Islam in Pakistan

Before independence Islam had reached the Indian subcontinent during the lifetime of Muhammad. According to a tradition, Baba Ratan Hindi was a trader from Punjab who was one of the non-Arab companions of Muhammad. In 644 AD, the Rashidun Caliphate conquered the coast of Makran after defeating the kingdom of Sindh in the battle of Rasil. According to Derryl N. Maclean, a link between Sindh and early partisans of Ali or proto-Shi'ites can be traced to Hakim ibn Jabalah al-Abdi who traveled across Sindh to Makran in the year 649 AD and presented a report on the area to the Caliph. During the Caliphate of Ali, Sindhi Hindus had come under influence of Islam and some even participated in the Battle of Camel. In 712 CE, the Ummayad Caliphate, under an Arab general Muhammad bin Qasim, conquered most of the Indus region and Takshashila (present-day Taxila) for the caliphate, to be made the "As-Sindh" province with its capital at Al-Mansurah. The Pakistan government's official chronology claims this as the time when the foundation of Pakistan was laid. By the end of the 10th century CE, the region was ruled by several Hindu Shahi kings who would be subdued by the Ghaznavids. was patronized by the Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan. The early medieval period (642–1219 CE) witnessed the spread of Islam in the region and Takshashila was an important city for the religion in South Asia. During this period, Sufi missionaries played a pivotal role in converting a majority of the regional Buddhist and Hindu population to Islam. These developments set the stage for the rule of several successive Muslim empires in the region, including the Ghaznavid Empire (975–1187 CE), the Ghorid Kingdom, and the Delhi Sultanate (1206–1526 CE). The Lodi dynasty, the last of the Delhi Sultanate, was replaced by the Mughal Empire (1526–1857 CE). c. 1889 of the marketplace near Wazir Khan Mosque In independent Pakistan Nature of state The Muslim League leadership, ulama (Islamic clergy) and Jinnah had articulated their vision of Pakistan in terms of an Islamic state. Muhammad Ali Jinnah had developed a close association with the ulama. When Jinnah died, Islamic scholar Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani described Jinnah as the greatest Muslim after the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb and also compared Jinnah's death to the Muhammad's passing. The Objectives Resolution declared that sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God. The president of the Muslim League, Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman, announced that Pakistan would bring together all Muslim countries into Islamistan-a pan-Islamic entity. Khaliq believed that Pakistan was only a Muslim state and was not yet an Islamic state, but that it could certainly become an Islamic state after bringing all believers of Islam into a single political unit. Keith Callard, one of the earliest scholars on Pakistani politics, observed that Pakistanis believed in the essential unity of purpose and outlook in the Muslim world:Pakistan was founded to advance the cause of Muslims. Other Muslims might have been expected to be sympathetic, even enthusiastic. But this assumed that other Muslim states would take the same view of the relation between religion and nationality. After General Zia-ul-Haq took power in a military coup, Hizb ut-Tahrir (an Islamist group calling for the establishment of a Caliphate) expanded its organisational network and activities in Pakistan. Its founder, Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani, would maintain regular correspondence with Abul A’la Maududi, the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), and he also urged Dr. Israr Ahmed to continue his work in Pakistan for the establishment of a global caliphate. Social scientist Nasim Ahmad Jawed conducted a survey in 1969 in pre-divided Pakistan on the type of national identity that was used by educated professional people. He found that over 60% of people in East Pakistan (modern day Bangladesh) professed to have a secular national identity. However, in West Pakistan (current day Pakistan) the same figure professed to have an Islamic and not a secular identity. Furthermore, the same figure in East Pakistan defined their identity in terms of their ethnicity and not Islam. It was the opposite in West Pakistan, where Islam was stated to be more important than ethnicity. After Pakistan's first ever general elections the 1973 Constitution was created by an elected Parliament. The Constitution declared Pakistan an Islamic Republic and Islam as the state religion. It also stated that all laws would have to be brought into accordance with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Quran and Sunnah and that no law repugnant to such injunctions could be enacted. The 1973 Constitution also created certain institutions such as the Shariat Court and the Council of Islamic Ideology to channel the interpretation and application of Islam. Zia ul Haq's Islamization On 5 July 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq led a coup d'état. In the year or two before Zia-ul-Haq's coup, his predecessor, leftist Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, had faced vigorous opposition which was united under the revivalist banner of Nizam-e-Mustafa ("Rule of the prophet"). According to supporters of the movement, establishing an Islamic state based on sharia law would mean a return to the justice and success of the early days of Islam when Muhammad ruled the Muslims. In an effort to stem the tide of street Islamisation, Bhutto had also called for it and banned the drinking and selling of wine by Muslims, nightclubs and horse racing. "Islamisation" was the "primary" policy, or "centerpiece" of his government. Zia-ul-Haq committed himself to establishing an Islamic state and enforcing sharia law. to judge legal cases using Islamic doctrine. New criminal offences (of adultery, fornication, and types of blasphemy), and new punishments (of whipping, amputation, and stoning to death), were added to Pakistani law. Interest payments for bank accounts were replaced by "profit and loss" payments. Zakat charitable donations became a 2.5% annual tax. School textbooks and libraries were overhauled to remove un-Islamic material. Offices, schools, and factories were required to offer praying space. Zia bolstered the influence of the ulama (Islamic clergy) and the Islamic parties, Conservative ulama (Islamic scholars) were added to the Council of Islamic Ideology. Zia's state sponsored Islamization increased sectarian divisions in Pakistan between Sunnis and Shias and between Deobandis and Barelvis. A solid majority of Barelvis had supported the creation of Pakistan, and Barelvi ulama had also issued fatwas in support of the Pakistan Movement during the 1946 elections, but ironically Islamic state politics in Pakistan was mostly in favour of Deobandi (and later Ahl-e-Hadith/Salafi) institutions. This was despite the fact that only a few (although influential) Deobandi clerics had supported the Pakistan Movement. Possible motivations for the Islamization programme included Zia's personal piety (most accounts agree that he came from a religious family), desire to gain political allies, to "fulfill Pakistan's ''raison d'être''" as a Muslim state, and/or the political need to legitimise what was seen by some Pakistanis as his "repressive, un-representative martial law regime". Until the government of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, "Islamic activists" were frustrated by the lack of "teeth" to enforce Islamic law in Pakistan's constitution. For example, in the 1956 constitution, the state did not enforce "Islamic moral standards" but "endeavor[ed]" to make them compulsory and to "prevent" prostitution, gambling, consumption of alcoholic liquor, etc. Interest was to be eliminated "as soon as possible". According to Shajeel Zaidi a million people attended Zia ul Haq's funeral because he had given them what they wanted: more religion. A PEW opinion poll found that 84% of Pakistanis favoured making Sharia the official law of the land. According to the 2013 Pew Research Center report, the majority of Pakistani Muslims also support the death penalty for those who leave Islam (62%). In contrast, support for the death penalty for those who leave Islam was only 36% in fellow South Asian Muslim country Bangladesh (which shared heritage with Pakistan). A 2010 opinion poll by PEW Research Centre also found that 87% of Pakistanis considered themselves 'Muslims first' rather than a member of their nationality. This was the highest figure amongst all Muslim populations surveyed. In contrast only 67% in Jordan, 59% in Egypt, 51% in Turkey, 36% in Indonesia and 71% in Nigeria considered themselves as 'Muslim first' rather than a member of their own nationality. "Islamic activists" such as much or the ulama (Islamic clerics) and Jamaat-e-Islami (Islamist party), support the expansion of "Islamic law and Islamic practices". "Islamic Modernists" are lukewarm to this expansion and "some may even advocate development along the secularist lines of the West." Islamic way of life The mosque is an important religious as well as social institution in Pakistan. Many rituals and ceremonies are celebrated according to Islamic calendar. ==Denominations==

According to the CIA World Factbook and Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, 96–97% of the total population of Pakistan is Muslim. Approximately 65% of Pakistan's Islamic seminaries are affiliated with the Deobandi school, compared to 25% associated with the Barelvi tradition. This widespread educational infrastructure has enabled the Deobandi movement to play a pivotal role in shaping religious education and discourse across the country. The Deobandi movement is especially prominent in regions such as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, where it forms the majority among Sunni Muslims. Its influence extends beyond education into political spheres, with parties like Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) playing active roles in national politics. In contrast, the Barelvi movement, while representing a significant portion of Pakistan's Sunni population, has historically had less institutional influence. However, it has seen a resurgence in recent years, with increased political activism and the formation of parties like Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan. Shia Shias are estimated to constitute about 10-15 percent of the country's population. Major traditions of Shia Islam found in Pakistan include the Twelver Shias (or Ithna Ashariyyah) and the Ismaili Shias (or Seveners); most notably the Dawoodi Bohras and the Khoja Ismailis—known for their prominence in commerce and industry. Many prominent Shia Muslim politicians were known to play a decisive role in the creation of Pakistan for decades during the Pakistan Movement. The role as the first president of the Muslim League and its main financial backer during its earlier years was undertaken by Sir Aga Khan III, an Ismaili by faith. Other politicians that held prominent roles in the initial decades of the Muslim League include Raja Sahib, Syed Ameer Ali and Syed Wazir Hasan, among others. A 2012 study found 50% of surveyed Pakistanis considered Shia as Muslims while 41% rejected Shia as Muslims. Shias allege discrimination by the Pakistani government since 1948, claiming that Sunnis are given preference in business, official positions and administration of justice. Attacks on Shias increased under the presidency of Zia-ul-Haq, Shias have long been a target of Sunni radical groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi in the country. Sectarian violence became a recurring feature of the Muharram month every year, with sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shias taking place on multiple occasions. Since 2008 thousands of Shia have been killed by Sunni extremists according to Human Rights Watch (HRW) and violent clashes between the two sects are common. A subset of Shia in Pakistan are the Hazara ethnic group—which are distinct from other Shi’a due to their language and facial features. Most Hazaras live in Afghanistan, but Pakistan also hosts between 650,000 and 900,000 – and around 500,000 live in the city of Quetta. Sufism is one of southern Punjab's most important Sufi shrines Sufism is a vast term and many Sufi orders exist within Pakistan where the philosophy has a strong tradition. Historically, the Sufi missionaries had played a pivotal role in converting the native peoples of Punjab and Sindh to Islam. The most notable Muslim Sufi orders in Pakistan are the Qadiriyya, Naqshbandiya, Chishtiya and Suhrawardiyya silsas (Muslim Orders) and they have a large amount of devotees in Pakistan. The tradition of visiting dargahs is still practiced today. Sufis whose shrines receive much national attention are Data Ganj Baksh (Ali Hajweri) in Lahore (ca. 11th century), Sultan Bahoo in Shorkot Jhang, Baha-ud-din Zakariya in Multan, and Shahbaz Qalander in Sehwan (ca. 12th century) and Rehman Baba in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. The Urs (death anniversary) of Sufi saints accounts for the largest gathering upon their shrines held annually by the devotees. Although, popular Sufi culture is centered on Thursday night gatherings at shrines and annual festivals which feature Sufi music and dance, certain tariqas such as Sarwari Qadri Order, refrain from such traditions and believe in paying visit to the shrines, making prayers or reciting manqabat. Moreover, contemporary Islamic fundamentalists also criticize the popular tradition of singing, dance and music, which in their view, does not accurately reflect the teachings and practice of Mohammad and his companions. There have been terrorist attacks directed at Sufi shrines and festivals, five in 2010 that killed 64 people. Presently, the known tariqas in Pakistan have maintained their organisations usually known as tehreeks and have their khanqahs for the dhikr of Allah, as per the old age Sufi tradition. Quranists Muslims who reject the authority of hadith, known as Quranist, Quraniyoon, or Ahle Quran, are also present in Pakistan. The largest Quranist organization in Pakistan is Ahle Quran, followed by Bazm-e-Tolu-e-Islam. Another Quranist movement in Pakistan is Ahlu Zikr. Non-denominational Roughly twelve per cent of Pakistani Muslims self-describe or have beliefs overlapping with non-denominational Muslims. These Muslims have beliefs that by and large overlap with those of the majority of Muslims and the difference in their prayers are usually non-existent or negligible. Nonetheless, in censuses asking for a clarification on which strand or rite of Muslim faith they most closely align, they usually answer "just a Muslim". == Religious institutions and education ==

Pakistan has a large and diverse landscape of religious institutions that play a significant role in the country’s social and educational fabric. According to Pakistan’s first economic census, there were over 600,000 mosques in the country as of 2023, reflecting the extensive infrastructure of Islamic worship and community life across urban and rural areas. The census also identified approximately 36,000 religious seminaries (madrassas), which function alongside formal educational institutions and provide structured instruction in Islamic sciences, Qur’anic studies, and traditional curricula such as Dars-i-Nizami, which includes intensive study of Arabic grammar, Qur’anic exegesis, Hadith and its sciences, Islamic jurisprudence and its principles (usul al-fiqh), theology (kalam), logic (mantiq), rhetoric (balagha), and classical Persian and Arabic texts. These seminaries are further organized under major federations such as Wifaq-ul-Madaris al-Arabia, which affiliates over 20,000 Deobandi-aligned madaris, and Tanzeem ul Madaris Ahle Sunnat, which works with a large network of over 10,000 Barelvi madrasas, reflecting the institutional diversity in religious education. In addition to seminaries, Pakistan hosts thousands of mosques and religious centres where mosque-based instruction, Qur’an memorization, and community religious activities take place. Large seminaries such as Jamia Tur Rasheed in Karachi offer accredited programs that blend traditional Islamic sciences with modern academic frameworks and contribute to the production of religious scholars, teachers, and writers. In parallel to the madrasa system, Islamic education in Pakistan is also firmly embedded within the country’s public and private universities, where Islamic Studies constitutes a major academic discipline at undergraduate, postgraduate, and doctoral levels. According to data compiled from the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan and presented by Gallup Pakistan, Islamic Studies ranks among the most popular PhD subjects nationwide, with approximately 1,300 doctoral candidates out approximately 32,640 PhD scholars enrolled across 119 universities nationwide, placing it behind Chemistry, Mathematics and Education, and ahead of disciplines such as Urdu, Physics and Zoology. This reflects the institutionalization of Islamic scholarship within Pakistan’s modern higher education system, where Islamic Studies is pursued alongside disciplines such as chemistry, mathematics, and education. Islamic Studies departments and research centres operate across a wide range of universities, including major public institutions such as the International Islamic University, Islamabad, as well as private and specialized universities. These departments offer degree programmes that combine classical Islamic sciences with contemporary academic methodologies, contributing to scholarly research, teacher training, and public intellectual life beyond the traditional madrasa framework. == Religiosity levels ==

Survey research indicates that Muslims in Pakistan report high levels of religious commitment compared with Muslims in neighboring South Asian countries. According to surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center in late 2011 and early 2012, approximately 94% of Muslim adults in Pakistan stated that religion is very important in their lives. Measures of religious practice also indicate high observance: about 42% reported praying five times daily, and 59% said they attend a mosque at least once a week. In comparative perspective, levels of mosque attendance reported by Muslims in Pakistan were somewhat lower than those reported by Muslims in India (70%), a difference that Pew attributes largely to higher reported attendance among women in India. On questions of religious interpretation, Pakistani Muslims were more likely than Muslims in India to endorse exclusivist views. In the same surveys, 72% of Muslims in Pakistan agreed that there is only one correct way to interpret the teachings of Islam, compared with 63% in India and 69% in Bangladesh, suggesting comparatively higher levels of doctrinal exclusivism among respondents in Pakistan. Likewise, core theological beliefs are reported at very high levels among Muslims in Pakistan. Approximately 98% of Pakistani Muslims reported belief in heaven, 97% reported belief in angels, and 91% expressed belief in fate (qadar). Belief in the "evil eye" was also relatively common, with about 61% of respondents affirming such beliefs. In comparative perspective, Pakistani Muslims reported substantially higher levels of belief in heaven and angels than Muslims in India, whose responses more closely resembled those of Hindus in India on these items. Youth radicalization Data from the World Values Survey (Wave 7, 2017–2022) indicate generational differences in religiosity and political attitudes among Muslims in Pakistan. Religious identification with Islam is near-universal across age groups, but more so among respondents aged up to 29 years (99.4%, compared to 98.3% for the general population). Younger cohorts also express stronger support for Islamist political ideas than older Pakistanis. When asked if they would like to have a system governed by religious law in which there are no political parties or elections, 75.1% of urban respondents aged up to 29 rated such arrangements positively, compared with 68.4% among urban respondents aged 30-49 and 65.2% among those aged 50 and above. A similar generational pattern is observed in rural areas, where 65.2% of respondents aged up to 29 expressed positive views, compared with 61.0% among those aged 30-49 and 56.6% among those aged 50 and above. Across both urban and rural settings, support declines steadily with age, indicating that younger Pakistanis are more inclined than older cohorts to endorse Islamist-oriented conceptions of politics. The rest would prefer a form of Islamic democracy. ==Contemporary issues==

Blasphemy The Pakistan Penal Code, the main criminal code of Pakistan, punishes blasphemy () against any recognized religion, providing penalties ranging from a fine to death. Parliament through the Second Amendment to the Constitution on 7 September 1974, under Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, declared Ahmadi Muslims as non-Muslims. In 1986 it was supplemented by a new blasphemy provision also applied to Ahmadi Muslims (See Persecution of Ahmadis). In 2020, the European Foundation for South Asian Studies (EFSAS) in a report entitled, Guilty until proven innocent: The sacrilegious nature of blasphemy laws Pakistan, recommended wide-ranging changes to Pakistan's laws and legal systems. Conversions There have been conversions to Islam from the religious minorities of Pakistan. The Human Rights Council of Pakistan has reported that cases of forced conversion to Islam are increasing. According to victims' families and activists, Mian Abdul Haq, who is a local political and religious leader in Sindh, has been accused of being responsible for forced conversions of girls within the province. ==See also==