Iran's missile program originated during the 1980–88
Iran–Iraq War as a means to deter Iraqi
Scud attacks during the
War of the Cities phase of the conflict and to compensate for its lack of modern air power amid U.S. sanctions. In 1984, Iran obtained its first contingent of ballistic missiles (20 Soviet "
Scud-B"
SRBMs) from
Libya and subsequently procured Scud derivatives and launchers from
North Korea and
China.
Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam, regarded as the father of Iran's missile program, sought expertise and blueprint designs from
North Korea. He designed missiles with an operational range of up to 2000 km to target Israel. By the 1990s, Iran had reverse-engineered Scud technology to produce the
Shahab-1 (a range of 330 km) and
Shahab-2 (a range of 500km)
missiles, as well as
Zelzal and
Fateh short-range
rockets. In the 2000s, Iran introduced longer-range systems (e.g. the
liquid-fueled Shahab-3
MRBM) and began testing
two-stage solid-fueled designs (e.g. the
Sejjil-2 MRBM). Key milestones include the public debut of Shahab-3 in 1998 (a range of ∼1,300 km) and the solid-fuel Sajjil in 2008. By 2010, Iran was unveiling newer variants (e.g.
Qiam-1 in 2010,
Zolfaghar in 2016) and integrating missile tests with its growing space launch program. Throughout this period the program's drivers included deterrence of
Israel and
Arab states of the Persian Gulf, asymmetrical warfare doctrine, and prestige, as summed up by experts: "Iran's ballistic missile programme… is an important element of military doctrine, a means of deterrence, and a tool of statecraft". In February 2025, Iran appeared to be rearming its missile program. A ship carrying 1,000 tons of
sodium perchlorate, a chemical crucial for solid propellant production in missiles, arrived at the Iranian port of
Bandar Abbas. This shipment could facilitate the production of propellant for about 260
Kheibar Shekan missiles or around 200 Martyr Hajj
Qassem Soleimani ballistic missiles. Iran intensified efforts to rebuild its ballistic missile program following the losses it sustained during the 2025 Twelve-Day War, and after the war, production of ballistic missiles quickly resumed. Iran was reported to have replenished its stockpile of approximately 2,000 missiles, while it was said to have made significant developments in the capabilities of its missiles. Iran's reported rearmament occurred despite the reinstating of
United Nations sanctions restricting arms transfers and ballistic missile activity through the
JCPOA "snapback" mechanism in late September 2025. used in Iran’s medium-range ballistic missiles, whose provision to Iran is prohibited explicitly. Initially, IRGC aligned media notified the public about the tests, while citing various videos of missile deployment surfacing from many locations, however state-run
IRIB News Agency denied the launches had ever taken place, As a result the number of daily ballistic missile launches was reduced by 86% after the first week of the war. There have also been four instances of Iranian ballistic missiles entering
Turkish airspace during the war, all of which were downed by NATO air defenses. Iran has denied targeting Turkey with ballistic missiles, with Turkish officials suggesting that the missiles may have intended to target
Cyprus but veered off course. Iran reportedly fired missiles towards the UK-US base on
Diego Garcia, part of the
Chagos Islands, which is around 4,000km (2,500 miles) from Iran, overnight between 19 and 20 March. However, an Iranian official later denied the claim. The
Spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran Esmail Baghaei called it a
false flag operation and accused Israel of launching the missiles at the base. == Types ==