Policy For de Valera, the purpose of a neutral stance was to maintain Irish independence. Nonetheless, he had no sympathy for the
Axis. While the revolutionaries of the
Irish War of Independence sought the support of the
Central Powers, they realized that, in the long term, Irish national security depended on Great Britain and Ireland being, if not allies, at least
not enemies. As early as 1920, de Valera noted that: This statement reflected a point de Valera had made as early as 1918 (when writing to President of the United States
Woodrow Wilson, seeking that the United States formally recognise the
Irish Republic as an independent state): After the
Italian conquest of Abyssinia in 1936, de Valera said at the
League of Nations: Months before the outbreak of war, de Valera gave a statement to the
Associated Press which appeared in newspapers on 20 February 1939:
Offer to end the partition of Ireland in 1940 At a series of meetings in 17–26 June 1940, during and after the
Battle of France, British envoy
Malcolm MacDonald brought a proposal to end the
partition of Ireland and offered a solemn undertaking to accept "the principle of a United Ireland" if the independent Irish state would abandon its neutrality and immediately join the war against Germany and Italy. However, the reality of unity would have to be agreed by the "representatives of the government of Éire and the
government of Northern Ireland", each of which distrusted the other intensely. De Valera therefore rejected the amended proposals on 4 July, worried that there was "no guarantee that in the end we would have a united Ireland" and that it "would commit us definitely to an immediate abandonment of our neutrality". The offer and his rejection remained secret until a biography was published in 1970. Prime Minister Churchill proposed that a Council for Defense of all Ireland should be formed out of which "the unity of the island would probably, in some form or other emerge after the war." The Irish Prime Minister interpreted that statement as an offer to end of partition in return for his nation's entry into the war. De Valera was said to have stated: "We cannot believe you." Later stating, "If we were foolish enough to accept that invitation ... we would be cheated in the end." De Valera had campaigned against partition and the
1937 Constitution drafted by him had an
irredentist clause describing the State as the "whole island of Ireland". After the war he again called repeatedly for the ending of partition.
Mixed effects inviting Irish citizens to register as "nationals of a neutral state." In April 1941, the question of Ireland's entry into the war was again raised when the Australian Prime Minister
Robert Menzies paid a visit to Belfast and Dublin for private discussions with De Valera and
John M. Andrews, the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland. Subsequently, Menzies reported to Churchill that the complexity of the questions of Irish unity and sovereignty meant that there was little possibility of Ireland's abandoning its policy of neutrality. Without the
Irish treaty ports (which the United Kingdom had released a year prior to the war), an independent Ireland posed a serious disadvantage to the military capability and safety of British fighting and trade, risking the possibility of invasion if that disadvantage ever proved too great. If Irish sovereignty was to be maintained, then neutrality would have to be steered consciously to the benefit of British interests, as these were its own: at once to aid the British war effort but also to forestall invasion by Britain to regain the treaty ports. Ireland, like other neutrals was "...neutral for the power that potentially threatened them most." During the war, and accusing de Valera as a "Nazi sympathiser", the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland,
Lord Craigavon, urged Churchill to use Scottish and Welsh troops to overrun "southern Ireland" before installing a Governor-General for the whole island at Dublin, but this proposal was rejected by London. Nevertheless, Churchill directed Field Marshal Sir
Bernard Montgomery to prepare plans to seize
Cork and
Queenstown (Cobh) so their harbours could be used as naval bases. Better submarine-detecting technology, as well as military bases in Iceland, meant that the Irish ports were no longer as vital for the Allies as they had been during World War I. In this regard
Viscount Cranborne acknowledged at the war's end that the Irish Government had "been willing to accord us any facilities which would not be regarded as overtly prejudicing their attitude to neutrality", collaborating with the British war cabinet. While de Valera rejected British appeals to use Irish ports and harbour facilities directly, de Valera was, according to M.E. Collins, "more friendly than strict neutrality should have allowed." The co-operation that emerged allowed for meetings to take place to consider events after German troops had overrun neutral
Denmark,
Norway,
the Netherlands,
Luxembourg and
Belgium. Three days after the fall of France, Irish and British defence officials met to discuss how British troops could, strictly at de Valera's invitation, occupy Ireland upon the event of a German landing there to expel foreign troops attempting to use her as a back door to later invade Britain (
Plan "W"). The meetings continued, as Cranborne described, throughout the war, facilitating further dialogue. Before the war began, de Valera had held a meeting with career diplomat
Eduard Hempel, the German Minister in Ireland since 1938. The meetings discussed Ireland's close trade links with the United Kingdom and the ease with which Britain could invade her if its interests were threatened. He, in turn, communicated to Berlin that such was the case that it "rendered it inevitable for the Irish government to show a certain consideration for Britain" and urged war officials to avoid any action that would legitimise a British invasion of Ireland. Academic J.J. Lee questioned just how much of Warnock's zeal towards
Hitler's
Reichstag speech on 19 July was genuine enthusiasm for the 'international justice' that could be expected after Germany's victory, as opposed to an adherence to the instructions of Dublin to please oneself to the potential victors. Three years later, by 1944, the orientation of the war and of Irish relations to Germany had turned about-face, with the likelihood of a German victory now remote. In that climate, the Irish Government, once so ready to "say agreeable things", Hempel remarked, had become "unhelpful and evasive". The
United States Ambassador to Ireland,
David Gray, stated that he once asked de Valera what he would do if German
paratroopers "liberated
Derry". According to Gray, de Valera was silent for a time and then replied, "I don't know".
Condolences on Hitler's death Ireland maintained a public stance of neutrality to the end by refusing to close the German and Japanese
Legations. The
Taoiseach Éamon de Valera personally visited
Ambassador Hempel at his home in
Dún Laoghaire on 2 May 1945 to express official condolences on the death of German dictator
Adolf Hitler, following the usual protocol on the death of a Head of State of a state with a legation in Ireland. President Hyde visited Hempel separately on 3 May. Irish envoys in other nations did likewise, but no other Western European democracies followed Ireland's example. The visits caused a storm of protest in the United States. De Valera denounced reports of
Bergen-Belsen concentration camp as "anti-national propaganda"; according to
Paul Bew, this was not out of disbelief but rather because the Holocaust undermined the assumptions underlying Irish neutrality:
moral equivalence between the Allies and the Axis, and the idea that the Irish were the most persecuted people in Europe.
Position on Jewish refugees Ireland's position on Jewish refugees
fleeing Europe was one of scepticism. Irish authorities during the war generally gave two justifications for turning away prospective immigrants: that they would overcrowd the nation and take Irish jobs, and that a substantial increase in the Jewish population might give rise to an antisemitic problem. There was some domestic anti-Jewish sentiment during World War II, most notably expressed in a notorious speech to the Dáil in 1943, when newly elected independent
TD Oliver J. Flanagan advocated "routing the Jews out of the country". There was some official indifference from the political establishment to the Jewish victims of
the Holocaust during and after the war. This indifference would later be described by
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform Michael McDowell as being "antipathetic, hostile and unfeeling". Mervyn O'Driscoll of
University College Cork reported on the unofficial and official barriers that prevented Jews from finding refuge in Ireland: ==Media==