Operation Opera

Iraq had established a nuclear program sometime in the 1960s, and in the mid-1970s looked to expand it through the acquisition of a nuclear reactor. After failing to convince the French Government to sell them a gas cooled graphite moderated plutonium-producing reactor and reprocessing plant, and likewise failing to convince the Italian government to sell them a Cirene reactor, the Iraqi government convinced the French government to sell them an Osiris-class research reactor. The purchase also included a smaller accompanying Isis-type reactor, the sale of 72 kilograms of 93% enriched uranium and the training of personnel. The total cost has been given as $300 million (equivalent to $1.62 billion in ). In November 1975, the countries signed a nuclear cooperation agreement and in 1976, the sale of the reactor was finalized. The main reactor was dubbed Osirak (Osiraq) by the French, blending the name of Iraq with that of the reactor class. Iraq named the main reactor Tammuz 1 () and the smaller Tammuz 2. Tammuz was the Babylonian month when the Ba'ath Party had come to power in 1968. On 6 April 1979, Israeli agents sabotaged the Osirak reactor awaiting shipment to Iraq at La Seyne-sur-Mer in France. On 14 June 1980, Mossad agents assassinated Yahya El Mashad, an Egyptian nuclear scientist who headed the Iraqi nuclear program, in a hotel in Paris. In July 1980, Iraq received from France a shipment of approximately 12.5 kilograms of highly enriched uranium fuel to be used in the reactor. The shipment was the first of a planned six deliveries totalling 72 kilograms. It was reportedly stipulated in the purchase agreement that no more than two HEU fuel loadings, 24 kilograms, could be in Iraq at any time. Iraq and France claimed that the Iraqi reactor was intended for peaceful scientific research. Agreements between France and Iraq excluded military use. The American private intelligence agency STRATFOR wrote in 2007 that the uranium-fueled reactor "was believed to be on the verge of producing plutonium for a weapons program". In a 2003 speech, Richard Wilson, a professor of physics at Harvard University who visually inspected the partially damaged reactor in December 1982, said that "to collect enough plutonium [for a nuclear weapon] using Osirak would've taken decades, not years". In 2005, Wilson further commented in The Atlantic: "The Osirak reactor that was bombed by Israel in June 1981 was explicitly designed by the French engineer Yves Girard to be unsuitable for making bombs. That was obvious to me on my 1982 visit". Elsewhere Wilson has stated that contrary to claims that the bombing of the Iraqi Osirak reactor delayed Iraq's nuclear bomb program, the Iraqi nuclear program before 1981 was peaceful, and the Osirak reactor was not only unsuited to making bombs but was under intensive safeguards. In an interview in 2012, Wilson again emphasised: "The Iraqis couldn't have been developing a nuclear weapon at Osirak. I challenge any scientist in the world to show me how they could have done so." Iraq was a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, placing its reactors under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. IAEA's Director-General Sigvard Eklund issued a rebuttal saying that Richter had never inspected Osirak and had never been assigned to inspect facilities in the Middle East. ==Strategy and diplomacy==

, Prime Minister of Israel and in charge of the operation, disembarks from an aircraft upon his arrival in the United States, accompanied by Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan. In Israel, discussions on which strategy to adopt in response to the Iraqi reactor development were taking place as early as Yitzhak Rabin's first term in office (1974–1977). Reportedly, planning and training for the operation began during this time. Three Israeli pilots died in accidents while training for the mission. Saddam Hussein consistently maintained that Osirak was intended for peaceful purposes. Begin considered the diplomatic options fruitless, and worried that prolonging the decision to attack would lead to a fatal inability to act in response to the perceived threat. Anthony Cordesman writes that the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad conducted a series of clandestine operations to halt construction or destroy the reactor. In April 1979, Mossad agents in France allegedly planted a bomb that destroyed the reactor's first set of core structures while they were awaiting shipment to Iraq. Following the bombing in April 1979, France inserted a clause in its agreement with Iraq saying that French personnel would have to supervise the Osirak reactor on-site for a period of ten years. The attack was the first on a nuclear reactor and only the third on a nuclear facility in history. It was also the first instance of a preventive attack on a nuclear reactor which aimed to forestall the development of a nuclear weapon. Due to last minute Iranian concerns that the reactor had been already fueled and could release radioactive fallout if hit, they did not attack the actual reactor dome, but the control room, research/centrifuge facilities, and the adjacent buildings. The targets were struck and the buildings were damaged, along with the plant cooling mechanisms. The source of the assertion is Ari Ben-Menashe, a former Israeli government employee. At the alleged meeting, the Iranians explained details of their 1980 attack on the site, and agreed to let Israeli planes land at an Iranian airfield in Tabriz in the case of an emergency. The Israeli planes would have to violate Jordanian and/or Saudi airspace in a covert flight over foreign territory, making mid-air refueling unfeasible. The Israelis eventually concluded that a squadron of heavily fueled and heavily armed F-16As, with a group of F-15As to provide air cover and fighter support, could perform a surgical strike to eliminate the reactor site without having to refuel. Dayan, Defense Minister (until late 1980) Ezer Weizman and Deputy Prime Minister Yigael Yadin were among those opposed. Begin and his supporters, including Sharon, were far less pessimistic than their opponents about the political fallout. In the end, Begin chose to order the attack based on a worst-case estimate where a weapon could be created in one to two years time. An analysis by Warren Donnelly of the United States Congressional Research Service concluded that "it would be most unlikely for an attack with conventional bombs upon the reactor when operating to have caused lethal exposures to radioactivity in Baghdad, although some people at the reactor site might receive some exposure". This was similarly the conclusion of Herbert Goldstein of Columbia University using IAEA release factors, the lethal contamination would be confined to a close proximity to the reactor and small amounts of radiation would be detectable in Baghdad under the assumption that winds were blowing in that direction. In October 1980, Mossad reported to Begin that the Osirak reactor would be fueled and operational by June 1981. This assessment was significantly aided by reconnaissance photos supplied by the United States, specifically using the KH-11 KENNEN satellite. French technicians installing the reactor later said it was scheduled to become operational only by the end of 1981. Iran claimed that 48 Iraqi aircraft were destroyed, although US intelligence concluded that 27 aircraft were destroyed and 11 others damaged. Among the aircraft hit were two Tu-22 Blinder and three Tu-16 Badger strategic bombers (which could have been used to retaliate against Israel in the event of an attack). The attack was a severe blow to Iraqi airpower, and largely gave Iran air superiority over Iraq. Israeli reconnaissance planes had been monitoring Iraq during the attack, and observed that the Iraqi Air Force had been severely degraded and their retaliatory capacity had been weakened. ==Attack==

Netz #243, flown by Colonel Ilan Ramon in Operation Opera. Here of 140 Squadron "Golden Eagle" (see tail), but at that time of 110 Squadron "Knights Of The North" at Ramat David Airbase. emblem. Yehuda Zvi Blum, in a speech to the United Nations Security Council following the attack, claimed that the operation was launched on a Sunday afternoon under the assumption that workers present on the site, including foreign experts employed at the reactor, would have left. The operation started on 7 June 1981, at 15:55 local time (12:55 GMT). The Israeli planes left Etzion Airbase, flying unchallenged in Jordanian and Saudi airspace. To avoid detection, the Israeli pilots conversed in Saudi-accented Arabic while in Jordanian airspace and told Jordanian air controllers that they were a Saudi patrol that had gone off course. The Israeli planes were so heavily loaded that the external fuel tanks that had been mounted on the planes were exhausted in-flight. The tanks were jettisoned over the Saudi desert. King Hussein of Jordan, vacationing in the Gulf of Aqaba, witnessed the planes overfly his yacht, and noticed their Israeli markings. Taking into account the location, heading, and armament of the jets, Hussein quickly deduced the Iraqi reactor to be the most probable target. Hussein immediately contacted his government and ordered a warning to be sent to the Iraqis. However, due to a communication failure the message was never received and the Israeli planes entered Iraqi airspace undetected. Upon reaching Iraqi airspace, the squadron split up, with two of the F-15s forming close escort to the F-16 squadron, and the remaining F-15s dispersing into Iraqi airspace as a diversion and ready back-up. The attack squadron descended to over the Iraqi desert, attempting to fly under the radar of the Iraqi defences. At 18:35 local time (14:35 GMT), from the Osirak reactor complex, the F-16 formation climbed to and went into a 35-degree dive at , aimed at the reactor complex. At , the F-16s began releasing the Mark 84 bombs in pairs, at 5-second intervals. At least eight of the sixteen released bombs struck the containment dome of the reactor. It was later revealed that half an hour before the Israeli planes arrived, a group of Iraqi soldiers manning anti-aircraft defenses had left their posts for an afternoon meal, turning off their radars. The Israeli planes were still intercepted by Iraqi defenses but managed to evade the remaining anti-aircraft fire. The squadron climbed to high altitude and started their return to Israel. The attack lasted less than two minutes. ==International political reactions==

with Osirak bombing mark. International response at the United Nations took two paths. The United Nations Security Council issued a unanimous and almost immediate response on 19 June 1981, following eight meetings and statements from Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Security Council Resolution 487 strongly condemned the attack as a "clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct" and called on Israel to refrain from such attacks in the future; the Council recognised the right of Iraq to "establish programmes of technological and nuclear development" and called for Israel to join Iraq within the "IAEA safeguards regime" of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The council also stated its consideration that Iraq was "entitled to appropriate redress for the destruction it has suffered." The United States voted for the resolution and suspended the delivery of four F-16 aircraft to Israel, but blocked punitive action by the UN. The suspension on the delivery of the aircraft was lifted two months later. The UN General Assembly followed the Security Council with Resolution No. 36/27 on 13 November 1981, expressing deep alarm and condemning Israel over the "premeditated and unprecedented act of aggression," and demanding that Israel pay prompt and adequate compensation for the damage and loss of life it had caused. The resolution also solemnly warned Israel to refrain from taking such measures in the future. The representative of France stated that the sole purpose of the reactor was scientific research. The Board further asked that the prospect of suspending Israel's privileges and rights of membership be considered at the next General Conference held by the organization. Privately, President Reagan wrote in his journal on the day of the attack, "I swear I believe Armageddon is near," adding of Begin's decision, "He should have told us & the French, we could have done something to remove the threat." Jonathan Steele, writing in The Guardian, described the reaction: The world was outraged by Israel's raid on 7 June 1981. "Armed attack in such circumstances cannot be justified. It represents a grave breach of international law," Margaret Thatcher thundered. Jeane Kirkpatrick, the U.S. ambassador to the UN and as stern a lecturer as Britain's then prime minister, described it as "shocking" and compared it to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. American newspapers were as fulsome. "Israel's sneak attack ... was an act of inexcusable and short-sighted aggression," said the New York Times. The Los Angeles Times called it "state-sponsored terrorism". In 1981, Israel agreed to pay restitution to Chaussepied's family. Because of a mix of factors, including the Iran–Iraq War, international pressure and Iraqi payment problems, negotiations broke down in 1984 and France withdrew from the project. The Osirak facility remained in its damaged state until the 1991 Persian Gulf War, when it was completely destroyed by subsequent coalition air strikes by the United States Air Force, one of them being the Package Q Strike. During the war, 100 out of 120 members of the Knesset signed a letter of appreciation to Menachem Begin, thanking him for ordering the attack on Osirak. In July 1991, Begin, in a rare interview granted to Israeli Army Radio, claimed that the Gulf War, and especially the Iraqi Scud missile attacks on Israel during that war, vindicated his decision to bomb the reactor. In response to their failures to prevent the Osirak attack (and the earlier H-3 attack), Saddam Hussein ordered the execution of Colonel Fakhri Hussein Jaber, the head of Iraq's Western Air Defense Zone, and all officers under his command above the rank of major. In addition, 23 other Iraqi pilots and officers were imprisoned. Dan Perry writes that "the Osirak bombing—and Peres's poor political judgement in criticizing it—were crucial in turning the tide of what initially had seemed to be a hopeless election campaign for Likud". In 2009, the Prime Minister of Iraq Nouri al-Maliki demanded that Israel compensate Iraq for the destruction of the reactor. An Iraqi official asserted that Iraq's right to redress is supported by Resolution 487 adopted by the United Nations Security Council in response to the attack. ==Assessment==

Israel claims that the attack impeded Iraq's nuclear ambitions by at least ten years. In an interview in 2005, Bill Clinton expressed support for the attack: "everybody talks about what the Israelis did at Osiraq, in 1981, which, I think, in retrospect, was a really good thing. You know, it kept Saddam from developing nuclear power." Louis René Beres wrote in 1995 that "[h]ad it not been for the brilliant raid at Osiraq, Saddam's forces might have been equipped with atomic warheads in 1991." In 2010, squad leader Ze'ev Raz said of the operation: "There was no doubt in the mind of the decision makers that we couldn't take a chance. We knew that the Iraqis could do exactly what we did in Dimona." As early as the autumn of 1981, Kenneth Waltz discussed the fallout from the strike: In 1991, David Ivry, who had been the commander of the Israeli Air Force at the time of the raid, received a photograph of the destroyed reactor from US Defense Secretary Dick Cheney with the message "For Gen. David Ivry, with thanks and appreciation for the outstanding job he did on the Iraqi nuclear program in 1981 -- which made our job much easier in Desert Storm." Charles R. H. Tripp, in an interview for the 25th anniversary of the attack, described the bombing of Osirak as a variation of Israeli military doctrine beginning with the premiership of David Ben-Gurion, "advocating devastating pre-emptive strikes on Arab enemies." Tripp asserted, "the Osirak attack is an illegal way to behave—Resolution 487 established that—but it is an understandable way to behave if you are the Israeli military-security establishment." In a 1982 conversation Hussein stated that, "Once Iraq walks out victorious [over Iran], there will not be any Israel." Of Israel's anti-Iraqi endeavors, Saddam noted, "Technically, they [the Israelis] are right in all of their attempts to harm Iraq." Joseph Cirincione, then director of non-proliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, wrote in 2006: By contrast, Iraqi researchers have stated that the Iraqi nuclear program simply went underground, diversified, and expanded. Khidir Hamza, an Iraqi nuclear scientist, made the following statement in an interview on CNN's Crossfire in 2003: Similarly, the Iraqi nuclear scientist Imad Khadduri wrote in 2003 that the bombing of Osirak convinced the Iraqi leadership to initiate a full-fledged nuclear weapons program. United States Secretary of Defense William Perry stated in 1997 that Iraq refocused its nuclear weapons effort on producing highly enriched uranium after the raid. In the Duelfer Report, released by the Iraq Survey Group in 2004, it is stated that the Iraqi nuclear program "expanded considerably" with the purchase of the French reactor in 1976, and that "Israel's bombing of Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor spurred Saddam to build up Iraq's military to confront Israel in the early 1980s." Bob Woodward, in the book State of Denial, writes: Richard K. Betts wrote that "there is no evidence that Israel's destruction of Osirak delayed Iraq's nuclear weapons program. The attack may actually have accelerated it." Dan Reiter has repeatedly said that the attack was a dangerous failure: the bombed reactor had nothing to do with weapons research, while "the attack may have actually increased Saddam's commitment to acquiring weapons." Elsewhere, she wrote: Following Desert Storm, Dick Cheney, then the United States Secretary of Defense, thanked the Israeli mission commander for the "outstanding job he did on the Iraqi nuclear program in 1981". While many scholars debate the value of the bombing, Iraq did not possess nuclear weapons at the outbreak of the Gulf War, and, according to Cheney, the bombing made Desert Storm easier. The second use of the Begin Doctrine was Operation Orchard in 2007, an Israeli airstrike on a purported Syrian nuclear target. Like in Operation Opera, the same types of aircraft were involved, although their roles were reversed with the F-15Is carrying bombs while the F-16Is provided escort. ==See also==