Emergence of new rebel groups and battles for Kouri Bougoudi Two new Chadian rebel groups,
FACT and the
CCMSR, were organized in southern Libya in 2016 and aided local groups in return for money, equipment, and other support. FACT initially became allied to a
Misrata-based faction. In September, Chad severed diplomatic relations with
Qatar, accusing it of attempting to destabilize the country. Journalist Ben Taub suspected that this development was related to Qatar harboring Timane Erdimi who was still trying to overthrow Déby. From then on, the
Chadian Air Force launched several bombing raids in the region, targeting the Kouri Bougoudi mining camp and camel herds, killing several civilians and depriving locals of their livelihood. Meanwhile, the CCMSR continued its attacks against government positions, such as at Tarbou in
Tibesti Region (21 September), and Miski in
Borkou Region (24 October). Some locals criticised the CCMSR of exploiting and worsening ethnic tensions in the Tibesti Mountains.
Minor rebel incursions On 12 January 2019, a Sudanese armed group, the
Justice and Equality Movement, crossed the border with Libya with dozens of vehicles and attacked CCSMR positions in Kouri Bougoudi. According to JEM 67 of its fighters were killed while CCSMR reported three dead and 12 wounded. On 3–6 February, the
French Air Force conducted airstrikes on
Union of Resistance Forces (UFR) troops who had launched a raid into Chad. On 9 February 2019, the Chadian army claimed to have captured 250 rebels including four leaders and destroyed forty vehicles.
French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian explained the operation by claiming that France had acted "to prevent a coup d'etat". On 11 April 2021, FACT launched an offensive in
Tibesti Region in the north of the country following the
2021 Chadian presidential election. President
Idriss Déby was killed during the offensive on 20 April. He established the
Transitional Military Council (TMC) as new governing authority, and initially refused to negotiate with insurgent groups. Déby softened his stance in August 2021, proposing a national dialogue with the rebels. FACT expressed interest in the proposal. On 29 November, the Chadian government announced an amnesty for 296 rebels and political dissidents. In January 2022, more opposition figures were released by the Chadian government. In the following month, the TMC junta accused the UFR of trying to enlist the Wagner Group to aid them in the insurgency. In doing so, UFR leader Timane Erdimi was allegedly using middlemen in the
Central African Republic. In March 2022, further peace talks were held in
Doha, involving Déby's regime and several rebel groups, including FACT,
MDJT, and
UFDD. while the insurgents maintained their presence in the country's north. Amid internal disagreements, the CCMSR left the negotiations in May. In the same month, gold miners in Tibesti clashed in a battle which left over one hundred people dead; CCMSR and FACT subsequently accused the government of negligence regarding communal violence. Over 20 rebel groups At least some of these subsequently resumed negotiations, and a "majority" of the active insurgent factions agreed to sign a peace agreement later that month. However, some of the most powerful rebel groups including FACT refused to sign the agreement unless the government made more concessions. On 7 August 2022, Chad's military government signed a deal with 42 opposition groups. Five other rebel factions –including FACT– refused to join the agreement. UFR leader Timane Erdimi subsequently returned to Chad, officially to support the implementation of the National Dialogue. In late August 2022, CCMSR declared that it had killed ten soldiers in Wouri district, northern Tibesti Region. Chadian government officials admitted that rebels had made an incursion into the country, though denied the deaths of security forces. In October, the Chadian government violently suppressed public protests in a crackdown that killed 200 people. This caused numerous opposition leaders to return to exile, and undermined the willindness of still-fighting insurgents to lay down arms. No one was held accountable for the civilians' deaths.
Renewed intensification of fighting in May 2023 By 2023, about 7,000 Chadian rebels were still active, scattered across Sudan, Libya, Niger, and Chad itself. In January 2023, a new insurgent group was founded at the Central African Republic–Chad border. Calling itself the "Revolution Movement for Southern Chad" (MRST), it claimed to have thousands of members and requested Russian support for its operations. Meanwhile, the Chadian government signed a peace agreement with a self-defence group based in
Miski; the militia had previously fought against state control of the local gold mines. In March, 400 captured rebels were sentenced to life imprisonment by a Chadian court; however, Mahamat Déby Itno pardoned 380 of them. In May 2023, rebels were battling the Chadian military in the Tibesti region as well as at the border to the
Central Africa Republic. At the same time, unrest grew in Chad's eastern regions due to a mass influx of
refugees fleeing the
civil war in Sudan. In response, the Chadian military cooperated with security forces of the neighboring state to destroy two rebels camps around
Paoua. Though the Chadian government described the Paoua camps as belonging to "bandits", journalists identified them as likely bases of the MRST and the
RPJET insurgent groups. Despite the joint operation, armed militants continued to carry out cross-border raids from the Central African Republic. The CCMSR also launched new attacks in northern Chad. In the same month, Haftar's
Libyan National Army attacked Chadian insurgent positions in Libya, mainly at Umm al-Araneb in
Murzuq District; the identity of the targeted insurgent group(s) was unclear. In January 2024, Chadian security forces arrested 80 military officers. The men, led by Lt. Kouroumta Levana Guelemi, had reportedly formed a group called "M3M" and planned an "insurrection" and/or
coup d'état. In May, a group of prisoners were released from CCMSR custody in Niger under disputed circumstances; the 21 Chadian soldiers had been captured by rebels in 2023 and taken to Libya. Russian media claimed that the group had been freed during a "joint Chad-Russia operation" against "Islamists", while the CCMSR stated that Russian officials had arranged the prisoners' release in exchange for providing the rebel group with equipment. By November, Ousman Dillo -brother of deceased opposition politician
Yaya Dillo Djérou- had organized a
Zaghawa rebel group and was waging a campaign from across the Sudanese border. In December 2024, Chad held controversial
parliamentary elections which saw widespread boycotts and unrest, as supporters of "opposition and civil society groups" attacked election caravans of the Chadian National Election Management Agency across the country. Officials requested military protection for
polling stations. In January 2025, Chadian rebels clashed with the Sudanese
Rapid Support Forces (RSF) at Hadjar Fatna inside the Central African Republic. Two insurgent leaders, Ali Massar and Abakar, were killed during the fighting. Furthermore, another Chadian rebel commander, Atahir Moussa, had defected to the RSF alongside his militia. In the same month, an armed group unsuccessfully attacked the presidential palace in N'Djamena. Foreign Minister
Abderaman Koulamallah attributed the attack to an unidentified rebel group, local civilians suspected a failed coup attempt, while
Agence France-Presse held Boko Haram responsible. In September 2025, several Tibesti self-defense groups agreed to join a peace agreement with the Chadian government. Members of one local armed group, the Diffa Al Watan Popular Committee, were supposed to be integrated into the Chadian security forces after undergoing additional training. However, local tensions continued, and Chadian soldiers shot three young men in Miski on 4 October, resulting in renewed violence. Dissatisfied locals created the new "Miski Martyrs Battalion" on 5 October to resume the battle against pro-government forces for the gold mines of Tibesti. On 19 October, the CCMSR and Movement for Peace, Reconstruction and Development (
Mouvement Populaire pour la Renaissance et le Developpement, MPRD) announced a new rebel alliance. Seven days later, FACT organized a meeting of 20 rebel and civil society groups in France, with the attendees vowing to unite to topple the Déby government. In January 2026, the Chadian military reportedly approached MPRD positions at the border to the Central African Republic after ordering the local insurgents to surrender. In response, MPRD rebels ambushed a column of government troops at
Korbol, killing three soldiers and wounding 10 at the cost of three dead and two injured insurgents. == Role of foreign forces ==