In arguing against the term "global
war on terror",
Francis Fukuyama said the United States was not fighting terrorism generically, as in
Chechnya or
Palestine. Rather, he said the slogan "war on terror" is directed at "
radical Islamism, a movement that makes use of culture for political objectives." He suggested it might be deeper than the ideological conflict of the Cold War, but it should not be confused with
Samuel Huntington's "
clash of civilizations." Addressing Huntington's thesis,
David Kilcullen wrote "We must distinguish Al Qa'eda and the broader militant movements it symbolises – entities that use terrorism – from the tactic of terrorism itself." There may be utility in examining a war not specifically on the tactic of terror but in co-ordination among multiple national or regional insurgencies. It may be politically infeasible to refer to a conflict as an "insurgency" rather than by some more charged term, but military analysts, when concepts associated with insurgency fit, should not ignore those ideas in their planning. Additionally, the recommendations can be applied to the strategic campaign, even if it is politically unfeasible to use precise terminology. Insurgent groups often struggle to maintain coherency and authority due to their decentralized nature, and thus rely heavily upon ethnic, religious, or ideological bounds to avoid splintering. While it may be reasonable to consider transnational insurgency, Anthony Cordesman points out some of the myths in trying to have a worldwide view of terror: Counterinsurgency models, not mutually exclusive from one another, come from Kilcullen, McCormick, Barnett and Eizenstat. Kilcullen describes the "pillars" of a stable society, while Eizenstat addresses the "gaps" that form cracks in societal stability. McCormick's model shows the interplay among the actors: insurgents, government, population and external organizations. Barnett discusses the relationship of the country with the outside world, and Cordesman focuses on the specifics of providing security. Recent studies have tried to model the conceptual architecture of insurgent warfare using computational and mathematical modelling. A recent study by Juan Camilo Bohorquez, Sean Gourley, Alexander R. Dixon, Michael Spagat, and Neil F. Johnson, entitled "Common Ecology Quantifies Human Insurgency", suggests a common structure for 9 contemporary insurgent wars, supported by statistical data of more than 50,000 insurgent attacks. The model explains the recurrent statistical pattern found in the distribution of deaths in insurgent and terrorist events.
Kilcullen's pillars model, as in Kilcullen's mode, unity of command becomes "
unity of effort at best, and collaboration or deconfliction at least." To be viable, a state must be able to close three "gaps", of which the first is most important: • Security: protection "... against internal and external threats, and preserving sovereignty over territory. If a government cannot ensure security, rebellious armed groups or criminal nonstate actors may use violence to exploit this security gap—as in Haiti, Nepal, and Somalia." • Capacity: the survival needs of water, electrical power, food and public health, closely followed by education, communications and a working economic system. "An inability to do so creates a capacity gap, which can lead to a loss of public confidence and then perhaps political upheaval.
In most environments, a capacity gap coexists with—or even grows out of—a security gap. In Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, segments of the population are cut off from their governments because of endemic insecurity. And in postconflict Iraq, critical capacity gaps exist despite the country's relative wealth and strategic importance." • Legitimacy: closing the legitimacy gap is more than an incantation of "democracy" and "elections", but a government that is perceived to exist by the
consent of the governed, has minimal corruption, and has a working law enforcement and judicial system that enforce human rights. Note the similarity between Eizenstat's gaps and Kilcullen's three pillars. is designed as a tool for counterinsurgency (COIN), but develops a symmetrical view of the required actions for both the Insurgent and COIN forces to achieve success. In this way the counterinsurgency model can demonstrate how both the insurgent and COIN forces succeed or fail. The model's strategies and principle apply to both forces, therefore the degree the forces follow the model should have a direct correlation to the success or failure of either the Insurgent or COIN force. The model depicts four key elements or players: • Insurgent force • Counterinsurgency force (i.e., the government) • Population • International community All of these interact, and the different elements have to assess their best options in a set of actions: • Gaining support of the population • Disrupt opponent's control over the population • Direct action against opponent • Disrupt opponent's relations with the international community • Establish relationships with the international community
Barnett and connecting to the core In Thomas Barnett's paradigm, the world is divided into a "connected core" of nations enjoying a high level of communications among their organizations and individuals, and those nations that are disconnected internally and externally. In a reasonably peaceful situation, he describes a "system administrator" force, often multinational, which does what some call "nation-building", but, most importantly, connects the nation to the core and empowers the natives to communicate—in other words, communication can be likened to swarm coordination. If the state is occupied, or in civil war, another paradigm comes into play: the leviathan, a first-world military force that takes down the opposition regular forces. Leviathan is constituted to fight major forces, not local insurgencies. Leviathan may use extensive
swarming at the tactical level, but its dispatch is a strategic decision that may be made unilaterally, or by an established group of the core such as
NATO or
ASEAN.
Cordesman and security Other than brief "Leviathan" takedowns, security building appears to need to be regional, with logistical and other technical support from more developed countries and alliances (e.g., ASEAN, NATO). Noncombat military assistance in closing the security gap begins with training, sometimes in specialized areas such as intelligence. More direct, but still noncombat support, includes intelligence, planning, logistics and communications. Anthony Cordesman notes that security requirements differ by region and state in region. Writing on the Middle East, he identified different security needs for specific areas, as well as the US interest in security in those areas. • In
North Africa, the US focus should be on security cooperation in achieving regional stability and in counterterrorism. • In the
Levant, the US must largely compartment security cooperation with Israel and cooperation with friendly Arab states like
Egypt,
Jordan, and
Lebanon, but can improve security cooperation with all these states. • In the
Persian Gulf, the US must deal with the strategic importance of a region whose petroleum and growing gas exports fuel key elements of the global economy. It is well to understand that counterterrorism, as used by Cordesman, does not mean using terrorism against the terrorism, but an entire spectrum of activities, nonviolent and violent, to disrupt an opposing terrorist organization. The French general, Joseph Gallieni, observed, while a colonial administrator in 1898, Both Kilcullen and Eizenstat define a more abstract goal than does Cordesman. Kilcullen's security pillar is roughly equivalent to Eizenstat's security gap: • Military security (securing the population from attack or intimidation by guerrillas, bandits, terrorists or other armed groups). • Police security (community policing, police intelligence or "Special Branch" activities, and paramilitary police field forces). • Human security, building a framework of human rights, civil institutions and individual protections, public safety (fire, ambulance, sanitation, civil defense) and population security. Anthony Cordesman, while speaking of the specific situation in Iraq, makes some points that can be generalized to other nations in turmoil. Cordesman recognizes some value in the groupings in
Samuel P. Huntington's idea of the
clash of civilizations, but, rather assuming the civilizations must clash, these civilizations simply can be recognized as actors in a multinational world. In the case of Iraq, Cordesman observes that the burden is on Islamic civilization, not unilaterally the West, if for no other reason that the civilization to which the problematic nation belongs will have cultural and linguistic context that Western civilization cannot hope to equal. The heart of strengthening weak nations must come from within, and that heart will fail if they deny that the real issue is the future of their civilization, if they tolerate religious, cultural or separatist violence and terrorism when it strikes at unpopular targets, or if they continue to try to export the blame for their own failures to other nations, religions, and cultures.
Asymmetric and irregular conflicts Asymmetric conflicts (or
irregular conflicts), as the emerging type of insurgencies in recent history, is described by
Berman and Matanock in their review as conflicts where "the government forces have a clear advantage over rebels in coercive capacity." In this kind of conflict, rebel groups can reintegrate into the civilian population after an attack if the civilians are willing to silently accept them. Some of the most recent examples include the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. As European countries intervene in the conflict, creating asymmetry between the government forces and rebels, asymmetric conflict has become the most common form of subnational conflict and civil conflict where western countries are likely to be involved. Such interventions and their impacts can be seen in the
NATO operation in Libya in 2011 and the
French-led intervention in Mali in 2013.
Berman and Matanock suggested an
information-centric framework to describe asymmetric conflicts on a local level. Three parties are involved in framework: government forces, rebels and civilians. Government forces and rebels attack each other and may inadvertently harm civilians, whereas civilians can
anonymously share local information with government forces, which would allow government forces to effectively use their asymmetric advantage to target rebels. Taking the role of civilians in this framework into consideration, the government and the rebels will divert resources to provide services to civilians so as to influence their decision about sharing information with the government. This framework is based on several assumptions: • The consequential action of civilians is information sharing. • Information can be shared anonymously without endangering the civilians who do so, and civilians are assumed to respond to incentives. • Neither government forces or the rebels will actively target civilians with coercion or intimidation. This framework leads to five major implications for counterinsurgency strategies: • The government and rebels have an incentive to provide services to civilians, which increases with the value of the information shared. • Rebel violence may be reduced by service provision from the government. • Projects that address the needs of the civilians in the local communities and conditioned on information sharing by the community are more effective in reducing rebel violence. In practice, these may be smaller projects that are developed through consultation with local communities, which are also more easily revoked when information is not shared. • Innovations that increase the value of projects to local civilians, such as including development professionals in project design and implementation, will enhance the effect of violence-reducing. • Security provided by the government and service provision (i.e. development spending) are complementary activities. • If either side of the conflict (government forces or rebels) causes casualties among civilians, civilians will reduce their support for that side. • Innovations that make anonymous tips to the government easier, which are often technical, can reduce rebel violence. These implications are tested by empirical evidences from conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq and several other subnational conflicts. Further research on
governance,
rule of law, attitudes, dynamics and agency between allies are needed to better understand
asymmetric conflicts and to have better informed decisions made at the tactical, strategic and public policy levels. ==Counter-insurgency==