier d'Entrecolles, who visited
Jingdezhen,
China in 1712 and later used this visit to reveal the manufacturing methods of
Chinese porcelain to Europe, is sometimes considered to have conducted an early case of industrial espionage. Historical accounts have been written of industrial espionage between
Britain and
France. Attributed to
Britain's emergence as an "industrial creditor", the second decade of the
18th century saw the emergence of a large-scale state-sponsored effort to surreptitiously take British
industrial technology to France.
Witnesses confirmed both the
inveigling of
tradespersons abroad and the placing of
apprentices in England. Protests by those such as
ironworkers in
Sheffield and
steelworkers in
Newcastle, about skilled
industrial workers being enticed abroad, led to the first
English legislation aimed at preventing this method of economic and industrial espionage. This did not prevent
Samuel Slater from bringing British textile technology to the
United States in 1789. In order to catch up with technological advances of European powers, the US government in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries actively encouraged intellectual piracy. American founding father and first
U.S. Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton advocated rewarding those bringing "improvements and secrets of extraordinary value" into the United States. This was instrumental in making the United States a haven for industrial spies.
20th century East-West commercial development opportunities after
World War I saw a rise in
Soviet interest in
American and
European manufacturing know-how, exploited by
Amtorg Corporation. Later, with Western restrictions on the
export of items thought likely to increase military capabilities to the
USSR, Soviet industrial espionage was a well known adjunct to other spying activities up until the 1980s.
BYTE reported in April 1984, for example, that although the Soviets sought to develop their own
microelectronics, their technology appeared to be several years behind the
West's. Soviet
CPUs required multiple
chips and appeared to be close or exact copies of American products such as the
Intel 3000 and
DEC LSI-11/2.
"Operation Brunnhilde" Some of these activities were directed via the
East German Stasi (Ministry for State Security). One such operation, "Operation Brunnhilde," operated from the mid-1950s until early 1966 and made use of spies from many
Communist Bloc countries. Through at least 20 forays, many western European industrial secrets were compromised. One member of the "Brunnhilde" ring was a
Swiss chemical engineer, Dr. Jean Paul Soupert (also known as "Air Bubble"), living in
Brussels. He was described by
Peter Wright in
Spycatcher as having been "doubled" by the
Belgian Sûreté de l'État. He revealed information about industrial espionage conducted by the ring, including the fact that
Russian agents had obtained details of
Concorde's advanced electronics system. He testified against two
Kodak employees, living and working in Britain, during a trial in which they were accused of passing information on industrial processes to him, though they were eventually acquitted. According to a 2020
American Economic Review study, East German industrial espionage in West Germany significantly reduced the gap in
total factor productivity between the two countries.
Soviet system A secret report from the
Military-Industrial Commission of the USSR (VPK), from 1979 to 1980, detailed how (, "special records") could be utilised in twelve different military industrial areas. Writing in the
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
Philip Hanson detailed a system in which 12 industrial branch ministries formulated requests for information to aid technological development in their military programs. Acquisition plans were described as operating on 2-year and 5-year cycles with about 3000 tasks underway each year. Efforts were aimed at civilian and military industrial targets, such as in the
petrochemical industries. Some information was gathered to compare Soviet technological advancement with that of their competitors. Much unclassified information was also gathered, blurring the boundary with "
competitive intelligence". The
Soviet military was recognised as making much better use of acquired information than civilian industries, where their record in replicating and developing industrial technology was poor.
Legacy of Cold War espionage Following the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the
Cold War, commentators, including the
US Congressional Intelligence Committee, noted a redirection amongst the espionage community from military to industrial targets, with Western and former communist countries making use of "underemployed" spies and expanding programs directed at stealing information. The legacy of Cold War spying included not just the redirection of personnel but the use of spying apparatus such as computer databases,
scanners for eavesdropping,
spy satellites,
bugs and
wires.
Industrial espionage as part of US foreign policy Former CIA Director
Stansfield Turner stated in 1991, "as we increase emphasis on securing economic intelligence, we will have to spy on the more developed countries—our allies and friends with whom we compete economically—but to whom we turn first for
political and
military assistance in a crisis. This means that rather than instinctively reaching for human, on-site spying, the United States will want to look to those impersonal technical systems, primarily
satellite photography and intercepts". Former
CIA Director James Woolsey acknowledged in 2000 that the United States steals economic secrets from foreign firms and their governments "with espionage, with
communications, with
reconnaissance satellites". He listed the three reasons as understanding whether sanctions are functioning for countries under sanction, monitoring dual-use technology that could be used to produce or develop weapons, and to spy on bribery. In 2013 The United States was accused of spying on
Brazilian oil company
Petrobras. Brazil's President
Dilma Rousseff stated that it was tantamount to industrial espionage and had no security justification. In 2014 former US intelligence officer
Edward Snowden stated that the
National Security Agency (NSA) was engaged in industrial espionage and that they spied on
German companies that compete with US firms. He also highlighted the fact the NSA uses
mobile phone apps such as
Angry Birds to gather
personal data. According to a 2014
Glenn Greenwald article, "potentially sabotaging another country's hi-tech industries and their top companies has long been a sanctioned American strategy." The article was based on a leaked report issued from former U.S.
Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper's office that evaluated how intelligence could be used to overcome a loss of the United States' technological and innovative edge. When contacted, the
Director of National Intelligence office responded, "the United States—unlike our adversaries—does not steal proprietary corporate information", and insisted that "the Intelligence Community regularly engages in analytic exercises". The report, he said, "is not intended to be, and is not, a reflection of current policy or operations". In September 2019, security firm
Qi An Xin published report linking the CIA to a series of attacks targeting Chinese aviation agencies between 2012 and 2017.
Seizure and Acquisition of Foreign Patents (World War II and Post-War Era) A significant, state-sponsored transfer of technology occurred during and after World War II, when the U.S. government formally seized patent rights from Axis powers like Germany and Italy. This was followed by programs such as the
Technical Industrial Intelligence Committee (TIIC) under the Department of Commerce, which actively dispatched missions to Europe—particularly Germany—to investigate, document, and acquire technical processes and patents. This systematic effort also extended to Allied nations; financially exhausted European countries, including the United Kingdom, were often compelled to make 'voluntary transfers' of intellectual property as a condition for aid or loans. Historians have argued that this large-scale acquisition of foreign intellectual property was a key factor in the post-war technological and industrial ascendancy of the United States, which subsequently licensed much of this Intellectual Property back to European firms.
Israel's economic espionage in the United States Israel has an active program to gather proprietary information within the United States. These collection activities are primarily directed at obtaining information on military systems and advanced computing applications that can be used in Israel's sizable
armaments industry. Israel was accused by the US government of selling US
military technology and secrets to China in 1993. In 2014 American counter-intelligence officials told members of the
House Judiciary and
Foreign Affairs committees that Israel's current espionage activities in America are "unrivaled". ==Use of computers and the Internet==