Before Dimona, 1949–1956 Israel's first
prime minister David Ben-Gurion was "nearly obsessed" with obtaining nuclear weapons to prevent the
Holocaust from reoccurring. He stated, "What
Einstein,
Oppenheimer, and
Teller, the three of them are Jews,
made for the United States, could also be done by scientists in Israel, for their own people." Ben-Gurion decided to recruit Jewish scientists from abroad even before the end of the
1948 Arab–Israeli War that established Israel's independence. He and others, such as head of the
Weizmann Institute of Science and defense ministry scientist
Ernst David Bergmann, believed and hoped that Jewish scientists such as Oppenheimer and Teller would help Israel. In 1949, a unit of the
Israel Defense Forces Science Corps, known by the
Hebrew acronym HEMED GIMMEL, began a two-year
geological survey of the
Negev. While a preliminary study was initially prompted by rumors of
petroleum fields, one objective of the longer two year survey was to find sources of
uranium; some small recoverable amounts were found in
phosphate deposits.
Excavation Before construction began it was determined that the scope of the project would be too large for the EMET and IAEC team, so Shimon Peres recruited Colonel
Manes Pratt, then Israeli
military attaché in Burma, to be the project leader. Building began in late 1957 or early 1958, bringing hundreds of French engineers and technicians to the
Beersheba and Dimona area. In addition, thousands of newly immigrated
Sephardi Jews were recruited to do digging; to circumvent strict
labor laws, they were hired in increments of 59 days, separated by one day off.
Creation of LEKEM By the late 1950s Shimon Peres had established and appointed a new intelligence service assigned to search the globe and clandestinely secure technology, materials and equipment needed for the program, by any means necessary. The new service would eventually be named
LEKEM (pronounced LAKAM, the Hebrew acronym for 'Science liaison Bureau'). Peres appointed IDF Internal Security Chief, Benjamin Blumberg, to the task. As head of the LEKEM, Blumberg would rise to become a key figure in Israel's intelligence community, coordinating agents worldwide and securing the crucial components for the program.
Rift between Israel and France When
Charles de Gaulle became
French President in late 1958 he wanted to end French–Israeli nuclear cooperation and said that he would not supply Israel with uranium unless the plant was opened to international inspectors, declared peaceful, and no plutonium was reprocessed. Through an extended series of negotiations, Shimon Peres finally reached a compromise with Foreign Minister
Maurice Couve de Murville over two years later, in which French companies would be able to continue to fulfill their contract obligations and Israel would declare the project peaceful. Due to this, French assistance did not end until 1966. However, the supply of uranium fuel was stopped earlier, in 1963. In 1960, the outgoing
Eisenhower administration asked the Israeli government for an explanation for the mysterious construction near Dimona. Israel's response was that the site was a future textile factory, but that no inspection would be allowed. When Ben-Gurion visited Washington in 1960, he held a series of meetings with
State Department officials, and was bluntly told that for Israel to possess nuclear weapons would affect the balance of power in the region. US pressure was such that reportedly, every high-level meeting and communication between the US and Israeli governments contained a demand for an inspection of Dimona. To increase pressure, Kennedy denied Ben-Gurion a meeting at the
White House – when they met in May 1961, it was at the
Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York. The meeting itself was dominated by this issue. Ben-Gurion was evasive on the issue for two years, in the face of persistent US demands for an inspection. On March 25, 1963, President Kennedy and CIA Director
John A. McCone discussed the Israeli nuclear program. According to McCone, Kennedy raised the "question of Israel acquiring nuclear capability," and McCone provided Kennedy with
Kent's estimate of the anticipated negative consequences of Israeli nuclearization. According to McCone, Kennedy then instructed National Security Adviser
McGeorge Bundy to guide Secretary of State
Dean Rusk, in collaboration with the CIA director and the AEC chairman, to submit a proposal "as to how some form of international or bilateral U.S. safeguards could be instituted to protect against the contingency mentioned." That also meant that the "next informal inspection of the Israeli reactor complex [must] …be undertaken promptly and... be as thorough as possible." As Yuval Ne'eman stated, it was immediately apparent to Eshkol and his advisers that Kennedy's demands were akin to an ultimatum, and thus constituted a crisis in the making. A stunned Eshkol, in his first and interim response, on July 17, requested more time to study the subject and for consultations. The premier noted that while he hoped that U.S-Israeli friendship would grow under his watch, "Israel would do what it had to do for its national security and to safeguard its sovereign rights." Barbour, apparently wanting to mitigate the bluntness of the letter, assured Eshkol that Kennedy's statement was "factual": Critics of strong U.S.-Israel relations might complicate the diplomatic relationship if Dimona was left uninspected. In 1968, the CIA stated in a top-secret National Intelligence Estimate that Israel had nuclear weapons. This assessment was given to President
Lyndon B. Johnson. The basis for this claim was the CIA's belief, although never proven, that the uranium that went missing in the
Apollo Affair had been diverted to Israel (
Seymour Hersh claims that during the plant decommissioning nearly all of the missing uranium was recovered trapped in the facility pipes or accounted for.), as well as evidence gathered from
NSA electronic eavesdropping on Israeli communications, which proved that the
Israeli Air Force had engaged in practice bombing runs that only made sense for the delivery of nuclear weapons. According to Israeli historian
Avner Cohen, author of
Israel and the Bomb, historical evidence indicates that when Nixon met with Israeli prime minister
Golda Meir at the White House in September 1969, they reached a secret understanding, where Israel would keep its nuclear program secret and refrain from carrying out nuclear tests, and the United States would tolerate Israel's possession of nuclear weapons and not press it to sign the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
British and Norwegian aid Top secret British documents obtained by
BBC Newsnight show that Britain made hundreds of secret shipments of restricted materials to Israel in the 1950s and 1960s. These included specialist chemicals for reprocessing and samples of fissile material—
uranium-235 in 1959, and plutonium in 1966, as well as highly enriched
lithium-6, which is used to boost fission bombs and fuel hydrogen bombs. The investigation also showed that Britain shipped 20 tons of
heavy water directly to Israel in 1959 and 1960 to start up the
Dimona reactor. The transaction was made through a Norwegian front company called
Noratom, which took a 2% commission on the transaction. Britain was challenged about the heavy water deal at the International Atomic Energy Agency after it was exposed on
Newsnight in 2005. British foreign minister
Kim Howells claimed this was a sale to Norway. But a former
British intelligence officer who investigated the deal at the time confirmed that this was really a sale to Israel and the Noratom contract was just a charade. The
Foreign Office finally admitted in March 2006 that Britain knew the destination was Israel all along. Israel admits running the Dimona reactor with Norway's heavy water since 1963. French engineers who helped build Dimona say the Israelis were expert operators, so only a relatively small portion of the water was lost during the years since the reactor was first put into operation.
Criticality In 1961, the
Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion informed the
Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker that a pilot plutonium-separation plant would be built at Dimona. British intelligence concluded from this and other information that this "can only mean that Israel intends to produce nuclear weapons". Between 1963 and 1966, about 90 tons of yellowcake were allegedly shipped to Israel from Argentina in secret. By 1965 the Israeli reprocessing plant was completed and ready to convert the reactor's
fuel rods into
weapons grade plutonium.
Costs The exact costs for the construction of the Israeli nuclear program are unknown, though Peres later said that the reactor cost $80 million in 1960, half of which was raised by foreign Jewish donors, including many American Jews. Some of these donors were given a tour of the Dimona complex in 1968.
Weapons production, 1966–present on November 11, 1968 Israel is believed to have begun full-scale production of nuclear weapons following the 1967
Six-Day War, although it had built its first operational nuclear weapon by December 1966. Spider () was the name for the devices. The name for the plan was
Operation Shimshon (), named after the
death of Samson in
Judges 16:30. It was also referred to as
Operation Samson,
codename "Samson" (), or (). General Yaakov also sometimes called the plan ''''. (). Another CIA report from 1968 states that "Israel might undertake a nuclear weapons program in the next several years."
Moshe Dayan, then Defense Minister, believed that nuclear weapons were cheaper and more practical than indefinitely growing Israel's conventional forces. He convinced the
Labor Party's finance minister
Pinchas Sapir of the value of commencing the program by giving him a tour of the Dimona site in early 1968, and soon after Dayan decided that he had the authority to order the start of full production of four to five nuclear warheads a year. Hersh stated that it is widely believed that the words "
Never Again" were welded, in English and Hebrew, onto the first warhead. In order to produce plutonium the Israelis needed a large supply of
uranium ore. In 1968, the
Mossad purchased 200 tons from
Union Minière du Haut Katanga, a
Belgian mining company, on the pretense of buying it for an Italian chemical company in
Milan. Once the uranium was shipped from
Antwerp it was transferred to an Israeli freighter at sea and brought to Israel. The orchestrated disappearance of the uranium, named
Operation Plumbat, became the subject of the 1978 book
The Plumbat Affair. Estimates as to how many warheads Israel has built since the late 1960s have varied, mainly based on the amount of fissile material that could have been produced and on the revelations of Israeli nuclear technician
Mordechai Vanunu. 's photograph of a
Negev Nuclear Research Center glove box containing nuclear materials in a model bomb assembly, one of about 60 photographs he later gave to the British press By 1969,
U.S. Defense Secretary Melvin Laird believed that Israel might have a nuclear weapon that year. Later that year,
U.S. President Richard Nixon in a meeting with Israeli prime minister
Golda Meir pressed Israel to "make no visible introduction of nuclear weapons or undertake a
nuclear test program", so maintaining a policy of nuclear ambiguity. Before the
Yom Kippur War, Peres nonetheless wanted Israel to publicly demonstrate its nuclear capability to discourage an Arab attack, and fear of Israeli nuclear weapons may have discouraged Arab military strategy during the war from being as aggressive as it could have been. The CIA believed that Israel's first bombs may have been made with
highly enriched uranium stolen in the mid-1960s from the
U.S. Navy nuclear fuel plant operated by the
Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation, where sloppy material accounting would have masked the theft. By 1974, the
U.S. intelligence community believed Israel had stockpiled a small number of
fission weapons, and by 1979 were perhaps in a position to test a more advanced small
tactical nuclear weapon or
thermonuclear weapon trigger design. The CIA believed that the number of Israeli nuclear weapons stayed from 10 to 20 from 1974 until the early 1980s. By the mid 2000s estimates of Israel's arsenal ranged from 75 to 400 nuclear warheads. If
highly enriched uranium is being produced in substantial quantities, then Israel's nuclear arsenal could be much larger than estimated solely from plutonium production. In 1991 alone, as the Soviet Union dissolved, nearly 20 top Jewish Soviet scientists reportedly emigrated to Israel, some of whom had been involved in operating nuclear power plants and planning for the next generation of Soviet reactors. In September 1992, German intelligence was quoted in the press as estimating that 40 top Jewish Soviet nuclear scientists had emigrated to Israel since 1989. The US denied an export license for a
Cray supercomputer to Israel in 1989, but approved them in 1994 and in 1996. A 1987 Pentagon-sponsored study concluded that
Technion – Israel Institute of Technology scientists develop Israeli nuclear missile
re-entry vehicles and work at the Dimona site, while
Hebrew University of Jerusalem scientists work at the Soreq site where thermonuclear explosion simulation code is developed. The
Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control cited critics concerned that the sale would set a poor precedent when considering supercomputer sales to the nuclear-armed states of China, India, and Pakistan. In a 2010 interview, Uzi Eilam, former head of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, told the Israeli daily
Maariv that the nuclear reactor in Dimona had been through extensive improvements and renovations and is now functioning as new, with no safety problems or hazard to the surrounding environment or the region. ==Nuclear testing==